Constitutional Law Case Digest: De Lima v. Pres. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019

De Lima v. Pres. Rodrigo R. Duterte
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019

Lessons Applicable: Writ of Habeas Data, Presidential Immunity from Suit
Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

• May 9, 2016: Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected as the 16th President of the Philippines with a key agenda of his Administration was the relentless national crackdown on illegal drugs.
• August 2, 2016: Sen. De Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the Senate calling a stop to the alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the crackdown.
• Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data seeking to enjoin President Rodrigo Roa Dutete from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security through his public statements: 
• August 11, 2016 public statement of President Duterte: “I know I’m the favorite whipping boy of the NGOs and the human rights stalwarts.  But, I have a special ano kaya no.  She is a government official.  One day soon I will – bitiwan ko yan in public and I will have to destroy her in public.”  Incidentally, in the same event, President Duterte insinuated that with the help of another country, he was keeping surveillance of her.  “Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa kanila.  So while all the time they were also listening to what I’ve done, I’ve also been busy, and with the help of another country, listening to them.
• The statement uttered in a briefing at the NAIA Terminal 3, Pasay City in August 17, 2016 wherein President Duterte named Sen. De Lima as the government office he referred to earlier at the same time accused her of living an immortal life by having a romantic affair with her driver, a married man, and of being involved in illegal drugs.  “There’s one crusading lady, whose even herself led a very immoral life, taking his driver as her lover… Paramour niya ang driver nya nagging hooked rin sa drugs because of the close association.  You know, when you are an immoral, dirty woman, the driver was married.  So you live with the driver, its concubinage.
• The statements that described her an immoral woman; that publicized her intimate and personal life, starting from her new boyfriend to her sexual escapades; that told of her being involved in illegal drugs as well as in activities that included her construction of a house for her driver/lover with financing from drug-money
• Statements that threatened her (“De Lima, you are finished”) and demeaned her womanhood and humanity.  If I were De Lima, ladies and gentlemen, I’ll hang myself.  Your life has been, hindi lang life, the innermost of your core as a female is being serialized everyday.  Dapat kang mag-resign.  You resign.  And “De Lima better hang yourself… Hindi ka na naghiya sa sarili mo.  Any other woman would have slashed her throat.  You?  Baka akala mo artista ka.  Mga artistang x-rated paglabas sa, paktapos ng shooting, nakangiti…”

• Sen. De Lima traces his animosity towards her when she 1st encountered President Durterte while he was still the City Mayor of Davao and she the Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights investigating the existence of the so-called “Davao Death Squad.”

ISSUE: W/N Presidential’s immunity from suit can shield the President from being haled to court
HELD: Dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from suit.
YES.
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019

• Immunity can be classified either by: a. extent i.e. absolute or qualified or b. duration i.e. permanent or temporary
• Extent: 
• Absolute immunity is granted to a government official who has proven that his actions fell within the scope of his duties, and that his actions are discretionary rather than ministerial – conduct or the action performed must not involve insignificant or routinely office work but rather the challenged action must involve personal judgment.  It attaches to the function instead of the office.
• Qualified immunity was initially given to a government official who was able to prove that at the time of commission of the act complained of, he possessed a good faith that his actions were lawful – subjective element determined with the two-tier test:

• If the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was clear at the time of the alleged wrongful action
• Whether the official should reasonably have known the action was contrary to law
• Duration:
• Permanent or the immunity for speech or debate – immunity from liability in law suits that arise out of the performance of public duties of democratic deliberation
• Temporary or congressional immunity from arrest – to legislators from litigating even private suits while “at Session” of Congress as public officers

• Estrada v. Desierto (G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001): Being a former President, President Estrada no longer enjoyed immunity from suit
• David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006): Improper to implead President Arroyo in a consolidated petition disputing the factual bases for Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 declaring a state of national emergency and called out the Armed Forces of the Philippines in her capacity as Commander-in-Chief to maintain law and order throughout the country and to suppress acts of lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion.  
• Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. No. 183871, February 18, 2010):  Court upheld the exclusion of President  Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, maintaining that presidential immunity from suit despite not being expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution and declared that the President could not be sued during her tenure in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo against military, police personnel and the Office of the Ombudsman and including President Arroyo.
• Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011): Court ruled that RTC had erred in holding that Presidential immunity could not be invoked in amparo proceedings
• While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of the 1981 constitutional amendments and the 1987 Constitution made our version of presidential immunity unique.  Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided for immunity at two distinct points in time: 1. Immunity during the tenure of the President 2. Thereafter.  Framer’s intended during tenure.  
• Presidential immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit.  It is not intended to immunize the President from liability or accountability.
• Rationale for the grant of immunity stated in Soliven v. Makasiar (G.R. No. 82585, 82827, 83979, November 14, 1988): To assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions fee from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
• Rationale expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.
• Passage in Soliven was made only to point out that it was the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf and that it was the President who had gone to court as the complainant
• If the Court were to first require the President to respond to each and every complaint brought against him, and then avail himself of presidential immunity on a case to case basis, then the rationale for the privilege – protecting the President from harassment, hindrance or distraction in the discharge of his duties – would very well be defeated.

• Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except an ordinary suit before the courts.  The Chief Executive must 1st be allowed to end his tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment. 

Tax Case Digest: FDCP v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation G.R. No. 203754/G.R. No. 204418, October 15, 2019

FDCP v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation
G.R. No. 203754/G.R. No. 204418, October 15, 2019
SC En Banc
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Lessons Applicable: Doctrine of Operative Fact , Lifeblood theory
Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

• 1993: Cebu City passed City Ordinance No. LXIX: Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu, Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI of the Ordinance required proprietors, lessees or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of amusement to pay amusement tax equivalent to 30% of the gross receipts of the admission fees to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City.
• June 7, 2002: Congress passed RA 9167 creating FDCP.  Sections 13 and 14 thereof provide that the amusement tax on certain graded films which would otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines during the period the graded film is exhibited, should be deducted and withheld by the proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted to the FDCP which shall reward the same to producers of the graded films.  
• RTC: Granted Cebu City and CHRC separate petition for declaratory relief before the RTC Cebu City which sought to declare Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 invalid and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: W/N doctrine of operative fact in relation to the declaration of Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.

HELD:  YES.  The operative fact doctrine equally applies to the non-remittance by proprietors since the law produced legal effects prior to the declaration of the nullity of Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167.

• The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence and validity of a legal provision prior its being declared as unconstitutional and legitimizes otherwise invalid acts done pursuant thereto because of considerations of practicality and fairness. 
• In this regard, certain acts done pursuant to a legal provision which was just recently declared as unconstitutional by the Court cannot be anymore undone because not only would it be highly impractical to do so, but more so, unfair to those who have relied on the said legal provision prior to the time it was struck down.

• The right to receive the amusement taxes accrued the moment the taxes were deemed payable under the provisions of the Omnibus Tax Ordinance of Cebu City. 
• Taxes, once due, must be paid without delay to the taxing authority
• Taxes are the lifeblood of Government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need.  This flows from the truism that without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it.  
• The prompt payment of taxes to the rightful authority, cannot be left to the whims of taxpayers.  To rule otherwise would be to acquiesce to the norm allowing taxpayers to reject payment of taxes under the supposition that the law imposing the same is illegal or unconstitutional.  This would unduly hamper government operations. 

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 157833 October 15, 2007

FIRST DIVISION

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. GREGORIO C. ROXAS,

 G.R. No. 157833  October 15, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION





SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:




For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) dated February 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67980.

The facts of the case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are:

Gregorio C. Roxas, respondent, is a trader.  Sometime in March 1993, he delivered stocks of vegetable oil to spouses Rodrigo and Marissa Cawili. As payment therefor, spouses Cawili issued a personal check in the amount of P348,805.50.   However, when respondent tried to encash the check, it was dishonored by the drawee bank.   Spouses Cawili then assured him that they would replace the bounced check with a cashier’s check from the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), petitioner.

On March 31, 1993, respondent and Rodrigo Cawili went to petitioner’s branch at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City where Elma Capistrano, the branch manager, personally attended to them.  Upon Elma’s instructions, Lita Sagun, the bank teller, prepared BPI Cashier’s Check No. 14428 in the amount of P348,805.50, drawn against the account of Marissa Cawili, payable to respondent.  Rodrigo then handed the check to respondent in the presence of Elma.

The following day, April 1, 1993, respondent returned to petitioner’s branch at Shaw Boulevard to encash the cashier’s check but it was dishonored.   Elma informed him that Marissa’s account was closed on that date.

Despite respondent’s insistence, the bank officers refused to encash the check and tried to retrieve it from respondent.   He then called his lawyer who advised him to deposit the check in his (respondent’s) account at Citytrust, Ortigas Avenue.   However, the check was dishonored on the ground “Account Closed.”

On September 23, 1993, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 263, Pasig City a complaint for sum of money against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 63663.   Respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of the check, damages and cost of the suit.

In its answer, petitioner specifically denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that it issued the check by mistake in good faith; that its dishonor was due to lack of consideration; and that respondent’s remedy was to sue Rodrigo Cawili who purchased the check.  As a counterclaim, petitioner prayed that respondent be ordered to pay attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. 

Petitioner filed a third-party complaint against spouses Cawili.  They were later declared in default for their failure to file their answer.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

         WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, this Court hereby renders judgment in favor of herein plaintiff and orders the defendant, Bank of the Philippine Islands, to pay Gerardo C. Roxas:



1)      The sum of P348,805.50, the face value of the cashier’s check, with legal interest thereon computed from April 1, 1993 until the amount is fully paid;

2)      The sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages;

3)      The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages to serve as an example for the public good;

4)      The sum of P25,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees; and the

5)      Costs of suit.

As to the third-party complaint, third-party defendants Spouses Rodrigo and Marissa Cawili are hereby ordered to indemnify defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands such amount(s) adjudged and actually paid by it to herein plaintiff Gregorio C. Roxas, including the costs of suit.



SO ORDERED.





On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following errors: (1) in finding that respondent is a holder in due course; and (2) in holding that it (petitioner) is liable to respondent for the amount of the cashier’s check.  

Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:

SEC. 52. What constitutes a holder in due course. – A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:

(a)    That it is complete and regular upon its face;

(b)    That he became the holder of it before it was overdue and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;

(c)    That he took it in good faith and for value;

(d)    That at the time it was negotiated to him, he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of person negotiating it.

        

          As a general rule, under the above provision, every holder is presumed prima facie to be a holder in due course.  One who claims otherwise has the onus probandi to prove that one or more of the conditions required to constitute a holder in due course are lacking.   In this case, petitioner contends that the element of “value” is not present, therefore, respondent could not be a holder in due course.

          Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.  Section 25 of the same law  states:

         SEC. 25. Value, what constitutes. – Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.  An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed as such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time.











          In Walker Rubber Corp. v. Nederlandsch Indische & Handelsbank, N.V. and South Sea Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.,[2] this Court ruled that value “in general terms may be some right, interest, profit or benefit to the party who makes the contract or some forbearance, detriment, loan, responsibility, etc. on the other side.”   Here, there is no dispute that respondent received Rodrigo Cawili’s cashier’s check as payment for the former’s vegetable oil.   The fact that it was Rodrigo who purchased the cashier’s check from petitioner will not affect respondent’s status as a holder for value since the check was delivered to him as payment for the vegetable oil he sold to spouses Cawili.  Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that respondent is a holder in due course of the cashier’s check.

          Furthermore, it bears emphasis that the disputed check is a cashier’s check.   In International Corporate Bank v. Spouses Gueco,[3] this Court held that a cashier’s check is really the bank’s own check and may be treated as a promissory note with the bank as the maker.   The check becomes the primary obligation of the bank which issues it and constitutes a written promise to pay upon demand.    In New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. Inc. v. Señeris,[4] this Court took judicial notice of the “well-known and accepted practice in the business sector that a cashier’s check is deemed as cash.”   This is because the mere issuance of a cashier’s check is considered acceptance thereof.

In view of the above pronouncements, petitioner bank became liable to respondent from the moment it issued the cashier’s check.   Having been accepted by respondent, subject to no condition whatsoever, petitioner should have paid the same upon presentment by the former.

          WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.   The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67980 is AFFIRMED.    Costs against petitioner.

          SO ORDERED.