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Showing posts with label 2002. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2002. Show all posts

PILA Case Digest: Lim v. Executive Secretary (2002)

G.R. No. 151445      April 11, 2002
Lim v. Executive Secretary

Lessons Applicable:   Locus Standi,  International Law v. Muncipal Law, Certiorari, Incorporation Clause, Treaties

Laws Applicable: Constitution

FACTS:

    Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002.  The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.  The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001.  Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.  Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as  residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

    The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no question of constitutionality is involved.  Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO.  Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements.  It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.  According to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general rule.
The meaning of the word  “activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises.  Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense."  ." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial.  In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory.  Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case.  The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."  Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.  Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: “The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.”
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002



EN BANC

G.R. No. 151445      April 11, 2002

ARTHUR D. LIM and PAULINO R. ERSANDO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY as alter ego of HER EXCELLENCEY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, and HONORABLE ANGELO REYES in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense, respondents.

----------------------------------------

SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, petitioners-intervenors,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGA-ARROYO, ALBERTO ROMULO, ANGELO REYES, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:

This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.

The facts are as follows:

Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.

Prior to the year 2002, the last "Balikatan" was held in 1995. This was due to the paucity of any formal agreement relative to the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Philippines. In the meantime, the respective governments of the two countries agreed to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale. The lack of consensus was eventually cured when the two nations concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999.

The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. On that day, three (3) commercial aircrafts were hijacked, flown and smashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. by terrorists with alleged links to the al-Qaeda ("the Base"), a Muslim extremist organization headed by the infamous Osama bin Laden. Of no comparable historical parallels, these acts caused billions of dollars worth of destruction of property and incalculable loss of hundreds of lives.

On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.

Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao. They likewise pray for a relaxation on the rules relative to locus standi citing the unprecedented importance of the issue involved.

On February 71 2002 the Senate conducted a hearing on the "Balikatan" exercise wherein Vice-President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented the Draft Terms of Reference (TOR). Five days later, he approved the TOR, which we quote hereunder:

I. POLICY LEVEL

1. The Exercise shall be consistent with the Philippine Constitution and all its activities shall be in consonance with the laws of the land and the provisions of the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).

2. The conduct of this training Exercise is in accordance with pertinent United Nations resolutions against global terrorism as understood by the respective parties.

3. No permanent US basing and support facilities shall be established. Temporary structures such as those for troop billeting, classroom instruction and messing may be set up for use by RP and US Forces during the Exercise.

4. The Exercise shall be implemented jointly by RP and US Exercise Co-Directors under the authority of the Chief of Staff, AFP. In no instance will US Forces operate independently during field training exercises (FTX). AFP and US Unit Commanders will retain command over their respective forces under the overall authority of the Exercise Co-Directors. RP and US participants shall comply with operational instructions of the AFP during the FTX.

5. The exercise shall be conducted and completed within a period of not more than six months, with the projected participation of 660 US personnel and 3,800 RP Forces. The Chief of Staff, AFP shall direct the Exercise Co-Directors to wind up and terminate the Exercise and other activities within the six month Exercise period.

6. The Exercise is a mutual counter-terrorism advising, assisting and training Exercise relative to Philippine efforts against the ASG, and will be conducted on the Island of Basilan. Further advising, assisting and training exercises shall be conducted in Malagutay and the Zamboanga area. Related activities in Cebu will be for support of the Exercise.

7. Only 160 US Forces organized in 12-man Special Forces Teams shall be deployed with AFP field, commanders. The US teams shall remain at the Battalion Headquarters and, when approved, Company Tactical headquarters where they can observe and assess the performance of the AFP Forces.

8. US exercise participants shall not engage in combat, without prejudice to their right of self-defense.

9. These terms of Reference are for purposes of this Exercise only and do not create additional legal obligations between the US Government and the Republic of the Philippines.

II. EXERCISE LEVEL

1. TRAINING

a. The Exercise shall involve the conduct of mutual military assisting, advising and training of RP and US Forces with the primary objective of enhancing the operational capabilities of both forces to combat terrorism.

b. At no time shall US Forces operate independently within RP territory.

c. Flight plans of all aircraft involved in the exercise will comply with the local air traffic regulations.

2. ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

a. RP and US participants shall be given a country and area briefing at the start of the Exercise. This briefing shall acquaint US Forces on the culture and sensitivities of the Filipinos and the provisions of the VF A. The briefing shall also promote the full cooperation on the part of the RP and US participants for the successful conduct of the Exercise.

b. RP and US participating forces may share, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, in the use of their resources, equipment and other assets. They will use their respective logistics channels.

c. Medical evaluation shall be jointly planned and executed utilizing RP and US assets and resources.

d. Legal liaison officers from each respective party shall be appointed by the Exercise Directors.

3. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

a. Combined RP-US Information Bureaus shall be established at the Exercise Directorate in Zamboanga City and at GHQ, AFP in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

b. Local media relations will be the concern of the AFP and all public affairs guidelines shall be jointly developed by RP and US Forces.

c. Socio-Economic Assistance Projects shall be planned and executed jointly by RP and US Forces in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, and in consultation with community and local government officials.

Contemporaneously, Assistant Secretary for American Affairs Minerva Jean A. Falcon and United States Charge d' Affaires Robert Fitts signed the Agreed Minutes of the discussion between the Vice-President and Assistant Secretary Kelly.

Petitioners Lim and Ersando present the following arguments:

I

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES SIGNED THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY (MDT) in 1951 TO PROVIDE MUTUAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 'CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES' OF EACH COUNTRY ONLY IN THE CASE OF AN ARMED ATTACK BY AN EXTERNAL AGGRESSOR, MEANING A THIRD COUNTRY AGAINST ONE OF THEM.

BY NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION CAN IT BE SAID THAT THE ABU SAYYAF BANDITS IN BASILAN CONSTITUTE AN EXTERNAL ARMED FORCE THAT HAS SUBJECT THE PHILIPPINES TO AN ARMED EXTERNAL ATTACK TO WARRANT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MDT OF 1951.

II

NEITHER DOES THE VFA OF 1999 AUTHORIZE AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO ENGAGE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN PHILIPPINE TERRITORY, NOT EVEN TO FIRE BACK "IF FIRED UPON".

Substantially the same points are advanced by petitioners SANLAKAS and PARTIDO.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General points to infirmities in the petitions regarding, inter alia, Lim and Ersando's standing to file suit, the prematurity of the action, as well as the impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact. Anent their locus standi, the Solicitor General argues that first, they may not file suit in their capacities as, taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been shown that "Balikatan 02-1 " involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers. Second, their being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to initiate the case, citing our ruling in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora. Third, Lim and Ersando have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of direct personal injury. We agree.

It is also contended that the petitioners are indulging in speculation. The Solicitor General is of the view that since the Terms of Reference are clear as to the extent and duration of "Balikatan 02-1," the issues raised by petitioners are premature, as they are based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference. Even petitioners' resort to a special civil action for certiorari is assailed on the ground that the writ may only issue on the basis of established facts.

Apart from these threshold issues, the Solicitor General claims that there is actually no question of constitutionality involved. The true object of the instant suit, it is said, is to obtain an interpretation of the VFA. The Solicitor General asks that we accord due deference to the executive determination that "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the VFA, considering the President's monopoly in the field of foreign relations and her role as commander-in-chief of the Philippine armed forces.

Given the primordial importance of the issue involved, it will suffice to reiterate our view on this point in a related case:

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases, where we had occasion to rule:

'x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that 'transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.' We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. [citation omitted]

This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs. COMELEC, Daza vs. Singson, and Basco vs. Phil, Amusement and Gaming Corporation, where we emphatically held:

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. xxx'

Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that in cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.

Hence, we treat with similar dispatch the general objection to the supposed prematurity of the action. At any rate, petitioners' concerns on the lack of any specific regulation on the latitude of activity US personnel may undertake and the duration of their stay has been addressed in the Terms of Reference.

The holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in the framework of the treaty antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself. The first of these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, for brevity). The MDT has been described as the "core" of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the United States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the "Balikatan" is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT's objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.

The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and the decision not to renew it created a vacuum in US-Philippine defense relations, that is, until it was replaced by the Visiting Forces Agreement. It should be recalled that on October 10, 2000, by a vote of eleven to three, this Court upheld the validity of the VFA. The V FA provides the "regulatory mechanism" by which "United States military and civilian personnel [may visit] temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government." It contains provisions relative to entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the agreement and its termination. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe.

The first question that should be addressed is whether "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement. To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself: Not much help can be had therefrom, unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.

We are not left completely unaided, however. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements, state:

SECTION 3. INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

Article 31

General rule of interpretation

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith ill accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the tenus of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the party .

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;

(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Article 32

Supplementary means of interpretation

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 :

(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or

(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd unreasonable.

It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. As explained by a writer on the Convention,

[t]he Commission's proposals (which were adopted virtually without change by the conference and are now reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention) were clearly based on the view that the text of a treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; the Commission accordingly came down firmly in favour of the view that 'the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties'. This is not to say that the travauxpreparatoires of a treaty , or the circumstances of its conclusion, are relegated to a subordinate, and wholly ineffective, role. As Professor Briggs points out, no rigid temporal prohibition on resort to travaux preparatoires of a treaty was intended by the use of the phrase 'supplementary means of interpretation' in what is now Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. The distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general rule.

The Terms of Reference rightly fall within the context of the VFA.

After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word  “activities" arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that “Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

That is not the end of the matter, though. Granted that "Balikatan 02-1" is permitted under the terms of the VFA, what may US forces legitimately do in furtherance of their aim to provide advice, assistance and training in the global effort against terrorism? Differently phrased, may American troops actually engage in combat in Philippine territory? The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." We wryly note that this sentiment is admirable in the abstract but difficult in implementation. The target of "Balikatan 02-1" the Abu Sayyaf, cannot reasonably be expected to sit idly while the battle is brought to their very doorstep. They cannot be expected to pick and choose their targets for they will not have the luxury of doing so. We state this point if only to signify our awareness that the parties straddle a fine line, observing the honored legal maxim "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial.

In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. We bear in mind the salutary proscription stated in the Charter of the United Nations, to wit:

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx

In the same manner, both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution. In particular, the Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded way before the present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a valid source of international obligation. The present Constitution contains key provisions useful in determining the extent to which foreign military troops are allowed in Philippine territory. Thus, in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is provided that:

xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx

SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx

SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self- determination.

SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the country.

xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx

The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly, the Transitory Provisions state:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception. Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international agreements.

A rather recent formulation of the relation of international law vis-a-vis municipal law was expressed in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

xxx Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.

This is not exactly helpful in solving the problem at hand since in trying to find a middle ground, it favors neither one law nor the other, which only leaves the hapless seeker with an unsolved dilemma. Other more traditional approaches may offer valuable insights.

From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."

Our Constitution espouses the opposing view. Witness our jurisdiction as I stated in section 5 of Article VIII:

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:

(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx

In Ichong v. Hernandez, we ruled that the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State. In Gonzales v. Hechanova,

xxx As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question." In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.

Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise? Contrary to what petitioners would have us do, we cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, we do not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. As a result, we cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite us to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao, to issue and make factual findings on matters well beyond our immediate perception, and this we are understandably loath to do.

It is all too apparent that the determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. On this point, we must concur with the Solicitor General that the present subject matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari. We have held in too many instances that questions of fact are not entertained in such a remedy. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion: The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility."

In this connection, it will not be amiss to add that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

Under the expanded concept of judicial power under the Constitution, courts are charged with the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." From the facts obtaining, we find that the holding of "Balikatan 02-1" joint military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for correction on our part. In other words, respondents in the case at bar have not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Carpio, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, dissenting opinion.

Ynares-Santiago, join the dissenting opinion.

Panganiban, separate opinion.

Davide., Jr., C.J., Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, join the main and separate opinion of J. Panganiban.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002

EN BANC

G.R. No. 148571.  September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued?  Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending?  In general, the answer to these two novel questions is “No.”  The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez.  The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez.  Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued.  Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.

“Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List.”

Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.

The Facts

This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.  Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.  The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465.   Initially,  the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition.  The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision.  It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.  This Resolution has become final and executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061.  The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999.  The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2.  In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001.  In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.  In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001.  Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues

Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

I.

“The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

II.

“The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:

‘1.  An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such power.

‘2.  Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.

‘3.  The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.

‘4.  On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.

‘5.  Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of ‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on bail.

‘6.  The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.

‘7.  The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

‘8.  The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled ‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.’”

In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.  Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Matters

Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition

Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: “(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law.”

For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: “(1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties.”

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it.  This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest.  Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.

Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. In Fortich v. Coronawe stated:

“[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant.   This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.  As we have further stated in Cuaresma:

‘x x x.  A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.  This is established policy.  x x x.’

“Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution.  Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.

“That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.  We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:

‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.  Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.  Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.  In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.’

In a number of other exceptional cases, we held as follows:

“This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same.”

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case.  Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

Five Postulates of Extradition

The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on extradition.  A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other.

With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent.  Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.

Today, “a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime.” It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.

“An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced.  For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime.  x x x.  From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself.”

In Secretary v. Lantion we explained:

“The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government.  More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world.  Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization.  One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries.  It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.”

Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state.  We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the  Accused

Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each other’s legal system and judicial process. More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature.  In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.

“An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis.  It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.  His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.  Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.

x x x  x x x     x x x

“There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding.  An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.  In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards.  In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.’  Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.  The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation’s foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.”

Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay.  Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person.  It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it.  Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.

Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state.  On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community.   Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied.  In other words, “[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the surrender.” Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.  This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.

The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.  Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he  is  charged with are bailable -- eloquently  speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost.  These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight.  He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee.  Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing

 Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?

Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition.  Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.

On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process.  He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.

Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments.  It states:

“SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.  [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.  Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.

“(2)  The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case.”  (Emphasis ours)

Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.

1.  On the Basis of the Extradition Law

It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused.  This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant.  Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments.  Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered “immediate.”  The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage.  The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition.  From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I “Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers” and enclosed Statements in two volumes;  (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J “Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix” with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L “Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward” and enclosed Statements in two volumes.

It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to “best serve the ends of justice.”  He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious.  In point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that “probable cause” did exist.  In the second questioned Order, he stated:

“In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee.”

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.  Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.

Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons.  In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word “hearing” is notably absent from the provision.  Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided.  It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature.  Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.

“It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States.  If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x .”

Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.

2.  On the Basis of the Constitution

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.  It provides:

“Sec. 2.  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.  There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.  All we required was that the “judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.”[55]

In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:

“Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused.  In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.  They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.”

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses.[57] In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system.  If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding?  Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous.  This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused.  If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee.

Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:

Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable.  At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.  If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.

On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings.  Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.  In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will “best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases.

Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

“Art. III, Sec. 13.  All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.  The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.  Excessive bail shall not be required.”

Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited.  Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.  He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.

On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.

Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner.  As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws.  It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”  It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.  It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”  Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses.  It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case.  To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged.  He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

No Violation of Due Process

Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti in arguing that, constitutionally, “[n]o  one  shall  be  deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law.”

Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard[63] but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case --  call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.[65] In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.  Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.

Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard.  That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country.  But  because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws.  His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow.  He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition?  His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the government’s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime.   Indeed, “[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests.”

Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide.  Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody.  In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.

The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty,  since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here.  Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.  However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.  Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees.   Indeed, the right to due process extends to the “life, liberty or property” of every person.  It is “dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.”

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.  The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations.  In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative.  Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised.  In short, while this Court is ever protective of “the sporting idea of fair play,” it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.

Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail.  We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.

1.  Alleged Disenfranchisement

While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives.  On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents.  We are not persuaded.  In People v. Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:

“When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action.  They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.  To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

“In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

“The Constitution guarantees:  ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.’  This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.  The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.  Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

“Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment?  Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

“The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison.  The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are multifarious.  The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.  The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.  Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.  Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty.  The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise.  The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature.  A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction.  An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents.  A police officer must maintain peace and order.  Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

“A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.

“The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.  The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

“We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.  The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.  Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.”

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.  Hence, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case.  Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

2.  Anticipated Delay

Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case.  Again we are not convinced.  We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature.  They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence.  Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.

We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.

However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be justified.  Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself.  It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more.  This we cannot allow.

3.  Not a Flight Risk?

Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk.  To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country.  True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition.  Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer.  That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied.  In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.

Brief Refutation of Dissents

The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out.  The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondent’s claim to bail.  As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondent’s prayer for temporary liberty.  Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.

This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties.  Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal.  Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled “Manifestations” by both parties and “Counter-Manifestation” by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail.

A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety.  The trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters.  Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand.  Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters.  Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez.  Rather, it lies in his legal arguments.  Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.

In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case.  Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings, which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in character.  What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay.  What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.

Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly “disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition.”  We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair.  Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.

Summation

As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:

1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable.  The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.

2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined.  Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available.  It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail.  Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.

4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable.  The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses.   If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.

5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail.  Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances.  The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance.  In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.

6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.  Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.  A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved.  Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights,  a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society.  But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.

8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties.  Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny.  They should not allow contortions, delays and “over-due process” every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a fugitive.  Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.

10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions,  delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.  The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez.  The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED.  The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before  it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.