PILA Case Digest: Lim v. Executive Secretary (2002)

G.R. No. 151445      April 11, 2002
Lim v. Executive Secretary

Lessons Applicable:   Locus Standi,  International Law v. Muncipal Law, Certiorari, Incorporation Clause, Treaties

Laws Applicable: Constitution

FACTS:

    Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002.  The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.  The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001.  Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.  Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as  residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

    The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no question of constitutionality is involved.  Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO.  Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements.  It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.  According to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general rule.
The meaning of the word  “activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises.  Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense."  ." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial.  In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory.  Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case.  The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."  Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.  Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: “The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.”
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.

PILA Case Digest: Vinuya v. Malaya Lolas Organization (2014)

G.R. No. 162230  August 12, 2014

Vinuya v. Malaya Lolas Organization

Lessons Applicable: foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch, Incorporation Clause

Laws Applicable: Constitution

Facts:

The Court in its April 28, 2010 decision held that:

(1)   Plagiarism were then already lodged with the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Court

(2)   A writ of certiorari did not lie in the absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

(3)   Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is valid pursuant to the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda

(4)   Formal apology by the Government of Japan and the reparation the Government of Japan has provided through the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) are sufficient to recompense petitioners on their claims

Petitioners Vinuya et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant their petition for certiorari.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners contended that our constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch are unlimited and that the court has erred in holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative whether to bring their claims against Japan because the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian law as incorporated into the laws of the land through the Incorporation Clause enshrined in Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as cited in the cases of Yamashita v. Styer and Kuroda v. Jalandoni.

They added that the status and applicability of the generally accepted principles of international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain without the Incorporation Clause as it implied that the general international law forms part of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly adopted.  They further cited The Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr. and U.S. v. Guinto where international law is deemed part of the Philippine law and Agustin v. Edu, where the Court declared that a treaty, though not yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land through the Incorporation Clause.  Moreover, they argue that the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnes obligations arising from the jus cogens norms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms.  Thus, the Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give justice to the victims of the comfort women system in the Philippines.

They further argue that the crimes of rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are not simple private claims that are the usual subject of diplomatic protection but are crimes that are shocking to the conscience of humanity.  Thus, they pray that the Court reconsider and declare:  (1) The crimes are against humanity and war crimes under customary international law. (2) The Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) The Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; (4) Petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents; (5) Order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an official apology, legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan and (6) It is improper to lift orders based on statements on plagiarism.

ISSUE: W/N the Executive Department has exclusive determination and judgment regarding the petitioners claim as part of their foreign policy prerogative.

HELD: YES. Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

            The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.

NOTE: The Court did not directly address the issue of incoporation clause but it is implied that the foreign policy prerogatives are NOT subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian law through the Incorporation Clause.

Human Rights Law PILA Case Digest: Government of Hong Kong v. Hon. Olalia Jr. (2007)

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

Lessons Applicable: generally accepted international law, due process, bill of rights, extradition

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

• June 20, 1997: Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong effect an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons."
• July 1, 1997: Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
• Juan Antonio Muñoz charged before the Hong Kong Court of 3 counts in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong
• August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999: warrants of arrest were issued against him
• September 13, 1999: DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest - granted and NBI arrested him
• Muñoz' Petition for Certiorari w/ the CA questioning the legality of his arrest - order of arrest void
• November 22, 1999: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition 
• DOJ Petition for Certiorari (became final April 10, 2001) - granted; order of arrest valid
• October 8, 2001:  Judge Bernardo, Jr. denied bail(then judge inhibited himself)
• October 30, 2001: Judge Olalia on motion for reconsideration granted bail
• Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to nullify: 
• 1. December 20, 2001 Order allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz to post bail; and  - nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings
• 2. April 10, 2002 Order denying the motion to vacate December 20, 2001 Order

 ISSUE: W/N there is a right to bail in extradition proceedings

HELD: YES. DISMISS the petition. REMANDED to the trial court determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence”

Human Rights Law

• It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
• The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.  While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. 
• Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty under Section II, Article II of our Constitution.  These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
• Exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
• Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.  
• the Court relied in Mejoff case upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail
• If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
• The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. 

Public International Law

• An extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.  But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following:
• 1)    it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and
• 2)    the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law

• This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
• Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
• By any standard, detention for over 2 years without having been convicted of any crime is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.  While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
• In criminal proceedings, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.  While in an extradition proceeding, the assumption is that the extraditee is a fugitive from justice, thus, he bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.  The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
• It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations under the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda that the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

PILA Case Digest: Rodriguez v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Manila Branch 17 (2006)

Rodriguez v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Manila Branch 17
GR. NO. 157977 Feb. 27 2006
QUISUMBING, J






Lessons: Notice and Hearing for Cancellation of Bail in Extradition

Laws: 

FACTS:

    After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda Gener Rodriguez,
they applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001.  They posted cash bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail which was denied.  The US government filed a petition for certiorari entitled Gov’t of the USA v. Hon. Ponferrada where the court directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail guided by this court’s ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan.  The lower court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest.  Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied.  Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition directed against the order for cancellation of cash bond and issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or NOT there should be notice and hearing before the cancellation of bail

HELD: YES.  Petition is GRANTED IN PART.  SET ASIDE for petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ.

The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to
prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release. 

Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has offered to go on
voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in her 60’s, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued.  Absent prior notice and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.

We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing showing that:
1)    he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2)    there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances

PILA Case Digest: Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan (2002)

Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan
GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.



Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition

Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty

FACTS:

    Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”.  The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.  But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.  On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez.  Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.  After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.  Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.  The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash.  After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. 

    Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still  no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
   
ISSUES:
i.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii.    Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED.  Regional Trial Court of
  Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i.    YES.

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage.  From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.  The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.  Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.  The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.  It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature.  Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

    Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.   To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases
    Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a)    they are sufficient in form and substance
b)    they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c)    the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.  If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.  On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings.  Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. 

ii.    Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws.  It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.  Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue.  The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”  

    That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case.  Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged.  He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
    Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.  It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.  Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1)    that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2)    that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

    Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

    It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.  Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case.  Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.   

    Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself.  It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more.   Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions,  delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
   
    That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
   
iii.    NO.

    Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.  The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.   A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.  He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.  Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

    It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country.  He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition
1)    Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state.  We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2)    The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the  Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3)    The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:
a)    It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.  His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b)    An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c)    In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case”
d)    Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person.  The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4)    Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty.  Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5)    There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a)    leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b)    remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties.  Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

PILA Case Digest: Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion (2000)

Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion
GR No. 139465 Jan. 18 2000
MELO, J.

Lessons: Extradition Process

Laws:  Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States, PD 1069, Bill of Rights


FACTS:
   
    In accordance to "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (RP-US Extradition Treaty), the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States attached with the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents on June 18, 1999.  Mr. Jimenez was charged with the following:

i.    18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
ii.    26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts; Maximum Penalty:5 years/count)
iii.    18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv.    18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
v.    2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts; Maximum Penalty: less than 1 year)

The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez request for extradition documents based
on the following:

i.    Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence.  Evidentiary requirements are under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.  Evaluation by the Department of the documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases.   Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are not available.  It merely determines the compliance of the Requesting Government with the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty.  After the filing of the petition for extradition, the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition.
ii.    The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.  Furthermore, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.   Thus, it must comply with the request of the United States Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.
iii.    Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation:
i.    mandamus to compel the Department to furnish the extradition documents
ii.    certiorari to set aside Department’s letter dated July 13, 1999 denying his request
iii.    prohibition to restrain the Department from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court
iv.    enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition
v.    application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction

Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of, from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government, from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court and from performing any act directed to the extradition for a period of 20 days from service of the order.

    Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered Hon. Lantion to cease and desist from enforcing the order.  Due to transcendental importance, the Court brushed aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684 and the TRO and proceded on the issues.

ISSUE:
i.    Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases
ii.    Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court on the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within 10 days from receipt is dispensable
iii.    Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted under Sec. 7 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is violated

HELD:  DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

i.    NO.

Extradition Request
The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.  The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has the executive authority to conduct the evaluation process which, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power:
1)    to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers in form and substance
2)    to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable
3)    to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. 

The process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5. PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to prosecution.   The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. 
In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents.   If the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.  Thus, the role of the administrative body is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.  The court has the power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected.  The evaluation procedure (in contrast to ordinary investigations) may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee or accused (Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2 stages:
1)    provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD 1069) if no request is submitted.  Otherwise, he can be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty)
2)    temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:
1)    there is yet no extradite; BUT
2)    it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration

The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.   Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.  The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing. 

In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999 (the following day the Department of Justice received the request).  Thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs failed to discharge its duty of evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. 

Extradition Petition
    After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Justice, the latter shall designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Par. 1, Sec. 5, PD 1069).  The attorney shall file a written Extradition Petition with the proper regional trial court, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Par. 2, Sec. 5, PD 1069).  The presiding judge shall issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition.  The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice or to prevent flight  (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069). 

Extradition Hearing
    The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply during the Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069)  The attorney may represent the Requesting state.  (Sec. 8, PD 1069).  The Court’s decision on whether the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty or whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) shall be final and immediately executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069) and appealable with the Court of Appeals where the provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).

ii.    YES. 

Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin rights of notice and hearing from a prospective extradite.  In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play.  Petitioner contends that United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.  Such argument, however has been overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.   If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings.  The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.

However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies and certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated) it cannot to be said to be urgent.  Therefore, notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside. 

iii.    NO.
During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature.  Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. 

PILA Case Digest: Wright v. CA (1994)

Wright v. CA
Gr. No. 113213 Aug. 15, 1994
KAPUNAN, J
 
Lessons: extradition treaty
Laws: Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution


FACTS:

      To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988.  It was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with.  The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the 2 countries and embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense."  A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited.

The Treaty defined extraditable offenses to include all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least 1 year, or by a more severe penalty."  For the purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:

(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the offense within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;

(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be taken into account in determining the constituent elements of the offense.

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking to indict Paul Joseph Wright, an Australian Citizen for:

a.       1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonestly obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round Solicitors, secured by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell

b.      13 counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. John Carson Craker's received approximately 11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., by submitting 215 false life insurance proposals, and paying premiums thereon o the Australian Mutual Provident Society through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, where he is an insurance agent

c.       1 count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's attempted to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 1 false proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society based on an inexistent policy-holder

d.      1 count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's signed and swore before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing 3 false statements

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings was initiated on April 6, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.  The Regional Trial Court on June 14, 1993 granted the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that the extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense was committed.  The extradition proceeding resulted in an order of his deportation.  The decision was sustained and Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.  Wright filed a review on certiorari to set aside the order of deportation contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.  Moreover, he argues that the trial court's decision ordering his extradition is based on evidence that failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country.

ISSUES:

a.       Whether or NOT the Regional Trial Court committed an order in granting the extradition proceeding.

b.      Whether or NOT enforcement of Article 18 of the Treaty states a prohibition for the retroactive application of offenses committed prior to the date of its effectivity

c.       whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex post facto law

HELD: AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit

                    i.            NO.

Complying with Article 2, Section 2 of the Treaty, the crimes for which the Mr. Wright was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been committed.  The trial court correctly determined the offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively.

The provisions of the Treaty was properly complied with.  The signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself.  The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.

            The relevant provisions merely requires "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited.”  It does not limited the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to a person charged with an information or a criminal complaint as it will render the  Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution.  Moreover, the “Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets” shows that he is not only wanted for prosecution but has absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution.  Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate such as in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed.

                  ii.            YES.

Article 18 states:  “ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.

Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.”

The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity and the second paragraph pertains to its termination.  There is no prohibition for its retroactive effect.

Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that: “4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was committed, provided that:

(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offense; and

(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at the time of the making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.”

                iii.            NO.

Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to penal and criminal statutes which affects the substantial rights of the accused.  As concluded by the Court of Appeals, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute.  "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."