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Showing posts with label 1962. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1962. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-18216 October 30, 1962

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18216            October 30, 1962

STOCKHOLDERS OF F. GUANZON AND SONS, INC., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA, respondent-appellee.

Ramon C. Fernando for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On September 19, 1960, the five stockholders of the F. Guanzon and Sons, Inc. executed a certificate of liquidation of the assets of the corporation reciting, among other things, that by virtue of a resolution of the stockholders adopted on September 17, 1960, dissolving the corporation, they have distributed among themselves in proportion to their shareholdings, as liquidating dividends, the assets of said corporation, including real properties located in Manila.

The certificate of liquidation, when presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila, was denied registration on seven grounds, of which the following were disputed by the stockholders:

3. The number of parcels not certified to in the acknowledgment;

5. P430.50 Reg. fees need be paid;

6. P940.45 documentary stamps need be attached to the document;

7. The judgment of the Court approving the dissolution and directing the disposition of the assets of the corporation need be presented (Rules of Court, Rule 104, Sec. 3).

Deciding the consulta elevated by the stockholders, the Commissioner of Land Registration overruled ground No. 7 and sustained requirements Nos. 3, 5 and 6.

The stockholders interposed the present appeal.

As correctly stated by the Commissioner of Land Registration, the propriety or impropriety of the three grounds on which the denial of the registration of the certificate of liquidation was predicated hinges on whether or not that certificate merely involves a distribution of the corporation's assets or should be considered a transfer or conveyance.

Appellants contend that the certificate of liquidation is not a conveyance or transfer but merely a distribution of the assets of the corporation which has ceased to exist for having been dissolved. This is apparent in the minutes for dissolution attached to the document. Not being a conveyance the certificate need not contain a statement of the number of parcel of land involved in the distribution in the acknowledgment appearing therein. Hence the amount of documentary stamps to be affixed thereon should only be P0.30 and not P940.45, as required by the register of deeds. Neither is it correct to require appellants to pay the amount of P430.50 as registration fee.

The Commissioner of Land Registration, however, entertained a different opinion. He concurred in the view expressed by the register of deed to the effect that the certificate of liquidation in question, though it involves a distribution of the corporation's assets, in the last analysis represents a transfer of said assets from the corporation to the stockholders. Hence, in substance it is a transfer or conveyance.

We agree with the opinion of these two officials. A corporation is a juridical person distinct from the members composing it. Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. While shares of stock constitute personal property they do not represent property of the corporation. The corporation has property of its own which consists chiefly of real estate (Nelson v. Owen, 113 Ala., 372, 21 So. 75; Morrow v. Gould, 145 Iowa 1, 123 N.W. 743). A share of stock only typifies an aliquot part of the corporation's property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and equity (Hall & Faley v. Alabama Terminal, 173 Ala 398, 56 So., 235), but its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation (Bradley v. Bauder 36 Ohio St., 28). Nor is he entitled to the possession of any definite portion of its property or assets (Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U.S., 521; Jones v. Davis, 35 Ohio St., 474). The stockholder is not a co-owner or tenant in common of the corporate property (Halton v. Hohnston, 166 Ala 317, 51 So 992).

On the basis of the foregoing authorities, it is clear that the act of liquidation made by the stockholders of the F. Guanzon and Sons, Inc. of the latter's assets is not and cannot be considered a partition of community property, but rather a transfer or conveyance of the title of its assets to the individual stockholders. Indeed, since the purpose of the liquidation, as well as the distribution of the assets of the corporation, is to transfer their title from the corporation to the stockholders in proportion to their shareholdings, — and this is in effect the purpose which they seek to obtain from the Register of Deeds of Manila, — that transfer cannot be effected without the corresponding deed of conveyance from the corporation to the stockholders. It is, therefore, fair and logical to consider the certificate of liquidation as one in the nature of a transfer or conveyance.

WHEREFORE, we affirm the resolution appealed from, with costs against appellants.

Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

Credit Transactions Case Digest: Republic v. Bagtas (1962)

G.R. No. L-17474 October 25, 1962

Laws Applicable: Commodatum

Lessons Applicable:

FACTS:

  • May 8, 1948: Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of 1 year for breeding purposes subject to a breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls
  • May 7, 1949: Jose requested for a renewal for another year for the three bulls but only one bull was approved while the others are to be returned
  • March 25, 1950: He wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the 3 bulls
  • October 17, 1950: he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a deduction of yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General.
  • October 19, 1950: Director of Animal Industry advised him that either the 3 bulls are to be returned or their book value without deductions should be paid not later than October 31, 1950 which he was not able to do
  • December 20, 1950: An action at the CFI was commenced against Jose praying that he be ordered to return the 3 bulls or to pay their book value of P3,241.45 and the unpaid breeding fee of P199.62, both with interests, and costs
  • July 5, 1951: Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel Navarro, Rosete and Manalo, answered that because of the bad peace and order situation in Cagayan Valley, particularly in the barrio of Baggao, and of the pending appeal he had taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the President of the Philippines, he could not return the animals nor pay their value and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
  • RTC: granted the action
  • December 1958: granted an ex-parte motion for the appointment of a special sheriff to serve the writ outside Manila
  • December 6, 1958: Felicidad M. Bagtas, the surviving spouse of Jose who died on October 23, 1951 and administratrix of his estate, was notified
  • January 7, 1959: she file a motion that the 2 bulls where returned by his son on June 26, 1952 evidenced by recipt and the 3rd bull died from gunshot wound inflicted during a Huk raid and prayed that the writ of execution be quashed and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. 
ISSUE: W/N the contract is commodatum and NOT a lease and the estate should be liable for the loss due to force majeure due to delay.

HELD: YES. writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs
  • If contract was commodatum then Bureau of Animal Industry retained ownership or title to the bull it should suffer its loss due to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous.  If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract.  And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable if he keeps it longer than the period stipulated
  • the estate of the late defendant is only liable for the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull which has not been returned because it was killed while in the custody of the administratrix of his estate
  • Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been instituted in the CFI, the money judgment rendered in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced by means of a writ of execution but must be presented to the probate court for payment by the appellant, the administratrix appointed by the court.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-17474


EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17474            October 25, 1962

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE V. BAGTAS, defendant,
FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate left by the late Jose V. Bagtas, petitioner-appellant.

D. T. Reyes, Liaison and Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

The Court of Appeals certified this case to this Court because only questions of law are raised.

On 8 May 1948 Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949 for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. Upon the expiration on 7 May 1949 of the contract, the borrower asked for a renewal for another period of one year. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved a renewal thereof of only one bull for another year from 8 May 1949 to 7 May 1950 and requested the return of the other two. On 25 March 1950 Jose V. Bagtas wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the three bulls. On 17 October 1950 he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a deduction of yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General. On 19 October 1950 the Director of Animal Industry advised him that the book value of the three bulls could not be reduced and that they either be returned or their book value paid not later than 31 October 1950. Jose V. Bagtas failed to pay the book value of the three bulls or to return them. So, on 20 December 1950 in the Court of First Instance of Manila the Republic of the Philippines commenced an action against him praying that he be ordered to return the three bulls loaned to him or to pay their book value in the total sum of P3,241.45 and the unpaid breeding fee in the sum of P199.62, both with interests, and costs; and that other just and equitable relief be granted in (civil No. 12818).

On 5 July 1951 Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel Navarro, Rosete and Manalo, answered that because of the bad peace and order situation in Cagayan Valley, particularly in the barrio of Baggao, and of the pending appeal he had taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the President of the Philippines from the refusal by the Director of Animal Industry to deduct from the book value of the bulls corresponding yearly depreciation of 8% from the date of acquisition, to which depreciation the Auditor General did not object, he could not return the animals nor pay their value and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

After hearing, on 30 July 1956 the trial court render judgment —

. . . sentencing the latter (defendant) to pay the sum of P3,625.09 the total value of the three bulls plus the breeding fees in the amount of P626.17 with interest on both sums of (at) the legal rate from the filing of this complaint and costs.

On 9 October 1958 the plaintiff moved ex parte for a writ of execution which the court granted on 18 October and issued on 11 November 1958. On 2 December 1958 granted an ex-parte motion filed by the plaintiff on November 1958 for the appointment of a special sheriff to serve the writ outside Manila. Of this order appointing a special sheriff, on 6 December 1958, Felicidad M. Bagtas, the surviving spouse of the defendant Jose Bagtas who died on 23 October 1951 and as administratrix of his estate, was notified. On 7 January 1959 she file a motion alleging that on 26 June 1952 the two bull Sindhi and Bhagnari were returned to the Bureau Animal of Industry and that sometime in November 1958 the third bull, the Sahiniwal, died from gunshot wound inflicted during a Huk raid on Hacienda Felicidad Intal, and praying that the writ of execution be quashed and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. On 31 January 1959 the plaintiff objected to her motion. On 6 February 1959 she filed a reply thereto. On the same day, 6 February, the Court denied her motion. Hence, this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court as stated at the beginning of this opinion.

It is true that on 26 June 1952 Jose M. Bagtas, Jr., son of the appellant by the late defendant, returned the Sindhi and Bhagnari bulls to Roman Remorin, Superintendent of the NVB Station, Bureau of Animal Industry, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as evidenced by a memorandum receipt signed by the latter (Exhibit 2). That is why in its objection of 31 January 1959 to the appellant's motion to quash the writ of execution the appellee prays "that another writ of execution in the sum of P859.53 be issued against the estate of defendant deceased Jose V. Bagtas." She cannot be held liable for the two bulls which already had been returned to and received by the appellee.

The appellant contends that the Sahiniwal bull was accidentally killed during a raid by the Huk in November 1953 upon the surrounding barrios of Hacienda Felicidad Intal, Baggao, Cagayan, where the animal was kept, and that as such death was due to force majeure she is relieved from the duty of returning the bull or paying its value to the appellee. The contention is without merit. The loan by the appellee to the late defendant Jose V. Bagtas of the three bulls for breeding purposes for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949, later on renewed for another year as regards one bull, was subject to the payment by the borrower of breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. The appellant contends that the contract was commodatum and that, for that reason, as the appellee retained ownership or title to the bull it should suffer its loss due to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous.1 If the breeding fee be considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith, because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum —

. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event:

(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .

(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event;

The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949. The loan of one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used the bull until November 1953 when during a Huk raid it was killed by stray bullets. Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the appellant the bulls had each an appraised book value, to with: the Sindhi, at P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the Sahiniwal at P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability.

The appellant's contention that the demand or prayer by the appellee for the return of the bull or the payment of its value being a money claim should be presented or filed in the intestate proceedings of the defendant who died on 23 October 1951, is not altogether without merit. However, the claim that his civil personality having ceased to exist the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case against him, is untenable, because section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that —

After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. . . .

and after the defendant's death on 23 October 1951 his counsel failed to comply with section 16 of Rule 3 which provides that —

Whenever a party to a pending case dies . . . it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence of the executory administrator, guardian, or other legal representative of the deceased . . . .

The notice by the probate court and its publication in the Voz de Manila that Felicidad M. Bagtas had been issue letters of administration of the estate of the late Jose Bagtas and that "all persons having claims for monopoly against the deceased Jose V. Bagtas, arising from contract express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, for funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the said decedent, and judgment for monopoly against him, to file said claims with the Clerk of this Court at the City Hall Bldg., Highway 54, Quezon City, within six (6) months from the date of the first publication of this order, serving a copy thereof upon the aforementioned Felicidad M. Bagtas, the appointed administratrix of the estate of the said deceased," is not a notice to the court and the appellee who were to be notified of the defendant's death in accordance with the above-quoted rule, and there was no reason for such failure to notify, because the attorney who appeared for the defendant was the same who represented the administratrix in the special proceedings instituted for the administration and settlement of his estate. The appellee or its attorney or representative could not be expected to know of the death of the defendant or of the administration proceedings of his estate instituted in another court that if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or its attorney of such death as required by the rule.

As the appellant already had returned the two bulls to the appellee, the estate of the late defendant is only liable for the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull which has not been returned to the appellee, because it was killed while in the custody of the administratrix of his estate. This is the amount prayed for by the appellee in its objection on 31 January 1959 to the motion filed on 7 January 1959 by the appellant for the quashing of the writ of execution.

Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Q-200), the money judgment rendered in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced by means of a writ of execution but must be presented to the probate court for payment by the appellant, the administratrix appointed by the court.

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.


Footnotes

1 Article 1933 of the Civil Code.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Cornelio Amaro, et al., v. Ambrocio Sumanguit (1962)


G.R. No. L-14986           July 31, 1962

Lessons Applicable: Dereliction of Duty (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code,Rule 8, section 1 and Rule 16 of Rules of Court

FACTS:

  • October 5, 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay
  • Next Day: Jose Amaro, his father Cornelio Amaro and his witnesses went to the office of the chief of police Ambrosio Sumanguit who harassed and terrorized them in their daily work, ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent and he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime
  • A case was filed against Sumanguit on the basis of:
    • ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

      ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
  • CFI: dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court below on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
ISSUE: W/N the case should not be dismissed for vagueness or because there are other recourse available

HELD: YES. set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings

  • Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rule 8, section 1), because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery provided by the Rules. 
  • having another recourse (in connection with the crime of illegal discharge of firearm supposedly committed against one of them) as by filing their complaint directly with the city attorney of Silay or by lodging an administrative charge against appellee herein, does not preclude this action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code and hence does not justify its dismissal

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-14986


EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14986             July 31, 1962

CORNELIO AMARO and JOSE AMARO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
AMBROSIO SUMANGUIT, defendant-appellee.

Jose B. Gamboa for plaintiffs-appellants.
L. G. Lopez for defendant-appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Appellants filed suit for damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the chief of police of the City of Silay. Although not specifically alleged in the complaint, it is admitted by both parties, as shown in their respective briefs, that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code, which provide:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

The complaint was dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court below on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The only question now before us refers to correctness of the order dismissal.

The pertinent allegations in the complaint are that on October 5, 1958 appellant Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay; that the following day he, together with his father (Cornelio Amaro) and his witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized;" that in view thereof they "gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime . . . .;" that upon advice of the City Mayor given to appellee an investigation (of said crime) was conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to file or had already filed an information for illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant; and that "having finished the investigation of the crime complained of, the defendant chief of police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime."

We are of the opinion that the facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the aforesaid provision that such refusal must be "without just cause" is implicit in the context of the allegation. The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in a subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged that "he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of the policemen.

The complaint is, without doubt, imperfectly drafted. It suffers from vagueness and generalization. But all that the Rules require is that there be a showing by a statement of ultimate facts, that the plaintiff his a right and that such right has been violated by the defendant. An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty, for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule 8, but rather for a bill of particulars according to Rule 16. Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. I, p. 111. In two cases decided by this Court, it was observed:

Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rule 8, section 1), because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery provided by the Rules. (Rules 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23.) Professor Sunderland once said "The real test of good pleading under the new rules is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the party to plead and prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as anything else if it gives the proper information. If the party wants more he may ask for more details in regard to the particular matter that is stated too generally (Vol. XIII, Cincinnati Law Review, January 1939.) Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672.

At any rate, if respondent's complaint, which was clear enough, had created confusion in petitioner's mind as to the foundation of her cause of action, then it should have moved for a more definite statement of the same before the trial. De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-15247, Feb. 28, 1962.

The fact, cited by the court below in the order subject to review, that appellants have another recourse (in connection with the crime of illegal discharge of firearm supposedly committed against one of them) as by filing their complaint directly with the city attorney of Silay or by lodging an administrative charge against appellee herein, does not preclude this action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code and hence does not justify its dismissal.

THE ORDER APPEALED from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against appellee.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

Corporate Law Case Digest: Stockholders of F. Guanzon and Sons, Inc v. Register of Deeds of Manila (1962)

G.R. No. L-18216            October 30, 1962
Lessons Applicable: Strong Juridical Personality (Corporate Law)

FACTS:
  • Sept 19, 1960: 5 stockholders of the F. Guanzon and Sons, Inc. executed a certificate of liquidation of the assets of the corporation, dissolution and distribution among themselves in proportion to their shareholdings, as liquidating dividends, corporate assets, including real properties

  • Register of Deeds of Manila denied the registration of the certificate of liquidation:

  1. The number of parcels not certified to in the acknowledgment;

  2. P430.50 Reg. fees need be paid;

  3. P940.45 documentary stamps need be attached to the document;

  4. The judgment of the Court approving the dissolution and directing the disposition of the assets of the corporation need be presented

  • Commissioner of Land Registration overruled ground No. 7 and sustained requirements Nos. 3, 5 and 6.

  • Stockholders appealed

    • contend that the certificate of liquidation is not a conveyance or transfer but merely a distribution of the assets of the corporation which has ceased to exist for having been dissolved

ISSUE: W/N certificate merely involves a distribution of the corporation's assets (or should be considered a transfer or conveyance)

HELD: NO. affirm the resolution appealed from
  • Corporation - juridical person distinct from the members composing it.

    • Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. 

    • While shares of stock constitute personal property they do not represent property of the corporation. 

      • A share of stock only typifies an aliquot part of the corporation's property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and equity but its holder is NOT the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation nor entitled to possession 

      • The stockholder is not a co-owner or tenant in common of the corporate property