Jurisprudence: G.R. Nos. 105965-70 March 20, 2001

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 105965-70.  March 20, 2001

GEORGE UY, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PUNO, J.:

Before the Court is the Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

The Court stated in its decision dated August 9, 1999:

“In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court.  The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.”

It explained in the resolution of February 22, 2000 that:

“(t)he clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.  The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan…" And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsman's and Special Prosecutor's authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.”

Seeking clarification of the foregoing ruling, respondent Ombudsman raises the following points:

“(1) The jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not parallel to or equated with the broader jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;

(2) The phrase "primary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" is not a delimitation of its jurisdiction solely to Sandiganbayan cases; and

(3) The authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases before the Sandiganbayan cannot be confused with the broader investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Office of the Ombudsman.”

Thus, the matter that needs to be discussed herein is the scope of the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation and the subsequent prosecution of criminal offenses in the light of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act [RA] 6770).

We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.

The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770.  Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, thus:

“Sec. 15.  Powers, Functions and Duties.--The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

x x x”

Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman under the latter’s supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  It states:

“Sec. 11.  Structural Organization.— x x x

x x x

(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff.  The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.

(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:

(a)     To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;

(b)     To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and

(c)     To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.”

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.  It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts.  It has been held that the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.[1]

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.  The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts.  The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees.  Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.[2]

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770.  The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.[3] Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases.  The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants.[4] To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.  Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control.[5] The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman.  In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.[6] A review of the development of our Ombudsman laws reveals this intent.

The concept of Ombudsman originated in Sweden in the early 19th century, referring to an officer appointed by the legislature to handle the people’s grievances against administrative and judicial actions.  He was primarily tasked with receiving complaints from persons aggrieved by administrative action or inaction, conducting investigation thereon, and making recommendations to the appropriate administrative agency based on his findings.  He relied mainly on the power of persuasion and the high prestige of the office to effect his recommendations.[7]

In this jurisdiction, several Ombudsman-like agencies were established by past Presidents to serve as the people’s medium for airing grievances and seeking redress against abuses and misconduct in the government.  These offices were conceived with the view of raising the standard in public service and ensuring integrity and efficiency in the government.  In May 1950, President Elpidio Quirino created the Integrity Board charged with receiving complaints against public officials for acts of corruption, dereliction of duty and irregularity in office, and conducting a thorough investigation of these complaints.  The Integrity Board was succeeded by several other agencies which performed basically the same functions of complaints-handling and investigation.  These were the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission under President Ramon Magsaysay, the Presidential Committee on Administration Performance Efficiency under President Carlos Garcia, the Presidential Anti-Graft Committee under President Diosdado Macapagal, and the Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations and the Office of the Citizens Counselor, both under President Ferdinand Marcos.  It was observed, however, that these agencies failed to realize their objective for they did not enjoy the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function as government critic.  Furthermore, their powers extended to no more than fact-finding and recommending.[8]

Thus, in the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the members of the Constitutional Convention saw the need to constitutionalize the office of an Ombudsman, to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its recommendations.[9] The 1973 Constitution mandated the legislature to create an office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan.  Its powers shall not be limited to receiving complaints and making recommendations, but shall also include the filing and prosecution of criminal, civil or administrative case before the appropriate body in case of failure of justice.  Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution read:

“Sec. 6.  The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative case before the proper court or body.”

Implementing this constitutional provision, President Marcos, on June 11, 1978, exercising his power under Proclamation 1081, enacted Presidential Decree (PD) 1487 creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan.  Its principal task was to “investigate, on complaint, any administrative act[10] of any administrative agency[11] including any government-owned or controlled corporation.”[12] The Tanodbayan also had the duty to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or body if he has reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner resulting in a failure of justice.[13] It should be noted, however, that the prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was to be done by the Tanodbayan through the Special Prosecutor who, according to PD 1486,[14] had the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file information for and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of said court.  The Special Prosecutor was then under the control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice.[15]

Shortly after its enactment, PD 1487 was amended by PD 1607 which took effect on December 10, 1978.  The amendatory law broadened the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative acts of administrative agencies by authorizing it to conduct an investigation on its own motion or initiative, even without a complaint from any person.[16] The new law also expanded the prosecutory function of the Tanodbayan by creating the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor in the Office of the Tanodbayan and placing under his direction and control the Special Prosecutor who had the “exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein.”[17] Thus, the law provided that if the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency.[18]

On July 18, 1979, PD 1630 was enacted further amending PD 1487 and PD 1607.  PD 1630 reorganized the Office of the Tanodbayan and transferred the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan himself.  Thus, the Tanodbayan was empowered to directly conduct preliminary investigation, file information and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and other courts.  The amendment gave the Tanodbayan the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file information therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases.[19] Section 10 of PD 1630 provided:

“Sec. 10.  Powers.--The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:

(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any government-owned or controlled corporation;

x x x

(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he may file the necessary information or complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative agency and prosecute the same.”

Section 18 further stated:

“Sec. 18.  Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.--If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall conduct the necessary investigation and shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency.”

With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created.  The present Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and to notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.[20] He possesses the following powers, functions and duties:

“1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;

2.  Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

3.  Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

4.  Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

5.  Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

6.  Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

7.  Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

8.  Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.”[21]

As a new Office of the Ombudsman was established, the then existing Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor which continued to function and exercise its powers as provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution.[22]

The frameworks for the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor were laid down by President Corazon Aquino in Executive Order (EO) 243 and EO 244, both passed on July 24, 1987.

In September 1989, Congress passed RA 6770 providing for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman.  As in the previous laws on the Ombudsman, RA 6770 gave the present Ombudsman not only the duty to receive and relay the people's grievances, but also the duty to investigate and prosecute for and in their behalf, civil, criminal and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees as embodied in Sections 15 and 11 of the law.

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and process the people's complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel.  The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees.  The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.  Recognizing the importance of this power, the Court cannot derogate the same by limiting it only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.  It is apparent from the history and the language of the present law that the legislature intended such power to apply not only to cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those within the jurisdiction of regular courts.  The Court observed in the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[23]

“A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.

x x x

Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law governing the then Tanodbayan when Republic Act No. 6770 was enacted providing for the functional and structural organization of the present Office of the Ombudsman.  This later law retained in the Ombudsman the power of the former Tanodbayan to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  x x x.”

Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public officers and employees.  The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou[24] that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.  Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman provides:

“The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman.  In cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined (therein).[25] The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.”

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and its resolution dated February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., I concur in the result.

Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Pardo, J., I dissent.  See attached.

De Leon, Jr., J.,  I join the dissenting opinion of Justice B. P. Pardo.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 167571

SECOND DIVISION

                                                                 

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR.,                         G.R. No.  167571

                     Petitioner,                            

                                                                    Present:

                                                                   QUISUMBING, J.,

                                      Chairperson,

          -  versus  -                                        CARPIO MORALES,

                                                         TINGA,

          VELASCO, JR., and

BRION,  JJ.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                    

RAMON C. TONGSON and 

RODRIGO G. CAWILI,                            Promulgated:

                      Respondents.

                                                                    November 25, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

          This is a Petition for Review[1] of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.’s (petitioner’s) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.[2]

          The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

          In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner.  On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.  Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.[3]

          On 24 August 1995, petitioner  filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson[4] for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)[5]  before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.[6]  Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had  lent money to Cawili in the latter’s personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various  sums  to  Cawili  and  in  appreciation  of his services, he was

offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation.  He averred that he was not  Cawili’s business associate; in fact, he himself had  filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.  Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said  checks had been  falsified.

          To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson’s signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those  appearing on the checks.[7]  He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili’s business associate.[8]

          In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,[9] City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court.  In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,[10]  after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).  

           Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

          On  15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution.  In her resolution,[11] ACP Sampaga   held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,[12] which provides that  violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.  In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor  on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the  prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.[13]  Moreover,  ACP Sampaga  stated  that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could  no longer be sanctioned  under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure  because the initiative should come from petitioner  himself and not the investigating prosecutor.[14]  Finally, ACP Sampaga  found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.[15]

           Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating  that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.[16]  Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,[17] the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,  ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor’s office interrupted the  running of the prescriptive period citing  Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.[18] Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[19] On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor’s Office  filed an information[20] charging petitioner with three (3) counts  of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[21]

          However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,[22] the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson,  ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered “the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22” against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.  Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.[23] The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,[24] wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor’s office.

          Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari[25] before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ.  The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner’s failure  to  attach  a  proper verification and certification of non-forum

shopping.  The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a  mere photocopy.[26]  Petitioner  moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court’s resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.[27] Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion, stating that subsequent  compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the  petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.[28]

          In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals  committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

          The DOJ, in its comment,[29] states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court.   It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22,  a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with  Act No. 3326.

          Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.  They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326.  In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated  their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.[30]

          The petition is meritorious.

          First on the technical issues.

          Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies  with  the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this  Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. [31]

          Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct—the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,[32] as in the instant case.  In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification  to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied  with the verification requirement.

          Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of  the  DOJ.  We  agree.  A  plain  reading  of  the  petition before the

Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ  resolution dated 9 August 2004,[33] a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex “A.”[34] Obviously,  the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.

          Now, on the substantive aspects.

          Petitioner assails the DOJ’s reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,[35] a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court.  According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,[36] wherein this  Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.  Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,  petitioner notes.[37]  He argues that sustaining the DOJ’s and the Court of Appeals’  pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.[38]

        

          There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled  An Act to Establish  Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When  Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods.  The pertinent provisions read:

          

SECTION 1.  Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x

        

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if  the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22.  An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof.   Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that  only the filing of a case in court can toll  the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on  4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,”[39]  and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.[40]

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.[41]  Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada[42] and People v. Joson,[43] is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace  for  preliminary  investigation   inasmuch  as the filing  of  the  complaint  signifies  the 

institution  of  the  criminal proceedings against the accused.[44]  These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao[45] that  the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.[46]  Subsequently, in  People v. Olarte,[47]  we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription  of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits.  In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender,[48] and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[49] and  Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[50] which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both  special laws, the Court ruled that the

prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused.  In the more recent case of  Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,[51]  the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,[52] another special law,  is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition  in the Interport Resources case[53] is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term “judicial proceedings” in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before “investigation and punishment” in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has  become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term “proceedings” should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the  trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution   should be sufficient to toll prescription.[54]

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.[55] A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner   filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period.  He likewise timely filed his  appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against

Tongson.  He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner’s control.  After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ’s flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.   Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed.  Petitioner ’s  filing of his  complaint–affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor  on  24 August 1995  signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the  prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a  definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE,  the petition is GRANTED.  The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are  REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The resolution of the Department of Justice dated  9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Criminal Procedure Case Digest: Zaldiva v. Reyes (1992)

G.R. No. 102342            July 03, 1992


Lessons Applicable: Rule 110 does not cover Rule on Summary Procedure (special law), Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right (Criminal Procedure)
Laws Applicable:  Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses


FACTS: 

• May 11, 1990: Luz M. Zaldiva violated Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal and was charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in 
• May 30, 1990: complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
• October 2, 1990: information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez
• Zaldiva: moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed - MTC denied and RTC affirmed on appeal
• Zadive filed a petition for review on certiorari and argues that the crime is covered under the Rule of Summary Procedure:
• Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases: x x x
• B. Criminal Cases: xxx
• 3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances xxx
• Section 9. How commenced. – The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
• Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
• Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
• Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
• The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
• The prosecution invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure where the phrase phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure which is according to the dictum in Francisco v. CA promulgated on May 30, 1983. (the promulgation of Rules on Summary Procedure is on Aug 1, 1983 while the revisionof Criminal Procedure was on Oct 1, 1988)
• Applying the canon that words statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent, the phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure
• Referenced to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129 vesting to the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts offenses not covered under Rules on Summary Procedure
• Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to but the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court
• Conflict between:
• Rule on Summary Procedure (special law) > Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
• Act No. 3326 > Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
• Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right  and according to Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution
• in the exercise of its rule-making power, not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 102342

EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342, July 03, 1992

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 76, SAN MATEO, RIZAL, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

CRUZ, J.:

The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.[1] The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.[2] The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.[3]

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge.[4]

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:

Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

x x x

B. Criminal Cases:

1.                Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2.                Violations of rental law;

3.                Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4.                All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)

x x x

Section 9. How commenced. – The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.

She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted - For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:

a)         For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;

b)               For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscals office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals:[5]

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."[6] Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.[7]

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months,[8] and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until its too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, p. 18.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Id., p. 19; Through Judge Andres B. Reyes, Jr.

[4] id., p. 21.

[5] 122 SCRA 538.

[6] The phrase "filed directly in court without need of prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation" was deleted under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure effective on November 15, 1991.

[7] People vs. Castro, 95 Phil. 463.

[8] Section 447, Local Government Code.