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Showing posts with label 1920. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1920. Show all posts

Insurance Case Digest: San Miguel Brewery v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co. (1920)

G.R. No. L-14300  January 19, 1920

Lessons Applicable: 
  • Mortgagor (Insurance)
  • Measure of Insurable Interest (Insurance) 
  • Effect of Change of Interest in Thing Insured (Insurance)
  • Effect of transfer of thing insured (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: sec. 16,sec. 19 (now sec. 20),sec. 50,sec.55 (now sec. 58) of the Insurance Code (all old law)

FACTS:

  • In the contract of mortgage, the owner P.D. Dunn had agreed, at his own expense, to insure the mortgaged property for its full value and to indorse the policies in such manner as to authorize the Brewery Company to receive the proceeds in case of loss and to retain such part thereof as might be necessary to satisfy the remainder then due upon the mortgage debt. Instead, however, of effecting the insurance himself Dunn authorized and requested the Brewery Company to procure insurance on the property in the amount of P15,000 at Dunn's expense.  
  • San Miguel insured the property only as mortgagee.
  • Dunn sold the propert to Henry Harding.  The insurance was not assigned by Dunn to Harding.
  • When it was destroyed by fire, the two companies settled with San Miguelto the extent of the mortgage credit.  
  • RTC: Absolved the 2 companies from the difference.  Henry Harding is not entitled to the difference between the mortgage credit and the face value of the policies.
  • Henry Harding appealed.
ISSUE: 
1. W/N San Miguel has insurable interest as mortgagor only to the extent of the mortgage credit - YES
2. W/N Harding has insurable interest as owner - NO

HELD: affirmed
  • section 19 of the Insurance Act:
    • a change of interest in any part of a thing insured unaccompanied by a corresponding change of interest in the insurance, suspends the insurance to an equivalent extent, until the interest in the thing and the interest in the insurance are vested in the same person
  • section 55:
    • the mere transfer of a thing insured does not transfer the policy, but suspends it until the same person becomes the owner of both the policy and the thing insured
  • Undoubtedly these policies of insurance might have been so framed as to have been "payable to the San Miguel Brewery, mortgagee, as its interest may appear, remainder to whomsoever, during the continuance of the risk, may become the owner of the interest insured." (Sec 54, Act No. 2427.) Such a clause would have proved an intention to insure the entire interest in the property, not merely the insurable interest of the San Miguel Brewery, and would have shown exactly to whom the money, in case of loss, should be paid. But the policies are not so written.
  • The blame for the situation thus created rests, however, with the Brewery rather than with the insurance companies, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the insurance companies were requested to write insurance upon the insurable interest of the owner or intended to make themselves liable to that extent
  • If by inadvertence, accident, or mistake the terms of the contract were not fully set forth in the policy, the parties are entitled to have it reformed.  But to justify the reformation of a contract, the proof must be of the most satisfactory character, and it must clearly appear that the contract failed to express the real agreement between the parties
  • In the case now before us the proof is entirely insufficient to authorize reformation. 

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-14300


EN BANC


DECISION


G.R. No. L-14300  January 19, 1920


SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, ETC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAW UNION AND ROCK INSURANCE CO., (LTD.) ET AL., defendants-appellees. HENRY HARDING, defendant-appellant.


Crossfield and O'Brien for appellant Harding.
Lawrence and Ross for appellee Law Union etc. Ins. Co., J.:


This action was begun on October 8, 1917, in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by the plaintiff, the San Miguel Brewery, for the purpose of recovering upon two policies of insurance underwritten respectively by Law Union and Rock Insurance Company (Ltd.), and the "Filipinas" Compania de Seguros, for the sum of P7,500 each, insuring certain property which has been destroyed by fire. The plaintiff, the San Miguel Brewery, is named as the party assured in the two policies referred to, but it is alleged in the complaint that said company was in reality interested in the property which was the subject of insurance in the character of a mortgage creditor only, and that the owner of said property upon the date the policies were issued was one D. P. Dunn who was later succeeded as owner by one Henry Harding. Accordingly said Harding was made a defendant, as a person interested in the subject of the litigation.


The prayer of the complaint is that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff against the two companies named for the sum of P15,000, with interest and costs, and further that upon satisfaction of the balance of P4,505.30 due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt, and upon the cancellation of the mortgage, the plaintiff be absolved from liability to the defendants or any of them. The peculiar form of the latter part of the prayer is evidently due to the design of the plaintiff to lay a foundation for Harding to recover the difference between the plaintiff's credit and the amount for which the property was insured. Accordingly, as was to be expected, Harding answered, admitting the material allegations of the complaint and claiming for himself the right to recover the difference between the plaintiff's mortgage credit and the face value of the policies. The two insurance companies also answered, admitting in effect their liability to the San Miguel Brewery to the extent of its mortgage credit, but denying liability to Harding on the ground that under the contracts of insurance the liability of the insurance companies was limited to the insurable interest of the plaintiff therein. Soon after the action was begun the insurance companies effected a settlement with the San Miguel Brewery by paying the full amount of the credit claimed by it, with the result that the litigation as between the original plaintiff and the two insurance companies came to an end, leaving the action to be prosecuted to final judgement by the defendant Harding with respect to the balance claimed to be due to him upon the policies.


Upon hearing the evidence the trial judge came to the conclusion that Harding had no right of action whatever against the companies and absolved them from liability without special finding as to costs. From this decision the said Henry Harding has appealed.


The two insurance companies who are named as defendants do not dispute their liability to the San Miguel Brewery, to the extent already stated, and the only question here under discussion is that of the liability of the insurance companies to Harding. It is therefore necessary to take account of such facts only as bear upon this aspect of the case.


In this connection it appears that on January 12, 1916, D. P. Dunn, then the owner of the property to which the insurance relates, mortgaged the same to the San Miguel Brewery to secure a debt of P10,000. In the contract of mortgage Dunn agreed to keep the property insured at his expense to the full amount of its value in companies to be selected by the Brewery Company and authorized the latter in case of loss to receive the proceeds of the insurance and to retain such part as might be necessary to cover the mortgage debt. At the same time, in order more conveniently to accomplish the end in view, Dunn authorized and requested the Brewery Company to effect said insurance itself. Accordingly on the same date Antonio Brias, general manager of the Brewery, made a verbal application to the Law Union and Rock Insurance Company for insurance to the extent of P15,000 upon said property. In reply to a question of the company's agent as to whether the Brewery was the owner of the property, he stated that the company was interested only as a mortgagee. No information was asked as to who was the owner of the property, and no information upon this point was given.


It seems that the insurance company to whom this application was directed did not want to carry more than one-half the risk. It therefore issued its own policy for P7,500 and procured a policy in a like amount to be issued by the "Filipinas" Compania de Seguros. Both policies were issued in the name of the San Miguel Brewery as the assured, and contained no reference to any other interest in the property. Both policies contain the usual clause requiring assignments to be approved and noted on the policy. The premiums were paid by the Brewery and charged to Dunn. A year later the policies were renewed, without change, the renewal premiums being paid by the Brewery, supposedly for the account of the owner. In the month of March of the year 1917 Dunn sold the insured property to the defendant Henry Harding, but not assignment of the insurance, or of the insurance policies, was at any time made to him.


We agree with the trial court that no cause of action in Henry Harding against the insurance companies is show. He is not a party to the contracts of insurance and cannot directly maintain an action thereon. (Uy Tam and Uy Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil. Rep., 471.) His claim is merely of an equitable and subsidiary nature and must be made effective, if at all, through the San Miguel Brewery in whose name the contracts are written. Now the Brewery, as mortgagee of the insured property, undoubtedly had an insurable interest therein; but it could not, in any event, recover upon these policies an amount in excess of its mortgage credit. In this connection it will be remembered that Antonio Brias, upon making application for the insurance, informed the company with which the insurance was placed that the Brewery was interested only as a mortgagee. It would, therefore, be impossible for the Brewery mortgage on the insured property C6GUE4qV8i.


This conclusion is not only deducible from the principles governing the operation and effect of insurance contracts in general but the point is clearly covered by the express provisions of sections 16 and 50 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427). In the first of the sections cited, it is declared that "the measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might be damnified by loss or injury thereof" (sec. 16); while in the other it is stated that "the insurance shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy" (sec. 50).


These provisions would have been fatal to any attempt at recovery even by D. P. Dunn, if the ownership of the property had continued in him up to the time of the loss; and as regards Harding, an additional insuperable obstacle is found in the fact that the ownership of the property had been charged, prior to the loss, without any corresponding change having been effected in the policy of insurance. In section 19 of the Insurance Act we find it stated that "a change of interest in any part of a thing insured unaccompanied by a corresponding change of interest in the insurance, suspends the insurance to an equivalent extent, until the interest in the thing and the interest in the insurance are vested in the same person." Again in section 55 it is declared that "the mere transfer of a thing insured does not transfer the policy, but suspends it until the same person becomes the owner of both the policy and the thing insured."


Undoubtedly these policies of insurance might have been so framed as to have been "payable to the Sane Miguel Brewery, mortgagee, as its interest may appear, remainder to whomsoever, during the continuance of the risk, may become the owner of the interest insured." (Sec 54, Act No. 2427.) Such a clause would have proved an intention to insure the entire interest in the property, not merely the insurable interest of the San Miguel Brewery, and would have shown exactly to whom the money, in case of loss, should be paid. But the policies are not so written.


It is easy to collect from the facts stated in the decision of the trial judge, no less than from the testimony of Brias, the manager of the San Miguel Brewery, that, as the insurance was written up, the obligation of the insurance companies was different from that contemplated by Dunn, at whose request the insurance was written, and Brias. In the contract of mortgage Dunn had agreed, at his own expense, to insure the mortgaged property for its full value and to indorse the policies in such manner as to authorize the Brewery Company to receive the proceeds in case of loss and to retain such part thereof as might be necessary to satisfy the remainder then due upon the mortgage debt. Instead, however, of effecting the insurance himself Dunn authorized and requested the Brewery Company to procure insurance on the property in the amount of P15,000 at Dunn's expense. The Brewery Company undertook to carry this mandate into effect, and it of course became its duty to procure insurance of the character contemplated, that is, to have the policies so written as to protect not only the insurable interest of the Brewery, but also the owner. Brias seems to have supposed that the policies as written had this effect, but in this he was mistaken. It was certainly a hardship on the owner to be required to pay the premiums upon P15,000 of insurance when he was receiving no benefit whatever except in protection to the extent of his indebtedness to the Brewery. The blame for the situation thus created rests, however, with the Brewery rather than with the insurance companies, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the insurance companies were requested to write insurance upon the insurable interest of the owner or intended to make themselves liable to that extent.


If during the negotiations which resulted in the writing of this insurance, it had been agreed between the contracting parties that the insurance should be so written as to protect not only the interest of the mortgagee but also the residuary interest of the owner, and the policies had been, by inadvertence, ignorance, or mistake written in the form in which they were issued, a court would have the power to reform the contracts and give effect to them in the sense in which the parties intended to be bound. But in order to justify this, it must be made clearly to appear that the minds of the contracting parties did actually meet in agreement and that they labored under some mutual error or mistake in respect to the expression of their purpose. Thus, in Bailey vs. American Central Insurance Co. (13 Fed., 250), it appeared that a mortgage desiring to insure his own insurable interest only, correctly stated his interest, and asked that the same be insured. The insurance company agreed to accept the risk, but the policy was issued in the name of the owner, because of the mistaken belief of the company's agent that the law required it to be so drawn. It was held that a court of equity had the power, at the suit of the mortgage, to reform the instrument and give judgment in his favor for the loss thereunder, although it had been exactly as it was. Said the court: "If the applicant correctly states his interest and distinctly asks for an insurance thereon, and the agent of the insurer agrees to comply with his request, and assumes to decide upon the form of the policy to be written for that purpose, and by mistake of law adopts the wrong form, a court of equity will reform the instrument so as to make it insurance upon the interest named." (See also Fink vs. Queens Insurance Co., 24 Fed., 318; Esch vs. Home Insurance Co., 78 Iowa, 334; 16 Am. St. Rep., 443; Woodbury Savings etc., Co., vs. Charter Oak Insurance Co., 31 Conn., 517; Balen vs. Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 67 Mich., 179.)


Similarly, in cases where the mortgage is by mistake described as owner, the court may grant reformation and permit a recovery by the mortgage in his character as such. (Dalton vs. Milwaukee etc. Insurance Co., 126 Iowa, 377; Spare vs. Home Mutual Insurance Co., 17 Fed., 568.) In Thompson vs. Phoenix Insurance Co. (136 U.S., 287; 34 L. 3d., 408), it appeared that one Kearney made application to an insurance company for insurance on certain property in his hands as receiver and it was understood between him and the company's agent that, in case of loss, the proceeds of the policy should accrue to him and his successors as receiver and to others whom it might concern. However, the policy, as issued, was so worded as to be payable only to him as receiver. In an action brought on the policy by a successor of Kearney, it was alleged that the making of the contract in this form was due to inadvertence, accident, and mistake upon the part of both Kearney and the company.


Said the court:


If by inadvertence, accident, or mistake the terms of the contract were not fully set forth in the policy, the plaintiff is entitled to have it reformed.


In another case the same court said:


We have before us a contract from which by mistake, material stipulations have been omitted, whereby the true intent and meaning of the parties are not fully or accurately expressed. There was a definite concluded agreement as to insurance, which, in point of time, preceded the preparation and delivery of the policy, and this is demonstrated by legal and exact evidence, which removes all doubt as to the sense and undertaking of the parties. In the agreement there has been a mutual mistake, caused chiefly by that contracting party who now seeks to limit the insurance to an interest in the property less than that agreed to be insured. The written agreement did not effect that which the parties intended. That a court of equity can afford relief in such a case, is, we think, well settled by the authorities. (Smell vs. Atlantic, etc., Ins. Co., 98 U.S., 85, 89; 25 L. ed., 52.)


But to justify the reformation of a contract, the proof must be of the most satisfactory character, and it must clearly appear that the contract failed to express the real agreement between the parties. (Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 62 L. ed., 1177, reversing Government of Philippine Island vs. Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co., 30 Phil. Rep., 27.)


In the case now before us the proof is entirely insufficient to authorize the application of the doctrine state in the foregoing cases, for it is by means clear from the testimony of Brias — and none other was offered — that the parties intended for the policy to cover the risk of the owner in addition to that of the mortgagee. It results that the defendant Harding is not entitled to relief in any aspect of the case.


The judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.


Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Malcolm and Avanceña, JJ., concur. .

Insurance Case Digest: Enriquez v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (1920)

G.R. No. L-15895             November 29, 1920
Lessons Applicable: Perfection (Insurance)

FACTS:
  • September 24, 1917: Joaquin Herrer made application to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity
  • 2 days later: he paid P6,000 to the manager of the company's Manila office and was given a receipt
  • according to the provisional receipt, 3 things had to be accomplished by the insurance company before there was a contract: 
    • (1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant; -check
    • (2) there had to be approval of the application by the head office of the company; and - check
    • (3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the company to the applicant - ?
  • November 26, 1917: The head office at Montreal, Canada gave notice of acceptance by cable to Manila but this was not mailed
  • December 4, 1917: policy was issued at Montreal
  • December 18, 1917: attorney Aurelio A. Torres wrote to the Manila office of the company stating that Herrer desired to withdraw his application
  • December 19, 1917: local office replied to Mr. Torres, stating that the policy had been issued, and called attention to the notification of November 26, 1917
  • December 21, 1917 morning: received by Mr. Torres
  • December 20, 1917: Mr. Herrer died
  • Rafael Enriquez, as administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. Herrer filed to recover from Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity
  • RTC: favored Sun Life Insurance
ISSUE: W/N Mr. Herrera received notice of acceptance of his application thereby perfecting his life annuity

HELD: NO. Judgment is reversed, and the Enriquez shall have and recover from the Sun Life the sum of P6,000 with legal interest from November 20, 1918, until paid, without special finding as to costs in either instance. So ordered.

Civil Code
Art. 1319 (formerly Art.1262)
Art. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered into in the place where the offer was made.
  • not perfected because it has not been proved satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application ever came to the knowledge of the applicant

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-15895

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15895             November 29, 1920
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, as administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. Herrer, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, defendant-appellee.
Jose A. Espiritu for appellant.
Cohn, Fisher and DeWitt for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
          This is an action brought by the plaintiff ad administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. Herrer to recover from the defendant life insurance company the sum of pesos 6,000 paid by the deceased for a life annuity. The trial court gave judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
          The undisputed facts are these: On September 24, 1917, Joaquin Herrer made application to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity. Two days later he paid the sum of P6,000 to the manager of the company's Manila office and was given a receipt reading as follows:
MANILA, I. F., 26 de septiembre, 1917.
          PROVISIONAL RECEIPT Pesos 6,000
          Recibi la suma de seis mil pesos de Don Joaquin Herrer de Manila como prima dela Renta Vitalicia solicitada por dicho Don Joaquin Herrer hoy, sujeta al examen medico y aprobacion de la Oficina Central de la Compañia.
          The application was immediately forwarded to the head office of the company at Montreal, Canada. On November 26, 1917, the head office gave notice of acceptance by cable to Manila. (Whether on the same day the cable was received notice was sent by the Manila office of Herrer that the application had been accepted, is a disputed point, which will be discussed later.) On December 4, 1917, the policy was issued at Montreal. On December 18, 1917, attorney Aurelio A. Torres wrote to the Manila office of the company stating that Herrer desired to withdraw his application. The following day the local office replied to Mr. Torres, stating that the policy had been issued, and called attention to the notification of November 26, 1917. This letter was received by Mr. Torres on the morning of December 21, 1917. Mr. Herrer died on December 20, 1917.
          As above suggested, the issue of fact raised by the evidence is whether Herrer received notice of acceptance of his application. To resolve this question, we propose to go directly to the evidence of record.
          The chief clerk of the Manila office of the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada at the time of the trial testified that he prepared the letter introduced in evidence as Exhibit 3, of date November 26, 1917, and handed it to the local manager, Mr. E. E. White, for signature. The witness admitted on cross-examination that after preparing the letter and giving it to he manager, he new nothing of what became of it. The local manager, Mr. White, testified to having received the cablegram accepting the application of Mr. Herrer from the home office on November 26, 1917. He said that on the same day he signed a letter notifying Mr. Herrer of this acceptance. The witness further said that letters, after being signed, were sent to the chief clerk and placed on the mailing desk for transmission. The witness could not tell if the letter had every actually been placed in the mails. Mr. Tuason, who was the chief clerk, on November 26, 1917, was not called as a witness. For the defense, attorney Manuel Torres testified to having prepared the will of Joaquin Ma. Herrer, that on this occasion, Mr. Herrer mentioned his application for a life annuity, and that he said that the only document relating to the transaction in his possession was the provisional receipt. Rafael Enriquez, the administrator of the estate, testified that he had gone through the effects of the deceased and had found no letter of notification from the insurance company to Mr. Herrer.
          Our deduction from the evidence on this issue must be that the letter of November 26, 1917, notifying Mr. Herrer that his application had been accepted, was prepared and signed in the local office of the insurance company, was placed in the ordinary channels for transmission, but as far as we know, was never actually mailed and thus was never received by the applicant.
          Not forgetting our conclusion of fact, it next becomes necessary to determine the law which should be applied to the facts. In order to reach our legal goal, the obvious signposts along the way must be noticed.
          Until quite recently, all of the provisions concerning life insurance in the Philippines were found in the Code of Commerce and the Civil Code. In the Code of the Commerce, there formerly existed Title VIII of Book III and Section III of Title III of Book III, which dealt with insurance contracts. In the Civil Code there formerly existed and presumably still exist, Chapters II and IV, entitled insurance contracts and life annuities, respectively, of Title XII of Book IV. On the after July 1, 1915, there was, however, in force the Insurance Act. No. 2427. Chapter IV of this Act concerns life and health insurance. The Act expressly repealed Title VIII of Book II and Section III of Title III of Book III of the code of Commerce. The law of insurance is consequently now found in the Insurance Act and the Civil Code.
          While, as just noticed, the Insurance Act deals with life insurance, it is silent as to the methods to be followed in order that there may be a contract of insurance. On the other hand, the Civil Code, in article 1802, not only describes a contact of life annuity markedly similar to the one we are considering, but in two other articles, gives strong clues as to the proper disposition of the case. For instance, article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "In matters which are governed by special laws, any deficiency of the latter shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code." On the supposition, therefore, which is incontestable, that the special law on the subject of insurance is deficient in enunciating the principles governing acceptance, the subject-matter of the Civil code, if there be any, would be controlling. In the Civil Code is found article 1262 providing that "Consent is shown by the concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the thing and the consideration which are to constitute the contract. An acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the offer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The contract, in such case, is presumed to have been entered into at the place where the offer was made." This latter article is in opposition to the provisions of article 54 of the Code of Commerce.
          If no mistake has been made in announcing the successive steps by which we reach a conclusion, then the only duty remaining is for the court to apply the law as it is found. The legislature in its wisdom having enacted a new law on insurance, and expressly repealed the provisions in the Code of Commerce on the same subject, and having thus left a void in the commercial law, it would seem logical to make use of the only pertinent provision of law found in the Civil code, closely related to the chapter concerning life annuities.
          The Civil Code rule, that an acceptance made by letter shall bind the person making the offer only from the date it came to his knowledge, may not be the best expression of modern commercial usage. Still it must be admitted that its enforcement avoids uncertainty and tends to security. Not only this, but in order that the principle may not be taken too lightly, let it be noticed that it is identical with the principles announced by a considerable number of respectable courts in the United States. The courts who take this view have expressly held that an acceptance of an offer of insurance not actually or constructively communicated to the proposer does not make a contract. Only the mailing of acceptance, it has been said, completes the contract of insurance, as the locus poenitentiae is ended when the acceptance has passed beyond the control of the party. (I Joyce, The Law of Insurance, pp. 235, 244.)
          In resume, therefore, the law applicable to the case is found to be the second paragraph of article 1262 of the Civil Code providing that an acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the offer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The pertinent fact is, that according to the provisional receipt, three things had to be accomplished by the insurance company before there was a contract: (1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant; (2) there had to be approval of the application by the head office of the company; and (3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the company to the applicant. The further admitted facts are that the head office in Montreal did accept the application, did cable the Manila office to that effect, did actually issue the policy and did, through its agent in Manila, actually write the letter of notification and place it in the usual channels for transmission to the addressee. The fact as to the letter of notification thus fails to concur with the essential elements of the general rule pertaining to the mailing and delivery of mail matter as announced by the American courts, namely, when a letter or other mail matter is addressed and mailed with postage prepaid there is a rebuttable presumption of fact that it was received by the addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the ordinary course of the mails. But if any one of these elemental facts fails to appear, it is fatal to the presumption. For instance, a letter will not be presumed to have been received by the addressee unless it is shown that it was deposited in the post-office, properly addressed and stamped. (See 22 C.J., 96, and 49 L. R. A. [N. S.], pp. 458, et seq., notes.)
          We hold that the contract for a life annuity in the case at bar was not perfected because it has not been proved satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application ever came to the knowledge of the applicant.
          Judgment is reversed, and the plaintiff shall have and recover from the defendant the sum of P6,000 with legal interest from November 20, 1918, until paid, without special finding as to costs in either instance. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., dissents.