Showing posts with label quasi delict. Show all posts

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Bernabe Castillo et al v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al (1989)

G.R. No. 48541 August 21, 1989

Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

Barnabe Castillo's Version (May 2, 1965, 2:00 p.m.)

Bernabe Castillo was driving his jeep on the right lane of the McArthur Highway with Generosa Castillo, his wife, father Serapion Castillo, seated in front and Eulogio Castillo, then a minor child at the rate of 25 kms/hr
Juanito Rosario, with his wife, Cresencia Rosario drove his car speeding and oncoming the same lane for the purpose of overtaking a cargo truck
To evade collission, Bernabe swerved his jeep hard right and the car rested on the shoulder of the right lane as the jeep's rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short tiremarks behind it while the rear left long tire-marks

The jeep suffered a shattered windshield, pushed-in radiator. The left mid-portion of its bumper badly dented. The car had a flat tire on its right front wheel; its right fender badly dented as the headlamp on top of it. The bumber stooped downward.
Bernabe's patella on his right knee was fractured and he suffered serious physical injuries, in other parts of his body. Serapion Castillo whose head crushed through the windshield and was nearly beheaded, while the other two passengers suffered multiple slight and less serious injuries.

Juanito Rosario's Version (May 2, 1965, 2:30 p.m.)

He was about to overtake a slow cargo truck but due to a flat tire, he parked his car on the left shoulder of the road
as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the jeep driven by Bernabe from the opposite direction

In the criminal case, Juanito was acquited from the crime for reckless imprudence on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt

Court held that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanito Rosario but it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was is the proximate cause of the collision

CA affirmed CFI: Dismissed the case against Juanito as well as the counterclaim against Bernabe

ISSUE: W/N the negligence of Juanito can make him civilly liable despite being acquitted from his criminal charges

HELD: YES.

Since the civil action is predicated upon Juanito Rosario's alleged negligence which does not exist, it follows that his acquittal in the criminal action, which is already final, carried with it the extinction of civil responsibility arising therefrom
findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Maria Benita A. Dulay, et al., v. The Court of Appeals, et al.(1995)

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

Lesson Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury

Superguard:

Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits

Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused
It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, et al (1993)

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Laws Applicable: Art. 21, Art. 23 and Art. 2176 of the Civil Code

Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

Gashem Shookat Baksh (Gashem), a medical student in Lyceum Northwestern Dagupan City, courted and proposed to marry 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community

she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married after the end of the school semester (October that year)

Gashem visited her parents in Pangasinan for approval for marriage

August 20 1987: Gashem forced her to live with him when she was still a virgin then he started to maltreat and threatened to kill her resulting into injuries

would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day
she became pregnant, but Gashem gave her some medicine to abort the fetus

Gashem continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he asked her not to live with him anymore as he is already married to someone living in Bacolod City

he lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff

resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding.
prayed for judgment ordering Gashem to pay her damages

Gashem: never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport

RTC: favored private respondent and against Gashem

gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false

CA: affirmed RTC

Gashem's acts are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning
Gashem criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement

promised to marry her would not be actionable since mere breach of promise is not actionable

ISSUE: W/N damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

HELD: YES. Petition is denied.

existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong
Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code

Article 21 fills that vacuum and has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts

acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21

It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault."
let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Porfirio P. Cinco v. Hon. Mateo Canonoy et al. (1979)

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31 and Article 2176 of the Civil Code

Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered
City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
CFI by certiorari: dismissed

ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for

nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant
primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Pedro Elcano, et al., v. Reginal Hill et al. (1977)

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
Laws Applicable: ART. 2177,Article 397,article 1093,Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Tort and Damages)

FACTS:

Reginald Hill, a minor, married but living with his father, Atty. Marvin Hill with whom he was living and getting subsistence killed Agapito Elcano
CFI Civil Case: dismissed on the ground that he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake
Spouses Elcano appealed

ISSUES:

W/N the civil action should be barred by the acquittal of criminal action - NO
W/N the Civil Code can be applied to Atty. Marvin Hill even though Reginald is already married -YES

HELD: order appealed from is reversed

1. NO.

separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life
to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. YES

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible
the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent