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Showing posts with label 1995. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1995. Show all posts

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People v. Go Shiu Ling

People v. Go Shiu Ling 
G.R. No. 115156  December 14, 1995

Lessons Applicable: malum prohibitum

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
·         Middle of August 1992: Chief Inspector Amador Pabustan of the Criminal Investigation Section of the Philippine National Police received a report from the International Police Organization (Interpol) that a large shipment of narcotics was arriving in Manila by air mail so he conferred it to the Pastor Guiao, Collector of Customs at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, who ordered an inspection of parcels of commercial quantity coming from Hongkong, Singapore, Indonesia and Bangkok
·         September 3, 1992: Antonio Comia who works for TASCO, a brokerage firm engaged in freight facilitating and forwarding, went to the Airmail Distribution Center (ADC) to inquire about packages of their client Mary Ong consisting of about 30 parcels which were addressed to various individuals and bearing the identifying marks "VGM" or "VGMO" which were supposed to have left the Hongkong Airport on September 2, 1992
·         Teresita Bajar informed him that they arrived but under inspection and that the packages marked "VGM" had arrived in bad order and that its contents, which turned out to be watches, had spilled out so Comia told TASCO Manager Lydia Dizon who relayed it to Mary Ong
·         Upon failure to have the cargo to be released, Comia arranged an appointment for Teodoro Evangelista, the owner of TASCO and Comia's brother-in-law, to see Supervising Appraiser of the Air Parcel Division of the Airmail Distribution Center Emmanuel Laudit
·         Evangelista came to see Laudit and suggested "Perahin na lang eka iyan." Laudit advised Evangelista to speak instead with Collector Guiao.
·         3 packages out of 9 where marked "VGMO" and addressed to comia was found to contain plastic bags of metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
·         Evangelista, who was present denied any knowledge of the importation and claimied that the cargo belonged to Mary Ong.
·         Mary Ong was called and she executed an affidavit admitting that the packages marked "VGM" were hers, but were actually meant for Mrs. Go Shiu Ling, the sister of the sender in Hongkong who asked her to facilitate the importation of the boxes of what she thought contained watches.
·         About September 9, 1992: An information against Comia was filed for conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously import or bring into the Philippines Metamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug
·         September 18, 1992: He pleaded not guilty on arraignment
·         October 12, 1992: Information was amended to include Teodoro Evangelista, who remained at large
·         RTC:
o    Dismissed the case against Bajar since she was merely of being in the working area of the customs examiners of the ADC, locating Comia's parcels, where she had no authority to be
o    granted the demurrers of Ong and Go since Evangelista's affidavitwas inadmissible as evidence because Evangelista was not presented to identify it. Likewise, Ong's own affidavit, in which she pointed to Go as the real consignee of the packages, was also held to be inadmissible on the ground that it had been taken while she was under custodial investigation without assistance of counsel. She also made no mention of the packages marked "VGMO" in her affidavit and admitted that the parcels were sent to her by Yu Yen Jian, whereas the three parcels appeared to have been shipped by a certain Ching Ming
o    Comia's demurrer was denied. He was found guilty and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00
§  Comia was persistent in his follow up showed that he knew the contents of the three parcels
§  He followed up even after becoming aware of the arrival of the packages is an indication that he was there not merely to know if they had arrived but to secure their immediate dispatch to the satellite office
o    TASCO's modus operandi was to have the cargo of clients divided into parcels which were then addressed to different individuals in order to reduce or entirely avoid customs duties. The addressees were people close to Evangelista, such as Comia, who is his brother-in-law, Lydia Dizon, his sister-in-law, Joel Evangelista, his son, and Bert Tuazon, his neighbor and addresses were interchanged or fictitious addresses were given. The packages were coded with the initials of TASCO's clients so that they could be identified. The code names "VGM" and "VGMO" stood for Mary Ong.  Teresita Bajar knew the coded initials of TASCO's clients, having been given a list of them so she monitors the packages and relays them to Comia.
·         Comia appealed contending that if he knew that the packages contained shabu, he would instead have gone into hiding
·         Emmanuel Laudit of the ADC allegedly warned Lydia Dizon that the shipment was going to be discovered indicates the existence of an alliance with Laudit
·         He had reason to work hard for the release of the packages, now that the watches had been discovered and ranking officials of the ADC presumably already knew that TASCO's packages had been misdeclared. He had to have them released before the rest of the packages were inspected. When his efforts failed, Comia called on his brother-in-law, Teodoro Evangelista, who was the owner of the firm and a former customs policeman, so that the latter could use his influence.
W/N: Comia can escape criminal responsibility due to lack of criminal intent and good faith

HELD: NO. AFFIRMED. MODIFIED to reclusion perpetua
·         crime of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum
o    punished as an offense under a special law
o    wrong because it is prohibited by law regardless of criminal intent.
·         acts mala in se -  there must be a criminal intent
·         mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate to act
·         notwithstanding that a majority of the defendants have been acquitted, the accused had been held responsible for the crime charged

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 115156 December 14, 1995

SECOND DIVISION


G.R. No. 115156  December 14, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GO SHIU LING, MARY ONG, TERESITA BAJAR y OBEDOZA, and TEODORO EVANGELISTA y DE LOS REYES, accused.

ANTONIO COMIA y QUINERY, accused-appellant.



MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CX, finding accused-appellant Antonio Comia guilty of conspiring with four others to import regulated drugs in violation of Art. III, §14 in relation to Art. IV, §21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended).

The facts are as follows:

About the middle of August 1992, Chief Inspector Amador Pabustan of the Criminal Investigation Section of the Philippine National Police received a report from the International Police Organization (Interpol) that a large shipment of narcotics was arriving in Manila by air mail. Accordingly, he conferred with the Collector of Customs at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pastor Guiao, who ordered an inspection of parcels of commercial quantity coming from Hongkong, Singapore, Indonesia and Bangkok.

On September 3, 1992, accused-appellant Antonio Comia went to the Airmail Distribution Center (ADC) at the NAIA to inquire about packages sent through TASCO, a brokerage firm engaged in freight facilitating and forwarding, in which Comia was working. Comia had been asked by TASCO Manager Lydia Dizon to follow up the release of the parcels of a client, Mary Ong, which were supposed to have left the Hongkong Airport on September 2, 1992. The cargo consisted of about 30 parcels which were addressed to various individuals and bearing the identifying marks "VGM" or "VGMO."

Comia was informed by Teresita Bajar at the Air Parcel Division of the ADC that the packages had arrived but that they were being held for inspection, possibly even for seizure. He was informed that one of the packages marked "VGM" had arrived in bad order and that its contents, which turned out to be watches, had spilled out.

Comia told Dizon what he had been told. Dizon, in turn, called up Mary Ong to inform her of the condition of the shipment.

Comia talked to several officials of the ADC. Having failed to convince them to release his cargo, Comia went to see Acting Supervising Appraiser of the Air Parcel Division of the Airmail Distribution Center Emmanuel Laudit on September 9, 1992 to make an appointment for Teodoro Evangelista, the owner of TASCO and Comia's brother-in-law, to see Laudit.

The same morning, Evangelista came and interceded for the release of the packages by suggesting to Laudit, "Perahin na lang eka iyan." Laudit advised Evangelista to speak instead with Collector Guiao.

Meanwhile, the other packages of TASCO, marked "VGM, N "VGMO," and "TRE," were inspected. On September 8, 1992, a package marked "VGMO" and addressed to a certain "COMIA," was found to contain plastic bags containing crystals. When examined at the National Bureau of Investigation, the shipment turned out to be metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

The matter was reported to the Commissioner of Customs and the Postmaster General. The following day, September 9, 1992, in their presence and in the presence of the PNP, nine parcels marked "VGMO" were opened. The parcels were addressed to different individuals. Two parcels, both addressed to "COMIA," were found to contain crystalline powder which when tested was found to be shabu. A total of 21.8 kilograms of shabu, with an estimated value of P50 million, was uncovered.

Evangelista, who was present, was confronted with the cargo. He gave a statement to the police denying any knowledge of the importation and claiming that the cargo belonged to Mary Ong.

Accordingly, Mary Ong was invited for questioning. She executed an affidavit admitting that the packages marked "VGM" were hers, but she claimed they were actually meant for Mrs. Go Shiu Ling, the sister of the sender in Hongkong. Ong claimed that she had merely been asked by Go Shiu Ling to facilitate the importation of the boxes which she (Mary Ong) thought contained watches. Based on Mary Ong's statement, Go Shiu Ling was also apprehended.

In an Information dated September 11, 1992, Comia, Teresita Bajar, Mary Ong, and Go Shiu Ling were charged with violation of Art. III, §14, in relation to Art. IV, §21 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The information alleged

That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously import or bring into the Philippines thru the Airmail Distribution Center, Domestic Road, this City, Metamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.

Upon their arraignment on September 18, 1992, the accused pleaded "not guilty."

On October 12, 1992, the Information was amended to include Teodoro Evangelista, who, however, has remained at large.

Trial proceeded except as to Evangelista. After the prosecution had rested its case, the accused filed separate demurrers to the prosecution's evidence.

On April 15, 1993, the trial court dismissed the case against Bajar, on the ground that her complicity consisted merely of being in the working area of the customs examiners of the ADC, locating Comia's parcels, where she had no authority to be. The trial court held that this circumstance was insufficient to prove that she was in conspiracy with the others in the importation of shabu.

On April 22, 1993, the trial court also granted the demurrers of Ong and Go. It held that Evangelista's affidavit, which implicated Ong, was inadmissible as evidence because Evangelista was not presented to identify it. Likewise, Ong's own affidavit, in which she pointed to Go as the real consignee of the packages, was also held to be inadmissible on the ground that it had been taken while she was under custodial investigation without assistance of counsel. (Ong was not confronted with the three parcels marked "VGMO." She admitted owning packages marked "VGM" but made no mention of the packages marked "VGMO" in her affidavit. Moreover, what she admitted was that the parcels were sent to her by one Yu Yen Jian, whereas the three parcels appeared to have been shipped by a certain Ching Ming).

Comia's demurrer was, however, denied. He was found guilty and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

The trial court found that TASCO's modus operandi was to have the cargo of clients divided into parcels which were then addressed to different individuals in order to reduce or entirely avoid customs duties. The addressees were people close to Evangelista, such as accused-appellant, who is his brother-in-law, Lydia Dizon, his sister-in-law, Joel Evangelista, his son, and Bert Tuazon, his neighbor. The names and addresses were likewise interchanged or fictitious addresses were given. The packages were coded with the initials of TASCO's clients so that they could be identified. The code names "VGM" and "VGMO" stood for Mary Ong.

Comia's job was to monitor the packages as they arrived at the ADC, although they were not released there but at pilot post offices to which they were forwarded. Teresita Bajar knew the coded initials of TASCO's clients, having been given a list of them. She would monitor the packages of TASCO that had arrived and relay the information to Comia so that the latter could claim them at the Sta. Mesa satellite post office. In claiming them, Comia did not have to sign nor show any identification for the packages he received for TASCO. The person in charge of the Sta. Mesa post office simply checked the items on his list. Comia refused to name the personnel from whom he claimed his packages.

In this particular instance, Comia was following up the parcels of Mary Ong which left the Airmail Center of Hongkong on September 2, 1992. They were supposed to contain watches misdeclared as toys and gifts. In this way Ong was in the past able to import dutiable goods, such as calculators, without paying the corresponding taxes.

Comia testified that although TASCO clients had used his name, it was the first time that Mary Ong used his name as a dummy addressee. Previously, Mary Ong had used the names of the other dummy addressees which had been given to her by Lydia Dizon. On the other hand, Comia's name was used by Rudy Hernandez, another client of TASCO. Comia said he consented to the use of his name by Ong at the instance of Lydia Dizon. Comia claimed he was a mere employee and delivery man and got nothing in exchange for the use of his name. Lydia Dizon, on the other hand, denied that she ever allowed Mary Ong to use Comia's name.

In finding Comia guilty, the trial court held that he acted on his own in conspiracy with unknown partners, by using Mary Ong's coded initials "VGMO" and thereby making it appear they were part of Ong's shipment, since only the three parcels all addressed to Comia and marked "VGMO" contained shabu. The trial court held that the fact that Comia was persistent in his follow up showed that he knew the contents of the three parcels. The trial court held:

If, as Comia claimed, he had been going to the ADC daily from the last week of August 1992 up to the first week of September 1992, he could not have failed to determine that the three parcels had arrived on September 3, 1992 and, therefore, there was no longer any need to follow-up even up to September 9, 1992 if his purpose was merely to determine whether or not they had arrived. That he had religiously gone to the ADC to follow up even after becoming aware of the arrival of the packages is an indication that he was there not merely to know if they had arrived but to secure their immediate dispatch to the satellite office. That he informed Laudit about Evangelista's wanting to see him (Laudit) as in fact Evangelista went to see Laudit to whom he proposed "Perahin na lang eka iyan" is an indication of his keen interest in having the parcels released. Such keen interest indicates prior knowledge of the contents of the parcels, for if, as claimed, they knew them to contain merely watches, and also as claimed, he got nothing for the use of his name, why the persistent follow-up?

Comia has appealed, making the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING FROM THE MAZE OF DUBIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE THREE PARCELS IN QUESTION WHICH WERE FOUND TO CONTAIN PROHIBITED DRUGS. 1

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS IN QUESTION WERE TO GO TO COMIA AND HIS CONSPIRATOR/S WHICH CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON THE UNDUE AND ERRONEOUS INFERENCE DERIVED FROM THE TESTIMONY OF LYDIA DIZON TO THE EFFECT THAT SHE DID NOT GIVE THE NAME OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR PARCELS OF MARY ONG AS IT WAS A CERTAIN RUDY HERNANDEZ WHO WAS USING THE NAME OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 2

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT "SHOWS PROOF OF CONSPIRACY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE IMPORTATION OF THE THREE PARCELS OF SHABU SUBJECT OF THE CASE AT BAR. 3

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ABSOLVING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED ON THE GROUND THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 4

The Solicitor General filed in lieu of an appellee's brief a Manifestation that, in his opinion, the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and, for this reason, recommending the acquittal of accused-appellant Comia.

We find accused-appellant's contentions and the Solicitor General's manifestation to be without merit.

First.        Accused-appellant and the Solicitor General contend that, instead of showing that Comia knew that the packages contained shabu, the fact that Comia was persistent in seeking the release of the packages shows that he did not know what the parcels contained.

They contend that Comia knew that one parcel had been discovered to contain watches in commercial quantity, not toys or gifts as stated in the customs declaration; that the next step would be the seizure of the cargo; and that in following up the matter at the ADC, his only purpose was to try to prevent the seizure of the goods. They contend that if Comia knew that the packages contained shabu, he would have stopped going to the ADC and instead would have gone into hiding.

This contention has no merit. It is clear from the evidence that Evangelista and his firm had connections with the people inside the ADC and the Sta. Mesa Post Office, because of which Evangelista and his firm were able to slip through customs commercial quantities of highly dutiable goods. Accused-appellant himself states in his brief that the fact that Emmanuel Laudit of the ADC allegedly warned Lydia Dizon that the shipment was going to be discovered "indicates [the] existence of an alliance with Laudit." Without such an "alliance," merely using dummy addressees with fictitious or inaccurate addresses on the parcels handled by the TASCO would not be enough to make the smuggling of goods and contraband possible.

Indeed, Lydia Dizon herself, the TASCO manager, testified:

ATTY. MARCOLETA:

Q   You said at the outset, Madam Witness, that you are presently jobless and that you last reported for work middle of August 1992, will you please explain to the Court the interruption in your work?

A   Because in mid-August 1992 ADC called up our office, informing me to stop working and since then I have stopped working.

COURT:

Q   Now, tell us, who in the ADC called you up?

A   Mr. Manny Laudit, Your Honor.

Q   Did it occur to you to inquire from him why he advised you to stop working?

A   Because according to him "mainit na daw ho" because it is from him was [sic] that we really get the information.

Q   Now tell us, what did you understand by "mainit?"

A   I cannot understand what he meant by "mainit." He just told me so.

Comia's role was to monitor the packages as they arrived at the ADC. He saw to it that the packages bearing false addresses were not sent to the dead letter office or returned to their senders. He was known at the Sta. Mesa post office to which the packages were forwarded. This fact enabled him to have them released without having to sign for anything or produce proof of identity, as would have been the procedure for claiming parcels.

Thus it is more likely that Comia kept on working for the release of the packages despite the discovery of the watches because of his friends at the ADC. He had reason to work hard for the release of the packages, now that the watches had been discovered and ranking officials of the ADC presumably already knew that TASCO's packages had been misdeclared. He had to have them released before the rest of the packages were inspected. When his efforts failed, Comia called on his brother-in-law, Teodoro Evangelista, who was the owner of the firm and a former customs policeman, so that the latter could use his influence. When Evangelista arrived, he assured Laudit that the packages contained only watches and boldly offered "Perahin na lang eka iyan."

This is far different from the scenario which the Solicitor General has portrayed where an innocent man's name is used by another for unlawful purposes without his knowledge or consent. Comia was not a victim, nor was he framed up. Comia was not an ordinary employee of the TASCO. He is the brother-in-law of the owner of TASCO, Teodoro Evangelista, and the one entrusted by the latter to follow up matters at the ADC and the Sta. Mesa Post Office. He was the one who was in fact known to the employees there. Bajar testified that Comia would inquire from her about TASCO's expected packages two or three times a week or sometimes daily. 5 Laudit testified that in the four years he had known Evangelista, he had seen him only about five times, while he had been seeing accused-appellant regularly:

FISCAL BERON:

Q   Now, do you know of a person by the name of Teodoro Evangelista?

A   Teddy Evangelista, not Teodoro.

Q   Why do you know Teddy?

A   Because he was one of the facilitators/forwarders there who has some commercial parcels there that are coming from abroad sir.

Q   Since when have you known Teddy Evangelista?

A   Since four (4) years ago sir. 6

. . . .

Q   How often was Teddy Evangelista in your office for the four (4) years that you say had been in this business of facilitating release of parcels?

A   I have seen him only a maximum of five (5) times.

COURT:

Q   Five (5) times during the four years?

A   Yes, Your Honor because he seldom comes to the office. It is only Tonying who goes to . . .

Q   Who is that Tonying that you mentioned?

A   Tonying, that fellow seated there Your Honor.

(witness approaching the gallery and tap [sic] the shoulder of a man who responded to the name Tonying Comia)

COURT:

Q   He is the one accused here?

A   Yes, Your Honor.

Q   What about him, why did you mention him when I was asking you about Teddy Evangelista?

Q   Tonying is the one who frequents our office to follow up their importations. 7

Even granting that Comia acted in good faith, he cannot escape criminal responsibility. The crime with which he is charged is a malum prohibitum. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances. As held in People v. Lo Ho Wing: 8

Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a "malum prohibitum" because it is punished as an offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.

Likewise, in People v. Bayona, it was held:

The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate to act." 9

Indeed, Comia cannot claim to have acted in good faith. Even assuming that he did not know that the packages contained shabu, the fact is that he tried to facilitate the importation of dutiable goods free of customs duties. It comes as a surprise therefore that in moving for the acquittal of accused-appellant the Solicitor General should downplay or minimize the role of accused-appellant by insisting that the latter was a "mere employee" who did not have a choice "but to assent to whatever his employer wanted to do," and that "besides, this practice of TASCO of using different addressed for a client has been admitted by no less than its manager, Lydia Dizon herself." 10

The fact is that accused-appellant Antonio Comia gave his consent for the importers of the illegal cargo to use his name for the purpose of concealing it from the authorities. He cannot now wash his hands and say he did not know that they would use his name to import shabu. He gave them license to use his name for whatever purpose and it was not at all unforeseeable that clients could employ the scheme to import shabu or other drugs and other contraband.

Second.    Accused-appellant argues that the trial court also erred in relying upon the testimony of Lydia Dizon that Mary Ong never used Comia's name, on the basis of which the trial court concluded that Comia had acted on his own together with his co-conspirators. Accused-appellant claims that Dizon had every reason to implicate him (Comia) as the sole perpetrator of the crime because as manager of TASCO she knew she could possibly be implicated in the crime. Accused-appellant points out that it was upon her instruction that Comia had gone to ADC on September 3, 1992 to inquire about the arrival of the parcels.

But while this may be true, as already discussed the evidence against Comia, even without Dizon's testimony, is sufficient to support a finding of his guilt.

Third.       Appellant argues further that he cannot be convicted of conspiracy because the cases against his alleged co-conspirators, Mary Ong and Go Shiu Ling, were dismissed.

The contention is without merit. In People v. Dramayo, 11 the Court affirmed the conviction of two out of seven conspirators originally accused of murder. This Court noted that there had been cases where, notwithstanding that a majority of the defendants have been acquitted, the accused had been held responsible for the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their culpability. 12

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to §17 of Republic Act No. 7659, however, the penalty of life imprisonment is MODIFIED to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Francisco., JJ., concur.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 113578 July 14, 1995

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113578 July 14, 1995

SULPICIO LINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS and TITO DURAN TABUQUILDE and ANGELINA DE PAZ TABUQUILDE, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 32864, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-89-3048.

I

The Court of Appeals found:

On October 23, 1988, plaintiff Tito Duran Tabuquilde (hereinafter, "Tito") and his three-year old daughter Jennifer Anne boarded the M/V Dona Marilyn at North Harbor, Manila, bringing with them several pieces of luggage.

In the morning of October 24, 1988, the M/V Dona Marilyn, while in transit, encountered inclement weather which caused huge waves due to Typhoon Unsang.

Notwithstanding the fact that Storm Signal No. 2 had been raised by the PAG-ASA authorities over Leyte as early as 5:30 P.M. of October 23, 1988 and which signal was raised to Signal No. 3 by 10 P.M. of the same day, the ship captain ordered the vessel to proceed to Tacloban when prudence dictated that he should have taken it to the nearest port for shelter, thus violating his duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in the carrying of passengers safely to their destination.

At about the same time, plaintiff-appellee Angelina Tabuquilde (hereinafter, "Angelina") mother of Jennifer Anne, contacted the Sulpicio Office to verify radio reports that the vessel M/V Dona Marilyn was missing. Employees of said Sulpicio Lines assured her that the ship was merely "hiding" thereby assuaging her anxiety.

At around 2:00 P.M. of October 24, 1988, said vessel capsized, throwing plaintiff-appellee Tito and Jennifer Anne, along with hundreds of passengers, into the tumultuous sea.

Tito tried to keep himself and his daughter afloat but to no avail as the waves got stronger and he was subsequently separated from his daughter despite his efforts.

He found himself on Almagro Island in Samar the next day at round (sic) 11:00 A.M. and immediately searched for his daughter among the survivors in the island, but the search proved fruitless.

In the meantime, Angelina tried to seek the assistance of the Sulpicio Lines in Manila to no avail, the latter refusing to entertain her and hundreds of relatives of the other passengers who waited long hours outside the Manila Office. Angelina spent sleepless nights worrying about her husband Tito and daughter Jennifer Anne in view of the refusal of Sulpicio Lines to release a verification of the sinking of the ship.

On October 26, 1988, Tito and other survivors in the Almagro Island were fetched and were brought to Tacloban Medical Center for treatment.

On October 31, 1988, Tito reported the loss of his daughter, was informed that the corpse of a child with his daughter's description had been found. Subsequently, Tito wrote a letter to his wife, reporting the sad fact that Jennifer Anne was dead. Angelina suffered from shock and severe grief upon receipt of the news.

On November 3, 1988, the coffin bearing the corpse of Jennifer Anne was buried in Tanauan, Leyte.

On November 24, 1988, a claim for damages was filed by Tito with the defendant Sulpicio Lines in connection with the death of the plaintiff-appellee's daughter and the loss of Tito's belongings worth P27,580.00. (Appellees' Brief, pp. 2-4) ( Rollo, pp. 52-54).

On January 3, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. Q-89-3048 in favor of the plaintiffs Tito Duran Tabuquilde and Angelina de Paz Tabuquilde (private respondents herein) and against defendant Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (petitioner herein) ordering defendant to pay P27,580.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 for the death of Jennifer Tabuquilde, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition.

II

Generally, the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and not disturbed except for cogent reasons (Gatmaitan v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 37 [1991]). One of the accepted reasons is when the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence (Sandoval Shipyard, Inc. v. Clave, 94 SCRA 472 [1979]). Corollary to this is the rule that actual or compensatory damages, to be recovered, must be proved; otherwise, if the proof is flimsy, no damages will be awarded (Dichoso v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 169 [1990]).

In the case at bench, the trial court merely mentioned the fact of the loss and the value of the contents of the pieces of baggage without stating the evidence on which it based its findings. There is no showing that the value of the contents of the lost pieces of baggage was based on the bill of lading or was previously declared by respondent Tito D. Tabuquilde before he boarded the ship. Hence, there can be no basis to award actual damages in the amount of P27,850.00.

The Court of Appeals was correct in confirming the award of damages for the death of the daughter of private respondents, a passenger on board the stricken vessel of petitioner. It is true that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only deaths caused by a crime as quasi delict are entitled to actual and compensatory damages without the need of proof of the said damages. Said Article provides:

The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi delict shall be at least Three Thousand Pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. . . .

Deducing alone from said provision, one can conclude that damages arising from culpa contractual are not compensable without proof of special damages sustained by the heirs of the victim.

However, the Civil Code, in Article 1764 thereof, expressly makes Article 2206 applicable "to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier." Accordingly, a common carrier is liable for actual or compensatory damages under Article 2206 in relation to Article 1764 of the Civil Code for deaths of its passengers caused by the breach of the contract of transportation.

The trial court awarded an indemnity of P30,000.00 for the death of the daughter of private respondents. The award of damages under Article 2206 has been increased to P50,000.00 (People v. Flores, 237 SCRA 653 [1994]).

With respect to the award of moral damages, the general rule is that said damages are not recoverable in culpa contractual except when the presence of bad faith was proven (Trans World Air Lines v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 143 [1988]). However, in breach of contract of carriage, moral damages may be recovered when it results in the death of a passenger (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Esguerra, 117 SCRA 741 [1982]; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 [1985]).

With respect to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2232 of the Civil Code of the Philippines gives the Court the discretion to grant said damages in breach of contract when the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent and reckless manner (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]).

Furthermore, in the case of Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 83 (1989), we ruled that:

. . . . The Court will take judicial notice of the dreadful regularity with which grievous maritime disasters occur in our waters with massive loss of life. The bulk of our population is too poor to afford domestic air transportation. So it is that notwithstanding the frequent sinking of passenger in our waters, crowds of people continue to travel by sea. This Court is prepared to use the instruments given to it by the law for securing the ends of law and public policy. One of those instruments is the institution of exemplary damages; one of those ends, of special importance in an archipelagic state like the Philippines, is the safe and reliable carriage of people and goods by sea. . . . (at p. 100).

A common carrier is obliged to transport its passengers to their destinations with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person (Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Tiongson, 16 SCRA 940 [1966]). The trial court found that petitioner failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier, which resulted in the sinking of the M/V Dona Marilyn.

The trial court correctly concluded that the sinking of M/V Dona Marilyn was due to gross negligence, thus:

. . . [i]t is undisputed that Typhoon Unsang entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility on October 21, 1988. The rain in Metro Manila started after lunch of October 23, 1988, and at about 5:00 p.m. Public Storm Signal No. 1 was hoisted over Metro Manila, Signal No. 2 in Leyte and Signal No. 3 in Samar. But at 10:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning of October 23, 1988, Public Storm Signal No. 1 was already hoisted over the province of Leyte, which is the destination of M/V Dona Marilyn. This was raised to Signal No. 2 at 4:00 p.m. and Signal No. 3 at 10:00 p.m. on the same date. The following day, October 24, 1988, at 4:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Storm Signal No. 3 remained hoisted in Leyte. At 4 p.m. on October 24, 1988, Storm Signal No. 3 remained hoisted in Leyte but was reduced to Storm Signal No. 2 (Exh. G). Signal No. 1 has maximum winds at 60 kph within 36 hours; Signal No. 2 has maximum winds of from 60 kph to 100 kph within a period of 24 hours; and Signal No. 3 has maximum winds of 100 kph and above within a period of 12 hours.

Warnings of the storm signal are issued by PAG-ASA thru DZZA, Office of Civil Defense, Philippine Navy, Coast Guard, Radio Stations, and other offices, every six (6) hours as soon as a cyclone enters the Philippine Area of Responsibility.

At 10:30 a.m. on October 24, 1988, the vessel was estimated to be between Mindoro and Masbate, and the center of the typhoon then was around 130 degrees longitude with maximum winds of 65 kph (Exh. G-3), with a "radius of rough to phenomenal sea at that time of 450 kms. North and 350 kms. elsewhere; 350 kms. North center and all throughout the rest" (p. 12, TSN, Lumalda, Feb. 19, 1990).

xxx xxx xxx

In the same manner, (referring to the negligence of the crew of the ship that sank in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 [1985]) the crew of the vessel M/V Dona Marilyn took a calculated risk when it proceeded despite the typhoon brewing somewhere in the general direction to which the vessel was going. The crew assumed a greater risk when, instead of dropping anchor in or at the periphery of the Port of Calapan, or returning to the port of Manila which is nearer, proceeded on its voyage on the assumption that it will be able to beat and race with the typhoon and reach its destination before it (Unsang) passes ( Rollo, pp. 45-47).

The award of attorney's fees by the trial court to respondents is also assailed by petitioner, citing Mirasol v. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 337 (1978). In this case, the petitioner filed before the Municipal Court an action for forcible entry against the private respondent. The said court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur sustained the decision of the lower court, dismissed the appeal and awarded attorney's fees in the sum of not less than P500.00 in favor of private respondent. Upon appeal to us, we deleted the award of attorney's fees because the text of the appealed decision was bereft of any findings of fact and law to justify such an award. Moreover, there was no proof, other than the bare allegation of harassment that the adverse party had acted in bad faith. The aforementioned decision is inapposite to the instant case where the decision clearly mentions the facts and the law upon which the award of attorney's fees were based.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of P27,580.00 as actual damages for the loss of the contents of the pieces of baggage is deleted and that the award of P30,000.00 under Article 2206 in relation Article 1764 is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 114061 August 23, 1995

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 114061 August 23, 1995

KOREAN AIRLINES CO., LTD., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JUANITO C. LAPUZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 113842 August 23, 1995

JUANITO C. LAPUZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES CO., LTD., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N



FRANCISCO, J.:

The case is of 1980 vintage. It originated from the Regional Trial Court, appealed to the Court of Appeals, then finally elevated to this Court. From the Court's disposition of the case stemmed incidents which are now the subjects for resolution. To elaborate:

In an action for breach of contract of carriage, Korean Airlines, Co., Ltd., (KAL) was ordered by the trial court to pay actual/compensatory damages, with legal interest, attorney's fees and costs of suit in favor of plaintiff Juanito C. Lapuz. 1 Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the trial court's judgment was merely modified: the award of compensatory damages reduced, an award for moral and exemplary damages added, with 6% interest per annum from the date of filing of the complaint, and the attorney's fees and costs deleted.

The parties subsequently elevated the case to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 114061 and G.R. No. 113842. On August 3, 1994, the Court in a consolidated decision affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, modified only as to the commencement date of the award of legal interest, i.e., from the date of the decision of the trial court and not from the date of filing of the complaint. 2 The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration with KAL, for the first time, assailing the Court's lack of jurisdiction to impose legal interest as the complaint allegedly failed to pray for its award. In a resolution dated September 21, 1994, the Court resolved to deny both motions for reconsideration with finality. Notwithstanding, KAL filed subsequent pleadings asking for reconsideration of the Court's consolidated decision and again impugning the award of legal interest. Lapuz, meanwhile, filed a motion for early resolution of the case followed by a motion for execution dated March 14, 1995, praying for the issuance of a writ of execution. KAL, in response, filed its Opposition and Supplemental Argument in Support of the Opposition dated March 28, 1995, and March 30, 1995, respectively. Additionally, on May 3, 1995, Lapuz filed another Urgent Motion for Early Resolution stating that the case has been pending for fifteen years which KAL admitted in its Comment filed two days later, albeit stressing that its pleadings were not intended for delay. 3

KAL's asseveration that the Court lacks jurisdiction to award legal interest is devoid of merit. Both the complaint and amended complaint against KAL dated November 27, 1980, and January 5, 1981, respectively, prayed for reliefs and remedies to which Lapuz may be entitled in law and equity. The award of legal interest is one such relief, as it is based on equitable grounds duly sanctioned by Article 2210 of the Civil Code which provides that: "[i]nterest may, in the discretion of the Court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract". 4

Furthermore, in its petition for review before the Court of Appeals, KAL did not question the trial court's imposition of legal interest. Likewise, in its appeal before the Court, KAL never bewailed the award of legal interest. In fact, KAL took exception only with respect to the date when legal interest should commence to run. 5 Indeed, it was only in its motion for reconsideration when suddenly its imposition was assailed for having been rendered without jurisdiction. To strengthen its languid position, KAL's subsequent pleadings clothed its attack with constitutional import for alleged violation of its right to due process. There is no cogent reason and none appears on record that could sustain KAL's scheme as KAL was amply given, in the courts below and in this Court, occasion to ventilate its case. What is repugnant to due process is the denial of opportunity to be heard 6 which opportunity KAL was extensively afforded. While it is a rule that jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. 7 This court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. 8 The Court shall not countenance KAL's undesirable moves. What attenuates KAL's unmeritorious importuning is that the assailed decision has long acquired finality. It is a settled rule that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistake. 9 Once a judgment becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest.

KAL's filing of numerous pleadings delayed the disposition of the case which for fifteen years remained pending. This practice may constitute abuse of the Court's processes for it tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice. In Li Kim Tho v. Go Siu Ko, et al., 10 the Court gave this reminder to litigants and lawyers' alike:

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about the result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. 11

Likewise, in Banogan v. Zerna 12 the Court reminded lawyers of their responsibility as officers of the court in this manner:

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not de permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts. 13

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. 14 Counsel for KAL is reminded that it is his duty not to unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes. 15

With respect to Lapuz' motion for execution, suffice to state that the application for a writ of execution should be addressed to the court of origin and not to this Court. As the judgment has become final and executory then all that is left of the trial court is the ministerial act of ordering the execution thereof.

ACCORDINGLY, KAL's motion for reconsideration is DENlED. Counsel for KAL is hereby warned that repetition of his undesirable practice shall be dealt with severely.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Persons Case Digest: Abadilla v. Tabiliran Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

ABADILLA  v. TABILIRAN, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995.

FACTS:
Ø  Administrative case filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr.
Ø  Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela.
Ø  Respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan.
ISSUE:
W/N his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan may be legitimated.

HELD: Court finds respondent guilty of gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
NO. 
An examination of the birth certificates of respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that it was respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important to note that these children were born prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code: (Executive Order, No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus:
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia v. Sempio Diy).

Jurisprudence: A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995



MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
We have a list of these crooked judges whose actuations have been found to be patently wrong and indefensible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this Augean stable. 1
Indeed, our judicial structure is supposed to be manned by magistrates chosen for their probity, integrity, impartiality, dedication and learning. And so, any judge wanting in any of these qualities should be broomed off and out of the bench in order to improve the judicial landscape. Screening off the misfits, considering the great number of judges and justices in the country at present, is the arduous and Herculean task of this Court. The effort if dramatized with rectitude and sincerity should bring about the strengthening of the people's abiding faith in democracy and the integrity of our courts of justice.
The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge."
In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela.
Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the marriage contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.
Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier, respondent's wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged therein for abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan, namely:
Buenasol B. Tabiliran born on July 14, 1970
Venus B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 7, 1971
Saturn B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 20, 1975
by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.
The following acts are alleged to have constituted the charge of corruption:
(1) Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in the private practice of law by the preparation and notarization of documents, out of which he charged fees beyond the authorized rates allowed as Ex-Officio Notary Public. These acts which, according to the charge, amount to the private practice of law, prejudice public interest.
Complainant submitted the following documents in support of these allegations:
a) Affidavit of Ponciana Geromo (Annex "B"), attesting to the fact that respondent Judge Tabiliran prepared a Simultaneous Deed of Sale, (Annex "C", Doc. No. 901, Page No. 77, Book No. V, Series of 1991 of Ex-Officio Notary Public Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr.) and collect P600.00 from the vendees (par. 10(a) a-1 Complaint, p. 9 records);
b) Receipt prepared under instruction of the respondent showing that he received P250.00 thru MCTC Aide Ely O. Inot for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit declaring the correct ages of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai dated November 12, 1991, when the legal fees therefor should have been P10.00 only (Annex "D") (par. 10(a) a-2 Complaint, p. 9 records);
c) Another receipt (Annex "E") prepared thru the direction of the respondent dated November 12, 1991, showing that said respondent received from Reynaldo Subebe the sum of P150.00 for preparation and notarization by him of a Joint Affidavit declaring the correct age of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias (par. 10(a) a-c Complaint, p. 9 records);
d) Still another receipt (Annex "F") dated November 12, 1991, signed by the respondent himself showing that he received from Nelly Baradas the sum of P50.00 for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit attesting to the correct age of one Luzviminda Jacoba (par. 10(a) a-d Complaint, p. 9 records);
e) Another receipt (Annex "G") dated November 12, 1991, issued by the respondent, showing that he received from Torres P. Modai the sum of P50.00, thru the same Ely O. Inot, MCTC Aide, for preparation of Joint Affidavit attesting to the correct age of Flores Jalampangan (par. 10 (a) a-e Complaint, pp. 9 & 10 records).
(2) Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his Court as supported by an affidavit (Annex "M") executed by a certain Calixto Calunod, a court aide, stating that he saw Edna Siton, complainant in a criminal case tried by respondent, hand over to the latter a bag of fish and squid which respondent Judge received.
(3) Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out of which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the accused Antonio Oriola, as supported by the affidavits of Arcelita Salvador, the complainant therein, and Benito Sagario, one of the persons present when the accused perpetrated the acts aforesaid. (Submitted as Annexes "I" and "J", respectively.)
Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice. By the example shown by the respondent, the public had allegedly lost confidence in the administration of justice, perceiving as is evident to see that the person occupying the position of a judge lacks the morality and probity required of one occupying such a high office.
Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.
Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code in order to show the legality of his acts:
After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes except for those of succession. (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.)
After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. (Art. 390, Civil Code.)
The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, where this Court held that for the purpose of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee is to respondent's mind, a case in point.
He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single", but he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation, claiming that, since there were only three words to choose from, namely: Single, Widow or Divorced, he preferred to choose the word "single", it being the most appropriate. Besides, both he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela was honestly divulged.
On the charge of corruption, respondent submitted certifications (Annexes "4" & "5") from the Mayor of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to the fact that there was no Notary Public in Manukan and, as such, respondent may be allowed to notarize documents. He denied having charged exorbitant fees. He claims that all the amounts received by him were used to subsidize office expenses, since the funds he had been receiving from the municipal government were not enough to cover expenses in maintaining his office. Respondent submitted a certification (Annex "6") from the Accounting Department of the Municipal Government of Manukan to the effect that his yearly expenditures were more than the yearly appropriations.
Respondent finds support in Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states:
A Judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities to improve . . . the administration of justice.
Respondent vehemently denies the charge of bribery claiming that it was inconceivable for him to receive a bag full of fish and squid since his residence was 42 kilometers from Jose Dalman where his courtroom or office was located. It takes one an hour and a half by bus to reach Katipunan and so, by the time he reaches his house, the fish and the squid should have become rotten. In support of his denials, respondent submitted as Annex "8", an affidavit of Ely D. Inot, their court Interpreter who declared:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That last June 6, 1991, I was with the Municipal Judge, Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., from the morning until we went home in the afternoon and we in fact dined together in the local Carenderia of Jose Dalman as it is the usual ways of the Judge to eat lunch together with the court personnel;
4. That when we went home in the afternoon of that day we were also together riding in a bus, the Lillian Express and until I drop in Roxas and he proceeded to Katipunan where his residence is;
5. That all the time during that day I did not noticed him bringing anything except his "Hand Bag" which he used to carry in going to the office; (Annex "8", Affidavit of Ely O. Inot, December 17, 1992.)
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, respondent tags as a fabricated lie the charge that he prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a case pending in his sala and thereafter charged the accused, Antonio Oriola, the sum of P500.00 for legal services. The complainant, he said, was the one who induced Arcelita Salvador (the complainant in the rape case) to execute an affidavit (Annex "I") in support of the charge of corruption against respondent.
Complainant's filing of the present case was motivated by revenge and resentment because, earlier, respondent filed an administrative case (A.M. No. P-91-597) against her for "Insubordination and Serious Misconduct". The Supreme Court decided to reprimand her with a warning that a repetition of her acts will be severely dealt with. Respondent claims that the complainant had nevertheless repeatedly continued to do acts of insubordination in the following manner:
1) She continues to keep court records and has kept refusing to hand them over to respondent inspite of verbal and written orders;
2) She refused to receive a memorandum from the Vice-Mayor requiring the Clerk of Court to submit an Annual report;
3) She refused to prepare the said annual report required of her as Clerk of Court;
4) She continue to refuse to obey just and lawful orders of the Court.
On April 12, 1993, by resolution of this Court En Banc, the herein administrative case was referred to Executive Judge Jesus O. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on two (2) counts of corruption: (1) for acting as notary public and collecting fees for his services; and (2) for preparing an affidavit of desistance in a case pending in his Court and receiving payment for it.
In his report and recommendation dated August 3, 1993, Executive Judge Angeles found that:
ON GROSS IMMORALITY:
In contracting marriage with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986, (p. 13 of the records), respondent did not hide the fact that he was married to Teresita T. Banzuela, having disclosed it in his affidavit jointly executed with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986 (p. 115 of the records), particularly paragraph 4 thereof which reads:
4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly married to Teresita T. Banzuela but who left and abandoned their family home sometime in 1965 in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, and until now at present her whereabouts is not known.
It was therefore a marriage contracted under Article 83 (2) of the Civil Code which, although bigamous, remains valid until automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42, Family Code). Respondent's assertion that since 1965 to the present, his first wife Teresita T. Banzuela had left their conjugal dwelling and did not return, her whereabouts being unknown, was not controverted. Living as husband and wife pursuant to an authorized bigamous marriage, respondent cannot be said to be acting in an immoral and scandalous manner, and the immoral stigma of extra-marital union since 1969 duly declared in their aforesaid joint affidavit, may be considered cleansed by their marriage in 1986, if Art. 1395 of the Civil Code on ratification on contracts in general is allowed to be applied, it being ratification of marital cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil Code, now Art. 34 of the Family Colde was intended to facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have been living in a state of concubinage for more than five years (Tolentino, Civil Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 245, cited in Ernesto L. Pineda, Family Code, 1992 Ed., p. 38). Indicating his civil status in the marriage contract as "single" is hardly considered a misrepresentation of fact, specially to the solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto C. Ruedas, Jr. to whom the aforesaid joint affidavit was submitted.
ON DECEITFUL CONDUCT:
Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, namely: Buenasol B. Tabiliran, Venus B. Tabiliran and Saturn B. Tabiliran, all of whom were born before their marriage, were disclosed and made known to the solemnizing officer and the latter himself, in his affidavit dated May 23, 1986 (p. 116 of the records) which supports the marriage contract of respondent with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, having shown such fact.
Exhibit P which purports to be an affidavit of Lydia T. Zanoria dated May 27, 1993, consisting of three pages, was submitted by the complainant for the purpose of proving her charge that the respondent falsely executed his three separate affidavits, namely: Exhibit K dated May 24, 1983 regarding the late registration of birth of his daughter Buenasol B. Tabiliran; Exhibit M dated May 28, 1988 regarding the late registration of birth of his third child Saturn B. Tabiliran; and his affidavit dated May 27, 1988, Exhibit O, in reference to the late registration of birth of his second child Venus B. Tabiliran, stating inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight as the reasons for the delayed registration of their births, without however presenting said affiant Mrs. Zanoria, consequently denying respondent the opportunity to cross examine her. Her affidavit is not among those brought out in the pre-hearing conference, and was not discussed during the hearing itself, submitting it only after the investigation proper was terminated. The supposed affiant claimed she was the government midwife who attended to the births of respondent's three children, denying, as the affidavit shows, negligence, inadvertence or oversight on her part to register their birth on time. Not having been presented for respondent to confront her, or an opportunity to do so, Exhibit P cannot be considered evidence of the charge. An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented (People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349), or admitted by the party against whom it is presented.
ON CORRUPTION:
1. Acting as Notary Public during office hours, and collecting fees:
Respondent has admitted having prepared the documents and collected fees, in the instances specified in par. 10 of the complaint, namely: (1) affidavit of Ponciana Geromo; (2) Joint Affidavit of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai; (3) Joint Affidavit of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias; (4) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Luzviminda Jacoba; and (5) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Flores Jalampangan, but not necessarily on the accuracy of the amounts therein stated as having been collected by him from them (please see Pre-Hearing Order of May 20, 1993 of the Investigating Judge). Seeking justification of his acts, respondent submitted Annexes 4 & 5 of his comments (pp. 118 and 119, records) which are certifications of Manukan Mayor Eugene U. Caballero attesting that in the absence of a Notary Public in Manukan town, respondent who is a Judge thereat was allowed "to prepare and ligalize (sic) documents".
He declared "the fees derived from the preparation and notarization of documents were mostly used by respondent to buy supplies and materials of his Office", explaining that his office needs cannot be sustained by the appropriations of the local government which are inadequate. On page 120 of the records, his Annex 6 shows a shortage in his appropriations for supplies. And supplies from the Supreme Court can only be obtained if secured personally but has to assume the expenses for transportation, freight and handling.
Respondent Judge maintains that the Code of Judicial conduct does not prohibit him from acting as Notary Public, and the fees he has received were much lower than the rates prescribed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, submitting Annex 3, p. 117 of the records, to prove it.
Further justifying his act under Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge may, with due regard to official duties, engaged in activities to improve the administration of justice, respondent claims that due to his efforts, he was able to secure an extension room of his office covering a floor area of 24 square meters, from the Sangguniang Pampook of Region IX based in Zamboanga City, costing P19,000.00 per certification shown in his Annex 7 (page 121 of the records).
In the light of 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis-a-vis the power of Municipal Trial Court Judges and Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judges to act in the capacity of Notary Public Ex-Officio, the Honorable Supreme Court in A.M. No. 89-11-1303, MTC, Dec. 19, 1989, has ruled:
MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as notary public ex-officio perform any act within the competency of a regular Notary Public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned-over to the municipal treasurer (Lapeña, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.
Although absence of a notary public commissioned for, and residing in Manukan town, even in Jose Dalman which is within his circuit is confirmed, respondent Judge while he may be justified in so acting as notary public, did not, however, comply with requirement No. 1 which obliged him to charge for the account of the Government and turn-over to the municipal treasurer all notarial fees. And there is no way of determining the truth of his assertion that the notarial fees he collected were "mostly used" to buy supplies and materials for his office, absent any accounting.
2. Accepting Bribe from Parties-litigants:
Admitting the existence of Annex H found on page 21 in the records, respondent, however, denied the imputation therein contained by affiant Calixto Calunod that he received a sando bag full of fish and squid from a certain Edna Siton who had a case with respondent's court as complainant in a certain criminal case. Instead of calling the affiant himself, complainant presented the Court Interpreter Ely O. Inot, who "confirmed that there was squid and fish contained in a plastic bag which was left in Aseniero Carenderia by a person unknown to her and some members of the Court staff. When informed by the carenderia owner that the stuff was intended for Judge Tabiliran, the latter told them to cook it, and they afterwards partook of it without the Judge who already boarded the passenger bus". (Record of Proceedings, p. 1, par. No. 1, dated June 11, 1993). Being her witness, complainant is bound by her testimony. This particular charge is, therefore, not proved.
3. Preparing Affidavit of Desistance and Collecting Fee for his Services:
Under this count, two affidavits both sworn before 2nd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Valeriano B. Lagula were submitted: one by Arcelita Salvador, complainant in an attempted rape case who was categorical in her declaration that respondent Judge asked and received from Pitoy Oriola, brother of accused Antonio Oriola the amount of P500.00 after the Judge prepared the affidavit of desistance and motion to dismiss which he made her sign (Annex I, p. 40 records). Benito Sagario who was present executed another separate affidavit, Annex J found on page 41 in the records, confirming it. In admitting the affidavit, respondent, however, denied the imputation, asserting that it is false, but without confronting them or presenting witnesses to dispute their accusation. He could have demanded that the affiants, including the persons they mentioned were present in the transaction, namely: accused Antonio Oriola, his brother Pitoy Oriola, Ignacio Salvador, and INC Minister Antonio Caluña be required to appear for his confrontation, but respondent chose not, contented himself only with the explanation that it was just the handiwork of complainant Abadilla and her husband, a major in the military who is an active member of the Iglesia Ni Cristo of which affiant Arcelita Salvador also belonged, which is bare and unsubstantiated. No other conclusion can be drawn other than holding, as the Investigating Judge does, that this particular charge is true. Evidently, Judge Tabiliran wants to avoid meeting them by way of confrontation. If he is innocent, and is certain the charge is fabricated, he will surely raise hell to insist that he confronts them face to face. Clearly, his deportment betrays his insistence of innocence.
On Respondent's Counterclaim:
It was not proven. On the contrary, the controverting evidence shows that the records of Criminal Case No. 2279 referred to in his Annex 9, p. 123 of the records, were not in the possession of complainant. Quite obviously, Ely O. Inot, respondent's Court Interpreter tried to cover up the fact that the same were already being kept by Judge Tabiliran before he issued the memorandum, Annex 9. Complainant, who is respondent's Clerk of Court was not, therefore, in a position to comply with his Order.
Also, Mrs. Abadilla's failure to prepare the annual report of the Court in 1992 as called for in Annexes 10 and 10-A was, contrary to respondent's claim, not by reason of her obstinate refusal to obey her superior but, by sheer impossibility to comply, considering that monthly reports upon which the annual report shall be based, were not prepared by her, not because of her refusal to do so which is among those included in her job description, but because the Judge himself took the work from her for no other reason than to establish the false impression that the complainant is disobedient to the Judge, and does not attend to her duties.
By and large, there is no harmony in their office. Complainant and respondent are not in talking terms. They are hostile to each other. Respondent's complaint that Mrs. Abadilla spat saliva in front of him whenever they meet each other; destroying the Court dry seal by throwing it at him one time she was mad; showing face; and sticking out her tongue to him, are all puerile acts which the undersigned cannot conclude as sufficiently established even with the testimony of Mrs. Ely O. Inot which is far from being definite and categorical, whose actuation is understandable because Judge Tabiliran, being her superior, has moral ascendancy over her (Record of Proceedings, June 11, 1993).
The undersigned believes that the problem is on Judge Tabiliran, and not on Mrs. Abadilla, who has been in the service as Clerk of Court under a previous Judge of the same Court for quite long without any complaint having been filed. The evidence disputing his counterclaim tends to show that respondent tried to build up a situation of undesirability against his Clerk of Court whom he wanted pulled out from her position in his Court.
Other Matters Not Covered By The Complaint And Comments:
The authority to investigate being confined only to matters alleged in the complaint on the basis of which respondent filed his comments, other matters not therein covered which complainant brought out by way of presenting documentary exhibits, (from Exhibit AAA to HHH), are not subject of this report and recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION:
The charge of GROSS IMMORALITY and DECEITFUL CONDUCT have not been proven, but the undersigned believes evidence is sufficient to sustain pronouncement of guilt on two counts of CORRUPTION, namely: acting as notary public and collecting fees for his services in preparing affidavit of desistance of a case in his Court. Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and false imputation against his Clerk of Court are found duly established.
WHEREFORE, suspension of the respondent Judge from the service for a period of three months is recommended.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the respondent culpable for gross immorality, he having scandalously and openly cohabited with the said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B. Tabiliran.
Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony." (Civil Code 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino).
By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).
As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We are not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for a proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code.
With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates (Exhs. "J", "L", & "M") of respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code: (Executive Order, No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus:
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia v. Sempio Diy).
It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent.
It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears that on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (G.R. No. 1155451) which was decided by this Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment of his family home and for living with another woman with whom he allegedly begot a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure of his wife to substantiate the charges. However, respondent was reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live Separately from Bed", with a stipulation that they allow each of the other spouse to live with another man or woman as the case may be, without the objection and intervention of the other. It was also in the same case where respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues. Thus, his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn and Venus are his third and second children respectively, are erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children.
With respect to the charge of corruption, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Judge that respondent should be found culpable for two counts of corruption: (1) acting as Notary Public; and (2) collecting legal fees in preparing an Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court.
Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the documents (Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G") wherein he charged notarial fees. Though he was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees therefor due to the fact that there has been no Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts.
Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus:
Sec. 252. Compensation of Notaries Public — No fee, compensation, or reward of any sort, except such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by law, shall be collected or received for any service rendered by a notary public. Such money collected by notaries public proper shall belong to them personally. Officers acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their services the fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p. 202.)
Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law raises the presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use.
With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein, respondent merely denied the said imputation but failed to offer any evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Canon 2
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
SO ORDERED.