Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 88866 February 18, 1991

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88866 February 18, 1991

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GOLDEN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., LUCIA CASTILLO, MAGNO CASTILLO and GLORIA CASTILLO, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for Magno and Lucia Castillo.

Agapito S. Fajardo and Jaime M. Cabiles for respondent Golden Savings & Loan Association, Inc.



CRUZ, J.:p

This case, for all its seeming complexity, turns on a simple question of negligence. The facts, pruned of all non-essentials, are easily told.

The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. is a commercial bank with branches throughout the Philippines and even abroad. Golden Savings and Loan Association was, at the time these events happened, operating in Calapan, Mindoro, with the other private respondents as its principal officers.

In January 1979, a certain Eduardo Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings and deposited over a period of two months 38 treasury warrants with a total value of P1,755,228.37. They were all drawn by the Philippine Fish Marketing Authority and purportedly signed by its General Manager and countersigned by its Auditor. Six of these were directly payable to Gomez while the others appeared to have been indorsed by their respective payees, followed by Gomez as second indorser. 1

On various dates between June 25 and July 16, 1979, all these warrants were subsequently indorsed by Gloria Castillo as Cashier of Golden Savings and deposited to its Savings Account No. 2498 in the Metrobank branch in Calapan, Mindoro. They were then sent for clearing by the branch office to the principal office of Metrobank, which forwarded them to the Bureau of Treasury for special clearing. 2

More than two weeks after the deposits, Gloria Castillo went to the Calapan branch several times to ask whether the warrants had been cleared. She was told to wait. Accordingly, Gomez was meanwhile not allowed to withdraw from his account. Later, however, "exasperated" over Gloria's repeated inquiries and also as an accommodation for a "valued client," the petitioner says it finally decided to allow Golden Savings to withdraw from the proceeds of the
warrants. 3 The first withdrawal was made on July 9, 1979, in the amount of P508,000.00, the second on July 13, 1979, in the amount of P310,000.00, and the third on July 16, 1979, in the amount of P150,000.00. The total withdrawal was P968.000.00. 4

In turn, Golden Savings subsequently allowed Gomez to make withdrawals from his own account, eventually collecting the total amount of P1,167,500.00 from the proceeds of the apparently cleared warrants. The last withdrawal was made on July 16, 1979.

On July 21, 1979, Metrobank informed Golden Savings that 32 of the warrants had been dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury on July 19, 1979, and demanded the refund by Golden Savings of the amount it had previously withdrawn, to make up the deficit in its account.

The demand was rejected. Metrobank then sued Golden Savings in the Regional Trial Court of Mindoro. 5 After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Golden Savings, which, however, filed a motion for reconsideration even as Metrobank filed its notice of appeal. On November 4, 1986, the lower court modified its decision thus:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff;

2. Dissolving and lifting the writ of attachment of the properties of defendant Golden Savings and Loan Association, Inc. and defendant Spouses Magno Castillo and Lucia Castillo;

3. Directing the plaintiff to reverse its action of debiting Savings Account No. 2498 of the sum of P1,754,089.00 and to reinstate and credit to such account such amount existing before the debit was made including the amount of P812,033.37 in favor of defendant Golden Savings and Loan Association, Inc. and thereafter, to allow defendant Golden Savings and Loan Association, Inc. to withdraw the amount outstanding thereon before the debit;

4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant Golden Savings and Loan Association, Inc. attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of P200,000.00.

5. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant Spouses Magno Castillo and Lucia Castillo attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal to the respondent court, 6 the decision was affirmed, prompting Metrobank to file this petition for review on the following grounds:

1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in disregarding and failing to apply the clear contractual terms and conditions on the deposit slips allowing Metrobank to charge back any amount erroneously credited.

(a) Metrobank's right to charge back is not limited to instances where the checks or treasury warrants are forged or unauthorized.

(b) Until such time as Metrobank is actually paid, its obligation is that of a mere collecting agent which cannot be held liable for its failure to collect on the warrants.

2. Under the lower court's decision, affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, Metrobank is made to pay for warrants already dishonored, thereby perpetuating the fraud committed by Eduardo Gomez.

3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that as between Metrobank and Golden Savings, the latter should bear the loss.

4. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the treasury warrants involved in this case are not negotiable instruments.

The petition has no merit.

From the above undisputed facts, it would appear to the Court that Metrobank was indeed negligent in giving Golden Savings the impression that the treasury warrants had been cleared and that, consequently, it was safe to allow Gomez to withdraw the proceeds thereof from his account with it. Without such assurance, Golden Savings would not have allowed the withdrawals; with such assurance, there was no reason not to allow the withdrawal. Indeed, Golden Savings might even have incurred liability for its refusal to return the money that to all appearances belonged to the depositor, who could therefore withdraw it any time and for any reason he saw fit.

It was, in fact, to secure the clearance of the treasury warrants that Golden Savings deposited them to its account with Metrobank. Golden Savings had no clearing facilities of its own. It relied on Metrobank to determine the validity of the warrants through its own services. The proceeds of the warrants were withheld from Gomez until Metrobank allowed Golden Savings itself to withdraw them from its own deposit. 7 It was only when Metrobank gave the go-signal that Gomez was finally allowed by Golden Savings to withdraw them from his own account.

The argument of Metrobank that Golden Savings should have exercised more care in checking the personal circumstances of Gomez before accepting his deposit does not hold water. It was Gomez who was entrusting the warrants, not Golden Savings that was extending him a loan; and moreover, the treasury warrants were subject to clearing, pending which the depositor could not withdraw its proceeds. There was no question of Gomez's identity or of the genuineness of his signature as checked by Golden Savings. In fact, the treasury warrants were dishonored allegedly because of the forgery of the signatures of the drawers, not of Gomez as payee or indorser. Under the circumstances, it is clear that Golden Savings acted with due care and diligence and cannot be faulted for the withdrawals it allowed Gomez to make.

By contrast, Metrobank exhibited extraordinary carelessness. The amount involved was not trifling — more than one and a half million pesos (and this was 1979). There was no reason why it should not have waited until the treasury warrants had been cleared; it would not have lost a single centavo by waiting. Yet, despite the lack of such clearance — and notwithstanding that it had not received a single centavo from the proceeds of the treasury warrants, as it now repeatedly stresses — it allowed Golden Savings to withdraw — not once, not twice, but thrice — from the uncleared treasury warrants in the total amount of P968,000.00

Its reason? It was "exasperated" over the persistent inquiries of Gloria Castillo about the clearance and it also wanted to "accommodate" a valued client. It "presumed" that the warrants had been cleared simply because of "the lapse of one week." 8 For a bank with its long experience, this explanation is unbelievably naive.

And now, to gloss over its carelessness, Metrobank would invoke the conditions printed on the dorsal side of the deposit slips through which the treasury warrants were deposited by Golden Savings with its Calapan branch. The conditions read as follows:

Kindly note that in receiving items on deposit, the bank obligates itself only as the depositor's collecting agent, assuming no responsibility beyond care in selecting correspondents, and until such time as actual payment shall have come into possession of this bank, the right is reserved to charge back to the depositor's account any amount previously credited, whether or not such item is returned. This also applies to checks drawn on local banks and bankers and their branches as well as on this bank, which are unpaid due to insufficiency of funds, forgery, unauthorized overdraft or any other reason. (Emphasis supplied.)

According to Metrobank, the said conditions clearly show that it was acting only as a collecting agent for Golden Savings and give it the right to "charge back to the depositor's account any amount previously credited, whether or not such item is returned. This also applies to checks ". . . which are unpaid due to insufficiency of funds, forgery, unauthorized overdraft of any other reason." It is claimed that the said conditions are in the nature of contractual stipulations and became binding on Golden Savings when Gloria Castillo, as its Cashier, signed the deposit slips.

Doubt may be expressed about the binding force of the conditions, considering that they have apparently been imposed by the bank unilaterally, without the consent of the depositor. Indeed, it could be argued that the depositor, in signing the deposit slip, does so only to identify himself and not to agree to the conditions set forth in the given permit at the back of the deposit slip. We do not have to rule on this matter at this time. At any rate, the Court feels that even if the deposit slip were considered a contract, the petitioner could still not validly disclaim responsibility thereunder in the light of the circumstances of this case.

In stressing that it was acting only as a collecting agent for Golden Savings, Metrobank seems to be suggesting that as a mere agent it cannot be liable to the principal. This is not exactly true. On the contrary, Article 1909 of the Civil Code clearly provides that —

Art. 1909. — The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence, which shall be judged 'with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not for a compensation.

The negligence of Metrobank has been sufficiently established. To repeat for emphasis, it was the clearance given by it that assured Golden Savings it was already safe to allow Gomez to withdraw the proceeds of the treasury warrants he had deposited Metrobank misled Golden Savings. There may have been no express clearance, as Metrobank insists (although this is refuted by Golden Savings) but in any case that clearance could be implied from its allowing Golden Savings to withdraw from its account not only once or even twice but three times. The total withdrawal was in excess of its original balance before the treasury warrants were deposited, which only added to its belief that the treasury warrants had indeed been cleared.

Metrobank's argument that it may recover the disputed amount if the warrants are not paid for any reason is not acceptable. Any reason does not mean no reason at all. Otherwise, there would have been no need at all for Golden Savings to deposit the treasury warrants with it for clearance. There would have been no need for it to wait until the warrants had been cleared before paying the proceeds thereof to Gomez. Such a condition, if interpreted in the way the petitioner suggests, is not binding for being arbitrary and unconscionable. And it becomes more so in the case at bar when it is considered that the supposed dishonor of the warrants was not communicated to Golden Savings before it made its own payment to Gomez.

The belated notification aggravated the petitioner's earlier negligence in giving express or at least implied clearance to the treasury warrants and allowing payments therefrom to Golden Savings. But that is not all. On top of this, the supposed reason for the dishonor, to wit, the forgery of the signatures of the general manager and the auditor of the drawer corporation, has not been established. 9 This was the finding of the lower courts which we see no reason to disturb. And as we said in MWSS v. Court of Appeals: 10

Forgery cannot be presumed (Siasat, et al. v. IAC, et al., 139 SCRA 238). It must be established by clear, positive and convincing evidence. This was not done in the present case.

A no less important consideration is the circumstance that the treasury warrants in question are not negotiable instruments. Clearly stamped on their face is the word "non-negotiable." Moreover, and this is of equal significance, it is indicated that they are payable from a particular fund, to wit, Fund 501.

The following sections of the Negotiable Instruments Law, especially the underscored parts, are pertinent:

Sec. 1. — Form of negotiable instruments. — An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements:

(a) It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer;

(b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money;

(c) Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time;

(d) Must be payable to order or to bearer; and

(e) Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. When promise is unconditional. — An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this Act though coupled with —

(a) An indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made or a particular account to be debited with the amount; or

(b) A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument judgment.

But an order or promise to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional.

The indication of Fund 501 as the source of the payment to be made on the treasury warrants makes the order or promise to pay "not unconditional" and the warrants themselves non-negotiable. There should be no question that the exception on Section 3 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is applicable in the case at bar. This conclusion conforms to Abubakar vs. Auditor General 11 where the Court held:

The petitioner argues that he is a holder in good faith and for value of a negotiable instrument and is entitled to the rights and privileges of a holder in due course, free from defenses. But this treasury warrant is not within the scope of the negotiable instrument law. For one thing, the document bearing on its face the words "payable from the appropriation for food administration, is actually an Order for payment out of "a particular fund," and is not unconditional and does not fulfill one of the essential requirements of a negotiable instrument (Sec. 3 last sentence and section [1(b)] of the Negotiable Instruments Law).

Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden Savings assumed that they were "genuine and in all respects what they purport to be," in accordance with Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The simple reason is that this law is not applicable to the non-negotiable treasury warrants. The indorsement was made by Gloria Castillo not for the purpose of guaranteeing the genuineness of the warrants but merely to deposit them with Metrobank for clearing. It was in fact Metrobank that made the guarantee when it stamped on the back of the warrants: "All prior indorsement and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed, Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., Calapan Branch."

The petitioner lays heavy stress on Jai Alai Corporation v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 12 but we feel this case is inapplicable to the present controversy. That case involved checks whereas this case involves treasury warrants. Golden Savings never represented that the warrants were negotiable but signed them only for the purpose of depositing them for clearance. Also, the fact of forgery was proved in that case but not in the case before us. Finally, the Court found the Jai Alai Corporation negligent in accepting the checks without question from one Antonio Ramirez notwithstanding that the payee was the Inter-Island Gas Services, Inc. and it did not appear that he was authorized to indorse it. No similar negligence can be imputed to Golden Savings.

We find the challenged decision to be basically correct. However, we will have to amend it insofar as it directs the petitioner to credit Golden Savings with the full amount of the treasury checks deposited to its account.

The total value of the 32 treasury warrants dishonored was P1,754,089.00, from which Gomez was allowed to withdraw P1,167,500.00 before Golden Savings was notified of the dishonor. The amount he has withdrawn must be charged not to Golden Savings but to Metrobank, which must bear the consequences of its own negligence. But the balance of P586,589.00 should be debited to Golden Savings, as obviously Gomez can no longer be permitted to withdraw this amount from his deposit because of the dishonor of the warrants. Gomez has in fact disappeared. To also credit the balance to Golden Savings would unduly enrich it at the expense of Metrobank, let alone the fact that it has already been informed of the dishonor of the treasury warrants.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification that Paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the judgment of the lower court shall be reworded as follows:

3. Debiting Savings Account No. 2498 in the sum of P586,589.00 only and thereafter allowing defendant Golden Savings & Loan Association, Inc. to withdraw the amount outstanding thereon, if any, after the debit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-40796 July 31, 1975

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40796 July 31, 1975

REPUBLIC BANK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAURICIA T. EBRADA, defendant-appellant.

Sabino de Leon, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.

Julio Baldonado for defendant-appellant.



MARTIN, J.:

Appeal on a question of law of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII in Civil Case No. 69288, entitled "Republic Bank vs. Mauricia T. Ebrada."

On or about February 27, 1963 defendant Mauricia T. Ebrada, encashed Back Pay Check No. 508060 dated January 15, 1963 for P1,246.08 at the main office of the plaintiff Republic Bank at Escolta, Manila. The check was issued by the Bureau of Treasury. 1 Plaintiff Bank was later advised by the said bureau that the alleged indorsement on the reverse side of the aforesaid check by the payee, "Martin Lorenzo" was a forgery 2 since the latter had allegedly died as of July 14, 1952. 3 Plaintiff Bank was then requested by the Bureau of Treasury to refund the amount of P1,246.08. 4 To recover what it had refunded to the Bureau of Treasury, plaintiff Bank made verbal and formal demands upon defendant Ebrada to account for the sum of P1,246.08, but said defendant refused to do so. So plaintiff Bank sued defendant Ebrada before the City Court of Manila.

On July 11, 1966, defendant Ebrada filed her answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged that she was a holder in due course of the check in question, or at the very least, has acquired her rights from a holder in due course and therefore entitled to the proceeds thereof. She also alleged that the plaintiff Bank has no cause of action against her; that it is in estoppel, or so negligent as not to be entitled to recover anything from her. 5

About the same day, July 11, 1966 defendant Ebrada filed a Third-Party complaint against Adelaida Dominguez who, in turn, filed on September 14, 1966 a Fourth-Party complaint against Justina Tinio.

On March 21, 1967, the City Court of Manila rendered judgment for the plaintiff Bank against defendant Ebrada; for Third-Party plaintiff against Third-Party defendant, Adelaida Dominguez, and for Fourth-Party plaintiff against Fourth-Party defendant, Justina Tinio.

From the judgment of the City Court, defendant Ebrada took an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila where the parties submitted a partial stipulation of facts as follows:

COME NOW the undersigned counsel for the plaintiff, defendant, Third-Party defendant and Fourth-Party plaintiff and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully submit the following:

PARTIAL STIPULATION OF FACTS

1. That they admit their respective capacities to sue and be sued;

2. That on January 15, 1963 the Treasury of the Philippines issued its Check No. BP-508060, payable to the order of one MARTIN LORENZO, in the sum of P1,246.08, and drawn on the Republic Bank, plaintiff herein, which check will be marked as Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff;

3. That the back side of aforementioned check bears the following signatures, in this order:

1) MARTIN LORENZO;

2) RAMON R. LORENZO;

3) DELIA DOMINGUEZ; and

4) MAURICIA T. EBRADA;

4. That the aforementioned check was delivered to the defendant MAURICIA T. EBRADA by the Third-Party defendant and Fourth-Party plaintiff ADELAIDA DOMINGUEZ, for the purpose of encashment;

5. That the signature of defendant MAURICIA T. EBRADA was affixed on said check on February 27, 1963 when she encashed it with the plaintiff Bank;

6. That immediately after defendant MAURICIA T. EBRADA received the cash proceeds of said check in the sum of P1,246.08 from the plaintiff Bank, she immediately turned over the said amount to the third-party defendant and fourth-party plaintiff ADELAIDA DOMINGUEZ, who in turn handed the said amount to the fourth-party defendant JUSTINA TINIO on the same date, as evidenced by the receipt signed by her which will be marked as Exhibit "1-Dominguez"; and

7. That the parties hereto reserve the right to present evidence on any other fact not covered by the foregoing stipulations,

Manila, Philippines, June 6, 1969.

Based on the foregoing stipulation of facts and the documentary evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment ordering the defendant Mauricia T. Ebrada to pay the plaintiff the amount of ONE THOUSAND TWO FORTY-SIX 08/100 (P1,246.08), with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint on June 16, 1966, until fully paid, plus the costs in both instances against Mauricia T. Ebrada.

The right of Mauricia T. Ebrada to file whatever claim she may have against Adelaida Dominguez in connection with this case is hereby reserved. The right of the estate of Dominguez to file the fourth-party complaint against Justina Tinio is also reserved.

SO ORDERED.

In her appeal, defendant-appellant presses that the lower court erred:

IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT TO PAY THE APPELLEE THE FACE VALUE OF THE SUBJECT CHECK AFTER FINDING THAT THE DRAWER ISSUED THE SUBJECT CHECK TO A PERSON ALREADY DECEASED FOR 11-½ YEARS AND THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOT BENEFIT FROM ENCASHING SAID CHECK.

From the stipulation of facts it is admitted that the check in question was delivered to defendant-appellant by Adelaida Dominguez for the purpose of encashment and that her signature was affixed on said check when she cashed it with the plaintiff Bank. Likewise it is admitted that defendant-appellant was the last indorser of the said check. As such indorser, she was supposed to have warranted that she has good title to said check; for under Section 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law: 6

Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by qualified indorsement, warrants:

(a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be.

(b) That she has good title to it.

xxx xxx xxx

and under Section 65 of the same Act:

Every indorser who indorses without qualification warrants to all subsequent holders in due course:

(a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of the next preceding sections;

(b) That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting.

It turned out, however, that the signature of the original payee of the check, Martin Lorenzo was a forgery because he was already dead 7 almost 11 years before the check in question was issued by the Bureau of Treasury. Under action 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (Act 2031):

When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instruments, or to give a discharge thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.

It is clear from the provision that where the signature on a negotiable instrument if forged, the negotiation of the check is without force or effect. But does this mean that the existence of one forged signature therein will render void all the other negotiations of the check with respect to the other parties whose signature are genuine?

In the case of Beam vs. Farrel, 135 Iowa 670, 113 N.W. 590, where a check has several indorsements on it, it was held that it is only the negotiation based on the forged or unauthorized signature which is inoperative. Applying this principle to the case before Us, it can be safely concluded that it is only the negotiation predicated on the forged indorsement that should be declared inoperative. This means that the negotiation of the check in question from Martin Lorenzo, the original payee, to Ramon R. Lorenzo, the second indorser, should be declared of no affect, but the negotiation of the aforesaid check from Ramon R. Lorenzo to Adelaida Dominguez, the third indorser, and from Adelaida Dominguez to the defendant-appellant who did not know of the forgery, should be considered valid and enforceable, barring any claim of forgery.

What happens then, if, after the drawee bank has paid the amount of the check to the holder thereof, it was discovered that the signature of the payee was forged? Can the drawee bank recover from the one who encashed the check?

In the case of State v. Broadway Mut. Bank, 282 S.W. 196, 197, it was held that the drawee of a check can recover from the holder the money paid to him on a forged instrument. It is not supposed to be its duty to ascertain whether the signatures of the payee or indorsers are genuine or not. This is because the indorser is supposed to warrant to the drawee that the signatures of the payee and previous indorsers are genuine, warranty not extending only to holders in due course. One who purchases a check or draft is bound to satisfy himself that the paper is genuine and that by indorsing it or presenting it for payment or putting it into circulation before presentation he impliedly asserts that he has performed his duty and the drawee who has paid the forged check, without actual negligence on his part, may recover the money paid from such negligent purchasers. In such cases the recovery is permitted because although the drawee was in a way negligent in failing to detect the forgery, yet if the encasher of the check had performed his duty, the forgery would in all probability, have been detected and the fraud defeated. The reason for allowing the drawee bank to recover from the encasher is:

Every one with even the least experience in business knows that no business man would accept a check in exchange for money or goods unless he is satisfied that the check is genuine. He accepts it only because he has proof that it is genuine, or because he has sufficient confidence in the honesty and financial responsibility of the person who vouches for it. If he is deceived he has suffered a loss of his cash or goods through his own mistake. His own credulity or recklessness, or misplaced confidence was the sole cause of the loss. Why should he be permitted to shift the loss due to his own fault in assuming the risk, upon the drawee, simply because of the accidental circumstance that the drawee afterwards failed to detect the forgery when the check was presented? 8

Similarly, in the case before Us, the defendant-appellant, upon receiving the check in question from Adelaida Dominguez, was duty-bound to ascertain whether the check in question was genuine before presenting it to plaintiff Bank for payment. Her failure to do so makes her liable for the loss and the plaintiff Bank may recover from her the money she received for the check. As reasoned out above, had she performed the duty of ascertaining the genuineness of the check, in all probability the forgery would have been detected and the fraud defeated.

In our jurisdiction We have a case of similar import. 9 The Great Eastern Life Insurance Company drew its check for P2000.00 on the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation payable to the order of Lazaro Melicor. A certain E. M. Maasin fraudulently obtained the check and forged the signature of Melicor, as an indorser, and then personally indorsed and presented the check to the Philippine National Bank where the amount of the check was placed to his (Maasin's) credit. On the next day, the Philippine National Bank indorsed the cheek to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation which paid it and charged the amount of the check to the insurance company. The Court held that the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation was liable to the insurance company for the amount of the check and that the Philippine National Bank was in turn liable to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Said the Court:

Where a check is drawn payable to the order of one person and is presented to a bank by another and purports upon its face to have been duly indorsed by the payee of the check, it is the duty of the bank to know that the check was duly indorsed by the original payee, and where the bank pays the amount of the check to a third person, who has forged the signature of the payee, the loss falls upon the bank who cashed the check, and its only remedy is against the person to whom it paid the money.

With the foregoing doctrine We are to concede that the plaintiff Bank should suffer the loss when it paid the amount of the check in question to defendant-appellant, but it has the remedy to recover from the latter the amount it paid to her. Although the defendant-appellant to whom the plaintiff Bank paid the check was not proven to be the author of the supposed forgery, yet as last indorser of the check, she has warranted that she has good title to it 10 even if in fact she did not have it because the payee of the check was already dead 11 years before the check was issued. The fact that immediately after receiving title cash proceeds of the check in question in the amount of P1,246.08 from the plaintiff Bank, defendant-appellant immediately turned over said amount to Adelaida Dominguez (Third-Party defendant and the Fourth-Party plaintiff) who in turn handed the amount to Justina Tinio on the same date would not exempt her from liability because by doing so, she acted as an accommodation party in the check for which she is also liable under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (Act 2031), thus: .An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto with costs against defendant-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-29432 August 6, 1975

FIRST DIVISION

 

G.R. No. L-29432    August 6, 1975 

  

JAI-ALAI CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND, Respondent.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition by the Jai-Alai Corporation of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. 34042-R dated June 25, 1968 in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (hereinafter referred to as the respondent).

From April 2, 1959 to May 18, 1959, ten checks with a total face value of P8,030.58 were deposited by the petitioner in its current account with the respondent bank. The particulars of these checks are as follows:

1. Drawn by the Delta Engineering Service upon the Pacific Banking Corporation and payable to the Inter-Island Gas Service Inc. or order:

Date Check Exhibit

Deposited Number Amount Number

4/2/59 B-352680 P500.00 18

4/20/59 A-156907 372.32 19

4/24/59 A-156924 397.82 20

5/4/59 B-364764 250.00 23

5/6/59 B-364775 250.00 24

2. Drawn by the Enrique Cortiz & Co. upon the Pacific Banking Corporation and payable to the Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. or bearer:

4/13/59 B-335063 P 2108.70 21

4/27/59 B-335072 P2210.94 22

3. Drawn by the Luzon Tinsmith & Company upon the China Banking Corporation and payable to the Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. or bearer:

5/18/59 VN430188 P940.80 25

4. Drawn by the Roxas Manufacturing, Inc. upon the Philippine National Bank and payable to the Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. order:

5/14/59 1860160 P 500.00 26

5/18/59 1860660 P 500.00 27

All the foregoing checks, which were acquired by the petitioner from one Antonio J. Ramirez, a sales agent of the Inter-Island Gas and a regular bettor at jai-alai games, were, upon deposit, temporarily credited to the petitioner's account in accordance with the clause printed on the deposit slips issued by the respondent and which reads:

"Any credit allowed the depositor on the books of the Bank for checks or drafts hereby received for deposit, is provisional only, until such time as the proceeds thereof, in current funds or solvent credits, shall have been actually received by the Bank and the latter reserves to itself the right to charge back the item to the account of its depositor, at any time before that event, regardless of whether or not the item itself can be returned."

About the latter part of July 1959, after Ramirez had resigned from the Inter-Island Gas and after the checks had been submitted to inter-bank clearing, the Inter-Island Gas discovered that all the indorsements made on the checks purportedly by its cashiers, Santiago Amplayo and Vicenta Mucor (who were merely authorized to deposit checks issued payable to the said company) as well as the rubber stamp impression thereon reading "Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc.," were forgeries. In due time, the Inter-Island Gas advised the petitioner, the respondent, the drawers and the drawee-banks of the said checks about the forgeries, and filed a criminal complaint against Ramirez with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. 1

The respondent's cashier, Ramon Sarthou, upon receipt of the latter of Inter-Island Gas dated August 31, 1959, called up the petitioner's cashier, Manuel Garcia, and advised the latter that in view of the circumstances he would debit the value of the checks against the petitioner's account as soon as they were returned by the respective drawee-banks.

Meanwhile, the drawers of the checks, having been notified of the forgeries, demanded reimbursement to their respective accounts from the drawee-banks, which in turn demanded from the respondent, as collecting bank, the return of the amounts they had paid on account thereof. When the drawee-banks returned the checks to the respondent, the latter paid their value which the former in turn paid to the Inter-Island Gas. The respondent, for its part, debited the petitioner's current account and forwarded to the latter the checks containing the forged indorsements, which the petitioner, however, refused to accept.

On October 8, 1959 the petitioner drew against its current account with the respondent a check for P135,000 payable to the order of the Mariano Olondriz y Cia. in payment of certain shares of stock. The check was, however, dishonored by the respondent as its records showed that as of October 8, 1959 the current account of the petitioner, after netting out the value of the checks P8,030.58) with the forged indorsements, had a balance of only P128,257.65.

The petitioner then filed a complaint against the respondent with the Court of First Instance of Manila, which was however dismissed by the trial court after due trial, and as well by the Court of Appeals, on appeal.

Hence, the present recourse.

The issues posed by the petitioner in the instant petition may be briefly stated as follows:

(a) Whether the respondent had the right to debit the petitioner's current account in the amount corresponding to the total value of the checks in question after more than three months had elapsed from the date their value was credited to the petitioner's account:(b) Whether the respondent is estopped from claiming that the amount of P8,030.58, representing the total value of the checks with the forged indorsements, had not been properly credited to the petitioner's account, since the same had already been paid by the drawee-banks and received in due course by the respondent; and(c) On the assumption that the respondent had improperly debited the petitioner's current account, whether the latter is entitled to damages.

These three issues interlock and will be resolved jointly.

In our opinion, the respondent acted within legal bounds when it debited the petitioner's account. When the petitioner deposited the checks with the respondent, the nature of the relationship created at that stage was one of agency, that is, the bank was to collect from the drawees of the checks the corresponding proceeds. It is true that the respondent had already collected the proceeds of the checks when it debited the petitioner's account, so that following the rule in Gullas vs. Philippine National Bank 2 it might be argued that the relationship between the parties had become that of creditor and debtor as to preclude the respondent from using the petitioner's funds to make payments not authorized by the latter. It is our view nonetheless that no creditor-debtor relationship was created between the parties.

Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (Act 2031) states that 3 —

"When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority."

Since under the foregoing provision, a forged signature in a negotiable instrument is wholly inoperative and no right to discharge it or enforce its payment can be acquired through or under the forged signature except against a party who cannot invoke the forgery, it stands to reason, upon the facts of record, that the respondent, as a collecting bank which indorsed the checks to the drawee-banks for clearing, should be liable to the latter for reimbursement, for, as found by the court a quo and by the appellate court, the indorsements on the checks had been forged prior to their delivery to the petitioner. In legal contemplation, therefore, the payments made by the drawee-banks to the respondent on account of the said checks were ineffective; and, such being the case, the relationship of creditor and debtor between the petitioner and the respondent had not been validly effected, the checks not having been properly and legitimately converted into cash. 4

In Great Eastern Life Ins. Co. vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 5 the Court ruled that it is the obligation of the collecting bank to reimburse the drawee-bank the value of the checks subsequently found to contain the forged indorsement of the payee. The reason is that the bank with which the check was deposited has no right to pay the sum stated therein to the forger "or anyone else upon a forged signature." "It was its duty to know," said the Court, "that [the payee's] endorsement was genuine before cashing the check." The petitioner must in turn shoulder the loss of the amounts which the respondent; as its collecting agent, had to reimburse to the drawee-banks.

We do not consider material for the purposes of the case at bar that more than three months had elapsed since the proceeds of the checks in question were collected by the respondent. The record shows that the respondent had acted promptly after being informed that the indorsements on the checks were forged. Moreover, having received the checks merely for collection and deposit, the respondent cannot he expected to know or ascertain the genuineness of all prior indorsements on the said checks. Indeed, having itself indorsed them to the respondent in accordance with the rules and practices of commercial banks, of which the Court takes due cognizance, the petitioner is deemed to have given the warranty prescribed in Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law that every single one of those checks "is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be.".

The petitioner was, moreover, grossly recreant in accepting the checks in question from Ramirez. It could not have escaped the attention of the petitioner that the payee of all the checks was a corporation — the Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. Yet, the petitioner cashed these checks to a mere individual who was admittedly a habitue at its jai-alai games without making any inquiry as to his authority to exchange checks belonging to the payee-corporation. In Insular Drug Co. vs. National 6 the Court made the pronouncement that.

". . . The right of an agent to indorse commercial paper is a very responsible power and will not be lightly inferred. A salesman with authority to collect money belonging to his principal does not have the implied authority to indorse checks received in payment. Any person taking checks made payable to a corporation, which can act only by agents, does so at his peril, and must abide by the consequences if the agent who indorses the same is without authority." (underscoring supplied)

It must be noted further that three of the checks in question are crossed checks, namely, exhs. 21, 25 and 27, which may only be deposited, but not encashed; yet, the petitioner negligently accepted them for cash. That two of the crossed checks, namely, exhs. 21 and 25, are bearer instruments would not, in our view, exculpate the petitioner from liability with respect to them. The fact that they are bearer checks and at the same time crossed checks should have aroused the petitioner's suspicion as to the title of Ramirez over them and his authority to cash them (apparently to purchase jai-alai tickets from the petitioner), it appearing on their face that a corporate entity — the Inter Island Gas Service, Inc. — was the payee thereof and Ramirez delivered the said checks to the petitioner ostensibly on the strength of the payee's cashiers' indorsements.

At all events, under Section 67 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "Where a person places his indorsement on an instrument negotiable by delivery he incurs all the liability of an indorser," and under Section 66 of the same statute a general indorser warrants that the instrument "is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be." Considering that the petitioner indorsed the said checks when it deposited them with the respondent, the petitioner as an indorser guaranteed the genuineness of all prior indorsements thereon. The respondent which relied upon the petitioner's warranty should not be held liable for the resulting loss. This conclusion applied similarly to exh. 22 which is an uncrossed bearer instrument, for under Section 65 of the Negotiable Instrument Law. "Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery . . . warrants (a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be." Under that same section this warranty "extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee," which, in the case at bar, would be the respondent.

The provision in the deposit slip issued by the respondent which stipulates that it "reserves to itself the right to charge back the item to the account of its depositor," at any time before "current funds or solvent credits shall have been actually received by the Bank," would not materially affect the conclusion we have reached. That stipulation prescribes that there must be an actual receipt by the bank of current funds or solvent credits; but as we have earlier indicated the transfer by the drawee-banks of funds to the respondent on account of the checks in question was ineffectual because made under the mistaken and valid assumption that the indorsements of the payee thereon were genuine. Under article 2154 of the New Civil Code "If something is received when there is no right to demand it and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises." There was, therefore, in contemplation of law, no valid payment of money made by the drawee-banks to the respondent on account of the questioned checks.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-18657 August 23, 1922

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18657             August 23, 1922

THE GREAT EASTERN LIFE INSURANCE CO., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendants-appellees.

Camus and Delgado for appellant.
Fisher and DeWitt and A. M. Opisso for Hongkong and Shanghai Bank.
Roman J. Lacson for Philippine National Bank.

STATEMENT

The plaintiff is an insurance corporation, and the defendants are banking corporations, and each is duly licensed to do its respective business in the Philippines Islands.

May 3, 1920, the plaintiff drew its check for P2,000 on the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation with whom it had an account, payable to the order of Lazaro Melicor. E. M. Maasim fraudulently obtained possession of the check, forged Melicor's signature, as an endorser, and then personally endorsed and presented it to the Philippine National Bank where the amount of the check was placed to his credit. After having paid the check, and on the next day, the Philippine national Bank endorsed the check to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation which paid it and charged the amount of the check to the account of the plaintiff. In the ordinary course of business, the Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation rendered a bank statement to the plaintiff showing that the amount of the check was charged to its account, and no objection was then made to the statement. About four months after the check was charged to the account of the plaintiff, it developed that Lazaro Melicor, to whom the check was made payable, had never received it, and that his signature, as an endorser, was forged by Maasim, who presented and deposited it to his private account in the Philippine National Bank. With this knowledge , the plaintiff promptly made a demand upon the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation that it should be given credit for the amount of the forged check, which the bank refused to do, and the plaintiff commenced this action to recover the P2,000 which was paid on the forged check. On the petition of the Shanghai Bank, the Philippine National Bank was made defendant. The Shanghai Bank denies any liability, but prays that, if a judgment should be rendered against it, in turn, it should have like judgment against the Philippine National Bank which denies all liability to either party.

Upon the issues being joined, a trial was had and judgment was rendered against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants, from which the plaintiff appeals, claiming that the court erred in dismissing the case, notwithstanding its finding of fact, and in not rendering a judgment in its favor, as prayed for in its complaint.

JOHNS, J.:

There is no dispute about any of the findings of fact made by the trial court, and the plaintiff relies upon them for a reversal. Among other things, the trial court says:

Who is responsible for the refund to the drawer of the amount of the check drawn and payable to order, when its value was collected by a third person by means of forgery of the signature of the payee? Is it the drawee or the last indorser, who ignored the forgery at the time of making the payment, or the forger?

To lower court found that Melicor's name was forged to the check. "So that the person to whose order the check was issued did not receive the money, which was collected by E. M. Maasim," and then says:

Now then, the National Bank should not be held responsible for the payment of made to Maasim in good faith of the amount of the check, because the indorsement of Maasim is unquestionable and his signature perfectly genuine, and the bank was not obliged to identify the signature of the former indorser. Neither could the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation be held responsible in making payment in good faith to the National Bank, because the latter is a holder in due course of the check in question. In other words, the two defendant banks can not be held civilly responsible for the consequences of the falsification or forgery of the signature of Lazaro Melicor, the National Bank having had no notice of said forgery in making payment to Maasim, nor the Hongkong bank in making payment to National Bank. Neither bank incurred in any responsibility arising from that crime, nor was either of the said banks by subsequent acts, guilty of negligence or fault.

This was fundamental error.

Plaintiff's check was drawn on Shanghai Bank payable to the order of Melicor. In other words, the plaintiff authorized and directed the Shanghai Bank to pay Melicor, or his order, P2,000. It did not authorize or direct the bank to pay the check to any other person than Melicor, or his order, and the testimony is undisputed that Melicor never did part with his title or endorse the check, and never received any of its proceeds. Neither is the plaintiff estopped or bound by the banks statement, which was made to it by the Shanghai Bank. This is not a case where the plaintiff's own signature was forged to one of it checks. In such a case, the plaintiff would have known of the forgery, and it would have been its duty to have promptly notified the bank of any forged signature, and any failure on its part would have released bank from any liability. That is not this case. Here, the forgery was that of Melicor, who was the payee of the check, and the legal presumption is that the bank would not honor the check without the genuine endorsement of Melicor. In other words, when the plaintiff received it banks statement, it had a right to assume that Melicor had personally endorsed the check, and that, otherwise, the bank would not have paid it.

Section 23 of Act No. 2031, known as the Negotiable Instruments Law, says:

When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.

That section is square in point.

The money was on deposit in the Shanghai Bank, and it had no legal right to pay it out to anyone except the plaintiff or its order. Here, the plaintiff ordered the Shanghai Bank to pay the P2,000 to Melicor, and the money was actually paid to Maasim and was never paid to Melicor, and he never paid to Melicor, and he never personally endorsed the check, or authorized any one to endorse it for him, and the alleged endorsement was a forgery. Hence, upon the undisputed facts, it must follow that the Shanghai Bank has no defense to this action.

It is admitted that the Philippine National Bank cashed the check upon a forged signature, and placed the money to the credit of Maasim, who was a forger. That the Philippine National Bank then endorsed the check and forwarded it to the Shanghai Bank by whom it was paid. The Philippine National Bank had no license or authority to pay the money to Maasim or anyone else upon a forge signature. It was its legal duty to know that Melicor's endorsment was genuine before cashing the check. Its remedy is against Maasim to whom it paid the money.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and one will be entered here in favor of the plaintiff and against the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation for the P2,000, with interest thereon from November 8, 1920 at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, and the costs of this action, and a corresponding judgment will be entered in favor of the Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation against the Philippine National Bank for the same amount, together with the amount of its costs in this action. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-15894 January 30, 1964

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15894             January 30, 1964

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, defendant-appellee.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-15894             January 30, 1964

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellee,
CORPORATION DE LOS P. DOMINICOS DE FILIPINAS, third-party-defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Claudio Teehankee and Aranda and Aviado for defendant-appellee.
Ignacio B. Alcuaz for third-party-defendant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the complaints and the third-party complaints in the above entitled cases, without special pronouncement as to costs. The cases are before us, only questions of law being raised in the appeal, apart from the fact that the amount involved in G.R. No. L-16895 exceeds P200,000, and that the evidence introduced therein is the same evidence in G.R. No. L-15894.

The Republic of the Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the Government, seeks to recover: (1) from the Equitable Banking Corporation — hereinafter referred to as the Equitable Bank — in case G.R. No. L-15894, the sum of P17,100, representing the aggregate value of four (4) treasury warrants — hereinafter referred to as warrants — paid to said bank by the Treasurer of the Philippines — hereinafter referred to as the Treasurer — thru the Clearing Office of the Central Bank of the Philippines; and (2) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands — hereinafter referred to as the PI Bank — in G.R. No. L-15895, the total sum of P342,767.63, representing the aggregate value of twenty-four (24) warrants similarly paid by the Treasurer to the PI Bank. These claims for refund are based upon a common ground — although said twenty-eight (28) warrants were executed on genuine government forms, the signature thereon of the drawing office and that of the representative of the Auditor General in that office are forged.

It is not disputed that from July to December 1952, the Corporacion de los Padres Dominicos — hereinafter referred to as the Corporacion — had acquired the twenty-four (24) treasury warrants involved in case G.R. No. L-15895 by accommodating its former trusted employee — one Jacinto Carranza — who asked the Corporacion to cash the warrants, alleging that it was difficult to do so directly with the Government and that his wife expected a sort of commission for the encashment; that the Corporacion acceded to Carranza's request, provided that the warrants would first be deposited with PI Bank, and that actual payment of the value of the warrants would be made only after the same had been duly accepted and cleared by the Treasurer and the proceeds thereof duly credited to the account of the Corporacion in the PI Bank; that the warrants were, accordingly, deposited by the Corporacion with said bank, which accepted them "subject to collection only"; that when the warrants were deposited with the PI Bank, each bore the indorsement of the respective payees and that of the Corporation; that, subsequently, the PI Bank presented the warrants for payment to the drawee thereof — the Government — thru the Clearing Office of the Central Bank — hereinafter referred to as the Clearing Office; that after being cleared, the warrants were paid by the Treasurer as follows:
T/W No.    Payee    Date ISSUED    Amount    Date Cleared
2132655    Marcela Antonio Domingo    6-18-52    P8,722.37    7- 1-52
2132650    Gregoria Santos Castro    6-23-52    14,605.91    7- 8-52
2468943    Josefa Castro de Villanueva    10-34-52    14,250.15    11-14-52
2159698    Anacleta Santos de Angeles    10-18-52    15,800.00    12- 5-52
2159668    Virginia Salem de Marcelino    11-13-52    16,900.00    12-10-52
2159692    Brigida San Luis de Santos    9-15-52    13,900.00    11- 3-52
2159673    Silva Sanches de Apolinario    10-14-52    14,810.00    11-11-52
2159667    Francisca Gomez de Galvez    10-12-52    16,200.75    11-11-52
2451448    Gaudencia Ruiz Alvarez    7- 1-52    12,702.76    7-15-52
2132653    Anastacia Capili Trinidad    6-25-52    8,794.21    7-15-52
2468979    Monica Anselmo de Pascua    7- 1-52    13,870.24    9- 852
2468944    Rosalia Manalo de Nazario    7-10-52    14,701.76    9- 8-52
2159682    Luisa Santos de Arellano    11-18-52    16,400.50    12- 8-52
2159669    Leticia Moreno de Ocampo    11-16-52    15,880.75    12- 8-52
2159670    Juana Castro de Jesus    10-12-52    16,200.00    12-15-52
2159671    Antonia Sison de Mauricio    9- 9-52    12,900.75    11-10-52
2159660    Rosario Pilapil de Rodrigo    9- 4-52    13,950.39    9-23-52
2169658    Mauricia Sison de Angeles    9-12-52    15,200.76    9-23-52
2159686    Lucia Angeles de Natalio    9-12-52    12,890.74    10-27-52
2468977    Nicolasa Alvares Jaranilla    7- 2-52    15,340.76    7-25-52
2468978    Maria Antonio de los Reyes    7- 2-52    14,722.31    7-25-52
2159659    Je Jastive de Fernandez    8-16-52    14,820.00    8-27-52
2159656    Gregoria Pascual de Lira    8-15-52    12,900.75    8-27-52
2159666    Luisa Dancel de Mendoza    10-11-52    16,300.75    12- 2-52

and that, accordingly, the PI Bank credited the proceeds of said warrants to the Corporation, which, in turn, withdrew said proceeds by means of its own checks and eventually paid the corresponding amounts to Jacinto Carranza. On December 23, 1952, the Treasurer returned three (3) of said warrants (Nos. 2159659, 2159656, and 2159666) to the Central Bank, and demanded, on the ground that they had been forged, that the value thereof be charged against the accounts of the PI Bank in the Clearing Office and credited back to the demand deposit of the Bureau of the Treasury, hereinafter referred to as the Treasury. Four (4) days later, two (2) more warrants (Nos. 2468977 and 2468978), and, finally, on January 16, 1953, the remaining nineteen (19) warrants were returned by the Treasury to the Central Bank for the same reason and with the same demand. The Central Bank in turn referred said warrants, together with the letters of demand of the Treasurer, for appropriate action to the PI Bank, which opposed the return of the warrants or to have the value thereof charged against its account in the Clearing Office and requested the Central Bank to return the warrants to the Treasurer.

The records of G.R. No. L-15894 show that the four (4) warrants involved therein were deposited with the Equitable Bank by persons known thereto as its depositors or customers, namely, Robert Wong, Lu Chill Kau and Chung Ching; that, in due course, the Equitable Bank cleared said warrants, thru the Clearing Office, then collected the corresponding amounts from the Treasurer and thereafter credited said amounts to the accounts of the respective depositors; that on January 15, 1958, the Treasurer notified the Equitable Bank of the alleged defect of said warrants and demanded reimbursement of the amounts thereof; and that this demand was rejected by the Equitable Bank. Hence, the institution of G.R. No. L-15895 (Civil Case No. 19599 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), against the PI Bank, for the recovery of P342,767.63, and of G.R. No. L-15894 (Civil Case No. 19600 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), against the Equitable Bank for, the recovery of P17,100.00.

Upon leave of the lower court, the PI Bank filed a third-party complaint against the Corporacion. In G.R. No. L-15895, and the Equitable Bank filed a similar complaint against, Robert Wong, Lu Chill Kau and Chung Ching in G.R. No. L-15894, for whatever reimbursements the PI Bank and the Equitable Bank may respectively be sentenced to make to the Government. By agreement of the parties, the two (2) cases were jointly heard, and after appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered the decision adverted to above. 1äwphï1.ñët

The clearing of the aforementioned twenty-eight (28) warrants thru the Clearing Office was made pursuant to the "24-hour clearing house rule", which had been adopted by the Central Bank in a conference with representatives and officials of the different banking institutions in the Philippines. The rule is embodied in Section 4, subsection (c) of Circular No. 9 of the Central Bank, dated February 17, 1949 (Exhibit B), as amended by the letter of the Governor of the Central Bank, dated June 4, 1949 (Exhibit D), reading:

Items which should be returned for any reason whatsoever shall be returned directly to the bank, institution or entity from which the item was received. For this purpose, the Receipt for Returned Checks (Cash Form No. 9) should be used. The original and duplicate copies of said Receipt shall be given to the bank, institution or entity which returned the items and the triplicate copy should be retained by the bank, institution or entity whose demand is being returned. At the following clearing, the original of the Receipt for returned Checks shall be presented through the Clearing Office as a demand against the bank, institution or entity whose item has been returned. Nothing in this section shall prevent the resumed items from being settled by direct reimbursement to the bank, institution or entity returning the items. All items cleared at 11:00 o'clock a.m. shall be returned not later than 2:00 o'clock p.m. on the same day and all items cleared at 3:00 o'clock p.m. shall be returned not later than 8:30 a.m. of the following business day, except for items cleared on Saturday which may be returned not later than 3:30 a.m. of the following day. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Government maintains that it is not bound by this rule because: (1) the Treasury is not a bank; and (2) the Treasurer has objected to the application of said rule to his office. This contention, however, untenable for, admittedly, the Treasury is a member of the aforementioned Clearing Office and Exh. A clearly shows that the former "has agreed to clear its clearable items through" the latter "subject to the rules and regulations of the Central Bank." Besides, the above quoted rule applies not only to banks, but, also, to the institutions and entities therein alluded to. Then too, the opposition of the Treasurer to the "24-hour clearing house rule" is not sufficient to exempt the Treasury from the operation thereof. Upon the other hand, said opposition is predicated upon the allegation that it is physically impossible for the Treasury to check and verify the genuineness of treasury warrants within twenty-four (24) hours, because, during 1952 said office used to receive daily from 3,000 to 4,000 warrants which, considering its very limited personnel at that time, would have required one (1) or two (2) months clear. This claim is belied, however, by the statements the Treasurer, Exhibits 38 and 38-A to 38-C, showing that on September 15, 23 and 24 and November 25, 1952, his office had cleared 1,618, 2,851, 1,742 and 2,360 warrant respectively. Moreover, if the rule was unwise, the Treasurer could have secured the proper remedy through the President of the Philippines, since the Treasury and Central Bank are both agencies of the Government.

At any rate, the aforementioned twenty-eight (28) warrants were cleared and paid by the Treasurer, in view which the PI Bank and the Equitable Bank credited the corresponding amounts to the respective depositors of the warrants and then honored their checks for said amounts. Thus, the Treasury had not only been negligent in clearing its own warrants, but had, also, thereby induced the PI Bank and the Equitable Bank to pay the amounts thereof to said depositors. The gross nature of the negligence of the Treasury becomes more apparent when we consider that each one of the twenty-four (24) warrants involve in G.R. No. L-15895 was for over P5,000, and, hence; beyond the authority of the auditor of the Treasury — whose signature thereon had been forged — to approve. In other words, the irregularity of said warrants was apparent the face thereof, from the viewpoint of the Treasury. Moreover, the same had not advertised the loss of genuine forms of its warrants. Neither had the PI Bank nor the Equitable Bank been informed of any irregularity in connection with any of the warrants involved in these two (2) cases, until after December 23, 1952, — or after the warrants had been cleared and honored — when the Treasury gave notice of the forgeries adverted to above. As a consequence, the loss of the amounts thereof is mainly imputable to acts and omissions of the Treasury, for which the PI Bank and the Equitable Bank should not and cannot be penalized.

Where a loss, which must be borne by one of two parties alike innocent of forgery, can be traced to the neglect or fault of either, it is reasonable that it would be borne by him, even if innocent of any intentional fraud, through whose means it has succeeded, (Phil. National Bank v. National City Bank of New York, 63 Phil. 711, 723.)

Generally, where a drawee bank otherwise would have a right of recovery against a collecting or indorsing bank for its payment of a forged check its action will be barred if it is guilty of an unreasonable delay in discovering the forgery and in giving notice? thereof. (C.J.S. 769-700.).

Where defendant bank, on presentation to it on September 2, of forged check drawn on another bank, paid part of amount to presenter, drawee paying check through clearing house on said day, held that the latter, not giving notice of forgery until December 5, could not hold defendant for amount so paid. (First State Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 145 N. E. 382, 314 Ill. 269, affirming 234 Ill. App. 39.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.