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Showing posts with label March 27. Show all posts
Showing posts with label March 27. Show all posts

Tax Case Digest: CIR V. Team Energy Corporation (formerly Mirant Pagbilao Corporation) G.R. No. 230412, March 27, 2019

CIR V. Team Energy Corporation (formerly Mirant Pagbilao Corporation)
G.R. No. 230412, March 27, 2019.

Second Division
J. REYES, JR., J.:

Lessons Applicable: VAT tax refund, judicial claim,
Laws Applicable: Section 108(B)(3) of NIRC, Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 (Consolidated Value Added Tax Regulations)

FACTS:
  • Team Energy Corporation (TEC) (formerly Mirant Pagbilao Corporation) is principally engaged in the business of power generation and the subsequent sale thereof to the National Power Corporation (NPC) under a Build, Operate, Transfer Scheme.  It is also a VAT taxpayer.
  • December 17, 2004: TEC filed with the BIR Audit Information, Tax Exemption and Incentives Division an Application for Effective Zero-Rate for the supply of electricity to the NPC for the period January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005, which was subsequently approved.
  • December 20, 2006: TEC filed an administrative claim for cash refund or issuance of tax credit certificate corresponding to the input VAT reported in its Quarterly VAT Returns for the 1st 3 quarters of 2005 and Monthly VAT Declaration for October 2005 in the amount of P80,136,251.60
  • April 18, 2007: Due to inaction on its claim, TEC filed a Petition for Review before the CTA in Division
  • CTA in Division on July 13, 2010: Partially granted ordered to refund or in the alternative, issue a tax credit certificate in the amount of P79,185,617.33 representing unutilized input VAT, attributable to its effectively zero-rated sales of power generation services to NPC for the period covering January 1, 2005 to October 31, 2005.
  • Court in Division: Granted CIR’s Motion for Reconsideration, reversed and set aside the Decision dated July 13, 2010, and dismissed the Petition for Review for having been filed prematurely
  • CTA En Banc: denied the Petition for Review for lack of merit and denied tis MR
  • Supreme Court 3rd Division: Granted Motion to Admit Attached Petition for Review on Certiorari and granted the Certiorari remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals for the proper determination of the refundable amount.  It became final and executory on March 10, 2014 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
  • January 9, 2015: CIR filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reinstatement of the July 13, 2010 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
  • CTA En Banc: Petition for Review is denied.
  • CIR filed a petition for review on certiorari
ISSUES:
1.    W/N the Certificate of Compliance (COC) issued by the Energy Regulation Commission (ERC) is indispensable in claiming a tax refund or tax credit.
2.    W/N judicial claim was prematurely filed for its failure to exhaust administrative remedies when it failed to submit complete supporting documents for its administrative claim

HELD:  Petition is denied.
1.    Yes.  But, considering that Team Energy's refund claim is premised on Section 108(B)(3) of the 1997 NIRC, in relation to Section 13 of the NPC Charter, as amended by Section 10 of P.D. No. 938, the requirements under the EPIRA are inapplicable. To qualify its electricity sale to NPC as zero-rated, Team Energy needs only to show that it is a VAT-registered entity and that it has complied with the invoicing requirements under Section 108(B)(3) of the 1997 NIRC, in conjunction with Section 4,.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.
  • CIR v. Toledo Power Company (G.R. No. 196415, December 02, 2015)
    • requirements of the EPIRA must be complied with only if the claim for refund is based on EPIRA
    • Section 6 of the EPIRA provides that the sale of generated power by generation companies shall be zero-rated. Section 4 (x) of the same law states that a generation company "refers to any person or entity authorized by the ERC to operate facilities used in the generation of electricity." Corollarily, to be entitled to a refund or credit of unutilized input VAT attributable to the sale of electricity under the EPIRA, a taxpayer must establish: (1) that it is a generation company, and (2) that it derived sales from power generation.
  • Team Energy Corporation v. CIR (G.R. Nos. 197663 and 197770, March 14, 2018)
    • CIR that Team Energy is not entitled to tax refund or tax credit because it cannot qualify for VAT zero-rating for its failure to submit its ERC Registration and COC required under the EPIRA.
  • Effective zero-rating was intended to relieve the exempt entity from being burdened with the indirect tax which is or which will be shifted to it had there been no exemption. In this case, respondent is being exempted from paying VAT on its purchases to relieve NPC of the burden of additional costs that respondent may shift to NPC by adding to the cost of the electricity sold to the latter.
2.    No.  There is no showing that the CIR sent a written notice requiring respondent to submit additional documents — a process that is indispensable in computing the 120+30 day period.
  • Pilipinas Total Gas, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (GR No. 207112, December 08, 2015)
    • To summarize, for the just disposition of the subject controversy, the rule is that from the date an administrative claim for excess unutilized VAT is filed, a taxpayer has thirty (30) days within which to submit the documentary requirements sufficient to support his claim, unless given further extension by the CIR. Then, upon filing by the taxpayer of his complete documents to support his application, or expiration of the period given, the CIR has 120 days within which to decide the claim for tax credit or refund. Should the taxpayer, on the date of his filing, manifest that he no longer wishes to submit any other addition documents to complete his administrative claim, the 120-day period allowed to the CIR begins to run from the date of filing. 

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People v. Fernando 1926

People v. Fernando

G.R. No. L-24978 March 27, 1926

Lessons Applicable: when negligent, mistake of fact is not a defense

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
·         Before the day of crime: Moro prisoners had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon, Zamboanga
·         3 suspicious looking persons who were prowling around the place alarmed the residents
·         As municipal policeman Fernando de Fernando, Paciencia Delgado daughter of Remigio Delgado told him that her father wished to see him
·         Remigio Delgado informed him that the 3 suspicious persons in blue were lurking in his house
·         About 7pm: De Fernando seated on a bench near the window talking to Paciencia when about 4 meters from the stairs was a person in dark clothes with 3 bolos tied together calling out “Nong Miong” without answering the inquiry of De Fernando.
o    De Fernando took out his revolver and fired a shot in the air but the person still continued to go up the stairs so he shot him at the base of the neck at the right side
o    The shot person turned out to be Buenventura Paulino, nephew of Remigio, who ran to their neighbor Leon Torres’ house, placing the bolo on the table, fell on the floor and died
·         de Fernando called the police chief to relay what happened
·         CFI of Zamboanga:  guilty of the crime of murder

ISSUE: W/N de Fernando is guilty of negligence

HELD: YES. reversing the appealed judgment, guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence

·         De Fernando failed to use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before taking such fatal action
o    The calling of “Nong Miong” indicated that the owner of the house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend
o    De Fernando failed to ask Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her father with such familiarity
·         NO malicious intent because he though at the time that he was justified in acting as he did
·         homicide through reckless negligence under article 568, in relation with article 404, of the Penal Code

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-24978 March 27, 1926

EN BANC
DECISION

G.R. No. L-24978  March 27, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO DE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.
W. A. Armstrong for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
Villareal, J.:
This appeal has been taken by the defendant Fernando de Fernando from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, in which he was held guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty years cadena temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Buenventura Paulino in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs, by virtue of a complaint filed by the fiscal charging with the said crime.
As a basis for his appeal the accused assigns the following errors as committed by the trial court: (1) in holding that the acts committed by the accused constituted the crime for murder; (2) in not holding that the accused was exempt from criminal liability and in not acquitting him.
At the trial the following facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Before the day of the crime several Moro prisoners had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon, Zamboanga. The residents of the barrio of Municahan of the municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by the presence of three suspicious looking persons who were prowling around the place. The accused Fernando de Fernando who, at that time, was a municipal policeman, when passing in front of the house of one Remigio Delgado, was called by the latter’s daughter Paciencia Delgado, who stated that her father wished to see him. When the policeman came up the house Remigio Delgado informed him that three unknown and suspicious looking persons, dressed in blue, prowling around his house. The accused remained in the said house talking with Paciencia Delgado, both being seated on a bench near the window. While they were thus talking, at about 7 o’clock at night, there appeared in the dark, at about 4 meters from the stairs, a person dressed in dark clothes, calling “Nong Miong.” At the time the accused nor Paciencia Delgado knew who was thus calling. The accused inquired what he wanted but instead of answering he continued advancing with bolo in hand. Upon seeing this Fernando de Fernando took out his revolver and fired a shot in the air. As he saw that the unknown continued to ascend the staircase he fired at him. The unknown disappeared and ran to the house of a neighbor Leon Torres, where, after placing upon a table the bolos that he carried, he fell on the floor and expired. Remigio Delgado, who was in the kitchen and had recognized the voice of the unknown, on hearing the shots ran into the parlor, took hold of the arm of the defendant and asked him why he had fired at Buenventura Paulino. Fernando de Fernando only said “Let me go, that is a cross eyed person” and immediately repaired to the house of the teniente of the barrio, Santiago Torres, from where he telephoned to the chief of police advising him of what had happened. When the body was examined it was found that a bullet had penetrated the base of the neck at the right, imbedding itself in the left side under the skin.
The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of the presence of suspicious looking persons who might be the Moro prisoners who had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon. The appearance of a man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color to the prisoner’s uniform who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of Paciencia Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown man was one of the three persons that the owner of the house said were prowling around the place. The suspicion become a reality in his mind when he saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand, not heeding his question as to who he was. In the midst of these circumstances and believing undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him appeared to be wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who was carrying three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment when the forces of far and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take full account of the true situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious character who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact he called “Nong Miong,” which indicated that the owner of the house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and in not asking Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before taking such fatal action.
Taking into consideration the estate of mind of the accused at the time, and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person, in shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the house against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder, but only that of simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal with malicious intent, because he though at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what he though him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.
The crime committed by the caused, therefore, is homicide through reckless negligence defined and punished in article 568, in relation with article 404, of the Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by lawarresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correcional in its minimum degree.
In view of the foregoing and reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is held guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, and he is sentenced to suffer one year prision correcional, to pay the amount of P500 to the heirs of the deceased as an indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the costs and with credit of one-half of the preventive imprisonment already suffered. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcom, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-16567 March 27, 1961

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16567             March 27, 1961

DELGADO BROTHERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HOME INSURANCE COMPANY and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Leocadio de Asis and A.C. Cruz for petitioner.
William H. Quasha for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 20441-R), reversing the judgment of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Civil Case No. 29144) and, instead, ordering petitioner-defendant Delgado Brothers, Inc. to pay to respondent-plaintiff Home Insurance Company, the sum of P1,436.86, plus 6% per annum interest from the commencement of the action until fully paid.

On March 7, 1956, respondent Home Insurance Company filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint against petitioner Delgado Brothers, Inc. alleging that on February 17, 1955, Victor Bijou & Co. of 14 East 37th Street, New York 16, New York, U.S.A., shipped at New York for Manila aboard the vessel S.S. Leoville and consigned to the Judy Philippines, Inc. of Manila, a shipment of 1 case Linen Handkerchiefs and 2 cases cotton piece goods, for which, the New York agent of said vessel, the Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., issued Bill of Lading No. 119; that said shipment as insured with herein respondent by the shipper and/or consignee; that said vessel arrived at the Port of Manila on March 30, 1955 and, thereafter, said shipment was unloaded complete and in good order from said vessel by petitioner, but the latter delivered the same to the consignee with 1 case of Linen Handkerchiefs in bad order, with a shortage of 503 yards of Linen Print Handkerchiefs, to the prejudice, loss and damage of shipper and or consignee in the sum of P1,287.20; that the shipper and/or consignee filed its claim with petitioner for said loss in the sum of $713.08 (P1,436.86); and since respondent dent paid the amount to the shipper and\or consignee, the former was subrogated to the shipper's and/or consignee's rights and interests; that notwithstanding respondent's claim against petitioner, the latter failed and refused to pay the shipper and/or consignee and/or respondent the total claim of P1,287.20; and that as it result of petitioner's gross and evident bad faith to pay the claim of the shipper and/or consignee and/or respondent, it was compelled to file the Case and will incur attorney's fees in the sum of P478.95. Respondent prayed that petitioner pay to it the sum of P1,287.20, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until fully, paid; P149.66, the difference between P1,436.86 paid by respondent to the shipper and/or consignee and the said sum of P1,287.20; and P478.95 as attorney's fees, plus costs.

To this complaint, petitioner filed its answer on March 27, 1956, alleging as special defense that since no claim whatsoever was filed by respondent or the consignee, or their representatives against petitioner within the 15-day period from the date of the arrival of the goods before they could file a suit in the court of proper jurisdiction within 1 year from the date of said arrival at the Port of Manila, petitioner is completely relieved and released of any and all liability for loss or damage under the law and in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the management Contract with the Bureau of Customs, covering the operation of the Arrastre Service for the Port of Manila; and that petitioner in no way acts as an agent of the carrying vessel or of the importer or consignee. Petitioner, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of respondent's complaint.

On October 16, 1956, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint", to which, respondent filed an opposition on October 19, 1956, alleging that since the case is an action in admiralty, it is within the original jurisdiction of the court. On October 20, 1956, the court issued an order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss.

The case was, thereafter, tried and, after trial, the court, on March 6, 1957, rendered a decision dismissing the case and absolving petitioner from liability to respondent, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction raised by petitioner-defendant, but on the merits of the latter's special defenses invoked in its answer.

Not satisfied with said decision, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which court, on December 29, 1959, rendered as already adverted to, a decision reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ordering petitioner to pay to respondent the sum of P1,436.86, plus 6% per annum interest thereon from the commencement of the action until fully paid. Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner, in this instance, claims that the Court of Appeals (as did the Court of First Instance of Manila) erred in not dismissing respondent's complaint on the specific ground that it (Court of First Instance) had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the same not being an admiralty case, and the amount sought to be recovered falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila.

Appellant's contention is meritorious. In the case of Macondray & Company, Inc. v. Delgado Brothers, Inc. (G.R. No. L-13116, prom. April 28, 1960), the facts and issues of which are identical, mutatis mutandis, to the case at bar, we held:

The case at bar does not deal with any maritime or with the administration and application of any maritime law. As custodian of the sixty-eight (68) cartons of paints it had received from the MS Pleasantville, it was defendant's duty, like that of any ordinary depositary, to take good care of said goods and to turn the same over to the party entitled to its possession, subject to such qualifications as may have validly been imposed in the contract between the parties concerned. Such duty on the part of the defendant would be the same if the final destination of the goods were Manila, not Iloilo, and the goods had not been imported from another state. The only issues raised in the pleadings are (1) whether or not defendant had fully discharged its obligation to deliver the aforementioned sixty-eight (68) cartons of paint; and (2) in the negative case, the amount of indemnity due the plaintiff therefor. The determination of those questions does not require the application of any maritime law and cannot affect either navigation or maritime commerce. The foreign origin of the goods is — under the attending circumstances — immaterial to the law applicable to this case or the rights of the parties herein, or the procedure for the settlement of their disputes. Indeed, it is well settled that —

In case of controversy involving both maritime and nonmaritime subject matter, where the principal matter involved belongs to the jurisdiction of a court of common law or of equity, admiralty will not take cognizance of incidental maritime matters connected therewith but will relegate the whole controversy to the appropriate tribunal. (2 C.J.S. 66.). (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent, however, submits that the above-quoted ruling is wrong and urges a re-examination of the issue, arguing that petitioner's arrastre service is maritime in nature and, therefore, actions against petitioner arrastre operator properly come under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

We have carefully considered respondent's argument but found nothing to justify a departure from our conclusion in the Macondray case, supra. Section 2 of the Management Contract entered into between petitioner an the Bureau of Customs on October 21, 1950 (effective January 1, 1951), reads as follows:

2. During the period while this agreement remains in force and effect, the CONTRACTOR (herein petitioner Delgado Brothers, Inc.) shall be, and the shall manager of the Arrastre Service at the Port of Manila, subject always, how ever, to the terms conditions, restrictions, subjections, supervisions and provisions in this agreement contained, with the exclusive right or privilege of receiving, handling, caring for, and delivering all merchandise, imported and exported, upon or passing over, the Philippine Government-owned wharves and piers in the Port of Manila; as also, the recording or checking of all merchandise which may be delivered to the Port of Manila at shipside, except coal, lumber and firebricks in quantity case crude oil and kerosene and gasoline in lots of over ten thousand cases or its equivalent, and whole cargoes of on commodity when consigned to one consignee only as hereafter provided, and in general to furnish lighting and water services and other incidental services, in order to undertake such work and with full power to fix the number and salaries of, and to appoint and dismiss, all officers, employees and laborers temporary and permanent, which may be necessary, and to do all acts and things which said CONTRACTOR may consider conclusive to the interests of the Arrastre Service. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under this provision, petitioner's functions as arrastre operator are (1) to receive, handle, care for, and deliver all merchandise imported and exported, upon or passing over Government-owned wharves and piers in the Port of Manila, (2) as well as to record or cheek all merchandise which may be delivered to said port at shipside, and in general, (3) to furnish light and water services and other incidental services in order to undertake its arrastre service. Note that there is nothing in those functions which relate to the trade and business of navigation (1 Am. Jur. 564), nor to the use or operation of vessels (Id. at 568). Both as to the nature of the functions and the place of their performance (upon wharves and piers shipside), petitioner's services are clearly not maritime. As we held in the Macondray case, they are no different from those of a depositary or warehouseman. Granting, arguendo, that petitioner's arrastre service depends on, assists, or furthers maritime transportation (Id. at 565), it may be deemed merely incidental to its aforementioned functions as arrastre operator and does not, thereby, make petitioner's arrastre service maritime in character.

To give admiralty jurisdiction over a contract as maritime, such contract must relate to the trade and business of the sea; it must be essentially and fully maritime in its character; it must provide for maritime services, maritime transactions, or maritime casualties. (The James T. Furber, 129 Fed. 808, cited in 66 L.R.A. 212; emphasis supplied.) See also 2 C.J.S. 66, supra.

The case of Cebu Arrastre Service v. Collector of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. L-7444, prom. May 30, 1956) cited by respondent is irrelevant to the present case, considering that the functions of the Cebu Arrastre Service involve the loading, and unloading of coastwise vessels calling at the port of Cebu and, are, therefore, of a "stevedore", subject to the percentage tax under Section 191 of the Tax Code. Similarly, the case of American Stevedores v. Porello (330 U.S. 446, 91 L. Ed. 1011) is inapplicable, involving as it does, stevedores or longshoremen, not an arrastre operator. In the instant case, Delgado Brothers, Inc. has nothing to do with the loading or unloading of cargoes to and from the ships. Its operation on and its responsibility for the merchandise and goods begins from the time they are placed upon the wharves or piers or delivered along sides of ships. Evans v. New York & Pacific Steamship Co., Ltd., et al. (145 F. 841) cited by respondent is, likewise, not in point. It should be noted that in said case, the New York & Pacific Steamship Co. Ltd. (owner of the steamship "Capac" and with whom appellant Evans has a contract evidenced by a bill of lading) and not the warehouseman or depositary Beards Erie Basin Stores, was the one sued by said appellant Evans for recovery of the value of 20 bales of rubber which said steamship failed to deliver. Hence, the District Court of New York properly held that the contract with the steamship company was maritime in nature, over which it had jurisdiction to entertain and decide. Undoubtedly, the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction in cases where suit is brought directly against the carrier or shipowner.

Respondent cannot invoke the rule against multiplicity of suits, for the simple reason that said rule has to be subservient to the superior requirement that the court must have jurisdiction. (See International Harvester Company of the Philippines v. Judge Aragon, et al., G.R. No. L-2372, prom. August 26, 1949, 84 Phil. 363.)

With these conclusions, it is needless to discuss the other points raised in the briefs.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and case dismissed, with costs against the respondent. So ordered.

Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 133179 March 27, 2008

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133179               March 27, 2008

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., and PRODUCERS BANK, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

To ingratiate themselves to their valued depositors, some banks at times bend over backwards that they unwittingly expose themselves to great risks.

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision promulgated on March 18, 19981 in CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 entitled Lim Sio Wan v. Allied Banking Corporation, et al. The CA Decision modified the Decision dated November 15, 19932 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 in Makati City rendered in Civil Case No. 6757.

The Facts

The facts as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA are as follows:

On November 14, 1983, respondent Lim Sio Wan deposited with petitioner Allied Banking Corporation (Allied) at its Quintin Paredes Branch in Manila a money market placement of PhP 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days to mature on December 15, 1983,3 as evidenced by Provisional Receipt No. 1356 dated November 14, 1983.4

On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an officer of Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement, to issue a manager’s check representing the proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to one Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the check.5 Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos so that So could easily identify her.6

Later, Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a manager’s check to be issued.7 The bank issued Manager’s Check No. 035669 for PhP 1,158,648.49, representing the proceeds of Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as payee.8 The check was cross-checked "For Payee’s Account Only" and given to Santos.9

Thereafter, the manager’s check was deposited in the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank),10 with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan as indorser.11

Earlier, on September 21, 1983, FCC had deposited a money market placement for PhP 2 million with respondent Producers Bank. Santos was the money market trader assigned to handle FCC’s account.12 Such deposit is evidenced by Official Receipt No. 31756813 and a Letter dated September 21, 1983 of Santos addressed to Angie Lazo of FCC, acknowledging receipt of the placement.14 The placement matured on October 25, 1983 and was rolled-over until December 5, 1983 as evidenced by a Letter dated October 25, 1983.15 When the placement matured, FCC demanded the payment of the proceeds of the placement.16 On December 5, 1983, the same date that So received the phone call instructing her to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wan’s placement, the manager’s check in the name of Lim Sio Wan was deposited in the account of FCC, purportedly representing the proceeds of FCC’s money market placement with Producers Bank.17 In other words, the Allied check was deposited with Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Bank’s payment of its obligation to FCC.

To clear the check and in compliance with the requirements of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations, Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which reads: "All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed."18

The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC. Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even without checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s purported indorsement. Thus, the amount on the face of the check was credited to the account of FCC.19

On December 9, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money market placement to mature on January 9, 1984.20

On December 14, 1983, upon the maturity date of the first money market placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it.21 She was then informed that the placement had been pre-terminated upon her instructions. She denied giving any instructions and receiving the proceeds thereof. She desisted from further complaints when she was assured by the bank’s manager that her money would be recovered.22

When Lim Sio Wan’s second placement matured on January 9, 1984, So called Lim Sio Wan to ask for the latter’s instructions on the second placement. Lim Sio Wan instructed So to roll-over the placement for another 30 days.23 On January 24, 1984, Lim Sio Wan, realizing that the promise that her money would be recovered would not materialize, sent a demand letter to Allied asking for the payment of the first placement.24 Allied refused to pay Lim Sio Wan, claiming that the latter had authorized the pre-termination of the placement and its subsequent release to Santos.25

Consequently, Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC a Complaint dated February 13, 198426 docketed as Civil Case No. 6757 against Allied to recover the proceeds of her first money market placement. Sometime in February 1984, she withdrew her second placement from Allied.

Allied filed a third party complaint27 against Metrobank and Santos. In turn, Metrobank filed a fourth party complaint28 against FCC. FCC for its part filed a fifth party complaint29 against Producers Bank. Summonses were duly served upon all the parties except for Santos, who was no longer connected with Producers Bank.30

On May 15, 1984, or more than six (6) months after funding the check, Allied informed Metrobank that the signature on the check was forged.31 Thus, Metrobank withheld the amount represented by the check from FCC. Later on, Metrobank agreed to release the amount to FCC after the latter executed an Undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank in case it was made to reimburse the amount.32

Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to include Metrobank as a party-defendant, along with Allied.33 The RTC admitted the amended complaint despite the opposition of Metrobank.34 Consequently, Allied’s third party complaint against Metrobank was converted into a cross-claim and the latter’s fourth party complaint against FCC was converted into a third party complaint.35

After trial, the RTC issued its Decision, holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering defendant Allied Banking Corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid;

2. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;

3. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P173,792.20 by way of attorney’s fees; and,

4. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay the costs of suit.

Defendant Allied Bank’s cross-claim against defendant Metrobank is DISMISSED.

Likewise defendant Metrobank’s third-party complaint as against Filipinas Cement Corporation is DISMISSED.

Filipinas Cement Corporation’s fourth-party complaint against Producer’s Bank is also DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.36

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

Allied appealed to the CA, which in turn issued the assailed Decision on March 18, 1998, modifying the RTC Decision, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company forty (40%) of the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid. The moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.37

Hence, Allied filed the instant petition.

The Issues

Allied raises the following issues for our consideration:

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Lim Sio Wan did not authorize [Allied] to pre-terminate the initial placement and to deliver the check to Deborah Santos.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in absolving Producers Bank of any liability for the reimbursement of amount adjudged demandable.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding [Allied] liable to the extent of 60% of amount adjudged demandable in clear disregard to the ultimate liability of Metrobank as guarantor of all endorsement on the check, it being the collecting bank.38

The petition is partly meritorious.

A Question of Fact

Allied questions the finding of both the trial and appellate courts that Allied was not authorized to release the proceeds of Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement to Santos. Allied clearly raises a question of fact. When the CA affirms the findings of fact of the RTC, the factual findings of both courts are binding on this Court.39

We also agree with the CA when it said that it could not disturb the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witness So inasmuch as it was the trial court that heard the witness and had the opportunity to observe closely her deportment and manner of testifying. Unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value, which, if considered, might affect the result of the case,40 we find it best to defer to the trial court on matters pertaining to credibility of witnesses.

Additionally, this Court has held that the matter of negligence is also a factual question.41 Thus, the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, that the respective parties were negligent in the exercise of their obligations is also conclusive upon this Court.

The Liability of the Parties

As to the liability of the parties, we find that Allied is liable to Lim Sio Wan. Fundamental and familiar is the doctrine that the relationship between a bank and a client is one of debtor-creditor.

Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code provide:

Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.

Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.

Thus, we have ruled in a line of cases that a bank deposit is in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum.42 More succinctly, in Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, this Court ruled that a money market placement is a simple loan or mutuum.43 Further, we defined a money market in Cebu International Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, as follows:

[A] money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term credit instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers do not deal directly with each other but through a middle man or dealer in open market. In a money market transaction, the investor is a lender who loans his money to a borrower through a middleman or dealer.

In the case at bar, the money market transaction between the petitioner and the private respondent is in the nature of a loan.44

Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market placement, is entitled to payment upon her request, or upon maturity of the placement, or until the bank is released from its obligation as debtor. Until any such event, the obligation of Allied to Lim Sio Wan remains unextinguished.

Art. 1231 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when obligations are considered extinguished, thus:

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

(1) By payment or performance;

(2) By the loss of the thing due;

(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;

(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;

(5) By compensation;

(6) By novation.

Other causes of extinguishment of obligations, such as annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, and prescription, are governed elsewhere in this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts that Lim Sio Wan did not authorize the release of her money market placement to Santos and the bank had been negligent in so doing, there is no question that the obligation of Allied to pay Lim Sio Wan had not been extinguished. Art. 1240 of the Code states that "payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it." As commented by Arturo Tolentino:

Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the obligation as to the creditor, if there is no fault or negligence which can be imputed to the latter. Even when the debtor acted in utmost good faith and by mistake as to the person of his creditor, or through error induced by the fraud of a third person, the payment to one who is not in fact his creditor, or authorized to receive such payment, is void, except as provided in Article 1241. Such payment does not prejudice the creditor, and accrual of interest is not suspended by it.45 (Emphasis supplied.)

Since there was no effective payment of Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement, the bank still has an obligation to pay her at six percent (6%) interest from March 16, 1984 until the payment thereof.

We cannot, however, say outright that Allied is solely liable to Lim Sio Wan.

Allied claims that Metrobank is the proximate cause of the loss of Lim Sio Wan’s money. It points out that Metrobank guaranteed all prior indorsements inscribed on the manager’s check, and without Metrobank’s guarantee, the present controversy would never have occurred. According to Allied:

Failure on the part of the collecting bank to ensure that the proceeds of the check is paid to the proper party is, aside from being an efficient intervening cause, also the last negligent act, x x x contributory to the injury caused in the present case, which thereby leads to the conclusion that it is the collecting bank, Metrobank that is the proximate cause of the alleged loss of the plaintiff in the instant case.46

We are not persuaded.

Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred."47 Thus, there is an efficient supervening event if the event breaks the sequence leading from the cause to the ultimate result. To determine the proximate cause of a controversy, the question that needs to be asked is: If the event did not happen, would the injury have resulted? If the answer is NO, then the event is the proximate cause.

In the instant case, Allied avers that even if it had not issued the check payment, the money represented by the check would still be lost because of Metrobank’s negligence in indorsing the check without verifying the genuineness of the indorsement thereon.

Section 66 in relation to Sec. 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:

Section 66. Liability of general indorser.—Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course;

a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the next preceding section; and

b) That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting;

And in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it.

Section 65. Warranty where negotiation by delivery, so forth.—Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement, warrants:

a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be;

b) That he has a good title of it;

c) That all prior parties had capacity to contract;

d) That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.

But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee.

The provisions of subdivision (c) of this section do not apply to persons negotiating public or corporation securities, other than bills and notes. (Emphasis supplied.)

The warranty "that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be" covers all the defects in the instrument affecting the validity thereof, including a forged indorsement. Thus, the last indorser will be liable for the amount indicated in the negotiable instrument even if a previous indorsement was forged. We held in a line of cases that "a collecting bank which indorses a check bearing a forged indorsement and presents it to the drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements, including the forged indorsement itself, and ultimately should be held liable therefor."48

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions. One such exception is when the issuance of the check itself was attended with negligence. Thus, in the cases cited above where the collecting bank is generally held liable, in two of the cases where the checks were negligently issued, this Court held the institution issuing the check just as liable as or more liable than the collecting bank.

In isolated cases where the checks were deposited in an account other than that of the payees on the strength of forged indorsements, we held the collecting bank solely liable for the whole amount of the checks involved for having indorsed the same. In Republic Bank v. Ebrada,49 the check was properly issued by the Bureau of Treasury. While in Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco de Oro) v. Equitable Banking Corporation,50 Banco de Oro admittedly issued the checks in the name of the correct payees. And in Traders Royal Bank v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc.,51 the checks were issued at the request of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. from Traders Royal Bank.1avvphi1

However, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, we said that the drawee bank is liable for 60% of the amount on the face of the negotiable instrument and the collecting bank is liable for 40%. We also noted the relative negligence exhibited by two banks, to wit:

Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss. While it is true that petitioner BPI’s negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss, respondent CBC’s negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts. (See Phoenix Construction Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Courts, 148 SCRA 353 [1987]).

Considering the comparative negligence of the two (2) banks, we rule that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the loss of P2,413,215.16 and the costs of the arbitration proceeding in the amount of P7,250.00 and the cost of litigation on a 60-40 ratio.52

Similarly, we ruled in Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals that the issuing institution and the collecting bank should equally share the liability for the loss of amount represented by the checks concerned due to the negligence of both parties:

The Court finds as reasonable, the proportionate sharing of fifty percent-fifty percent (50%-50%). Due to the negligence of the Province of Tarlac in releasing the checks to an unauthorized person (Fausto Pangilinan), in allowing the retired hospital cashier to receive the checks for the payee hospital for a period close to three years and in not properly ascertaining why the retired hospital cashier was collecting checks for the payee hospital in addition to the hospital’s real cashier, respondent Province contributed to the loss amounting to P203,300.00 and shall be liable to the PNB for fifty (50%) percent thereof. In effect, the Province of Tarlac can only recover fifty percent (50%) of P203,300.00 from PNB.

The collecting bank, Associated Bank, shall be liable to PNB for fifty (50%) percent of P203,300.00. It is liable on its warranties as indorser of the checks which were deposited by Fausto Pangilinan, having guaranteed the genuineness of all prior indorsements, including that of the chief of the payee hospital, Dr. Adena Canlas. Associated Bank was also remiss in its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the payee’s indorsement.53

A reading of the facts of the two immediately preceding cases would reveal that the reason why the bank or institution which issued the check was held partially liable for the amount of the check was because of the negligence of these parties which resulted in the issuance of the checks.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly found Allied negligent in issuing the manager’s check and in transmitting it to Santos without even a written authorization.54 In fact, Allied did not even ask for the certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her residence or office to confirm her instructions. Both actions could have prevented the whole fraudulent transaction from unfolding. Allied’s negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of the resulting loss.

To reiterate, had Allied exercised the diligence due from a financial institution, the check would not have been issued and no loss of funds would have resulted. In fact, there would have been no issuance of indorsement had there been no check in the first place.

The liability of Allied, however, is concurrent with that of Metrobank as the last indorser of the check. When Metrobank indorsed the check in compliance with the PCHC Rules and Regulations55 without verifying the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s indorsement and when it accepted the check despite the fact that it was cross-checked payable to payee’s account only,56 its negligent and cavalier indorsement contributed to the easier release of Lim Sio Wan’s money and perpetuation of the fraud. Given the relative participation of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case, both banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of the liabilities of Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the CA, must be upheld.

FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of the check and in the forgery of Lim Sio Wan’s indorsement, can raise the real defense of forgery as against both banks.57

As to Producers Bank, Allied Bank’s argument that Producers Bank must be held liable as employer of Santos under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is erroneous. Art. 2180 pertains to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.

One also cannot apply the principle of subsidiary liability in Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code in the instant case. Such liability on the part of the employer for the civil aspect of the criminal act of the employee is based on the conviction of the employee for a crime. Here, there has been no conviction for any crime.

As to the claim that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank, the same is correct. Allied correctly claims in its petition that Producers Bank should reimburse Allied for whatever judgment that may be rendered against it pursuant to Art. 22 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to him."1avvphi1

The above provision of law was clarified in Reyes v. Lim, where we ruled that "[t]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."58

In Tamio v. Ticson, we further clarified the principle of unjust enrichment, thus: "Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another."59

In the instant case, Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement in Allied Bank was pre-terminated and withdrawn without her consent. Moreover, the proceeds of the placement were deposited in Producers Bank’s account in Metrobank without any justification. In other words, there is no reason that the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans’ placement should be deposited in FCC’s account purportedly as payment for FCC’s money market placement and interest in Producers Bank.lavvphil With such payment, Producers Bank’s indebtedness to FCC was extinguished, thereby benefitting the former. Clearly, Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio Wan. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts the two latter banks are ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan.

It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank, should be considered as having been unjustly enriched. It must be remembered that FCC’s money market placement with Producers Bank was already due and demandable; thus, Producers Bank’s payment thereof was justified. FCC was entitled to such payment. As earlier stated, the fact that the indorsement on the check was forged cannot be raised against FCC which was not a part in any stage of the negotiation of the check. FCC was not unjustly enriched.

From the facts of the instant case, we see that Santos could be the architect of the entire controversy. Unfortunately, since summons had not been served on Santos, the courts have not acquired jurisdiction over her.60 We, therefore, cannot ascribe to her liability in the instant case.

Clearly, Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for the amount of the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit which Allied and Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 18, 1998 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 and the November 15, 1993 RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 6757 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Thus, the CA Decision is AFFIRMED, the fallo of which is reproduced, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company forty (40%) of the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid. The moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Additionally and by way of MODIFICATION, Producers Bank is hereby ordered to pay Allied and Metrobank the aforementioned amounts. The liabilities of the parties are concurrent and independent of each other.

SO ORDERED.

Transportation Case Digest: Delgado Brothers, Inc. v. Home Insurance, Inc. (1961)

G.R. No. L-16567             March 27, 1961
Lessons Applicable: Ancillary Contracts (Transportation)

FACTS:
  • February 17, 1955: Victor Bijou & Co. shipped at New York for Manila aboard the vessel S.S. Leoville and consigned to the Judy Philippines, Inc. of Manila, a shipment of 1 case Linen Handkerchiefs and 2 cases cotton piece goods, for which, the New York agent of said vessel, the Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., issued Bill of Lading No. 119
    • shipment as insured with Home Insurance, Inc. by the shipper and/or consignee
      • March 30, 1955: vessel arrived at the Port of Manila and delivered 1 case of Linen Handkerchiefs in bad order, with a shortage of 503 yards of Linen Print Handkerchiefs, to the prejudice, loss and damage of shipper and or consignee in the sum of P1,287.20 so they filed a claim against Home Insurance Inc.
  • March 7, 1956: Home Insurance Inc.  filed against contractor Delgado Brothers Inc.
  • Trial Court: dismissed the case in favor of Home based on its special defenses invoked in its answer
    • since no claim was filed within the 15-day period from the date of the arrival of the goods before they could file a suit in the court of proper jurisdiction within 1 year from the date of said arrival at the Port of Manila, it is completely relieved and released of any and all liability for loss or damage under the law and in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the management Contract with the Bureau of Customs, covering the operation of the Arrastre Service for the Port of Manila; and that petitioner in no way acts as an agent of the carrying vessel or of the importer or consignee
  • CA: reversed because of lack of jurisdiction it being a maritime contract should be handled by the Municipal Court
ISSUE: W/N the case has prescribed according to maritime law (arrastre being a maritime case)

HELD: NO.
  • In case of controversy involving both maritime and nonmaritime subject matter, where the principal matter involved belongs to the jurisdiction of a court of common law or of equity, admiralty will not take cognizance of incidental maritime matters connected therewith but will relegate the whole controversy to the appropriate tribunal
  • Both as to the nature of the functions and the place of their performance (upon wharves and piers shipside), Brother's services are clearly not maritime but arrastre services
    • they are no different from those of a depositary or warehouseman
  • To give admiralty jurisdiction over a contract as maritime, such contract must relate to the trade and business of the sea; it must be essentially and fully maritime in its character; it must provide for maritime services, maritime transactions, or maritime casualties. 
  • Delgado Brothers, Inc. has nothing to do with the loading or unloading of cargoes to and from the ships. Its operation on and its responsibility for the merchandise and goods begins from the time they are placed upon the wharves or piers or delivered along sides of ships
  • Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction in cases where suit is brought directly against the carrier or shipowner.
    Respondent cannot invoke the rule against multiplicity of suits, for the simple reason that said rule has to be subservient to the superior requirement that the court must have jurisdiction

Negotiable Instruments Case Digest: Allied Banking Corp. v. Lim Sio Wan (2008)


G.R. No. 133179               March 27, 2008
Lessons Applicable: Liabilities of the Parties (Negotiable Instruments Law)


FACTS: 
Lim Sio Wan (deposited 1st money market) > Allied Bank > (pre-terminated and withdrawn) Santos > (through forged indorsement of Lim Sio Wan deposited in FCC account) Metrobank > (release in exchange of undertaking of reimbursement) FCC > (through Santos, as officer of Producers bank, deposited money market) Producers Bank 
  • September 21, 1983: FCC had deposited a money market placement for P 2M with Producers Bank

    • Santos was the money market trader assigned to handle FCC’s account

    • Such deposit is evidenced by Official Receipt and a Letter 

    • When the placement matured, FCC demanded the payment of the proceeds of the placement

  • November 14, 1983: Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied Banking Corporation (Allied) a money market placement of P 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days

  • December 5, 1983: a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an officer of Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement, to issue a manager’s check representing the proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the check.  Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos 

    • Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a manager’s check to be issued

      • The bank issued Manager’s Check representing the proceeds of Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as payee, cross-checked "For Payee’s Account Only" and given to Santos

  • Allied manager’s check was deposited in the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan as indorser

    • Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which reads: "All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed."

    • Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even without checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s purported indorsement. 

      • amount on the face of the check was credited to the account of FCC

  • December 9, 1983: Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money market placement to mature on January 9, 1984

  • December 14, 1983: upon the maturity date of the first money market placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it. She was then informed that the placement had been pre-terminated upon her instructions which she denied

  • Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC against Allied to recover the proceeds of her first money market placement

    • Allied filed a third party complaint against Metrobank and Santos

    • Metrobank filed a fourth party complainagainst FCC

    • FCC for its part filed a fifth party complaint against Producers Bank. 

    • Summonses were duly served upon all the parties except for Santos, who was no longer connected with Producers Bank

  • May 15, 1984: Allied informed Metrobank that the signature on the check was forged

    • Metrobank withheld the amount represented by the check from FCC.

    • Metrobank agreed to release the amount to FCC after the FCC executed an undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank in case it was made to reimburse the amount

    • Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to include Metrobank as a party-defendant, along with Allied.

  • RTC :  Allied Bank to pay Lim Sio Wan plus damages and atty. fees

    • Allied Bank’s cross-claim against Metrobank is DISMISSED.

    • Metrobank’s third-party complaint as against Filipinas Cement Corporation is DISMISSED

    • Filipinas Cement Corporation’s fourth-party complaint against Producer’s Bank is DISMISSED

  • CA: Modified.  Allied Banking Corporation to pay 60% and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company 40%

ISSUE: W/N Allied should be solely liable to Lim Sio Wan.

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.  Modified Porudcers Bank to reimburse Allied and Metrobank.

  • Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code


Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.

Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.

  • bank deposit is in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum

  • money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term credit instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers do not deal directly with each other but through a middle man or dealer in open market. In a money market transaction, the investor is a lender who loans his money to a borrower through a middleman or dealer.

    • Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market placement, is entitled to payment upon her request, or upon maturity of the placement, or until the bank is released from its obligation as debtor

  • GR: collecting bank which indorses a check bearing a forged indorsement and presents it to the drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements, including the forged indorsement itself, and ultimately should be held liable therefor

  • EX: when the issuance of the check itself was attended with negligence. 

  • Allied negligent in issuing the manager’s check and in transmitting it to Santos without even a written authorization

    • Allied did not even ask for the certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her residence or office to confirm her instructions.

    • Allied’s negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of the resulting loss.

  • When Metrobank indorsed the check without verifying the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s indorsement and when it accepted the check despite the fact that it was cross-checked payable to payee’s account only

    • contributed to the easier release of Lim Sio Wan’s money and perpetuation of the fraud

  • Given the relative participation of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case, both banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of the liabilities of Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the CA, must be upheld.

  • FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of the check and in the forgery of Lim Sio Wan’s indorsement, can raise the real defense of forgery as against both banks

  • Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio Wan

    • Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan