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Showing posts with label 1937. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1937. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-42462 August 31, 1937



EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42462     August 31, 1937

THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MARIANO LACSON LEDESMA, TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellees.

IMPERIAL, J.:

This is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover the amount of the judgments obtained by it in civil cases Nos. 31597 and 31821 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying in its complaint: (a) That the transfer of certificate of stock dividends No. 772 of the Talisay-Silay Milling of the Philippine National Bank, be declared null and void, as against the plaintiff: (b) that the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., ordered to cancel the entry of the transfer of the 6,300 stock dividends covered by certificate No. 772, made by it on its books in favor of the Philippine National Bank; (c) that said stock dividends be sold to satisfy the judgment obtained by it in civil cases Nos. 31597 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; (d) that the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., be ordered to pay to it amount of P21,379.39, with interest on the sums and from the dates set forth in paragraph XV of the complain, or any part thereof necessary to complete payment of said sums and interest thereon , in case the 6,300 stock dividends can not be sold or the proceeds of the sale thereof should be insufficient to cover the sums in question, and (e) that the defendants pay the costs of the suit. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment declaring the right of the Philippine National Bank to the 6,300 stock dividends a preferred one, and absolving the defendants from the complaint, with costs.

The parties submitted the case upon the following stipulation of facts, to wit:

STIPULATION OF FACTS. - That the plaintiff, the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., on June 30, 1927, obtained judgment in civil case No. 31597 of the Court of First Instance of Manila against the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma, in the sum of P3,442.75, with interest thereon from March 30, 1927, with costs. That a writ of execution of said judgment was issued on August 20, 1927, and Jose Y. Orosa was appointed Special sheriff to execute it. That on October 4, 1927, said Jose Y. Orosa, as special sheriff, in compliance with the writ of execution in question, attached all right, title to and interest which the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma may have in "Any bonus, dividend, share of stock, money, or other property which that defendant is entitle to receive from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., by virtue of the fact that such defendant has mortgage his land in favor of the Philippine National Bank to guarantee the indebtedness of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., or which such defendant is entitled to receive from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., on account of being a stockholder in the corporation or which he is entitled to receive from that corporation for any other cause or pretext whatsoever." That notice of said attachment was served not only upon the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma but also upon the herein defendant the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., which received a copy of the notice of attachment, as evidenced by the Annex A attached to this stipulation of facts. That on October 3, 1927, the herein plaintiff, the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., obtained judgment in case No. 31821 of the Court of First Instance of Manila against the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma, in the sum of four thousand four hundred pesos and seventy-eight centavos with interest at 10 per cent per annum on the sum of P3,523.82 from April 30, 1927; in the sum of P14,171, 52 with interest at 10 per cent per annum on the sum of P13,290.89 from April 30, 1927; and in the sum of P1,150.72 with the legal interest of 6 per cent per annum thereon from May 25, 1927, and the costs. A copy of said judgment is attached to this stipulation of facts and marked Annex B. That a writ of execution of said judgment was issue, thereby causing the attachment, sale and adjudication to the plaintiff the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., for the sum of P100, Philippine currency, of the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma's right of redemption over the following properties to wit: "Original certificate of title No. 1929 (Lot No. 1473 of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod) containing an area of 2,647 square meters, more or less.

Original certificate of title No. 2978 (Lot No. 1475 of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod) containing an area of 8.501 square meters, more or less.

Original certificate of title No. 2624 (Lot No. 1474 of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod) containing an area of 8,714 square meter, more or less.

    Original certificate of title No. 9443 (Lot No. 426 of the Cadastral Survey of Talisay) containing an area of 150,301 square meters more or less. Original certificate of title No. 1928 (Lot No. 1472 of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod) containing an area of 36,818 square meters, more or less. Original certificate of title No. 2923 (Lot No. 1489 of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod) containing an area of 286,879 square meters, more or less. Original certificate of title No. 356 (Lot No. 4-A of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod) containing an area of 641,448 square meters, more or less. Original certificate of title No. 356 (Lot No. 4-B of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod) containing an area of 280,556 square meters, more or less. Original certificate of title No. 356 (Lot No. 4-C of the cadastral Survey of Bacolod) containing an area of 2,842,946 square meters, more or less." The certificate of sale issued by the provincial sheriff of Occidental Negros in favor of the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., on March 29, 1928, is attached to this stipulation of facts, and marked Annex C. That on the date of the issuance of the execution in case No. 31597 of the Court of First Instance of Manila as well as on that of the issuance of the execution and sale of the properties described in Exhibit C, in case No. 31821 of the same court, said real properties were mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank to secure the payment to said bank by Mariano Lacson Ledesma of the sum of P624,000, Philippine currency, by virtue of an instrument executed by the debtor Mariano Lacson Ledesma in favor of said bank on August 9, 1923. said instrument of mortgage is copied on pages 18 to 32, both inclusive, of the bill of exceptions in case No. 8136 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (G. R. No. 35223), which is attached to this stipulation of facts and marked Annex D. That in the same instrument of mortgage (pages 18 to 32 of Annex D) said debtor Mariano Lacson Ledesma mortgaged in favor the bank, as part of the securities to ensure compliance with his obligation, the following shares owned by him in the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to wit: 1,540 share covered by Certificate No. 147; 520 shares covered by Certificate No. 146; 40 share covered by Certificate in the preceeding two paragraph, there was another mortgage constituted on the above-described real properties in favor of the Philippine National Bank, to answer for the debts contracted by the Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., with said bank. That on December 22, 1923, the defendant, Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co. resolved to grant a bonus or compensation to the owners of the real properties mortgaged to answer for the debts contracted by said central with the Philippine National Bank, for the risk incurred by said properties upon being subjected to said mortgage lien, and the resolution in question the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma was allotted the sum of P19,911.11, Philippine currency, which sum, however, would not be payable until the month of January, 1930. That on September 29, 1928, the Philippine National Bank brought an action against the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma and his wife Concepcion Diaz for the recovery of a mortgage credit which, together with interest thereon amounted to P853,729.49 on said date. Sometime later that is, on January 2, 1929, the Philippine National Bank amended its complaint by including the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., as party defendant, among other, because they claim to have some right to certain properties which are the subject matter of this complaint." Said case bears No. 4706 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros. That on January 30, 1929, the defendant Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., file a general denial. That after due hearing the Court of First Instance of Bacolod on September 3, 1930, rendered judgment in case No. 4706 of said court in favor of the Philippine National Bank and against the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma, sentencing the latter to pay the amount claimed by said bank and ordering, upon failure to satisfy said amount, the sale at public auction of the real properties mortgaged under the instrument of mortgage appearing on pages 18 to 32 of Annex D. That the real estate and chattel mortgage deed in question (pages 18 to 32 of Annex D), marked as Exhibit G, was among the exhibits presented in said case No. 4706 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros. That likewise, among the exhibit presented in said case No. 4706 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, was Exhibit H which was a deed of mortgage of certain carabaos belonging to the debtor Mariano Lacson Ledesma, executed by the latter in favor of the Philippine National Bank on January 21, 1925. That in the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros in case No. 4706 thereof, said court, referring to stock certificates Nos. 145 and 147 of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., which were pledged or mortgaged by virtue of Exhibit G of said No. 4706, rendered the following ruling: "(e) With respect to the chattel mortgaged bank, which are described in Exhibit G and H, the Philippine National Bank, as soon as this judgment becomes final, shall have authority to sell them in accordance with the provisions of section 23 of Act No. 2938, immediately informing this court of whatever action it may take in the premises." That during the pendency of case No. 4706 of the Court of First Instance of Bacolod referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, the plaintiff Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., on December 20, 1929, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., recover from it the sum of P13,850 against the bonus or dividend which, by virtue of the resolution of December 22, 1923, said Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., had declared in favor of the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma as one of the owners of the hacienda which had been mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank to secure the obligation of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. in favor of said bank. Copy of said complaint appears on pages 2 to 5 of the bill of exceptions in case No. 8136 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (G. R. No. 35223), Annex D of this stipulation of facts. That on January 30, 1930, the Philippine National Bank sought permission to intervene in said case No. 8136 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and after the permission had been granted, said bank, on February 13, 1930, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that it had a preferred right to said bonus granted by the central to the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma as one of the owners of the haciendas which had been mortgaged to said bank to answer for the obligations of the Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., basing such allegation on the fact that, as said properties were mortgaged to it by the debtor Mariano Lacson Ledesma, not Talisay Milling Co., Inc., but also by virtue of the deed of August 9, 1923 (pages 18 to 32 of Annex D) and said bonus being a civil fruit of the mortgaged lands, said bank was entitled to it on the ground that the mortgage of August 9, 1923, had become due. That after the trial of civil case No. 8136 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, said court, on December 8, 1930, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., Upon appeal, the Supreme Court, on September 17, 1931, 1 affirmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that the bonus had no immediate relation to the lands in question but merely a remote and accidental one and, therefore, it was not a civil fruit of the real properties mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank to secure the obligation of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., being a mere personal right of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. The decision of the Supreme Court published in Volume 30, No. 104, of the Official Gazette, on August 29, 1932, is attached to this stipulation of facts and marked Annex E. That on January 24, 1930, that Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., issued stock certificate No. 772 for 3,600 shares, as stock dividend to Mariano Lacson Ledesma, which certificate was ordered by Mariano Lacson Ledesma to be delivered to Roman Lacson, attorney for the Philippine National Bank, by virtue of the letter of February 27, 1930, Annex G of this stipulation of facts, and of the letter of the Philippine National Bank dated January 18, 1930, Annex G-1. Said 6,300 shares constituted the stock dividend allotted to Mariano Lacson Ledesma for his 2,100 original shares in the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., which were given as pledge to the Philippine National Bank under the deed of mortgage appearing on pages 18 to 32 of Annex D prior to the issuance of stock certificate No. 772, an were covered by Stock Certificates Nos. 145, 146 and 147 of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. That stock certificate No. 772 was issued by virtue of resolution No. 4 of the general meeting of stockholders of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., which resolution is quote in paragraph 8 of the complaint in this case. That in a letter of March 25, 1930, addressed by the Philippine National Bank to the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., said bank informed the letter that the 6,300 shares represented by stock certificate No. 772 had been given by Mariano Lacson Ledesma as pledge to the Philippine National Bank. Said letter is attached to this stipulation of facts as Annex H. That said stock certificate No. 772 has continuously been in the possession of the Philippine National Bank from February 27, 1930, to February 25, 1931, but like stock certificates Nos. 145, 146 and 147, it was registered in the books of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. in the name of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. That on August 11, 1930, the plaintiff Bachrach Motor Co., by virtue of an alias execution issued in case No. 31821 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, attached all right, title to an interest which the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma might have in Any bonus, dividend, shares of stock, money or other property specially on the sum of P19,911.11 which the defendant is entitled to receive from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., by virtue of the fact that such defendant has mortgage his lands in favor of the Philippine National Bank to guarantee the indebtedness of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., or which such defendant is entitled to receive from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., on account of being stockholder in that corporation, or which he is entitle to receive from that corporation for any other cause or pretext whatsoever." In connection with the proceedings and attachment made notice of garnishment was served on the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., as evidence by Annexes I and J of this stipulation of facts. That on February 5, 1931, the provincial the is positive part of the decision rendered in civil case NO. 4706 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, copy of which is attached to this stipulation of facts as Annex I, sold at public auction not only the 2,100 share specified in the deed of August 9, 1923, but also the 6,300 shares covered by stock certificate No. 772, the sale of said shares having been made by order and under the direction of the attachment creditor Philippine National Bank. A copy of the certificate of sale marked Exhibit K is attached hereto. That on February 25, 1931, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., upon petition of the Philippine National Bank, as shown by the letter dated February 19,1931, marked and attached to this stipulation as Annex L, which letter was accompanied by the certificate of sale Exhibit K, issued stock certificate No. 1155 representing 8,968 shares, which include the 6,300 shares formerly represented by stock certificate No. 772 and the 2,100 shares formerly represented by stock certificates Nos. 145, 146 and 147, the bank having acknowledged receipt of certificate No. 1155 in a letter of March 4, 1931, marked as Exhibit M. Attention is invited to the fact that of the 8,969 shares represented by stock certificate No. 1155, 568 shares formerly belonged to Concepcion Diaz e Lacson wife of the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma, and of the 568 shares, 142 were mortgaged under the deed of August 9, 1923, and 426 were the stock dividend that had corresponded to said 142 shares. That on the same date, February 25,1931, Marino Lacson Ledesma endorsed the back of stock certificate No. 772 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. Said stock certificate with the endorsement in question is attached to this stipulation of facts and marked Annex N. That both on the date on which the garnishment was carried out by the Bachrach Motor Co., that is, on August 11, 1930, and on the date on which the 6,300 shares, covered by stock certificate No. 772, were sold, case No. 8136 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (G. R. No. 35223) was still pending. That the amount of the actual indebtedness of the defendant Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the plaintiff the Bachrach Motor Co. is P21,377.34 with the interest and other sums specified in paragraph XV of the complaint. That the real properties mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank were sold for P300,000 Philippine currency; the mortgaged carabaos for P2,000 Philippine currency, and all the shares, that is, the 8,968 share for the sum of P90,000 Philippine currency, the bank having been the highest bidder herein all these sales, there still remaining unpaid in civil case No. 4796 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros the sum of P695,421.74, as stated in Annex 9. That the notices of garnishment issue by virtue of the execution in cases Nos. 31597 and 31821 of the Court of First Instance of Manila are the same notices of attachment and garnishment mentioned in the complaint in the case No. 8136 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and presented as evidence in said case, and are the same notices mentioned in this case now submitted to the court for decision. That on March 20,1925, the Philippine National Bank served notice on the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc, of the pledge made by Mariano Lacson Ledesma to said bank of the shares represented by stock certificates Nos. 145, 146 and 147, and on March 25th the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., acknowledged receipt thereof and considered itself notified of said pledge, as evidenced by Annexes P and Q of this stipulation of facts, That prior to the declaration of stock divided by virtue of resolution No. 4 of the regular meeting of stockholders of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., the shares of this corporation were quote in private sales at P32 a share; and immediately after the declaration of stock dividend, the quotation of said shares dropped by P7 or P8 a share, the same having been P11.25 a share on the date of their sale at public auction. Upon this stipulation of facts, the parties submit the case to the court for decision.

I. The plaintiff bases the preferred right invoked by it over the 6,300 stock dividends, certificate No. 772, on the garnishment made thereon by reason of the issuance of the alias execution in civil case No. 31821 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which garnishment was carried out on August 11, 1930. The plaintiff contends in its first assignment of error that these stock dividends were certificate No. 772 thereof was delivered to the Philippine National Bank and when the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., entered them in its books in the name of said bank and issued certificate No. 1166 in favor of the latter. The contention is unfounded because it appears that the stock dividends in question were pledged to the bank prior to the garnishment and because certificate No. 772 was in the possession of said bank from February 27, 1930. The reasons upon which this court base its opinion in declaring that the stock dividends were pledge beforehand to the Philippine National Bank will be stated in the discussion of the following assignment of error.

II. In the stipulation of facts, it appears stipulated by the parties that, by virtue of the letters of the Philippine National Bank and having been so asked by Mariano Lacson Ledesma, certificate No. 772 covering the 6,300 stock dividends was delivered as security to Attorney Roman Lacson as representative of the bank, on February 27, 1930, in view of the fact that the original shares covered by certificate Nos. 145, 146 and 147 had been previously mortgaged to the same bank. On February 25, 1931, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., in conformity with the letter of the Philippines National Bank of the 19th of said month, cancelled certificate No. 772 and in lieu thereof issued certificate No. 1155 in favor of said bank, which certificate includes the 6,300 stock dividends, among other shares. On the other hand, the garnishment obtained by the plaintiff, upon which it bases all its alleged preferred right was notified to the parties and became effective on August 11, 1930, more than five months after the delivery of certificate No. 772. The plaintiff, in its second assignment of error, maintains that the pledge is ineffective as against it because evidence of its date was not made to appear in a public instrument and concludes that its right to the 6,300 stock dividends is superior and preferred. It is admitted that the delivery of the certificate in question and the pledge thereof were not made to appear in a public instrument.

It is true, according to article 1865 of the Civil Code, that in order that a pledge may be effective as against third person, evidence of its date must appear in a public instrument in addition to the delivery of the thing pledged to the creditor. This provision has been interpreted in the sense that for the contract to affect third person, it must appear in a public instrument in addition to delivery of the thing pledged (Ocejo, Perez and Co., vs. International Banking Corporation, 37 Phil., 631: Tec Bi & Co. vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, 41 Phil., 596; Te Pate vs. Ingersoll, 43 Phil., 394). It cannot be denied, however, that section 4 of Act No. 1508, otherwise known as the Chattel Mortgage Law, implicitly modified article 1865 of the Civil Code in the sense that a contract of pledge and that of chattel mortgage, to be effective as against third persons, need not appear in public instruments provided the thing pledged or mortgaged be delivered or placed in the possession of the creditor. In the case of Mahoney vs. Tuason (39 Phil., 952, 958), where this doctrine was laid down, it was stated; "From the foregoing provisions of the abovecited Act, it is inferred that the same does not entirely repeal the provisions of the Civil Code, but only modify them in part and amplify them in another, as may be seen from an examination of, and comparison between, the provisions of the Civil Code regarding pledge and the abovequoted provisions of Act No. 1508. Article 1865 of the Civil Code provides that no pledge shall be effective against a third person unless evidence of its date appears in a public instrument. The provision of this article has, undoubtedly, been modified by section 4 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, in so far as it provides that a chattel mortgage shall not be valid against any person except the mortgagor, his executors or administrators, unless the possession of the property is delivered to and retained by the mortgagee or unless the mortgage is recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the mortgagor resides. From the date the said Act No. 1508 was in force, a contract of pledge or chattel mortgage should be deemed legally entered into and should produce all its effects and consequences, provided it appears to have been in some manner perfected and that the things pledged have been delivered, and in a contrary case, and even if the creditor has not received them or has not retained them in his custody, provided that the contract of pledge or chattel mortgage appears in a notarial document and is inscribed in the registry of deeds of the province." Therefore, this court holds that the pledge of the 6,300 stock dividends is valid against the plaintiff for the reason that the certificate was delivered to the creditor bank, notwithstanding the fact that the contract does not appear in a public instrument.

The plaintiff further contends that the pledge could not legally exist because the certificate was not the shares themselves, making it understood that a certificate of stock or of stock dividends can not be the subject matter of the contract of pledge or of chattel mortgage. Neither is this contention tenable. Certificates of stock or of stock dividends, under the Corporation Law, are quasi negotiable instruments in the sense that they may be given in pledge or mortgage to secure an obligation. The question is settled in this wise by the weight of American authorities and it is the modern doctrine of general acceptance by the courts.

    In view, however, of the fact that certificates of stock, while not negotiable in the sense of the law merchant, like bills and notes, are so framed and dealt with as to be transferable, when property endorsed, by mere delivery, and as they frequently convey, by estoppel against the corporation or against prior holders, as good a title to the transferee as if they were negotiable, and inasmuch as a large commercial use is made of such certificates as collateral security, and it is to the public interest that such use should be simplify and facilitated by placing them as nearly as possible on the plane of commercial paper, they are often spoken of and treated as quasi negotiable, that is as having some of the attributes and partaking of the character of negotiable instruments, in passing from hand to hand, especially where they are accompanied by an assignment and power of attorney, executed in blank, to transfer them to anyone who may obtain possession as holders, even though such assignment and power are under seal. (14 C. J., 665, sec 1034; South Bend First Nat. Bank vs. Lanier, 20 Law. ed., 172; Weniger vs. Success Min. Co., 227 Fedd., 548; Scott vs. Pequonnock Nat. Bank, 15 Fed., 494.)

III. In the third assignment of error, the plaintiff maintains that the court erred in holding that the stock dividends are civil fruits or an extension of the original shares. This court deems it unnecessary to determine whether or not the stock devidends are civil fruits or an extension of the original shares. This point becomes immaterial after the case has been decided in the manner stated in the discussion of the second assignment of error .

IV. In the forth assignment of error, the plaintiff contends that court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of the 6,300 stock dividends in execution of the judgment rendered in favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 4706 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros. Inasmuch as this court has declared that the stock dividends in question were pledged to the bank, it follows that the sale thereof in execution of said judgment is legal and valid.

V. In the fifth assignment of error, the plaintiff argues that the court erred in declaring the Philippine National Bank's right to the stock dividends a preferred one. After it has been held that these stock dividends had been pledged to the Philippine National Bank and that this contract was prior to the garnishment of the plaintiff, it appear clear that the court violated no law in holding the right of the Philippine National Bank, as pledgee, a superior one.

VI. The plaintiff assigns as sixth and last error committed by the court the fact of its having absolved all the defendants. The case having been decided in favor of the Philippine National Bank, on the grounds stated in passing upon the second assignment of error, the absolution of the defendants is unavoidable, thereby making this last assignment of error likewise untenable.

For the foregoing consideration the appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance to the plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.

Insurance Case Digest: Sharuff & Co. v. Baloise Fire Insurance Co. (1937)

G.R. No. 44119             March 30, 1937

Lessons Applicable: Effect of Lack of Insurable Interest (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: 

FACTS:

  • Salomon Sharruf and Elias Eskenazi were doing business under the firm name of Sharruf & Co.  They insured their stocks with aloise Fire Insurance Co., Sun Insurance Office Ltd., and Springfield Insurance Co. raising it to P40,000. Elias Eskenazi having paid the corresponding premiums
  • Soon they changed the name of their partnership to Sharruf & Eskenazi
  • September 22, 1933: A fire ensued at their building at Muelle de la Industria street where petroleum was spilt lasting 27 minutes
  • Sharruf & Co. claimed 40 cases when only 10 or 11 partly burned and scorched cases were found
  • RTC: ordered Baloise Fire Insurance Co., Sun Insurance Office Ltd., and Springfield Insurance Co., to pay the partners Salomon Sharruf and Elias Eskenazi  P40,000 plus 8% interest
ISSUE: W/N Sharruf & Eskenazi has juridical personality and insurable interest

HELD: YES. Reversd.  Insurance companies are absolved.
  • It does not appear that in changing the title of the partnership they had the intention of defrauding the insurance companies
  • fire which broke out in the building at Nos. 299-301 Muelle de la Industria, occupied by  Sharruf & Eskenazi but no evidence sufficient to warrant a finding that they are responsible for the fire
  • So great is the difference between the amount of articles insured, which the plaintiffs claim to have been in the building before the fire, and the amount thereof shown by the vestige of the fire to have been therein, that the most liberal human judgment can not attribute such difference to a mere innocent error in estimate or counting but to a deliberate intent to demand of the insurance companies payment of an indemnity for goods not existing at the time of the fire, thereby constituting the so-called "fraudulent claim" which, by express agreement between the insurers and the insured, is a ground for exemption of the insurers from civil liability
  • acted in bad faith in presenting a fraudulent claim, they are not entitled to the indemnity claimed
  • when the partners of a general partnership doing business under the firm name of "Sharruf & Co." obtain insurance policies issued to said firm and the latter is afterwards changed to "Sharruf & Eskenazi", which are the names of the same and only partners of said firm "Sharruf & Co.", continuing the same business, the new firm acquires the rights of the former under the same policies; 

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 44119


EN BANC

G.R. No. 44119             March 30, 1937

SHARRUF & CO., known also as SHARRUF & ESKENAZI, SALOMON SHARRUF and ELIAS ESKENAZI, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
BALOISE FIRE INSURANCE CO., SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., and SPRINGFIELD INSURANCE CO., represented by KUENZLE & STREIFF, INC., defendants-appellants.

Carlos A. Sobral for appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the defendant companies Baloise Fire Insurance Co., Sun Insurance Office Ltd., and Springfield Insurance Co., represented by Kuenzle & Streiff, Inc., from the judgment of the Court of First instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is rendered ordering the defendant insurance companies to pay to the plantiffs Salomon Sharruf and Elias Eskenazi the total amount of P40,000 plus interest thereon at 8 per cent per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint, with the costs of the trial. The defendants shall pay this judgment jointly in proportion to the respective policies issued by them. The plaintiffs Salomon Sharruf and Elias Eskenazi shall recover the judgment share and share alike, deducting from the portion of the plaintiff Elias Eskenazi the sum of P3,000 which belongs and shall turned over to the intervenor E. Awad & Co., Inc. It is so ordered.

In support of their appeal the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in its decision in question, to wit:

1. the lower court erred in holding, that Salomon Sharruf and Elias Eskenazi had personality to sue, either as a partnership or individually, and therefore, an insurable interest.

2. The lower court erred in holding, that the fire that broke out in the premises at Nos. 299-301 Muelle de la Industria of this city, occupied by the alleged plaintiffs, was not of incendiary origin.

3. The lower court erred in holding, that the "idea of using petroleum in the fire in question, surged after the fire for the purpose of making it appear as a part of the evidence."

4. The lower court erred in holding, that the claim of loss filed by the alleged plaintiffs was not fraudulent, but merely inaccurate, due to the peculiar circumstances of the case, such as the loss of invoices and sales-slips.

5. The lower court erred in sentencing the defendants to pay jointly to the alleged plaintiffs the sum of P40,000, with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent year and costs.

6. The lower court erred in overruling defendants' motion for new trial and in failing to dismiss the case altogether, with costs against the alleged plaintiffs.

The preponderance of the evidence shows the existence of the following facts:.

In the months of June and July 1933, the plaintiffs Salomon Sharruf and Elias Eskenazi were doing business under the firm name of Sharruf & Co. As they had applied to the defendant companies for insurance of the merchandise they had in stock, the latter sent their representative P. E. Schiess to examine and asses it. On July 25, 1933, the defendant insurance companies issued insurance policies Exhibits D, E, and F in the total amount of P25,000 in the name of Sharruf & Co. issued an additional policy (Exhibit G) in the sum of P15,000 in favor of said firm Sharruf & Co., raising the total amount of the insurance on said merchandise to P40,000. On August 26, 1933, the plaintiffs executed a contract of partnership between themselves (Exhibit A) wherein they substituted the name of Sharruf & Co. with the Sharruf & Eskenazi, stating that Elias Eskenazi contributed to the partnership, as his capital, goods valued at P26,299.94 listed in an inventory Exhibit B. It was likewise stated in said contract that Salomon Sharruf brought to said partnership, as his capital, goods valued at P24,205.10, appearing in the inventories Exhibit C and C-1. The total value of the merchandise contributed by both partners amounted to P50,505.04. Part of said merchandise, most of which were textiles, was sold for P8,000, leaving goods worth P43,000. In all there were from 60 to 70 bolts of silk. All the goods, most of which were aluminum kitchen utensils, various porcelain and glass wares, and other articles of stucco, were contained in about 39 or 40 cases. The last time the plaintiffs were in the building was on September 19, 1933, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Up to the month of September 1933, about 30 or 40 cases of merchandise belonging to the plaintiffs were in Robles' garage at No. 1012 Mabini Street.

At about 12.41 o'clock on the morning of September 22, 1933, the fire alarm bell rang in the different fire stations of the city. The firemen of the San Nicolas Fire Station, headed by Captain Charles A. Baker, were the first to arrive at the scene of the fire, followed by Captain Thomas F. McIntyre of the Santa Cruz Fire Station, who arrived at 12.44 o'clock. Having found the door at No. 301, Muelle de la Industria Street, where the building was in flames, locked, the firemen pumped water on the upper part of the building and later broke open the door through which they an entered the premises. They then saw an inflamed liquid flowing towards the sidewalk, the flames thereon blazing more intensely every time water fell on them. The liquid apparently came from under the staircase of said floor. They likewise noted that the entire space occupied by the staircase was in flames except the adjoining room. After the fire had been extinguished, an earthen pot (Exhibit 15) containing ashes and the residue of a certain substance, all of which smelled of petroleum, was found by detective Manalo near the railing of the stairway of the second floor. At about 8.30 o'clock that same morning, detective Irada found nother earthen pot (Exhibit 16), one-fourth full of water smelled of petroleum, under the staircase of the first floor; straw and excelsior, that also smelled of petroleum, around said pot, a red rag (Exhibit 18) in front of the toilet, and a towel which also smelled of petroleum can, Exhibit 21. On the following day, September 23, 1933, photographs were taken of the condition of the different parts of the building and of the goods found therein. Said photographs are: Exhibit 1, showing the interior of the first floor partially burned, with the staircase, the doorway, the wooden partition wall and pieces of wood scattered on the floor supposed to be from the door that was demolished; Exhibit 2, showing about 8 or 9 scorched cases, some closed and others open; Exhibit 3, showing the space or hall of the upper floor partially damaged by the fire at the place occupied by the staircase, with chairs piled up and unburnt, pieces of wood and debris apparently from the cement partition wall beside the staircase and the attic; Exhibit 4, showing the same space taken from another angle, with the partition wall of cement and stone and some broken railings of the stairways; Exhibit 5, showing a room with partially burnt partition wall, with a wardrobe and a table in the background, another table in the center, a showcase near the wall with porcelain and iron articles on top thereof and fallen and burnt window shutters on the floor; Exhibit 6, showing an open unburnt showcase containing necklaces with limitation stones and other jewelry; Exhibit 7, showing piled up chairs and boxes and the burned and destroyed upper part of the partition wall and attic; Exhibit 8, presenting a showcase with a burnt top, containing kitchen utensils, tableware, dinner pails and other articles; Exhibit 9, presenting a half-open trunk with protruding ends of cloth, other pieces of cloth scattered on the floor, a step of the staircase and a bench; Exhibit 10, showing the partially destroyed attic and wires wound around the beams; Exhibit 11, presenting another view of the same attic from another angle. On the 27th of said month and year, the following photographs were taken: Exhibit 12, presenting a close-up of the beams and electric wiring on September 25, 1933, was of the opinion that the wires wound around the beam and a nail might have caused the fire, but he could not assure whether any of the wires was burned due to an electrical discharge the passed through it, or whether or not the fire started from the lighting system. In the burned building the plaintiffs kept petroleum used for cleaning the floor.

The first question to be decided in the present appeal, which is raised in the first assignment of alleged error, is whether or not Salomon Sharruf and Elias Eskenazi had juridical personality to bring this action, either individually or collectively, and whether or not they had insurable interest.

As already seen, Salomon Sharruf and Elias Eskenazi were doing business under the firm name of Sharruf & Co. in whose name the insurance policies were issued, Elias Eskenazi having paid the corresponding premiums.

In the case of Lim Cuan Sy vs. Northern Assurance Co. (55 Phil., 248), this court said:

A policy insuring merchandise against fire is not invalidated by the fact that the name of the insured in the policy is incorrectly written "Lim Cuan Sy" instead of "Lim Cuan Sy & Co.", the latter being the proper legal designation of the firm, where it appears that the designation "Lim Cuan Sy" was commonly used as the name of the firm in its business dealings and that the error in the designation of the insured in the policy was not due to any fraudulent intent on the part of the latter and did not mislead the insurer as to the extent of the liability assumed.

In the present case, while it is true that at the beginning the plaintiffs had been doing business in said name of "Sharruf & Co.", insuring their business in said name, and upon executing the contract of partnership (exhibit A) on August 26, 1933, they changed the title thereof to "Sharruf & Eskenazi," the membership of the partnership in question remained unchanged, the same and only members of the former, Salomon Sharruf and Elias Eskenazi, being the ones composing the latter, and it does not appear that in changing the title of the partnership they had the intention of defrauding the herein defendant insurance companies. Therefore, under the above-cited doctrine the responsibility of said defendants to the plaintiffs by virtue of the respective insurance policies has not been altered. If this is true, the plaintiffs have juridical personality to bring this action.

The second question to be decided is that raised in the second assignment of alleged error, which consists in whether or not the fire which broke out in the building at Nos. 299-301 Muelle de la Industria, occupied by the plaintiffs, is of incentiary origin.

In maintaining the affirmative, the appellants call attention to the earthen pots Exhibits 15 and 16, the first found by detective Manalo beside the railing of the stairways of the upper floor and the second found by detective Irada on the first floor, both containing liquid, ashes and other residues which smelled of petroleum; a red rag (Exhibit 18) found by detective Irada in front of the toilet; the partially burnt box (Exhibit 20); and the old can (Exhibit 21) containing garbage. The fact that the liquid found by the detectives in the earthen jars smelled of petroleum, does not constitute conclusive evidence that they had been used as containers for petroleum to burn the house. Said smell could have very well come the strips of China wood of which boxes from abroad are made, the resin of which smells of petroleum, or from the rags found therein which might have been used to clean the floor by saturating them with petroleum. There being petroleum for cleaning the floor in the building, it is not strange that when the house caught fire the petroleum also caught fire, the flames floating on the water coming out from under the door from the pumps. There is neither direct nor strong circumstantial evidence that the plaintiffs personally or through their agents placed petroleum in the building in order to burn it, because it was locked on the outside and nobody was staying therein. As it cannot be assumed that the petroleum might have burned by itself, it is probable that the fire might have originated from the electric wiring, although electrical engineer Mora stated that he could not assure whether any of the wires was burned due to an electric discharge passing through it, or whether or not the fire was caused by the lighting system.

Upon consideration of all the evidence and circumstances surrounding the fire, this court finds no evidence sufficient to warrant a finding that the plaintiffs are responsible for the fire.

With respect to the question whether or not the claim of loss filed by the plaintiffs is fraudulent, it is alleged by them that the total value of the textiles contained in cases deposited inside the building when the partnership Sharruf & Eskenazi was formed was P12,000; that of the fancy jewelry with imitation stones from P15,000 to P17,000, and that of the kitchen utensils and tableware made of aluminum, bronze and glass P10,676 (Exhibits B, C, and C-1). If, as said plaintiffs claim, they had already sold articles, mostly textiles, valued at P8,000, a small quantity of cloth must have been left at the time the fire occured. In their claim, however, the textiles allegedly consumed by fire and damaged by water are assessed by them at P12,000. The claim of P12,000 is certainly not attributable to a mere mistake in estimate and counting because if they had textiles worth only P12,000 before the fire and they sold goods, mostly textiles, worth P8,000, surely textiles in the same amount of P12,000 could not have been burned and damaged after the fire. Of the kitchen utensils and tableware made of aluminum, bronze and glass, of which, according to the evidence for the plaintiffs, they had a stock valued at P10,676 (Exhibit B), there were found after the fire articles worth only P1,248.80 (Exhibit K). Therefore, utensils valued at P9,427.20 were lacking. A considerable amount of kitchen utensils made of noninflammable and fire-proof material could not, by the very nature of things have been totally consumed by the fire. At most, said articles would have been damaged, as the rest, and would have left traces of their existence. The same may be said of the fancy jewels with imitation stones, and others of which the fancy jewels with imitation stones, and others of which the plaintiffs claim to have had a stock worth from P15,000 to P17,000 at the time of the fire, of which only a few valued at P3,471.16, were left after the fire (Exhibit K). According to said plaintiffs, all the articles, for the alleged loss of which indemnity is sought, were contained in about 40 showcases and wardrobes. According to the testimony of the fire station chiefs, corrobarated by the photographs of record, the flames caused more damage in the upper part of the rooms than in the lower part thereof; since, of the ten or eleven cases found inside the building after the fire, only a few were partially burned and others scorched judging from their appearance, the goods were damaged more by water than by fire. According to the inventory made by White & Page, adjusters of the insurance companies, in the presence of the plaintiffs themselves and according to data supplied by the latter, the total value thereof, aside, from the articles not included in the inventories Exhibits B, C, and C-1, assessed at P744.50, amounts to only P8,077.35. If the plaintiffs' claim that at time of the fire there were about 40 cases inside the burnt building were true, a ten or eleven of them were found after the fire, traces of the thirty or twenty-nine cases allegedly burnt would be found, since experience has shown that during the burning of a building all the cases deposited therein are not so reduced to ashes that the least vestige thereof cannot be found. In the case of Go Lu vs. Yorkshire Insurance Co. (43 Phil., 633), this court laid down the following doctrine:

This court will legally presume that in an ordinary fire fifty bales or boxes of bolt goods of cloth cannot be wholly consumed or totally destroyed, and that in the very nature of things some trace or evidence will be left remaining of their loss or destruction.

The plaintiffs, upon whom devolve the legal obligation to prove the existence, at the time of the fire, of the articles and merchandise for the destruction of which they claim indemnity from the defendant companies, have not complied with their duty because they have failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that when the fire took place there where in the burnt building articles and merchandise in the total amount of the insurance policies or that the textiles and other damaged and undamaged goods found in the building after the fire were worth P40,000. On the contrary, their own witness, Robles, testified that up to the month of September, 1933, there were about 39 or 40 cases belonging to the plaintiffs in his garage on Mabini Street, indicating thereby that the cases of merchandise examined by the agent of the insurance companies on July 25 and August 15, 1933, and for which the insurance policies were issued, were taken from the burned building where they were found. So great is the difference between the amount of articles insured, which the plaintiffs claim to have been in the building before the fire, and the amount thereof shown by the vestige of the fire to have been therein, that the most liberal human judgment can not attribute such difference to a mere innocent error in estimate or counting but to a deliberate intent to demand of the insurance companies payment of an indemnity for goods not existing at the time of the fire, thereby constituting the so-called "fraudulent claim" which, by express agreement between the insurers and the insured, is a ground for exemption of the insurers from civil liability.

Therefore, as the herein plaintiffs-appellees have acted in bad faith in presenting a fraudulent claim, they are not entitled to the indemnity claimed by them by virtue of the insurance policies issued by the defendant-appellant companies in their favor.

For the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion and so holds: (1) that when the partners of a general partnership doing business under the firm name of "Sharruf & Co." obtain insurance policies issued to said firm and the latter is afterwards changed to "Sharruf & Eskenazi", which are the names of the same and only partners of said firm "Sharruf & Co.", continuing the same business, the new firm acquires the rights of the former under the same policies; (2) that when the evidence relative to the cause of a fire and the author thereof is so vague and doubtful, the insured cannot be attributed incendiary intervention therein for the mere fact that he had the keys to the unoccupied building in his possession; (3) that a person who presents a claim for damages caused by fire to articles and goods not existing at the time of the fire does so fradulently and his claim is fraudulent, and (4) that when immediately after a fire that broke out inside a completely locked building, lasting scarcely 27 minutes, only about ten or eleven partly burned and scorched cases, some containing textiles and wrapping paper and others, statutes of saints, have been found without any trace of the destruction of other cases by said fire, it can neither logically nor reasonably be inferred that 40 of said cases were inside the building when the fire broke out.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant companies are absolved from the complaint which is dismissed, with costs to the appellees. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Corporate Law Case Digest: Bachrach Motor Co v. Lacson Ledesma (1937)

G.R. No. L-42462     August 31, 1937
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-negotiable Character of Certificate of Stock (Corporate Law)

FACTS:

  • June 30, 1927: CFI favored Bachrach Motor Co., Inc (Bachrach) against Mariano Lacson Ledesma 
  • Ledesma mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc shares
  • September 29, 1928: PNB brought an action against Ledesma and his wife Concepcion Diaz for the recovery of a mortgage credit 
  • January 2, 1929: PNB amended its complaint by including the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., as party defendant because they claim to have rights to some of the subject matters of this complaint
  • January 30, 1929: Bachrach field a gen. denial
  • CFI: favored PNB
  • December 20, 1929: Bachrach brought an action in the CFI against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to recover P13,850 against the bonus or dividend w/c, by virtue of the resolution of December 22, 1923, Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., had declared in favor of Ledesma as one of the owners of the hacienda which had been mortgaged to the PNB to secure the obligation of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. in favor of said bank
  • CFI: favored Bachrach
ISSUE: W/N shares of stock are personal property and therefore can be subject to pledge or chattel mortgage

HELD:  YES. AFIRMED
  • section 4 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, in so far as it provides that a chattel mortgage shall not be valid against any person except the mortgagor, his executors or administrators, unless the possession of the property is delivered to and retained by the mortgagee or unless the mortgage is recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the mortgagor resides.
  • pledge of the 6,300 stock dividends is valid against the Bachrach because the certificate was delivered to the creditor bank, notwithstanding the fact that the contract does not appear in a public instrument
  • Certificates of stock or of stock dividends, under the Corporation Law, are quasi negotiable instruments in the sense that they may be given in pledge or mortgage to secure an obligation
  • certificates of stock, while not negotiable in the sense of the law merchant, like bills and notes, are so framed and dealt with as to be transferable, when property endorsed, by mere delivery, and as they frequently convey, by estoppel against the corporation or against prior holders, as good a title to the transferee as if they were negotiable, and inasmuch as a large commercial use is made of such certificates as collateral security, and it is to the public interest that such use should be simplify and facilitated by placing them as nearly as possible on the plane of commercial paper, they are often spoken of and treated as quasi negotiable, that is as having some of the attributes and partaking of the character of negotiable instruments, in passing from hand to hand, especially where they are accompanied by an assignment and power of attorney, executed in blank, to transfer them to anyone who may obtain possession as holders, even though such assignment and power are under seal.