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Showing posts with label 1978. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1978. Show all posts

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People v. Marco (1978)

People v. Marco

G.R. Nos. L-28324-5    May 19, 1978

Lessons Applicable: Proximate cause, Conspiracy

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
•    November 5, 1964 2:30 pm: It was raining and there was a fiesta being celebrated within the vicinity of the market place of Barrio Subang, Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur. Constancio Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if he was the one who boxed the latter's brother the previous year. Constancio denied. Then Simeon asked if he had cigarettes and when he said he had none, Simeon said, "I have cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as he pulled out a one-foot long hunting knife. Frightened, Constancio ran away and Simeon chased him.  As Constancio was passing by Rafael Marco, father of Simeon, he struck Constancio with a round cane, hitting him on the left ear and left shoulder.
•    Vicente, the father of Constancio, who was in the crowd heard a shout of "Fight! Fight!".  He saw Simeon about to stab Constancio, so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that was holding the knife. Then, Rafael Marco approached him armed with a cane and a hunting knife. Sensing danger, Vicente shouted to Constancio and his other son Bienvenido, who appeared on the scene, to run away. Vicente and Constancio was able to run away but Bienvenido was chased and stabbed by Rafael which wounded his left hand.  Bienvenido tried to run Vicente, but his foot got caught in a vine on the ground and he fell. Out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was accused arrived and stabbed Bienvenido near his anus while he had his two hands touching the floor and both feet in a forward position.  Beltran was followed by Simeon who stabbed Bienvenido on the left breast and the upper part of the left arm.  Then, Rafael, Simeon and Beltran ran away.  Bienvenido got up slowly and walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda where he fell to the ground.  Vicente asked him what happened and he said he was ganged up then died.
•    Criminal Case No. 2758: Rafael Marco was convicted of slight physical injuries and his son, Simeon, was acquitted
•    Criminal Case No, 2757: Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran, and Simeon Marco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength.  Sentenced Rafael Marco to reclusion perpetua. While, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco who surrendered voluntarily sentenced EACH to an indeterminate penalty consisting of 10 YEARS and 1 DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS, and 1 DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum

ISSUE: W/N Rafael Marco should be guilty of murder.

HELD: NO. modified Rafael Marco guilty of slight physical injuries
•    while it is true that Rafael started by stabbing Bienvenido on the left hand, there is no clear evidence connecting his act with those of Beltran and Simeon.  If Rafael had any intention to really kill Bienvenido, he did not have to await for Simeon and Beltran to do it. 
•    The stabbing by the 3 was not simultaneous. Rather, it was successive.  The manner in which the incident occurred indicates that there was no pre-conceived plan among the 3.  There is absolutely no showing that Rafael knew of the criminal intentions of Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco as to the decedent.  Neither is there any showing that after the decedent was able to run away that Rafael shouted to Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco for assistance.  Or that he gave them any inciting or encouraging words, or that he even joined them
•    The accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is furthermore, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former's criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or material aid in the consummation of the crime.
•    The ensuing death was not the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wound inflicted by Rafael. There was an active intervening cause, which was no other than the sudden and appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and Beltran.

Jurisprudence: G.R. Nos. L-28324-5 May 19, 1978

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-28324-5      May 19, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL MARCO, SIMEON MARCO and DULCISIMO BELTRAN, defendants. RAFAEL MARCO, defendant-appellant.

Jose P. Bengzon (Counsel de Oficio) for appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Felisicimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Teodulo R. Dino for appellee.



BARREDO, J.:

Appeal by accused Rafael Marco from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur in Criminal Case No. 2757, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco, the dispositive part of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No, 2757, the Court finds Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran, and Simeon Marco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength' and hereby sentences Rafael Marco, who has neither aggravating circumstance against him or any mitigating circumstance in his favor, to RECLUSION PERPETUA. Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran, who surrendered voluntarily, are hereby sentenced EACH to an indeterminate penalty consisting of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The Court further sentences the three defendants to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of Bienvenido Sabelbero, the amount of P6,000.00, to suffer the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. (Page 69, Record.)

Actually, there were two cases filed against appellant in connection with two successive phases of a single occurrence. The two cases were consolidated and tried together. In Criminal Case No. 2757, he was charged together with his son Simeon and one Dulcisimo Beltran with the alleged murder of one Bienvenido Sabelbero. 1 In Criminal Case 2758, he was charged together also with his son Simeon with frustrated murder allegedly committed against Constancio Sabelbero, a brother Bienvenido. In this second case, herein appellant was found guilty only a slight physical injuries and sentenced to twelve (12) days of arresto menor. He did not appeal. Simeon was acquitted.

The incident in question took place on November 5, 1964 at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon within the vicinity of the market place of Barrio Subang, Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur. There was a fiesta being celebrated, but it was raining. The details, according to the the are as follows:

Constancio Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if he was the one who boxed the latter's brother the previous year. Constancio denied. Then Simeon asked if he had cigarettes and when he said he had none, Simeon said, "I have cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as he pulled out a one-foot long hunting knife. Frightened, Constancio ran away and Simeon chased him. As Constancio was passing by the place were appellant Rafael Marco, the father of Simeon, was standing, Rafael struck Constancio with a round cane, hitting him on the left ear and left shoulder. This was the basis of the information in Criminal Case No. 2758, where appellant was convicted of slight physical injuries and his son, Simeon, was acquitted.

Vicente, the father of Constancio, happened to be standing in the crowd and heard shout of "Fight! Fight!" He saw Simeon about to stab Constancio, so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that was holding the knife.

At this juncture, Rafael Marco approached Vicente armed with a cane and a hunting knife. Sensing danger, Vicente shouted to his son Constancio, who had been hit by Rafael, and his other son Bienvenido, who appeared on the scene, to run away because the Marcos were armed. Constancio was able to run away. So also Vicente. Bienvenido who was being chased by Rafael was stabbed by the latter, and when the parried the blow, he was wounded on the left hand. After being stabbed by Rafael, Bienvenido still tried to run father, but unluckily, his foot got caught in a vine on the ground and he fell, whereupon, out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was accused with herein appellant and who did not appeal his conviction, arrived and stabbed Bienvenido near his anus while he was in the position described in the record thus "(Witness demonstrating with his two hands touching the floor and his both feet (sic) in a forward position)". (p. 24, t.s.n.) Beltran was followed by Simeon, 2 who stabbed Bienvenido on the left breast and the upper part of the left arm. Afterwards, Rafael, Simeon and Beltran ran away. "Bienvenido Sabelbero stood up slowly and walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda and when he arrived in front of the store, he fell to the ground." (p.27, t.s.n.)

When Vicente came to know that his son Bienvenido was wounded, he went to the store of Pinda and found him lying there. Vicente asked him what happened, "Bienvenido Sebelvero answered that he was wounded because he was ganged up by them and immediately after that he died." (p. 28 t.s.n.)

For the purposes of this appeal, the foregoing facts We have gathered from the recorded evidence and which coincide substantially with the findings and basis of tea appealed decision are more or less admitted by appellant in the brief of his counsel de oficio to be more credible version of what happened. Nevertheless, counsel has assigned seven alleged errors of the trial court, although the whole thrust of this appeal revolves around the issue of whether not with what has been proven, as narrated above, to be the participation of appellant in the Phase of the incident that led to the death of Bienvenido appellant, Rafael Marco, may be held liable for murder, as found by the court below.

It will be recalled that the whole incident was started by Simeon Marco, the son of Rafael, who approached Constancio and after asking him if he was the one who boxed his (Simeon's) brother the year before, brandished a hunting knife, which caused Constancio to run away. While thus running, he passed by appellant who hit him with a round cane. Such was the first phase of the incident subject of this case. According the trial court for such act of Rafael, he was guilty of slight physical injuries, since "it is safe to assume that at that moment there was no intent to kill any one."

As to the second phase, according to the evidence, when Simeon was about to pursue Constancio, Vicente grabbed Simeon's hand that was holding the knife. But when Vicente saw that Rafael who was holding a round cane a and a hunting knife, was approaching them, he shouted Constancio and his other son Bienvenido who was around to run away, which they did, as he himself released Simeon and ran away. Rafael followed Bienvenido and stabbed him, but the latter parried the blow with his left hand. And as Bienvenido was trying to to run farther, unluckily, his feet got entangled with some vines and he fell down. Whereupon, Beltran, who came from nowhere, stabbed him near the anus, followed by Simeon who Stabbed him on the left side of the breast.

Upon these facts, the People maintain that appellant is as guilty as Simeon and Beltran of the killing of Bienvenido, the theory being that there was obvious conspiracy among there

The trouble with the evidence of the prosecution is that it is vague and incomplete. For instance, as to the first phase of the incident, the relative Positions and distances from each other Of the three Protagonist, Simeon, Constancio and Rafael are not revealed. How far Rafael was from Simeon and Constancio when Simeon sort of threatened him with a knife is not clear. Neither is it shown how Rafael happened to be in the path of Constancio when the latter was running away from Simeon, such that Rafael was able to hit him with a cane. In this situation, We do not feel safe in concluding that there was concerted connection between the act of Simeon, on the one hand, and that of Rafael, on the other. Thus, the trial court was correct in acquitting Simeon and holding Rafael guilty only of slight physical injuries instead of frustrated murder as charged.

Likewise, in regard to the second phase of the incident, We are at a loss as to what Bienvenido was actually doing and what participation he had at the early stages of the incident, when Vicente shouted him to run away. 3 The pertinent portion of testimony of the lone eye-witness, Dominador Carbajosa, is as follows:

Q Then what happened?

A   Then Vicente Sabelvero held the arm of Simeon Marco and at the same time Vicente Sabelvero shouted to his sons, Constancio and Bienvenido Sabelvero to run away because they were all armed.

Q This Vicente Sebolvero you mentioned, how is he related to Constancio and Bienvenido Sabelvero?

A Vicente Sabelvero is the father.

Q Do you know if Constancio Sabelvero and Bienvenido Sabelvero ran away?

A Yes, they ran away.

Q   This Bienvenido Sabelvero, where was he when this incident happened?

A He was only a few meters away,

Q What happened to him?

A He was overtaken by Rafael Marco and he was stabbed by Rafael Marco.

Q Who stabbed him'?

A   Rafael Marco.

Q Will you tell the Honorable Court what part of the body of Bienvenido Sabelvero did Rafael Marco stab?

A Bienvenido Sabelvero was able to parry the thrust which was directed to his left side and he was not wounded and instead in parrying the thrust he was wounded on the hand.

Q Do you know what kind of weapon did Rafael Marco use in injuries upon Bienvenido Sabelvero?

A I know.

Q What kind of weapon?

A Flamingco or hunting knife.

Q Then after Rafael Marco inflicted injuries upon Bienvenido Sabelvero, what to Bienvenido Sabelvero?

A While Bienvenido Sabelvero was trying to run away his feet were wrapped by the having of the cover crop and he fell down and right at that time Beltran approached him and dabbed Bienvenido Sabelvero near his anus

ATTY. ORGANO —

(Addressing the Court)

If Your Honor please I would like to make it of that the witness indicated to a portion above his body which is above the anus.

(To the witness)

Q   What was the position of Bienvenido Sebolvero when this Dulcisimo Beltran stabbed him?

A   In this manner. (Witness demonstrating with his two hands touching the floor and his both feet in a forward position).

Q   Then when Dulcisimo Beltran stabbed him in that position, what happened next?

A   While Bienvenido Sebolvero was in that position, he was stabbed by Simeon Marco on the left breast and because he was able to parry the weapon he was wounded on the upper part of his left hand.

Q   This Dulcisimo Beltran whom you said stabbed Bienvenido Sebolvero, do you know what was his weapon?

A   I know.

Q   What was his weapon?

A   Bayonet.

Q   This Dulcisimo Beltran, according to you, stabbed Bienvenido Sebolvero near the buttock?....

ATTY. PIELAGO —

Misleading, Your Honor.

COURT —

This witness testified that this Bienvenido Sebolvero was stabbed near the anus.

(To the witness)

Q   This Dulcisimo Beltran whom you said also stabbed Bienvenido (Beltran), is he here in court?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   Please point to him?

A   That one. (Witness pointing to accused Dulcisimo Beltran).

Q   This Simeon Marco whom you said stabbed Bienvenido Sebolvero on the left breast and hand is he here in court?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   Where is he?

A   That one. (Witness pointing to accused Simeon Marco).

Q   Do you know what kind of weapon did Simeon Marco use in stabbing the left arm of Bienvenido Sebolvero?

A   I know.

Q   What kind of weapon?

A   A bayonet.

(to the direct examiner)

Proceed.

ATTY. ORGANO —

(continuing)

Q   Presenting to you this weapon . . . . (counsel hands over the same to the witness). . . . Will you tell the Honorable Court whether this is the very weapon used by Simeon Marco in stabbing Bienvenido Sebolvero?

A   It is shorter than this one.

Q   Now, during that time that Rafael Marco, Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran were inflicting injuries on the body of Bienvenido Sebolvero, what did the father of Bienvenido Sebolvero do? Where were they at that time?

A   Constancio Sebolvero and the father ran away and they have not seen the incident.

Q   Do you remember if the father of Bienvenido Sebolvero ever ran afterwards?

A   No, sir.

Q   Now, that happened to Bienvenido Sebolvero after Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco stabbed him?

A   They ran away and after they ran away, Bienvenido Sebolvero stood up slowly and walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda and when he arrived in front of the store he fell down to the ground. (Pp. 23-27, t.s.n.)

The nearest indication of Bienvenido's position vis-a-vis those Of the Marcos and Beltran at the moment that Vicente was holding the hand of Simeon appears only in the cross-examination of Garbajosa, when he said that "Bienvenido Sabelvero, was nearer to the three accused" than either Vicente or Constancio, which makes the whole matter more confusing.

As matters stand, Our problem is to determine whether or not the act of Rafael in stabbing Bienvenido is a separate one from the stabbing of said deceased by the two other accused who did not appeal, Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran. To be sure, the acts of each of the three of them followed one after the other in rather fast succession, as if propelled by a common and concerted design, but this circumstance alone does not prove criminal conspiracy. In order that mere simultaneity or near simultaneity of the acts of several accused may justify the conclusion that they had conspired together, the inference must be ineludible.

It would seem that there must have been some bad blood between the Sabelveros and the Marcos but Vicente categorically denied that there was any misunderstanding between them and although Constancio suggested that there was, he was quick in adding that the same had been patched up. This makes commonality of intent on the part of the three accused not necessarily existent.

As already stated, Simeon and Beltran did not appeal from the decision of the trial court which credited them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary and imposed on them the penalty of only Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum. And indeed there can be no doubt as to the homicidal character of their assault on Bienvenido. In the case of herein appellant, while it is true that he somehow started the by trying to stab Bienvenido, and did cause him injury on the left hand, there is no clear evidence connecting his act with those of Beltran and Simeon. As We have noted earlier, Beltran came out of nowhere and it is not shown that Rafael saw him before the latter stabbed Bienvenido near the anus. On the other hand, the most that We can gather from Carbajosa's testimony is that Simeon was being held by Vicente, when Rafael tried to chase Bienvenido. In any event, if Rafael had any intention to really kill Bienvenido, he did not have to await for Simeon and Beltran to do it. Bienvenido had fallen to the ground, and that was the chance to finish with him. But here is precisely where the prosecution's evidence is incomplete. The distance and relative position of Rafael from where Bienvenido fell are not indicated. What appears instead is that Beltran and Simeon were the ones who stabbed him fatally. What Rafael did or where he was after Bienvenido fell and while Beltran and Simeon were assaulting has not been shown.

We find the following ratiocination of appellant's counsel de oficio to be well taken:

2.  The evidence on record does not show beyond reasonable doubt that appellant acted in conspiracy with the two other accused in the actual killing of the decedent.

This Honorable Court has established the rule that conspiracy, although implied or indirect, must, nonetheless, be positively and convincingly proved and established (People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571). Only recently, this Honorable Tribunal said, through the pen of Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that:

... As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold, conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full subbed the substance of the time-honored principle of criminal law requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt before conviction ... (People vs. Tividad,, L-21469, June 30, 1967; 20 SCRA 549, 554; emphasis supplied).

The Court also laid down the following norm in the said case of People vs. Tividad:

... It is undubitably clear from the record that the accused did not attack the deceased simultaneously. Even if they did, this would not of itself indicate the existence of a conspiracy among them as simultaneity per se is not a badge of conspiracy, absent the requisite concurrence of wills. It is not sufficient that the attack is joint and simultaneous; it is that the assailants are animated by one and the same purpose (U.S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil 386, 389; People vs. Caballero , 53 Phil. 584, 595-596). Evidently, in a situation where the as were not simultaneous but successive, greater proof is demanded to establish concert of crime design. The evidence for the prosecution was that the assaults on the were out by a successively (Id., pp. 554-55; emphasis supplied)

As happened in the Tividad case, the facts established by the evidence hem show that appellant did not attack the document simultaneously and in concert with the two other accuse From the testimony of Dominador Carbajosa, it will be seen that: (1) it was the appellant who went after the decedent first. And the situation at that moment was this: Simeon Marco was chasing Constancio Sebelvero while appellant, on the other hand, was approaching Vicente Sebelbero. The latter had just shouted to his two sons to run away when the appellant overtook the document and stabbed at hint Accused Dulcisimo Beltran, it will be noted, was not yet a participant. (2) After the appellant wounded the decedent on the hand, the latter continued running. There is no evidence however, that appellant continued running after him (3) While running, the decadent ripped and fell down. Accused Dulcisimo Beltran just came from nowhere and stabbed the decedent near the anus. It will be noted from the time appellant wounded the document on the hand up to the time Dulcisimo Beltran stabbed him at the back, an appreciable length of time elapse There is no evidence just how far Beltran was from the respondent when the latter felt Neither is there evidence that the decadent was running in the direction of Beltran The evidence is only that Dulcisimo Beltran came upon the document who had fallen to the ground and nabbed him. (4) After Dulcisimo Beltran had stabbed the decedent Simeon Marco, who earlier had been chasing Constancio Sebelbero came also and stabbed the decedent. From Dominador Carbajosa's testimony, it appears that there was no appreciable lapse of time between the stabbing by Dulcisimo Beltran and that by Simeon Marco. (5) There is no showing that appellant joined his two other accused during or after their stabbing of the respondent Carbajosa merely stated that after the stabbing, "they ran away" (session of Sept. 13, 1965; t.s.n., p. 27)

From the foregoing, this Honorable Court will that the stabbing of the decedent by the three accused (including appellant) was not simultaneous. Rather, it was successive, with appellant inflicting the first blow. And, Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco were nowhere around yet. It was only after the decedent fell down that the latter two came and successively stabbed him. The manner in which the incident occurred indicates that there was no pre-conceived plan among the three accused to kill the decedent. It strongly suggests, on the other hand, that Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco participated suddenly, unexpectedly and without any previous agreement.

Another interesting point to observe is that there is absolutely no showing that appellant knew of the criminal intentions of Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco as to the decedent. There is no proof that appellant chased the decedent in the direction of Simeon Marco or Dulcisimo Beltran. It was not even shown that appellant knew that Dulcisimo Beltran was around at the start. As to Simeon Marco, it will be remembered that when the appellant started after the decedent, Simeon Marco was running after Constancio Sebelbero. Hence, appellant could not have intentionally chased the decedent in the direction of Simeon Marco. Besides, as previously pointed out already, there is no evidence showing that appellant ran after or chased the decedent at all. Dominador Carbajosa said only that appellant overtook the decedent who was just nearby and then stabbed at him (Session of Sept. 13, 1965; t.s.n., p. 23). Likewise, there is no evidence that after the decedent ran again, the appellant continued going after him.

Neither is there any showing that after the decedent was able to run away from the appellant with only a slight would on the hand, the latter shouted to Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco for assistance. As the facts were related by the star prosecution witness. Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco just came upon the fallen decedent and stabbed him. There is no showing that Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco fell upon the decedent in response to shout or cries from the appellant. Lastly, there is no proof that while Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran were stabbing the decedent, appellant gave them any inciting or encouraging words, or that he even joined them.

The point appellant wants to established with all the foregoing considerations is that the prosecution utterly failed to established the guilty knowledge and assent of appellant concerning the criminal design of Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco. And the established rule is that:

xxx          xxx    xxx

... a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. In other words, the accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is furthermore, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former's criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or material aid in the consummation of the crime ... (People vs. Ibañez, 77 Phil. 664, 665-666; emphasis supplied).

The trial court, therefore, seriously erred in holding appellant responsible together with Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco for the death of the decedent on the basis of incorrect conspiracy.

3.  Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent under death of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code provides that, "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Under this provision, one who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result thereto whether form or intended or not. (I Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 6th ed., p. 62).

It cannot be denied that the stabbing of the decedent by the appellant which caused a slight wound on the former's hand was intentionally made; hence, felony. However, the ensuing death of the decedent was not the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wound inflicted by the appellant. There was an active intervening cause, which was no other than the sudden and appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and Beltran. And there is authority that if the consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact absolutely from the criminal case the offender is not responsible for such consequence. (People vs. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038; I Reyes, 75). (Pp. 18-22, Appellant's brief — pp. 53-57, Record.)

All circumstances considered, We are not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was in any conspiracy with Simeon and Beltran to kill Bienvenido or any of the Sabelberos. In the absence of clear and convincing the We can only speculate as to why appellant did not join his son, Simeon, and Beltran in attacking Bienvenido after he had fallen to the ground. Either the two were too fast for him and were thus able to act ahead of him or that he voluntarily desisted from further pursuing the deceased after hitting him on the left hand. In line with the presumption of innocence which We are constitutionally bound to accorded. We are constrained to hold that he had no homicidal intent. He can be held criminally responsible only for the wound on the back of the left hand of the deceased which is described as a "stab wound, 2-1/2 inches wide at the back of the left hand" by witness Felix S. Toledo, the Sanitary Inspector, who examined the corpse. And there being no evidence as to the period of incapacity or medical attendance consequence to said wound, appellant is guilty only of slight physical injuries. (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, p. 1258, 1961 ed.)

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby modified, and in its stead appellant is found guilty only of slight physical injuries and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor, and to pay the costs.

Fernando (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no part.

Tax 2 Case Digest: De Guzman v. De Guzman



G.R. No. L-29276 May 18, 1978

Laws Applicable: Sec. 3, Rule 84, Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court

Lessons Applicable: allowable administration expenses

FACTS:
  • The late Felix J. de Guzman was survived by 8 children.  Letters of administration were issued to his son, Doctor Victorino G. de Guzman.  One of the properties left by the decedent was a residential house located in the poblacion of which 8 children were given a 1/8 proindiviso share in the project of partition.  3 heirs Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola and Arsenio de Guzman interposed objections to the administrator's disbursements in the total sum of P13,610.48.
o    Expense for the improvement and renovation of the decedent's residential house
o    Living expenses of Librada de Guzman while occupying the family home without paying rent
o    Other expenses: Lawyer's subsistence, Gratuity pay in lieu of medical fee, stenographic notes, decedent's first death anniversary, representation expenses
o    Irrigation fee
  • Lower court: allowed the expenses

ISSUE: W/N they were allowable administration expenses

Held: Some yes and some no.  Affirmed with modification.
  • An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent's real and personal estate as long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He is accountable for the whole decedent's estate which has come into his possession, with all the interest, profit, and income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).
  • One of the Conditions of the administrator's bond is that he should render a true and just account of his administration to the court
  • A hearing is usually held before an administrator's account is approved, especially if an interested Party raises objections to certain items in the accounting report
  • Expenses:
o    Expense for the improvement and renovation of the decedent's residential house – allowable
§  5 out of 8 co-owners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for repair and improvement of the family home. It is obvious that the expenses in question were incurred to preserve the family home and to maintain the family's social standing in the community.
o    Living expenses of Librada de Guzman while occupying the family home without paying rent – disallowed
o    Other expenses:
§  Lawyer's subsistence – allowable
§  Gratuity pay in lieu of medical fee – allowable
§  stenographic notes – disallowed
§  decedent's first death anniversary - disallowed
§  representation expenses - unexplained = disallowed
  • Irrigation fee – allowable since unquestioned though duplicate

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-29276 May 18, 1978



SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29276 May 18, 1978

Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de Guzman. VICTORINO G. DE GUZMAN, administrator-appellee,
vs.
CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN and HONORATA DE GUZMAN-MENDIOLA, oppositors-appellants.

Emiliano Samson & R. Balderama-Samson for appellants.

Cezar Paralejo for appellee.


AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the propriety of allowing as administration expenses certain disbursements made by the administrator of the testate estate of the late Felix J. de Guzman of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

The deceased testator was survived by eight children named Victorino, Librada, Severino, Margarita, Josefina, Honorata, Arsenio and Crispina. His will was duly probated. Letters of administration were issued to his son, Doctor Victorino G. de Guzman, pursuant to the order dated September 17, 1964 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Special Proceeding No. 1431.

One of the properties left by the decedent was a residential house located in the poblacion. In conformity with his last will, that house and the lot on which it stands were adjudicated to his eight children, each being given a one-eighth proindiviso share in the project of partition dated March 19, 1966, which was signed by the eight heirs and which was approved in the lower court's order of April 14, 1967 but without prejudice to the final outcome of the accounting.

The administrator submitted four accounting reports for the period from June 16, 1964 to September, 1967. Three heirs Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola and Arsenio de Guzman interposed objections to the administrator's disbursements in the total sum of P13,610.48, broken down as follows:

I. Expense for the improvement and renovation of the decedent's residential house.

1. Construction of fence — P3,082.07

2. Renovation of bathroom — P1,389.52

3. Repair of terrace and

interior of house — P5,928.00 — P10,399.59

II. Living expenses of Librada de Guzman while occupying the family home without paying rent:

1. For house helper — P1,170.00

2. Light bills — 227.41

3. Water bills — 150.80

4. Gas oil, floor wax

and switch nail — 54.90 — P 1,603.11

III. Other expenses:

1. Lawyer's subsistence — P 19.30

2. Gratuity pay in lieu

of medical fee — 144.00

3. For stenographic notes — 100.00

4. For food served on

decedent's first

death anniversary — 166.65

5. Cost of publication of

death anniversary

of decedent — 102.00

6. Representation

expenses — 26.25 — P558.20

IV. Irrigation fee P1.049.58

TOTAL P13,610.48

It should be noted that the probate court in its order of August 29, 1966 directed the administrator "to refrain from spending the assets of the estate for reconstructing and remodeling the house of the deceased and to stop spending (sic) any asset of the estate without first during authority of the court to do so" (pp. 26-27, Record on Appeal).

The lower court in its order of April 29, 1968 allowed the d items as legitimate expenses of administration. From that order, the three oppositors appealed to this Court. Their contention is that the probate court erred in approving the utilization of the income of the estate (from rice harvests) to defray those expenditures which allegedly are not allowable under the Rules of Court.

An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent's real and personal estate as long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He is accountable for the whole decedent's estate which has come into his possession, with all the interest, profit, and income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).

One of the Conditions of the administrator's bond is that he should render a true and just account of his administration to the court. The court may examine him upon oath With respect to every matter relating to his accounting 't and shall so examine him as to the correctness of his account before the same is allowed, except when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily established by competent proof. The heirs, legatees, distributes, and creditors of the estate shall have the same privilege as the executor or administrator of being examined on oath on any matter relating to an administration account." (Sec. 1[c] Rule 81 and secs. 8 and 9, Rule 85, Rules of Court).

A hearing is usually held before an administrator's account is approved, especially if an interested Party raises objections to certain items in the accounting report (Sec. 10, Rule 85).

At that hearing, the practice is for the administrator to take the witness stand, testify under oath on his accounts and Identify the receipts, vouchers and documents evidencing his disbursements which are offered as exhibits. He may be interrogated by the court and crossed by the oppositors's counsel. The oppositors may present proofs to rebut the ad. administrator's evidence in support of his accounts.

I. Expenses for the renovation and improvement of the family residence — P10,399.59. — As already shown above, these expenses consisted of disbursements for the repair of the terrace and interior of the family home, the renovation of the bathroom, and the construction of a fence. The probate court allowed those expenses because an administrator has the duty to "maintain in tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devises" when directed to do so by the court (Sec. 2, Rule 84, Rules of Court).

On the other hand, the oppositors-appellants contend that the trial court erred in allowing those expenses because the same did not come within the category of necessary expenses of administration which are understood to be the reasonable and necessary expenses of caring for the property and managing it until the debts are paid and the estate is partitioned and distributed among the heirs (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil. 124).

As clarified in the Lizarraga case, administration expenses should be those which are necessary for the management of the estate, for protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the production of fruits. They are expenses entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and its management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of the residue among the persons entitled thereto.

It should be noted that the family residence was partitioned proindiviso among the decedent's eight children. Each one of them was given a one-eighth share in conformity with the testator's will. Five of the eight co-owners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for repair and improvement of the family home. It is obvious that the expenses in question were incurred to preserve the family home and to maintain the family's social standing in the community.

Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of an the co- owners. They were necessary for the preservation and use of the family residence. As a result of those expenses, the co-owners, including the three oppositors, would be able to use the family home in comfort, convenience and security.

We hold that the probate court did not err in approving the use of the income of the estate to defray those ex

II.  Expenses incurred by Librada de Guzman as occupant of the family residence without paying rent — P1 603.11 — The probate court allowed the income of the estate to be used for those expenses on the theory that the occupancy of the house by one heir did not deprive the other seven heirs from living in it. Those expenses consist of the salaries of the house helper, light and water bills, and the cost of gas, oil floor wax and switch nail

We are of the opinion that those expenses were personal expenses of Librada de Guzman, inuring to her benefit. Those expenses, not being reasonable administration expenses incurred by the administrator, should not be charged against the income of the estate.

Librada de Guzman, as an heir, is entitled to share in the net income of the estate. She occupied the house without paying rent. She should use her income for her living expenses while occupying the family residence.

The trial court erred in approving those expenses in the administrator's accounts. They should be, as they are hereby, disallowed (See 33 C.J.S 1239-40).

III. Other expenses — P558.20. — Among these expenses is the sum of P100 for stenographic notes which, as admitted by the administrator on page 24 of his brief, should be disallowed. Another item, "representation expenses" in the sum of P26.25 (2nd accounting), was not explained. it should likewise be disallowed.

The probate court erred in allowing as expenses of administration the sum of P268.65 which was incurred during the celebration of the first death anniversary of the deceased. Those expenses are disallowed because they have no connection with the care, management and settlement of the decedent's estate (Nicolas vs. Nicolas 63 Phil 332).

The other expenses, namely, P19.30 for the lawyer's subsistence and P144 as the cost of the gift to the physician who attended to the testator during his last are allowable expenses.

IV. Irrigation fee — P1,049.58. —The appellants question the deductibility of that expense on the ground that it seems to be a duplication of the item of P1,320 as irrigation fee for the same 1966-67 crop-year.

The administrator in his comment filed on February 28, 1978 explained that the item of P1,320 represented the "allotments" for irrigation fees to eight tenants who cultivated the Intan crop, which allotments were treated as "assumed expenses" deducted as farming expenses from the value of the net harvests.

The explanation is not quite clear but it was not disputed by the appellants. The fact is that the said sum of P1,049.58 was paid by the administrator to the Penaranda Irrigation System as shown in Official Receipt No. 3596378 dated April 28, 1967. It was included in his accounting as part of the farming expenses. The amount was properly allowed as a legitimate expense of administration.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of April 29, 1968 is affirmed with the modifications that the sum of (a) P1,603.11 as the living expenses of Librada de Guzman. (b) P100 for stenographic notes, (c) P26.25 as representation expenses, and (d) P268.65 as expenses for the celebration of the first anniversary of the decedent's death are disallowed in the administrator's accounts. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.