Like us on Facebook

Please wait..10 Seconds Cancel
Showing posts with label August 12. Show all posts
Showing posts with label August 12. Show all posts

PILA Case Digest: Vinuya v. Malaya Lolas Organization (2014)

G.R. No. 162230  August 12, 2014

Vinuya v. Malaya Lolas Organization

Lessons Applicable: foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch, Incorporation Clause

Laws Applicable: Constitution

Facts:

The Court in its April 28, 2010 decision held that:

(1)   Plagiarism were then already lodged with the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Court

(2)   A writ of certiorari did not lie in the absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

(3)   Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is valid pursuant to the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda

(4)   Formal apology by the Government of Japan and the reparation the Government of Japan has provided through the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) are sufficient to recompense petitioners on their claims

Petitioners Vinuya et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant their petition for certiorari.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners contended that our constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch are unlimited and that the court has erred in holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative whether to bring their claims against Japan because the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian law as incorporated into the laws of the land through the Incorporation Clause enshrined in Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as cited in the cases of Yamashita v. Styer and Kuroda v. Jalandoni.

They added that the status and applicability of the generally accepted principles of international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain without the Incorporation Clause as it implied that the general international law forms part of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly adopted.  They further cited The Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr. and U.S. v. Guinto where international law is deemed part of the Philippine law and Agustin v. Edu, where the Court declared that a treaty, though not yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land through the Incorporation Clause.  Moreover, they argue that the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnes obligations arising from the jus cogens norms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms.  Thus, the Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give justice to the victims of the comfort women system in the Philippines.

They further argue that the crimes of rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are not simple private claims that are the usual subject of diplomatic protection but are crimes that are shocking to the conscience of humanity.  Thus, they pray that the Court reconsider and declare:  (1) The crimes are against humanity and war crimes under customary international law. (2) The Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) The Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; (4) Petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents; (5) Order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an official apology, legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan and (6) It is improper to lift orders based on statements on plagiarism.

ISSUE: W/N the Executive Department has exclusive determination and judgment regarding the petitioners claim as part of their foreign policy prerogative.

HELD: YES. Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

            The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.

NOTE: The Court did not directly address the issue of incoporation clause but it is implied that the foreign policy prerogatives are NOT subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian law through the Incorporation Clause.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 162230, August 12, 2014



G.R. No. 162230, August 12, 2014

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEÑA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEÑA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PEÑA, MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA, ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PEÑA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. in their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organizations,” Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, AND THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant their petition for certiorari.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that our constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch are unlimited; that under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and international conventions of which the Philippines is a party; that the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative whether to bring petitioners’ claims against Japan, has read the foreign policy powers of the Office of the President in isolation from the rest of the constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human rights; that the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian law as incorporated into the laws of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that the Court must re-visit its decisions in Yamashita v. Styer and Kuroda v. Jalandoni which have been noted for their prescient articulation of the import of laws of humanity; that in said decision, the Court ruled that the State was bound to observe the laws of war and humanity; that in Yamashita, the Court expressly recognized rape as an international crime under international humanitarian law, and in Jalandoni, the Court declared that even if the Philippines had not acceded or signed the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare, the Rules and Regulations formed part of the law of the nation by virtue of the Incorporation Clause; that such commitment to the laws of war and humanity has been enshrined in Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides “that the Philippines…adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.”

The petitioners added that the status and applicability of the generally accepted principles of international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain without the Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the general international law forms part of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly adopted; that in its rulings in The Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr. and U.S. v. Guinto the Court has said that international law is deemed part of the Philippine law as a consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu, the Court has declared that a treaty, though not yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the Incorporation Clause, the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnes obligations arising from the jus cogens norms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes; that the crimes committed against petitioners are proscribed under international human rights law as there were undeniable violations of jus cogens norms; that the need to punish crimes against the laws of humanity has long become jus cogens norms, and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms; that the Court’s invocation of the political doctrine in the instant case is misplaced; and that the Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give justice to the victims of the comfort women system in the Philippines.

Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader responsibility of states to protect the human rights of their citizens, especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms; that the claims raised by petitioners are not simple private claims that are the usual subject of diplomatic protection; that the crimes committed against petitioners are shocking to the conscience of humanity; and that the atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers against petitioners are not subject to the statute of limitations under international law.

Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents.

Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an official apology, legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan.

In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it was highly improper for the April 28, 2010 decision to lift commentaries from at least three sources without proper attribution – an article published in 2009 in the Yale Law Journal of International Law; a book published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and an article published in 2006 in the Western Reserve Journal of International Law – and make it appear that such commentaries supported its arguments for dismissing the petition, when in truth the plagiarized sources even made a strong case in favour of petitioners’ claims.

In their Comment, respondents disagree with petitioners, maintaining that aside from the statements on plagiarism, the arguments raised by petitioners merely rehashed those made in their June 7, 2005 Memorandum; that they already refuted such arguments in their Memorandum of June 6, 2005 that the Court resolved through its April 28, 2010 decision, specifically as follows:

    1. The contentions pertaining to the alleged plagiarism were then already lodged with the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Court; hence, the matter of alleged plagiarism should not be discussed or resolved herein.

    2. A writ of certiorari did not lie in the absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in view of the failure of petitioners to show any arbitrary or despotic act on the part of respondents, the relief of the writ of certiorari was not warranted.

    3. Respondents hold that the Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, being valid, bound the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda. The validity of the Treaty of Peace was the result of the ratification by two mutually consenting parties. Consequently, the obligations embodied in the Treaty of Peace must be carried out in accordance with the common and real intention of the parties at the time the treaty was concluded.

    4. Respondents assert that individuals did not have direct international remedies against any State that violated their human rights except where such remedies are provided by an international agreement. Herein, neither of the Treaty of Peace and the Reparations Agreement, the relevant agreements affecting herein petitioners, provided for the reparation of petitioners’ claims. Respondents aver that the formal apology by the Government of Japan and the reparation the Government of Japan has provided through the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) are sufficient to recompense petitioners on their claims, specifically:

        About 700 million yen would be paid from the national treasury over the next 10 years as welfare and medical services;

        Instead of paying the money directly to the former comfort women, the services would be provided through organizations delegated by governmental bodies in the recipient countries (i.e., the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan); and

        Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing services (like home helpers), housing, environmental development, medical expenses, and medical goods.

Ruling

The Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for being devoid of merit.

1.      Petitioners did not show that their resort was timely under the Rules of Court.

Petitioners did not show that their bringing of the special civil action for certiorari was timely, i.e., within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

    Section 4. When and where position filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives the assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not. To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the petition; otherwise, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated, for such dates determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge Development Corporation:

    There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance with the Rules. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals:

    The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

The petition for certiorari contains the following averments, viz:

    82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the “comfort women system,” approached the Executive Department through the Department of Justice in order to request for assistance to file a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines;

    83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their request and refused to file a claim against the said Japanese officials and military officers;

    84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turn approached the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Justice and Office of the of the Solicitor General to file their claim against the responsible Japanese officials and military officers, but their efforts were similarly and carelessly disregarded;20

The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners approached the Department of Justice for assistance, but does not specifically state when they received the denial of their request for assistance by the Executive Department of the Government. This alone warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.

Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request for assistance in 1998, their filing of the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still way beyond the 60-day period. Only the most compelling reasons could justify the Court’s acts of disregarding and lifting the strictures of the rule on the period. As we pointed out in MTM Garment Mfg. Inc. v. Court of Appeals:

    All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely: to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.

    As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is neither a natural right nor an essential element of due process; a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.

    Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule and the requirements under current jurisprudence. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

2.      Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial on the part of respondents.

Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorari that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires such showing, to wit:

    Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

    The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

However, petitioners did not make such a showing.

3.      Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.

The Court cannot grant petitioners’ prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to the main case, and is subject to the latter’s outcome. It is not a cause of action itself. It is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action. Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there is no more legal basis to issue the writ of injunction sought. As an auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be issued independently of the principal action.

In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act. Hence, it is an extreme remedy, to be granted only if the following requisites are attendant, namely:

    (a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse;

    (b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and

    (c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez), RTC Br. 58, Lucena City, we expounded as follows:

    It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.

Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., no part.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 123486


FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 123486           August 12, 1999

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:

Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has been established and the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will. Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic will in question be called for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for appellant in the instant case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing the probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.2

The facts are as follows:

On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition3 for probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.

In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily.

The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.4

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.

Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.1âwphi1.nêt

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for probate of the document (Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.7

On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal,8 and in support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.

To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account of their testimonies.

Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased was filed. He produced and identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear the signature of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for comparison of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.

Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produced and identify the voter's affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters' affidavit was not produced for the same was already destroyed and no longer available.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of Matilde's husband, the latter lived with her in her parent's house for eleven (11) years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of close association the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her (deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and deceased always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the deceased to her creditors.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which was personally and entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein, the dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.

Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and documents signed by the deceased in connection with the proceedings of her late husband, as a result of which he is familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.

The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that she processed the application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the deceased, since the signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for pasture permit.

Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a long period of time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows:

Instruction

August 30, 1978

1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:

1. Eufemia Patigas

2. Josefina Salcedo

3. Evangeline Calugay

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R. Calugay

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no longer around.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

Gene and Manuel:

Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.

Mama

Matilde Vda de Ramonal

On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision9 ruling that the appeal was meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals held:

. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of the holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810, new civil code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness maybe unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of article 811 prescribes that —

in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness ma be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfianado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the court may still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.

Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of the having the probate denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems essential is that the court is convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.10

According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.

Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioners raise the following issues:

(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the case.

(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had been able to present credible evidence to that the date, text, and signature on the holographic will written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.

(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the holographic will of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.1âwphi1.nêt

We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.11

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.

It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that of the deceased.

Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to identify the signature of the deceased in the voter's affidavit, which was not even produced as it was no longer available.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:

Q.   And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the court what was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy that time?

A.   Collecting rentals.

Q.   From where?

A.   From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets.12

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Who sometime accompany her?

A.   I sometimes accompany her.

Q.   In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?

A.   Yes, sir.13

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are referring to as one of the receipts which she issued to them?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is that Mrs. Binanay?

A.   Matilde vda. De Ramonal.

Q.   Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?

A.   I am familiar with her signature.

Q.   Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her tenants?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Why do you say so?

A.   Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal.

Q.   How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?

A.   In handwritten.14

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and deed of sale which you said what else did you do to acquire familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?

A.   Posting records.

Q.   Aside from that?

A.   Carrying letters.

Q.   Letters of whom?

A.   Matilde.

Q.   To whom?

A.   To her creditors.15

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you a document with its title "tugon" is this the document you are referring to?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon", whose handwriting is this?

A.   My Aunt.

Q.   Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?

A.   Because I am familiar with her signature.16

What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.

Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that the will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:

Q.   Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said, yes?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Who was in possession of that will?

A.   I.

Q.   Since when did you have the possession of the will?

A.   It was in my mother's possession.

Q.   So, it was not in your possession?

A.   Sorry, yes.

Q.   And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally in the possession of your mother?

A.   1985.17

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that will to you and therefore you have that in your possession?

A.   It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she died.

Q.   After taking that document you kept it with you?

A.   I presented it to the fiscal.

Q.   For what purpose?

A.   Just to seek advice.

Q.   Advice of what?

A.   About the will.18

In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:

Q.   Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is that correct?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and she could go to her building to collect rentals, is that correct?

A.   Yes, sir.19

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that there are retracings in the word Vda.?

A.   Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.

Q.   And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is continued towards letter D.

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?

A.   Yes, sir.20

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic will. Now, you identified a document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated January 8, 1978 which is only about eight months from August 30, 1978. Do you notice that the signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is beautifully written and legible?

A.   Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.

Q.   You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was exhausted?

A.   In writing.

Q.   How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and you just tried to explain yourself out because of the apparent inconsistencies?

A.   That was I think. (sic).

Q.   Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid movement. . . . And in fact, the name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one of the petitioners?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned signature appearing in the alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but in the handwriting themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and tremors, do you notice that?

A.   Yes, sir.21

Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testator. She testified that:

Q.   You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the services if any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?

A.   During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then to her transactions.

Q.   What else? What services that you rendered?

A.   After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to her lawyer.

Q.   What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?

A.   I used to be her personal driver.

Q.   In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   How come that you acquired familiarity?

A.   Because I lived with her since birth.22

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated Agosto 30, 1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1, will you tell this court whose signature is this?

A.   Yes, sir, that is her signature.

Q.   Why do you say that is her signature?

A.   I am familiar with her signature.23

So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.

The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:

Q.   Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A.   Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my godfather. Actually I am related to the husband by consanguinity.

Q.   Can you tell the name of the husband?

A.   The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde Ramonal have legitimate children?

A.   As far as I know they have no legitimate children.25

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?

A.   Here in Cagayan de Oro City.

Q.   Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?

A.   I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.

Q.   When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in what case is that, Fiscal?

A.   It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under the court before.26

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is marked as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and there appears a signature over the type written word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

A.   That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.

Q.   Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?

A.   This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.27

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were the other assistance wherein you were rendering professional service to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A.   I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are documents to show that I have assisted then I can recall.28

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly go over this document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether you are familiar with the handwriting contained in that document marked as exhibit "S"?

A.   I am not familiar with the handwriting.

Q.   This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

A.   I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.

Q.   Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is this?

A.   Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.

Q.   Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is that?

A.   As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.

Q.   Why do you say that?

A.   Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.

Q.   How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature is this?

A.   The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are similar.29

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q.   Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal?

A.   Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.

Q.   So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it seems to be her signature because it is similar to the signature of the project of partition which you have made?

A.   That is true.30

From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31 ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.

In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.

However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.

Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978,33 and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978,35 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal.1âwphi1.nêt

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.