Persons Case Digest: Llorente vs CA

Llorente vs CA

GR 124371 November 23, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Divorce

Laws Applicable: Art. 15,  Art. 17, Art. 26 FC

FACTS:

Alicia( 2^nd wife) ß Lorenzo N. Llorente --- Paula (1^ST wife) --- Ceferino Llorente (brother)

Crisologo Llorente(son)

• Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957
• February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur
• Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home
• November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
• 1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines, He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente
• December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank
• Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her
• February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written agreement which was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother to the effect that

1.    all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended

2.    they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings

3.    they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and

4.    Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. 

• November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego
• December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final
• January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and lived together as husband and wife and bore 3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente
• March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children
• December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate
• January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason that the Lorenzo was still alive
• January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was duly executedthe will to probate
• June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died
• RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by Paula over Lorenzo’s estate contending that she was the surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate proceedings filed by Alicia, gave due course to Paula’s petition
• divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is void
• Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and ½ conjugal estate
• illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate
• RTC denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children “legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him thus, Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles her to 1/3 of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate
• CA: Affirmed with modification

ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952. REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

• Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:

o    nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality

o    Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law

• Quita v. Court of Appeals:

o    once proven that NO longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable

• Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.  Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
• The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed.  We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.
• Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. 
• Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law.  In fact, the will was duly probated.

Persons Case Digest: Garcia – Recio vs Recio

Garcia – Recio vs Recio

GR 138322, October 2, 2002

Lessons Applicable: divorce

Laws Applicable: Art. 15 and Art. 26 par. 2 FC

FACTS:

Grace J. Garcia-Recio (2^nd mariage) ----- Rederick A. Recio à Editha Samson (Wife)

• March 1, 1987: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal
• May 18, 1989: a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court
• June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government
• January 12, 1994: Recio married Grace j. Garcia, a Filipino, in Cabanatuan City.  Recio declared himself as "single" and "Filipino."
• October 22, 1995: Recio and Grace J. Garcia ak.a. Garcia-Recio begun to live separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage
• May 16, 1996: In accordance to the Statutory Declarations secured in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
• March 3, 1998: Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage  on the ground of bigamy claiming she only learned of the prior marriage in November, 1997
• Recio prayed in his answer that it be dismissed for no cause of action
• RTC: marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines

ISSUE: W/N the divorce between Recio and Samson was valid and proven

HELD: NO. Remand the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy

• Divorces:

1.    A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. 

2.    In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."

3.    A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

• Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it

o    legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned

o    A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself

§  The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country

o    Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

1.    an official publication; or

2.    a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

1.    accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and

2.    authenticated by the seal of his office

• Since the divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him
• In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types:

1.    absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates the marriage

2.    limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and leaves the bond in full force

• Recio presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce

o    On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."

Insurance Case Digest: Pineda v. CA (1993)

G.R. No. 105562  September 27, 1993

Lessons Applicable: Who Exercises Rights of Minor Insured or Beneficiaries (Insurance)

Laws Applicable: Art. 225 Family Code

FACTS:

• Prime Marine Services, Inc. (PMSI), a crewing/manning outfit, procured Group PoIicy
  from Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. to provide life insurance coverage to its sea-based employees enrolled under the plan. 
• February 17 1986: 6 employees of the PMSI perished at sea when M/V Nemos, a Greek cargo vessel, sunk somewhere in El Jadida, Morocco
• The beneficiaries asked President and General Manager of PMSI, Capt. Roberto Nuval and issued him special powers of attorney authorizing him to "follow up, ask, demand, collect and receive" for their benefit indemnities.  It only verbally pertained to the sinking of the fatal vessel
• Unknown to them, however, the PMSI, in its capacity as employer and policyholder of the life insurance of its deceased workers, filed with formal claims with their special power of attorney 
• Capt. Nuval, upon receipt of these checks from the treasurer, who happened to be his son-in-law, endorsed and deposited them in his account with the Commercial Bank of Manila, now Boston Bank
• Upon learning that they are entitled to the claim, they sought to recover from Insular Life but it denied on the ground that they already delivered to PMSI
• The fact that there was a verbal agreement between complainants-appellees and Capt. Nuval limiting the authority of the latter to claiming specified death benefits cannot prejudice the insurance company which relied on the terms of the powers of attorney which on their face do not disclose such limitation
• Section 180 of the Insurance Code has been amended by the Family Code 17 which grants the father and mother joint legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment; however, when the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall be required to put up a bond in such amount as the court may determine.
• Insurance Commission: favored petitioners
• The Insular Life Assurance Company appealed stating that
• (a) had no jurisdiction over the case considering that the claims exceeded P100,000
• (b) erred in holding that the powers of attorney relied upon by Insular Life were insufficient to convey absolute authority to Capt. Nuval to demand, receive and take delivery of the insurance proceeds pertaining to the petitioners
• (c) erred in not giving credit to the version of Insular Life that the power of attorney supposed to have been executed in favor of the Alarcons was missing, and
• (d) erred in holding that Insular Life was liable for violating Section 180 of the Insurance Code for having released to the surviving mothers the insurance proceeds pertaining to the beneficiaries who were still minors despite the failure of the former to obtain a court authorization or to post a bond.
• CA: eliminated the award to minor beneficiaries Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok

ISSUE: W/N the minor beneficiaries award should be eliminated

HELD: YES. petition is GRANTED.  CA Reversed. Insurance Commission Reinstated.

• Being special powers of attorney, they must be strictly construed.  Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the collection and receipt of such proceeds was a deviation from its practice with respect to group policies.
• Group Insurance
• coverage terms for group insurance are usually stated in a master agreement or policy that is issued by the insurer to a representative of the group or to an administrator of the insurance program
• employer acts as a functionary in the collection and payment of premiums and in performing related duties
• falling within the ambit of administration of a group policy is the disbursement of insurance payments by the employer to the employees
• employee is in the position of a real party to the master policy
• employees is the true source of the benefits, which are a form of additional compensation to them
• enables the employees to carry a larger amount of insurance than they could otherwise, and helps to attract and hold a permanent class of employees
• Even granting for the sake of argument that the special powers of attorney were in due form, Insular Life was grossly negligent in delivering the checks, drawn in favor of the petitioners, to a party who is not the agent mentioned in the special power of attorney
• Nor can we agree with the opinion of the public respondent that since the shares of the minors in the insurance proceeds are less than P50,000.00, then under Article 225 of the Family Code their mothers could receive such shares without need of either court appointments as guardian or the posting of a bond
• Art. 225.    The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

It is clear from the said Article that regardless of the value of the unemancipated common child's property, the father and mother ipso jure become the legal guardian of the child's property. However, if the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee the performance of the obligations of a general guardian.

• It must, however, be noted that the second paragraph of Article 225 of the Family Code speaks of the "market value of the property or the annual income of the child," which means, therefore, the aggregate of the child's property or annual income; if this exceeds P50,000.00, a bond is required. 
• There is no evidence that the share of each of the minors in the proceeds of the group policy in question is the minor's only property. Without such evidence, it would not be safe to conclude that, indeed, that is his only property.