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Showing posts with label June 27. Show all posts
Showing posts with label June 27. Show all posts

Crim Law 1 Digest: People v. Pilola 2003

People v. Pilola

G.R. No. 121828  June 27, 2003

Lessons Applicable:

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
  • February 5, 1988 11:30 pm: Elisa Rolan was inside their store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Although already drunk, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba joined them.  Edmar had a heated argument with Julian.  Elisa pacified Edmar and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left then returned to block Joselito and Julian.  Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face.  Elisa shouted: “Tama na.  Tama na” but she was ignored as they continued until they reached the end of the street.  Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches.  As Joselito tried to stop the fight, Odilon pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch.  He placed his left arm around Joselito’s neck, and stabbed him.  Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray.  Ronnie took a knife from the kitchen of Teresita and rushed together with Pilola to the scene and stabbed Joselito.  As Joeslito was stabbed 11 times (6 fatal stab wounds), he fell in the canal.  Odilon and Pilola fled while Ronnie went after Julian who ran dear life.  When Julian noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, he looked back and saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and bashed Joselito’s head.  Then, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more before fleing from the scene.  Joselito died on the spot.  Elisa rushed to Joselito’s house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.
  • Agripina Gloria, a female security guard, saw Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito and fled towards the direction of the mental hospital.  She did not see Odilon.
  • Elisa cross-examination had an inconsistency, she stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim (before it was Ronnie)
  • RTC: Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced to reclusion perpetua

ISSUE: W/N Pilola is guilty of murder

HELD: YES.  Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION

  • The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis importance.  Elisa’s testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz. No showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime.  The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisa’s testimony.
  • There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.  Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence.  After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.  It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators.  If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others.
  • The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
  • Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim.  Art. 4.  Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
o    1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
  • Art. 18.  Accomplices. – Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
o    To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur:
1.    the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2.    the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime
  • Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution.  Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment
  • However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice
    • Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the Pilola before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.  Since the victim is not yet dead, the crime is not yet consummated so Pilola is a principal by direct participation.
  • Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but hard to disprove.  To serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  For it to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was absent from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been present then.
  • Pilola knew that he was charged for the stabbing but instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he evaded arrest and this flight is evidence of guilt
  • There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.  The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part -  attack on the unarmed victim was sudden.  The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 121828 June 27, 2003

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121828.  June 27, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT PILOLA, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is the appeal of appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa y Rulloda in the amount of P50,000 for the latter’s death.

The Indictment

On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were charged with murder in an Information which reads:

That on or about the 5th day of February, 1988 in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one Ronnie Diamante who is still at-large and no fixed address and mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with double-bladed knives and a bolo and with intent to kill, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault hack and stab one Joselito Capa y Rulloda, as a result of which the latter sustained hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested[3] and tried, and subsequently convicted of murder.[4] The decision of the trial court became final and executory.  Accused Edmar Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie Diamante reportedly died a month after the incident.  Meanwhile, herein appellant Rene Gayot Pilola was arrested.  He was arraigned on March 9, 1994, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.[5] Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.

The Evidence of the Prosecution[6]

On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive.  Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer.  Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store.  Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers obliged.  In the course of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated argument.  Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved.  An altercation between the two ensued.  Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up.  Edmar and Odilon left the store.  Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way.  Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face.  Elisa shouted: “Tama na.  Tama na.”  Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they reached Aling Sotera’s store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen meters away from Elisa’s store.  For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches.  Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail.  Joselito’s intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon.  He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch.  He placed his left arm around Joselito’s neck, and stabbed the latter.  Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray.  They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito.  Elisa could not tell how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom.  The victim fell in the canal.  Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him.  Julian ran for dear life.  When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back.  He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselito’s head.  Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more.  Ronnie then fled from the scene.  Joselito died on the spot.  Elisa rushed to Joselito’s house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.[7]

The next day, Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Joselito and prepared Autopsy Report No. N-88-375,[8] with the following findings:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Pallor, conjunctivae and integument, marked and generalized.

Contused abrasions: temple, right, 3.0 x 3.0 cm.; mandibular region, right, 2.0 x 8.0 cm.; back, suprascapular region, left, 3.0 x 4.0 cm.; deltoid region, right, 1.0 x 3.0 cm.

Lacerated wound, scalp, occipital region, 4.0 cm.

Incised wounds: forehead, right side, 5.5 cm.; arm, left, upper third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.

Stab wounds:

1.       Elliptical, 1.8 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, medial extremity is sharp, lateral extremity is blunt; located at the anterior chest wall, level of 3rd intercostal space, right, 5.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, non-penetrating, with an approximate depth of 3.0 cm.;

2.       Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 3rd intercostal space, left, 3.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, into the left thoracic cavity, penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of 10.0 cm.;

3.       Elliptical, 3.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 4th intercostal space, 12.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating upper lobe of left lung with an approximate depth of 9.0 cm.;

4.       Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 5th intercostal space, left, 15.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating the left thoracic cavity and then lower lobe of left lung and then penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of 11.0 cm.;

5.       Elliptical, 1.3 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the lateral chest wall, level of 7th intercostal space, left, 16.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the left thoracic cavity and then penetrating the lower lobe of left lung with an approximately depth of 10.0 cm.;

6.       Elliptical, 4.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the lumbar region, left, 14.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the abdominal cavity and then penetrating ileum;

7.       Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower extremity is blunt; located at the chest, lateral, level of 9th intercostal space, left; 14.0 cm. from posterior median line; directed forward, upward and medially, non-penetrating with an approximate depth of 4.0 cm.;

8.       Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower extremity is sharp; located at the abdomen, postero-lateral aspect, 15.0 cm. from posterior median line; directed forward, upward and laterally, into the abdominal cavity and then perforating the spleen and pancreas with an approximate depth of 13.0 cm.;

9.       Elliptical, 5.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower extremity is sharp; located at the left arm, upper third, anterior; directed backward, downward and medially, involving skin and underlying soft tissues with an approximate depth of 6.0 cm.;

10.     Elliptical, 2.3 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower extremity is blunt; located at the left forearm, upper third, anterior; directed backward, upward and medially and communicating with another wound, arm, left, medial aspect, 2.0 cm.;

11.     Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity blunt, lower extremity, sharp; located at the left arm, lower third, posterior aspect, directed forward, downward and medially, communicating with another wound, arm, left, lower third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.

Hemothorax, left – 900 c.c.

Hemopericardium – 300 c.c.

Hemoperitoneum – 750 c.c.

Brain and other visceral organs, pale.

Stomach-filled with rice and other food particles.

CAUSE OF DEATH:  Multiple stab wounds.

The Evidence of the Appellant

The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi.  He testified that at around 11:00 p.m. of February 5, 1988, he was in the house of his cousin, Julian Cadion, at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City.  He suddenly heard a commotion coming from outside.  Julian rushed out of the house to find out what was going on.  The appellant remained inside the house because he was suffering from ulcer and was experiencing excessive pain in his stomach.  The following morning, the appellant learned from their neighbor, Elisa Rolan, that Joselito had been stabbed to death.  The appellant did not bother to ask who was responsible for the stabbing.[9]

Julian alias “Buboy” Cadion corroborated the appellant’s testimony.  He testified that the appellant was in their house on the night of February 5, 1988, and was suffering from ulcer.  The appellant stayed home on the night of the incident.[10]

Agripina Gloria, a female security guard residing at Block 30, Nueve de Pebrero, 612, Int. 4, Allison St., Mandaluyong City, testified that on February 5, 1988 at around 11:00 p.m., she heard a commotion outside.  Momentarily, she saw Ronnie rush into the kitchen of the house of her niece Teresita; he took a knife and run towards Nueve de Pebrero Street where Edmar and Julian were fighting.  She then followed Ronnie and saw Joselito trying to pacify the protagonists.  Ronnie grabbed Joselito and instantly stabbed the latter, who for a while retreated and fell down the canal.  Not content, Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito.  Thereafter, Ronnie ran towards the direction of the mental hospital.  Agripina did not see Odilon or the appellant anywhere within the vicinity of the incident.[11]

On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de Febrero Street, Mandaluyong City, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua.  Pilola is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of deceased Joselito Capa alias Jessie in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death jointly and solidarily with Odilon Lagliba who was earlier convicted herein.  With cost against the accused.[12]

In the case at bar, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY ANENT THE ASSAILED INCIDENT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ELISA ROLAN AND IN SETTING ASIDE THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]

The appellant avers that Elisa is not a credible witness and her testimony is barren of probative weight.  This is so because she contradicted herself when she testified on direct examination that Ronnie struck the head of the victim with a hollow block.  However, on cross-examination, she stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim.  The inconsistency in Elisa’s testimony impaired her credibility.

The contention of the appellant does not hold water.

First.  The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis importance.  The victim died because of multiple wounds.  The appellant is charged with murder for the killing of the victim with a knife, in conspiracy with the other accused.

Second.  The perceived inconsistency in Elisa’s account of events is a minor and collateral detail that does not affect the substance of her testimony, as it even serves to strengthen rather than destroy her credibility.[14]

Third.  Elisa has been consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the men who stabbed the victim, the others being Ronnie and Odilon.  Elisa’s testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz and his testimony that the victim sustained eleven stab wounds.  The doctor testified that there were two or more assailants:

Q    Could you tell the court what instrument could have been used by the perpetrator in inflicting those two incise wounds?

A     Those incise wounds were caused by a sharp instrument like a knife or any similar instrument.

…

Q    Now you also found out from the body of the victim eleven stab wounds?

A     Yes, sir.

Q    Now, tell the court in which part of the body of the victim where these eleven stab wounds [are] located?

A     Shall I go one by one, all the eleven stab wounds?

Q    All the eleven stab wounds?

A     One stab wound was located at the front portion of the chest, right side.  Another stab wound was located also on the chest left side, another stab wound was located at the antero lateral aspect, it’s the front of the chest almost to the side.  And also another one, also at the chest, another stab wound was at the left side of the chest and another one was at the lumbar region of the abdomen left side or where the left kidney is located, lumbar area.  Another one at the side of the chest, left side of the chest.  Another stab wound in the abdomen, another stab wound at the left arm.  Another one at the left forearm and the last one in the autopsy report is located at the left arm.  These are all the eleven stab wounds sustained by the victim.

…

A     The instrument used was a sharp pointed edge or a single bladed instrument like a knife, kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument.

Q    Considering the number of stab wounds, doctor, will you tell us whether there were several assailants?

A     In my opinion, there were more than one assailants (sic) here because of the presence of different types of stab wounds and lacerated wounds.  This lacerated wound could not have been inflicted by the one holding the one which inflicted the instrument . . (discontinued) which inflicted the stab wounds.

Q    So there could have been two or three assailants?

A     More than one.[15]

The physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of the veracity of Elisa’s testimony.[16]

Fourth.  Even the appellant himself declared on the witness stand that he could not think of any reason why Elisa pointed to him as one of the assailants.  In a litany of cases, we have ruled that when there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime, as in the case at bar, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[17]

Fifth.  The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisa’s testimony.  Case law has it that the trial court’s calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight thereof is given high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the appellate court.

The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death.  He contends that for one to be a conspirator, his participation in the criminal resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent with the criminal acts.  He asserts that even if it were true that he was present at the situs criminis and that he stabbed the victim, it was Odilon who had already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed the victim.  He could not have conspired with Odilon as the incident was only a chance encounter between the victim, the appellant and his co-accused.  In the absence of a conspiracy, the appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct participation.  Elisa could not categorically and positively assert as to what part of the victim’s body was hit by whom, and how many times the victim was stabbed by the appellant.  He asserts that he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by direct participation.

We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[18] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself.  Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence.  After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.  It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.[19] Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.[20] There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders,[21] and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning.[22] One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it.[23] One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators.  If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all.[24] Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others.[25]

To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.[26] The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make him a party to a conspiracy.  There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[27] Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.  From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[28] As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end.[29]

Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 4.  Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1.       By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself.  It is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victim’s death.  Both the offenders are criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts.[30] Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an accomplice, under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 18.  Accomplices. – Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;  (b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.[31] Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution.  Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment.[32] However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice.[33]

In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim.  The appellant and Ronnie were on the side of the street.  However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives.  The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim.  Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian.  When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle.  Ronnie then hurriedly left.  All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.

The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons.  There is no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs criminis, the victim was already dead.  It cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in stabbing the victim, the crime was already consummated.

All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latter’s death.  The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.

Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation.  The stab wounds inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the victim or contributed materially thereto.[34]

The trial court correctly overruled the appellant’s defense of alibi.  Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but hard to disprove.  To serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  For it to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was absent from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been present then.[35] In this case, the appellant avers that at the time of the stabbing incident, he was resting in the house of his cousin at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street as he was suffering from stomach pain due to his ulcer.[36] But the appellant failed to adduce any medical certificate that he was suffering from the ailment.  Moreover, Elisa positively identified the appellant as one of the men who repeatedly stabbed the victim.  The appellant’s defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward identification of the appellant as one of the victim’s assailants.  The appellant himself admitted that his cousin’s house, the place where he was allegedly resting when the victim was stabbed, was merely ten to fifteen meters away from the scene of the stabbing.  Indeed, the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of prosecution eyewitness Elisa Rolan.[37]

The appellant’s defenses must crumble in the face of evidence that he fled from the situs criminis and later left his house.  The records show that despite being informed that he was sought after by the authorities as a suspect for the killing of the victim, the appellant suddenly and inscrutably disappeared from his residence at Nueve de Pebrero.  As early as May 5, 1988, a subpoena for the appellant was returned unserved because he was “out of town.”[38] The appellant’s own witness, Julian Cadion, testified that the appellant had left and was no longer seen at Nueve de Pebrero after the incident, thus:

Q    So, how long did you stay at 606 Nueve de Pebrero after February 5, 1988?

A     One week only, sir, and then three weeks after, I returned to Nueve de Pebrero.

Q    The whole week after February 5, 1988, was Rene Pilola still living at 606 Nueve de Pebrero?

A     I did not see him anymore, sir.

Q    And then three weeks thereafter, you went back to Nueve de Pebrero.  Is that what you were then saying?

A     Yes, sir.

Q    Now, at the time that you went back to 606 Nueve de Pebrero, was Rene Pilola there?

A     I did not see him anymore, sir.[39]

The records show that the appellant knew that he was charged for the stabbing of the victim.  However, instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he adroitly evaded arrest.  The appellant’s flight is evidence of guilt and, from the factual circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, no reason can be deduced from it other than that he was driven by a strong sense of guilt and admission that he had no tenable defense.[40]

The Crime Committed by the Appellant
and the Proper Penalty Therefor

The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery.  Abuse of superior strength likewise attended the commission of the crime.  There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.  The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part.[41] In this case, the attack on the unarmed victim was sudden.  Odilon, without provocation, suddenly placed his arm around the victim’s neck and forthwith stabbed the latter.  The victim had no inkling that he would be attacked as he was attempting to pacify Edmar and Julian.  Ronnie and the appellant, both also armed with deadly weapons, rushed to the scene and stabbed the victim, giving no real opportunity for the latter to defend himself.  And even as the victim was already sprawled on the canal, Ronnie bashed his head with a hollow block.  The peacemaker became the victim of violence.

Unquestionably, the nature and location of the wounds showed that the killing was executed in a treacherous manner, preventing any means of defense on the part of the victim.  As testified to by Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, the victim was stabbed, not just once, but eleven times mostly on the chest and the abdominal area.  Six of the stab wounds were fatal, causing damage to the victim’s vital internal organs.[42]

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery.[43] There is no mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the felony.  The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.  Since no aggravating and mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

Civil Liabilities of the Appellant

The trial court correctly directed the appellant to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselita Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, in accord with current jurisprudence.[44] The said heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000, also conformably to current jurisprudence.[45] In addition, the heirs are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.[46]

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.  The appellant is hereby directed to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity; the amount of P50,000 as moral damages; and the amount of P25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

Tax 2 Case Digest: Balanay Jr. v. Martinez G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975



G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

     Laws Applicable: Art. 792, Art. 179[1], Art. 1041, Art. 1060[1], Art.  750 and 752  Civil
                              Code
 
     Lessons Applicable: illegal provision in a will, donation, preterition of surviving spouse


FACTS:
  • Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of 67. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and 6 legitimate children: Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon
  • Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English where Leodegaria Julian declared (a) she was the owner of the "southern half of 9 conjugal lots (b) she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited from her father (c) it was her desire that her properties should NOT be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (d) after her husband's death (age of 82 in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her.
  • Although initially opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights manifesting that out of respect for his wife's will he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their 6 children.  In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
  • Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void for illegally claiming the conjugal lands
  • David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding also referring to the provisions relating to the conjugal assets as compromising the future legitimes
  • Lower Court: Will was void and converted to intestate proceedings
  • Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order on the ground that Atty. Montaña had NO authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will
  • Lower Court on motion for reconsideration: Denied and clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.

ISSUE: W/N the will should be void and interstate proceeding should follow

HELD: NO.
  • illegal declaration does NOT nullify the entire will and may be disregarded
  • Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as it partakes of a donation, it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
  • The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr.  In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
  • The preterition of surviving spouse did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975



SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.
Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a special administrator.
It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).
We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's estate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* The pertinent provisions of the will are as follows:
"II. That I am the absolute owner of the southern half of the following conjugal properties which I acquired during my married life with my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., namely: (Here follows an enumeration of nine lots).
"III. I am the absolute owner of the following paraphernal properties which I inherited from my deceased father, Cecilio Julian, namely: (Here follows a description of two lots).
"IV. It is my desire and I direct that in the interest of my family, my properties shall not be divided among my heirs during the lifetime of my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr. but should be kept intact. The respective legitimes of my husband and my children should be paid in cash out of the proceeds of sale of the produce and rents derived from said properties.
"V. After the death of my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., my properties shall be divided and distributed in the manner as follows:" (Here follows a partition of the nine conjugal lots and the two paraphernal lots. The testatrix divided among her six children not only her two paraphernal lots, one of which she devised to Emilia Pabaonon and the other lot to Felix Balanay, Jr., but also the nine conjugal lots. She did not restrict the partition to her one-half conjugal share but included her husband's one-half share.).