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Showing posts with label 1994. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1994. Show all posts

PILA Case Digest: Wright v. CA (1994)

Wright v. CA
Gr. No. 113213 Aug. 15, 1994
KAPUNAN, J
 
Lessons: extradition treaty
Laws: Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution


FACTS:

      To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988.  It was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with.  The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the 2 countries and embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense."  A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited.

The Treaty defined extraditable offenses to include all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least 1 year, or by a more severe penalty."  For the purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:

(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the offense within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;

(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be taken into account in determining the constituent elements of the offense.

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking to indict Paul Joseph Wright, an Australian Citizen for:

a.       1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonestly obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round Solicitors, secured by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell

b.      13 counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. John Carson Craker's received approximately 11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., by submitting 215 false life insurance proposals, and paying premiums thereon o the Australian Mutual Provident Society through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, where he is an insurance agent

c.       1 count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's attempted to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 1 false proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society based on an inexistent policy-holder

d.      1 count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's signed and swore before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing 3 false statements

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings was initiated on April 6, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.  The Regional Trial Court on June 14, 1993 granted the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that the extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense was committed.  The extradition proceeding resulted in an order of his deportation.  The decision was sustained and Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.  Wright filed a review on certiorari to set aside the order of deportation contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.  Moreover, he argues that the trial court's decision ordering his extradition is based on evidence that failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country.

ISSUES:

a.       Whether or NOT the Regional Trial Court committed an order in granting the extradition proceeding.

b.      Whether or NOT enforcement of Article 18 of the Treaty states a prohibition for the retroactive application of offenses committed prior to the date of its effectivity

c.       whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex post facto law

HELD: AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit

                    i.            NO.

Complying with Article 2, Section 2 of the Treaty, the crimes for which the Mr. Wright was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been committed.  The trial court correctly determined the offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively.

The provisions of the Treaty was properly complied with.  The signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself.  The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.

            The relevant provisions merely requires "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited.”  It does not limited the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to a person charged with an information or a criminal complaint as it will render the  Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution.  Moreover, the “Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets” shows that he is not only wanted for prosecution but has absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution.  Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate such as in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed.

                  ii.            YES.

Article 18 states:  “ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.

Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.”

The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity and the second paragraph pertains to its termination.  There is no prohibition for its retroactive effect.

Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that: “4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was committed, provided that:

(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offense; and

(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at the time of the making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.”

                iii.            NO.

Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to penal and criminal statutes which affects the substantial rights of the accused.  As concluded by the Court of Appeals, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute.  "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI, M.M. and HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.

Rodrigo E. Mallari for petitioner.

Aurora Salva Bautista collaborating for petitioner.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any individual for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition. This principle arises from the reality of extradition as a derogation of sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own territory.  The act of extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a person accused or convicted of a crime, to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive, it was committed and which asks for his surrender with a view to execute justice."  As it is an act of "surrender" of an individual found in a sovereign State to another State which demands his surrender , an act of extradition, even with a treaty rendered executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities, does not imposed an obligation to extradite on the requested State until the latter has made its own determination of the validity of the requesting State's demand, in accordance with the requested State's own interests.

The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from treaty.  Pursuant to these principles, States enter into treaties of extradition principally for the purpose of bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit of their laws, under conventions recognizing the right of nations to mutually agree to surrender individuals within their jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose of enforcing their respective municipal laws. Since punishment of fugitive criminals is dependent mainly on the willingness of host State to apprehend them and revert them to the State where their offenses were committed,  jurisdiction over such fugitives and subsequent enforcement of penal laws can be effectively accomplished only by agreement between States through treaties of extradition.

Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime,  the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with.
The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the two countries and (which) embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least one (1) year. Additionally, the Treaty allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons
. . . wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense."  A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited.
In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least one (1) year, or by a more severe penalty."  For the purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:

(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the offense within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;

(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be taken into account in determining the constituent elements of the offense.

Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the court below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner before this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the government against him.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed:

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable crimes:

1. Wright/Orr Matter — one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and

2. Wright/Cracker Matter — Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were allegedly committed in the following manner:

The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81 (1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and co-offender, Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonesty in obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round Solicitors (MM7R), secured by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell.

The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and co-offender Mr. John Carson Craker's receiving a total of approximately 11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., depending on the volume of business written, by submitting two hundred fifteen (215) life insurance proposals, and paying premiums thereon (to the acceptance of the policies and payment of commissions) to the Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) Society through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, of which respondent is an insurance agent, out of which life proposals none are in existence and approximately 200 of which are alleged to have been false, in one or more of the following ways:

( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because they were told the policies were free (usually for 2 years) and no payments were required.

(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50 or $100) to sign and had to supply a bank account no longer used (at which a direct debit request for payment of premiums would apply). These policy-holders were also told no payments by them were required.

(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the "Daily Personnel Agency", and again were told the policies were free for 2 years as long as an unused bank account was applied.

(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.

The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's attempting to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting one proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does not exist with the end in view of paying the premiums thereon to insure acceptance of the policy and commission payments.

The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's signing and swearing before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing three (3) false statements.

Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the respondent court.

In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner to appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. In the same order, the respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the petitioner.

The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where petitioner, to date, continue to be held.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.

In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in Australia; that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against him; that he arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990 returned to Australia on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11, 1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned to the Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to the Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from that time on, has not left the Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been extended but he could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary working visa.

The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense — in relation to the extradition — was committed, provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed.

Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:

I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.

II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

III. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DO NOT SHOW THAT PETITIONER IS WANTED FOR PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.

IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN MISINTERPRETING THE EXTENDED STAY OF PETITIONER AS EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO HIDE AND EVADE PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.

V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SPECIFYING IN HIS ORDER OR DECISION THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS TO STAND TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on September 14, 1993 and denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 1993. 14 Reiterating substantially the same assignments of error which he interposed in the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenges in this petition the validity of the extradition order issued by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the Treaty. Petitioner vigorously argues that the trial court order violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the extradition order to be valid, the Australian government should show that he "has a criminal case pending before a competent court" in that country "which can legally pass judgement or acquittal or conviction upon him."

Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which are relevant to our determination of the validity of the extradition order, reveals that the trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioner's extradition. Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the crimes for which the petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been committed. From its examination of the charges against the petitioner, the trial court correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively.
The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The warrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. All of these documentary requirements were dully submitted to the trial court in its proceedings a quo. For purposes of the compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself. In conformity with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the appropriate documents and annexes were signed by "an officer in or of the Requesting State" "sealed with . . . (a) public seal of the Requesting State or of a Minister of State, or of a Department or officer of the Government of the Requesting State,"  and "certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of the Requesting State accredited to the Requested State."  The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.

The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a "criminal case pending before a competent court in the Requesting State which can legally pass judgement of acquittal or conviction"  stretches the meaning of the phrase "wanted for prosecution" beyond the intended by the treaty provisions because the relevant provisions merely require "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited."  Furthermore, the 'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that petitioner is not only wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to person charged with an information or a criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution.

This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals. May the extradition of the petitioner who is wanted for prosecution by the government of Australia be granted in spite of the fact that the offenses for which the petitioner is sought in his country were allegedly committed prior to the date of effectivity of the Treaty.

Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement cannot be given retroactive effect. Article 18 states:

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.

Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.

We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive enforcement from this provision. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity; the second paragraph pertains to its termination. Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates to, much less, prohibits retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.

On the other hand, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:

4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was committed, provided that:

(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offense; and

(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at the time of the making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.

Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under Article 2 of the Treaty. They were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were committed, and, irrespective of the time they were committed, they fall under the panoply of the Extradition Treaty's provisions, specifically, Article 2 paragraph 4, quoted above.

Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws? Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil or criminal.  However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused."  This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."
In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either country. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a Resolution dated September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in accordance with the provision of the 1987 Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days after the requirements for entry into force were complied with by both governments.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, we hereby AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 105836 March 7, 1994

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 105836 March 7, 1994

SPOUSES GEORGE MORAN and LIBRADA P. MORAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.

Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for petitioners.

Agcaoli & Associates for private respondent.



REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner spouses George and Librada Moran are the owners of the Wack-Wack Petron gasoline station located at Shaw Boulevard, corner Old Wack-Wack Road, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. They regularly purchased bulk fuel and other related products from Petrophil Corporation on cash on delivery (COD) basis. Orders for bulk fuel and other related products were made by telephone and payments were effected by personal checks upon delivery. 1

Petitioners maintained three joint accounts, namely one current account (No. 37-00066-7) and two savings accounts, (Nos. 1037002387 and 1037001372) with the Shaw Boulevard branch of Citytrust Banking Corporation. As a special privilege to the Morans, whom it considered as valued clients, the bank allowed them to maintain a zero balance in their current account. Transfers from Saving Account No. 1037002387 to their current account could be made only with their prior authorization, but they gave written authority to Citytrust to automatically transfer funds from their Savings Account No. 1037001372 to their Current Account No. 37-00066-7 at any time whenever the funds in their current account were insufficient to meet withdrawals from said current account. Such arrangement for automatic transfer of funds was called a pre-authorized transfer (PAT) agreement. 2

The PAT letter-agreement entered into by the parties on March 19, 1982 contained the following provisions:

xxx xxx xxx

1. The transfer may be effected on the day following the overdrawing of the current account, but the check/s would be honored if the savings account has sufficient balance to cover the overdraft.

2. The regular charges on overdraft, and activity fees will be imposed by the Bank.

3. This is merely an accommodation on our part and we have the right, at all times and for any reason whatsoever, to refuse to effect transfer of funds at our sole and absolute option and discretion, reserving our right to terminate this arrangement at any time without written notice to you.

4. You hold CITYTRUST free and harmless for any and all omissions or oversight in executing this automatic transfer of funds; . . . 3

xxx xxx xxx

On December 12, 1983, petitioners, through Librada Moran, drew a check (Citytrust No. 041960) for P50,576.00 payable to Petrophil
Corporation. 4 The next day, December 13, 1983, petitioners, again through Librada Moran, issued another check (Citytrust No. 041962) in the amount of P56,090.00 in favor of the same corporation. 5 The total sum of the two checks was P106,666.00.

On December 14, 1983, Petrophil Corporation deposited the two aforementioned checks to its account with the Pandacan branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the collecting bank. In turn, PNB, Pandacan branch presented them for clearing with the Philippine Clearing House Corporation in the afternoon of the same day. The records show that on December 14, 1983, Current Account No. 37-00066-7 had a zero balance, while Savings Account No. 1037001372 (covered by the PAT) had an available balance of
P26,104.30 6 and Savings Account No. 1037002387 had an available balance of P43,268.39. 7

At about ten o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 15, 1983, petitioner George Moran went to the bank, as was his regular practice, to personally oversee their daily transactions with the bank. He deposited in their Savings Account No. 1037002387 the amounts of P10,874.58 and P6,754.25, 8 and he likewise deposited in their Savings Account No. 1037001372 the amounts of P5,900.00, P35,100.00 and 30.00. 9 The amount of P40,000.00 was then transferred by him from Saving Account No. 1037002387 to their current account by means of a pro forma withdrawal form (a debit memorandum), which was provided by the bank, authorizing the latter to make the necessary transfer. At the same time, the amount of P66,666.00 was transferred from Savings Account No. 1037001372 to the same current account through the pre-authorized transfer (PAT) agreement. 10

Sometime on December 15 or 16, 1983 George Moran was informed by his wife Librada, that Petrophil refused to deliver their orders on a credit basis because the two checks they had previously issued were dishonored upon presentment for payment. Apparently, the bank dishonored the checks due to "insufficiency of funds." 11 The non-delivery of gasoline forced petitioners to temporarily stop business operations, allegedly causing them to suffer loss of earnings. In addition, Petrophil cancelled their credit accommodation, forcing them to pay for their purchases in cash. 12 George Moran, furious and upset, demanded an explanation from Raul Diaz, the branch manager. Failing to get a sufficient explanation, he talked to a certain Villareal, a bank officer, who allegedly told him that Amy Belen Ragodo, the customer service officer, had committed a "grave error". 13

On December 16 or 17, 1983, Diaz went to the Moran residence to get the signatures of the petitioners on an application for a manager's check so that the dishonored checks could be redeemed. Diaz then went to Petrophil to personally present the checks in payment for the two dishonored checks. 14

In a chance meeting around May or June, 1984, George Moran learned from one Constancio Magno, credit manager of Petrophil, that the latter received from Citytrust, through Diaz, a letter dated December 16, 1983, notifying them that the two aforementioned checks were "inadvertently dishonored . . . due to operational error." Said letter was received by Petrophil on January 4, 1984. 15

On July 24, 1984, or a little over six months after the incident, petitioners, through counsel, wrote Citytrust claiming that the bank's dishonor of the checks caused them besmirched business and personal reputation, shame and anxiety, hence they were contemplating the filing of the necessary legal actions unless the bank issued a certification clearing their name and paid them P1,000,000.00 as moral damages. 16

The bank did not act favorably on their demands, hence petitioners filed a complaint for damages on September 8, 1984, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 159 at Pasig, Metro Manila, which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 51549. In turn, Citytrust filed a counterclaim for damages, alleging that the case filed against it was unfounded and unjust.

After trial, a decision dated October 9, 1989 was rendered by the trial court dismissing both the complaint and the counterclaim. 17 On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 25009 on October 9, 1989 affirming the decision of the trial court. 18

We start some basic and accepted rules, statutory and doctrinal. A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. 19 Thus, a check is a written order addressed to a bank or persons carrying on the business of banking, by a party having money in their hands, requesting them to pay on presentment, to a person named therein or to bearer or order, a named sum of money. 20

Fixed savings and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan. 21 In other words, the relationship between the bank and the depositor is that of a debtor and creditor. 22 By virtue of the contract of deposit between the banker and its depositor, the banker agrees to pay checks drawn by the depositor provided that said depositor has money in the hands of the bank. 23

Hence, where the bank possesses funds of a depositor, it is bound to honor his checks to the extent of the amount of his deposits. The failure of a bank to pay the check of a merchant or a trader, when the deposit is sufficient, entitles the drawer to substantial damages without any proof of actual
damages. 24

Conversely, a bank is not liable for its refusal to pay a check on account of insufficient funds, notwithstanding the fact that a deposit may be made later in the day. 25 Before a bank depositor may maintain a suit to recover a specific amount from his bank, he must first show that he had on deposit sufficient funds to meet his demand. 26

The present action for damages accordingly hinges on the resolution of the inquiry as to whether or not petitioners had sufficient funds in their accounts when the bank dishonored the checks in question. In view of the factual findings of the two lower courts the correctness of which are challenged by what appear to be plausible, arguments, we feel that the same should properly be resolved by us. This would necessarily require us to inquire into both the savings and current accounts of petitioners in relation to the PAT arrangement.

On December 14, 1983, when PNB, Pandacan branch, presented the checks for collection, the available balance for Savings Account No. 1037001372 was P26,104.30 while Current Account No. 37-00066-7 expectedly had a zero balance. On December 15, 1983, at approximately ten o'clock in the morning, petitioners, through George Moran, learned that P66,666.00 from Saving Account No. 1037001372 was transferred to their current account. Another P40,000.00 was transferred from Saving Accounts No. 1037002387 to the current account. Considering that the transfers were by then sufficient to cover the two checks, it is asserted by petitioners that such fact should have prevented the dishonor of the checks. It appears, however, that it was not so.

As explained by respondent court in its decision, Gerard E. Rionisto, head of the centralized clearing unit of Citytrust, detailed on the witness stand the standard clearing procedure adopted by respondent bank and the Philippine Clearing House Corporation, to wit:.

Q: Let me again re-phase the question. Most of (sic) these two checks issued by Mrs. Librada Moran under the accounts of the plaintiffs with Citytrust Banking Corporation were drawn dated December 12, 1983 and December 13, 1983(and) these two (2) checks were made payable to Petrophil Corporation. On record, Petrophil Corporation presented these two (2) checks for clearing with PNB Pandacan Branch on December 14, 1983. Now in accordance with the bank, what would happen with these checks drawn with (sic) PNB on December 14, 1983?.

A: So these checks will now be presented by PNB with the Philippine Clearing House on December 14, and then the Philippine Clearing House will process it until midnight of December 14. Citytrust will send a clearing representative to the Philippine Clearing House at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of December 15 and then get the checks. The checks will now be processed at the Citytrust Computer at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of December 14 (sic)but it will be processed for balance of Citytrust as of December 14 because for one, we have not opened on December 15 at 3:00 o'clock. Under the clearing house rules, we are supposed to process it on the date it was presented for clearing. (tsn, September 9, 1988, pp. 9-10). 27

Considering the clearing process adopted, as explained in the aforequoted testimony, it is clear that the available balance on December 14, 1983 was used by the bank in determining whether or not there was sufficient cash deposited to fund the two checks, although what was stamped on the dorsal side of the two checks in question was "DAIF/12-15-83," since December 15, 1983 was the actual date when the checks were processed. As earlier stated, when petitioners' checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, the available balance of Savings Account No. 1037001372, which was the subject of the PAT agreement, was not enough to cover either of the two checks. On December 14, 1983, when PNB, Pandacan branch presented the checks for collection, the available balance for Savings Account No. 1037001372, to repeat, was only P26,104.30 while Current Account No. 37-0006-7 had no available balance. It was only on December 15, 1983 at around ten o'clock in the morning that the necessary funds were deposited, which unfortunately was too late to prevent the dishonor of the checks.

Petitioners argue that public respondent, by relying heavily on Rionisto's testimony, failed to consider the fact that the witness himself admitted that he had no personal knowledge surrounding the dishonor of the two checks in question. Thus, although he knew the standard clearing procedure, it does not necessarily mean that the same procedure was adopted with regard to the two checks.

We do not agree. Section 3(q), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption in law that the ordinary course of business has been followed. In the absence of a contrary showing, it is presumed that the acts in question were in conformity with the usual conduct of business. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present countervailing evidence to rebut the presumption that the checks involved underwent the same regular process for clearing of checks followed by the bank since 1983.

Petitioner had no reason to complain, for they alone were at fault. A drawer must remember his responsibilities every time he issues a check. He must personally keep track of his available balance in the bank and not rely on the bank to notify him of the necessity to fund certain check she previously issued. A check, as distinguished from an ordinary bill of exchange, is supposed to be drawn against a previous deposit of funds for it is ordinarily intended for immediately payment. 28

Moreover, between the time of the issuance of said checks on December 12 and 13 and the time of their presentment on December 14, petitioners had, at the very least, twenty-four hours to replenish their balance in the bank.

As previously noted, it was only during business hours in the morning of December 15, 1983, that P66,666.00 was automatically transferred from Savings Account No. 1037001372 to Current Account No. 37-00066-7, and another P40,000.00 was transferred from Savings Account No. 1037002387 to the same current by a debit memorandum. Petitioners argue that if indeed the checks were dishonored in the early morning of December 15, 1983, the bank would not have automatically transferred P66,666.00 to said current account. They theorize that the checks having already been dishonored, there was no necessity to put into effect the pre-authorized transfer agreement.

That theory is incorrect. When the transfer from both savings accounts to the current account were made, they were done in the hope that the checks may be retrieved, thus preventing their dishonor. Unfortunately, respondent bank did not succeed in effectuating its good intentions. The transfers were made to preserve its relations with petitioners whom it knew were valued clients, hence it wanted to prevent the dishonor of their checks, if the same was at all possible. Although not admitting fault, it tried its best to make sure that the checks would not bounce.

Under similar circumstances, it was held in Whitman vs. First National Bank 29 that a bank performs its full duty where, upon the receipt of a check drawn against an account in which there are insufficient funds to pay it in full, it endeavors to induce the drawer to make good his account so that the check can be paid, and failing in this, it protests the check on the following morning and notifies its correspondent bank by the telegraph of the protest. It cannot, therefore, be held liable to the payee and holder of the check for not protesting it upon the day when it was received. In fact, the court added that the bank did more that it was required to do by making an effort to induce the drawer to deposit sufficient money to make the check good, and by notifying its correspondent of the dishonor of the check by telegram.

Petitioners maintain that at the time the checks were dishonored, they had already deposited sufficient funds to cover said checks. To prove their point, petitioners quoted in their petition the following testimony of said witness Rionisto, to wit:

Q: Now according to you, you would receive the checks from (being deposited to) the collecting bank which in this particular example was the Pandacan Branch of PNB which in turn will deliver it to the Philippine Clearing House and the Philippine Clearing House will deliver it to your office around 12:00 o'clock of December . . . ?

A: Around 2:00 o'clock of December 15. We sent a clearing representative.

Q: And the checks will be processed in accordance with the balance available as of December 14?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And naturally you will place there "drawn against insufficient funds, December 14, 1983"?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Are you sure about that?

A: Yes, sir . . . (tsn, September 9, 1988, p. 14) 30

Obviously witness Rionisto was merely confused as to the dates (December 14 and 15) because it did not jibe with his previous testimony, wherein he categorically stated that "the checks will now be processed as the Citytrust Computer at around 3:00 in the morning of December 14 (sic) but it will be processed for balance of Citytrust as of December 14 because for one, we have not opened on December 15 at 3:00 o'clock. Under the clearing house rules, we are supposed to process it on the date it was presented for
clearing." 31 Analyzing the procedure he had previously explained, and analyzing his testimony in its entirety and not in truncated portions, it would logically and ineluctably appear that he actually meant December 15, and not December 14.

In the early morning of every business day, prior to banking hours, the various branches of Citytrust would receive a computer printout called the "rejected transactions" report from the head office. The report contains, among others, a listing of "checks to be funded." When Citytrust, Shaw Boulevard branch, received said report in the early morning of December 15, 1983, the two checks involved were included in the "checks to be funded." That report was used by the bank as its basis in dishonoring the two checks in question. Petitioner contends that the bank erred when it did so because on previous occasions, the report was merely used by the bank as a basis for determining whether or not it was necessary to notify them of the need to deposit certain amounts in their accounts.

Amy Belen Rogado, a bank employee, testified that she would normally copy the details stated in the report and transfer in on a "pink slip." These pink slips were then given to George Moran. In turn, George Moran testified that he would deposit the necessary funds stated in the pink slips. As a matter of fact, so petitioner asseverated, not a single check written on the notices was ever dishonored after he had funded said checks with the bank. Thus, petitioner argues, the checks were not yet dishonored after the bank received the report in the early morning of December 15, 1983.

Said argument does not persuade. If ever petitioners on previous occasions were given notices every time a check was presented for clearing and payment and there were no adequate funds in their accounts, these were, at most, mere accommodations on the part of respondent bank. It was not a requirement or a general banking practice, hence non-compliance therewith could not lay the bank open to blame or rebuke. Legally, the bank had all the right to dishonor the checks because there were no sufficient funds to speak of in the first place. If the demand is by check, a drawer must have to his credit enough to cover the demand. If his credit with the bank is less than the amount on the face of the check, the bank may lawfully refuse payment. 32

Pursuing this matter further, the bank could also not be faulted for not accepting either of the two checks. The first check issued was in the amount of P50,576.00, while the second one was for P56,090.00. Savings Account No. 1307001372 then had a balance of only P26,104.30. This being the case, Citytrust could not be expected to accept for payment either one of the two checks nor partially honor one check.

A bank is under no obligation to make part payment on a check, up to only the amount of the drawer's funds, where the check is drawn for an amount larger than what the drawer has on deposit. Such a practice of paying checks in part has never existed. Upon partial payment, the check holder could not be called upon to surrender the check, and the bank would be without a voucher affording a certain means of showing the payment. The rule is based on commercial convenience, and any rule that would work such manifest inconvenience should not be recognized. A check is intended not only to transfer a right to the amount named in it, but to serve the further purpose of affording evidence for the bank of the payment of such amount when the check is taken up. 33

On the other hand, assuming arguendo that Savings Account No. 1037002387, which is not covered by a pre-arranged automatic transfer agreement, had enough amount deposited to cover both checks (which is not so in this case), the bank still had no obligation to honor said checks as there was then no authority given to it to make the transfer of funds. Where a depositor has two accounts with a bank, an open account and a savings account, and draws a check upon the open account for more money than the account contains, the bank may rightfully refuse to pay the check, and is under no duty to make up the deficiency from the savings account. 34

We are agree with respondent Court of Appeals in its assessment and interpretation of the nature of the letter of Citytrust to Petrophil, dated December 16, 1983. As aptly and correctly stated by said court, ". . . the letter is not an admission of liability as it was written merely to maintain the goodwill and continued patronage of plaintiff-appellants. (This) cannot be characterized as baseless, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding its writing." 35

In the present case, the actions taken by the bank after the incident clearly show that there was neither malice nor bad faith, but rather a clear intent to mollify an obviously agitated client. Raul Diaz, the branch manager, even went for this purpose to the Moran residence to facilitate their application for a manager's check. Later, he went to the Petrophil Corporation to personally redeem the checks. Still later, the letter was sent by respondent bank to Petrophil explaining that the dishonor of the checks was due to "operational error." However, we reiterate, it would be a mistake to construe that letter as an admission of guilt on the part of the bank. It knew that it was confronted with a client who obviously was not willing to admit any fault on his part, although the facts show otherwise. Thus, respondent bank ran the risk of losing the business of an important and influential member of the financial community if it did not do anything to assuage the feelings of petitioners.

It will be recalled that the credit standing of the Morans with Petrophil Corporation was involved, which fact, more than anything, displeased them, to say the least. On demand of petitioners that their names be cleared, the bank considered it more prudent to send the letter. It never realized that it would thereafter be used by petitioners as one of the bases of their legal action. It will be noted that there was no reason for the bank to send the letter to Petrophil Corporation since the latter was not a client nor was it demanding any explanation. Clearly, therefore, the letter was merely intended to accommodate the request of the Morans and was part of the series of damage-control measures taken by the bank to placate petitioners.

Respondent Court of Appeals perceptively observed that "all these somehow pacified plaintiffs-appellants (herein petitioners) for they did not thereafter take immediate punitive action against the defendant-appellee (herein private respondent). As pointed out by the court a quo, it took plaintiffs-appellants about six (6) months after the dishonor of the checks to demand that defendant-appellee pay them P1,000,000.00 as damages. At that time, plaintiffs-appellants had discovered the letter of Mr. Diaz attributing the dishonor of their checks to 'operational error'. The attempt to unduly ride on the letter of Mr. Diaz speaks for itself." 36

On the above premises which irresistibly commend themselves to our acceptance, we find no cogent and sufficient to award actual, moral, or exemplary damages to petitioners. Although we take judicial notice of the fact that there is a fiduciary relationship between a bank and its depositors, as well as the extent of diligence expected of it in handling the accounts entrusted to its care, 37 the bank may not be held responsible for such damages in the absence of fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude. 38

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 93048 March 3, 1994

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 93048 March 3, 1994

BATAAN CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., respondents.

Teresita Gandiongco Oledan for petitioner.

Acaban & Sabado for private respondent.



NOCON, J.:

For our review is the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled "State Investment House, Inc. v. Bataan Cigar & Cigarette Factory Inc.," 1 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court 2 in a complaint filed by the State Investment House, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as SIHI) for collection on three unpaid checks issued by Bataan Cigar & Cigarette Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as BCCFI). The foregoing decisions unanimously ruled in favor of SIHI, the private respondent in this case.

Emanating from the records are the following facts. Petitioner, Bataan Cigar & Cigarette Factory, Inc. (BCCFI), a corporation involved in the manufacturing of cigarettes, engaged one of its suppliers, King Tim Pua George (herein after referred to as George King), to deliver 2,000 bales of tobacco leaf starting October 1978. In consideration thereof, BCCFI, on July 13, 1978 issued crossed checks post dated sometime in March 1979 in the total amount of P820,000.00. 3

Relying on the supplier's representation that he would complete delivery within three months from December 5, 1978, petitioner agreed to purchase additional 2,500 bales of tobacco leaves, despite the supplier's failure to deliver in accordance with their earlier agreement. Again petitioner issued post dated crossed checks in the total amount of P1,100,000.00, payable sometime in September 1979. 4

During these times, George King was simultaneously dealing with private respondent SIHI. On July 19, 1978, he sold at a discount check TCBT 551826 5 bearing an amount of P164,000.00, post dated March 31, 1979, drawn by petitioner, naming George King as payee to SIHI. On December 19 and 26, 1978, he again sold to respondent checks TCBT Nos. 608967 & 608968, 6 both in the amount of P100,000.00, post dated September 15 & 30, 1979 respectively, drawn by petitioner in favor of George King.

In as much as George King failed to deliver the bales of tobacco leaf as agreed despite petitioner's demand, BCCFI issued on March 30, 1979, a stop payment order on all checks payable to George King, including check TCBT 551826. Subsequently, stop payment was also ordered on checks TCBT Nos. 608967 & 608968 on September 14 & 28, 1979, respectively, due to George King's failure to deliver the tobacco leaves.

Efforts of SIHI to collect from BCCFI having failed, it instituted the present case, naming only BCCFI as party defendant. The trial court pronounced SIHI as having a valid claim being a holder in due course. It further said that the non-inclusion of King Tim Pua George as party defendant is immaterial in this case, since he, as payee, is not an indispensable party.

The main issue then is whether SIHI, a second indorser, a holder of crossed checks, is a holder in due course, to be able to collect from the drawer, BCCFI.

The Negotiable Instruments Law states what constitutes a holder in due course, thus:

Sec. 52 — A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:

(a) That it is complete and regular upon its face;

(b) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;

(c) That he took it in good faith and for value;

(d) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.

Section 59 of the NIL further states that every holder is deemed prima facie a holder in due course. However, when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims, acquired the title as holder in due course.

The facts in this present case are on all fours to the case of State Investment House, Inc. (the very respondent in this case) v. Intermediate Appellate Court 7 wherein we made a discourse on the effects of crossing of checks.

As preliminary, a check is defined by law as a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. 8 There are a variety of checks, the more popular of which are the memorandum check, cashier's check, traveler's check and crossed check. Crossed check is one where two parallel lines are drawn across its face or across a corner thereof. It may be crossed generally or specially.

A check is crossed specially when the name of a particular banker or a company is written between the parallel lines drawn. It is crossed generally when only the words "and company" are written or nothing is written at all between the parallel lines. It may be issued so that the presentment can be made only by a bank. Veritably the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) does not mention "crossed checks," although Article 541 9 of the Code of Commerce refers to such instruments.

According to commentators, the negotiability of a check is not affected by its being crossed, whether specially or generally. It may legally be negotiated from one person to another as long as the one who encashes the check with the drawee bank is another bank, or if it is specially crossed, by the bank mentioned between the parallel lines. 10 This is specially true in England where the Negotiable Instrument Law originated.

In the Philippine business setting, however, we used to be beset with bouncing checks, forging of checks, and so forth that banks have become quite guarded in encashing checks, particularly those which name a specific payee. Unless one is a valued client, a bank will not even accept second indorsements on checks.

In order to preserve the credit worthiness of checks, jurisprudence has pronounced that crossing of a check should have the following effects: (a) the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank; (b) the check may be negotiated only once — to one who has an account with a bank; (c) and the act of crossing the check serves as warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose, otherwise, he is not a holder in due course. 11

The foregoing was adopted in the case of SIHI v. IAC, supra. In that case, New Sikatuna Wood Industries, Inc. also sold at a discount to SIHI three post dated crossed checks, issued by Anita Peña Chua naming as payee New Sikatuna Wood Industries, Inc. Ruling that SIHI was not a holder in due course, we then said:

The three checks in the case at bar had been crossed generally and issued payable to New Sikatuna Wood Industries, Inc. which could only mean that the drawer had intended the same for deposit only by the rightful person, i.e. the payee named therein. Apparently, it was not the payee who presented the same for payment and therefore, there was no proper presentment, and the liability did not attach to the drawer. Thus, in the absence of due presentment, the drawer did not become liable. Consequently, no right of recourse is available to petitioner (SIHI) against the drawer of the subject checks, private respondent wife (Anita), considering that petitioner is not the proper party authorized to make presentment of the checks in question.

xxx xxx xxx

That the subject checks had been issued subject to the condition that private respondents (Anita and her husband) on due date would make the back up deposit for said checks but which condition apparently was not made, thus resulting in the non-consummation of the loan intended to be granted by private respondents to New Sikatuna Wood Industries, Inc., constitutes a good defense against petitioner who is not a holder in due course. 12

It is then settled that crossing of checks should put the holder on inquiry and upon him devolves the duty to ascertain the indorser's title to the check or the nature of his possession. Failing in this respect, the holder is declared guilty of gross negligence amounting to legal absence of good faith, contrary to Sec. 52(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 13 and as such the consensus of authority is to the effect that the holder of the check is not a holder in due course.

In the present case, BCCFI's defense in stopping payment is as good to SIHI as it is to George King. Because, really, the checks were issued with the intention that George King would supply BCCFI with the bales of tobacco leaf. There being failure of consideration, SIHI is not a holder in due course. Consequently, BCCFI cannot be obliged to pay the checks.

The foregoing does not mean, however, that respondent could not recover from the checks. The only disadvantage of a holder who is not a holder in due course is that the instrument is subject to defenses as if it were
non-negotiable. 14 Hence, respondent can collect from the immediate indorser, in this case, George King.

WHEREFORE, finding that the court a quo erred in the application of law, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED. Cost against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

Persons Case Digest: Ilano v. CA G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994



ILANO v. CA
G.R. No. 104376  February 23, 1994
NOCON, J.

FACTS:
Ø  Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata.
Ø  Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped.
Ø  While they were living at Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born   Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano.  Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.
Ø  During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods
Ø  CA  REVERSED RTC  judgment declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
ISSUE:
W/N MERCEDITAS S. ILANO is the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
HELD: Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.
YES. 
Ø  Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. Rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.  A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself. To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
Ø  The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Merceditas is not appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
Ø  It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and handwriting.
Ø  The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated denials.
Ø  Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiatio
Ø  As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into account the following:
Ø  The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
Ø  The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on December 30, 1963, was about 9 years old at the time and was already of school age spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a month. She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of 12 years, 4 months and 14 days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the 1st 3 years; and considering the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next 3 years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding 3 years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last 3 years, 4 months and 14 days until she attained the age of majority.
Ø  This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts and circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.