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Showing posts with label August 28. Show all posts
Showing posts with label August 28. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 168118 August 28, 2006

SECOND DIVISION
Manila Bank v. CIR (2006)
G.R. No. 168118 August 28, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
 
FACTS
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 11, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 77177, entitled The Manila Banking Corporation, petitioner, versus Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent.

The Manila Banking Corporation, petitioner, was incorporated in 1961 and since then had engaged in the commercial banking industry until 1987. On May 22, 1987, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued Resolution No. 505, pursuant to Section 29 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 265 (the Central Bank Act), prohibiting petitioner from engaging in business by reason of insolvency. Thus, petitioner ceased operations that year and its assets and liabilities were placed under the charge of a government-appointed receiver.

Meanwhile, R.A. No. 8424, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Tax Reform Act of 1997, became effective on January 1, 1998. One of the changes introduced by this law is the imposition of the minimum corporate income tax on domestic and resident foreign corporations. Implementing this law is Revenue Regulations No. 9-98 stating that the law allows a four (4) year period from the time the corporations were registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) during which the minimum corporate income tax should not be imposed.

On June 23, 1999, after 12 years since petitioner stopped its business operations, the BSP authorized it to operate as a thrift bank. The following year, specifically on April 7, 2000, it filed with the BIR its annual corporate income tax return and paid P33,816,164.00 for taxable year 1999.

Prior to the filing of its income tax return, or on December 28, 1999, petitioner sent a letter to the BIR requesting a ruling on whether it is entitled to the four (4)-year grace period reckoned from 1999. In other words, petitioners position is that since it resumed operations in 1999, it will pay its minimum corporate income tax only after four (4) years thereafter.

On February 22, 2001, the BIR issued BIR Ruling No. 007-2001 stating that petitioner is entitled to the four (4)-year grace period. Since it reopened in 1999, the minimum corporate income tax may be imposed not earlier than 2002, i.e. the fourth taxable year beginning 1999. The relevant portions of the BIR Ruling state:

In reply, we hereby confirm that the law and regulations allow new corporations as well as existing corporations a leeway or adjustment period of four years counted from the year of commencement of business operations (reckoned at the time of registration by the corporation with the BIR) during which the MCIT (minimum corporate income tax) does not apply. If new corporations, as well as existing corporations such as those registered with the BIR in 1994 or earlier, are granted a 4-year grace period, we see no reason why TMBC, a corporation that has ceased business activities due to involuntary closure for more than a decade and is now only starting again to place its business back in order, may not be given the same opportunity. It should be stressed that although TMBC had been registered with the BIR before 1994, yet it did not have any business from 1987 to June 1999 due to its involuntary closure. This Office is therefore of an opinion, that for purposes of justice, equity and consistent with the intent of the law, TMBC's reopening last July 1999 is akin to the commencement of business operations of a new corporation, in consideration of which the law allows a 4-year period during which MCIT is not to be applied. Hence, MCIT may be imposed upon TMBC not earlier than 2002, i.e., the fourth taxable year beginning 1999 which is the year when TMBC reopened.

Likewise, we find merit in your position that for having just come out of receivership proceedings, which not only resulted in substantial losses but actually brought about a complete cessation of all businesses, TMBC may be qualified to ask for suspension of the MCIT. The law provides that the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, may suspend the imposition of the MCIT on any corporation which suffers losses on account of prolonged labor dispute, or because of force majeure, or because of legitimate business reverses. [NIRC, Sec. 27(E)(3)] Revenue Regulations 9-98 defines the term legitimate business reverses to include substantial losses sustained due to fire, robbery, theft or embezzlement, or for other economic reasons as determined by the Secretary of Finance. Cessation of business activities as a result of being placed under involuntary receivership may be one such economic reason. But to be a basis for the recognition of the suspension of MCIT, such a situation should be properly defined and included in the regulations, which this Office intends to do. Pending such inclusion, the same cannot yet be invoked. Nevertheless, it is the position of this Office that the counting of the fourth taxable year, insofar as TMBC is concerned, begins in the year 1999 when TMBC reopened such that it will be only subject to MCIT beginning the year 2002.

Pursuant to the above Ruling, petitioner filed with the BIR a claim for refund of the sum of P33,816,164.00 erroneously paid as minimum corporate income tax for taxable year 1999.

Due to the inaction of the BIR on its claim, petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a petition for review.

On April 21, 2003, the CTA denied the petition, finding that petitioners payment of the amount of P33,816,164.00 corresponding to its minimum corporate income tax for taxable year 1999 is in order. The CTA held that petitioner is not entitled to the four (4)-year grace period because it is not a new corporation. It has continued to be the same corporation, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the BIR, despite being placed under receivership, thus:

Moreover, it must be emphasized that when herein petitioner was placed under receivership, there was merely an interruption of its business operations. However, its corporate existence was never affected. The general rule is that the appointment of the receiver does not terminate the charter or work a dissolution of the corporation, even though the receivership is a permanent one. In other words, the corporation continues to exist as a legal entity, clothed with its franchises (65 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 973-974). Petitioner, for all intents and purposes, remained to be the same corporation, registered with the SEC and with the BIR. While it may continue to perform its corporate functions, all its properties and assets were under the control and custody of a receiver, and its dealings with the public is somehow limited, if not momentarily suspended. x x x

On June 11, 2003, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On May 11, 2005, the appellate court rendered a Decision affirming the assailed judgment of the CTA. 

Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.

The main issue for our resolution is whether petitioner is entitled to a refund of its minimum corporate income tax paid to the BIR for taxable year 1999. 

Petitioner contends that the Court of Tax Appeals erred in holding that it is not entitled to the four (4)-year grace period provided by law suspending the payment of its minimum corporate income tax since it is not a newly created corporation, having been registered as early as 1961.

For his part, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), respondent, maintains that pursuant to R.A. No. 8424, petitioner should pay its minimum corporate income tax beginning January 1, 1998 as it did not close its business operations in 1987 but merely suspended the same. Even if placed under receivership, its corporate existence was never affected. Thus, it falls under the category of an existing corporation recommencing its banking business operations. 

Section 27(E) of the Tax Code provides:
Sec. 27. Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporations. x x x

(E) Minimum Corporate Income Tax on Domestic Corporations. -

(1) Imposition of Tax. - A minimum corporate income tax of two percent (2%) of the gross income as of the end of the taxable year, as defined herein, is hereby imposed on a corporation taxable under this Title, beginning on the fourth taxable year immediately following the year in which such corporation commenced its business operations, when the minimum corporate income tax is greater than the tax computed under Subsection (A) of this Section for the taxable year.

(2) Carry Forward of Excess Minimum Tax. - Any excess of the minimum corporate income tax over the normal income tax as computed under Subsection (A) of this Section shall be carried forward and credited against the normal income tax for the three (3) immediately succeeding taxable years.
x x x
Upon the other hand, Revenue Regulation No. 9-98 specifies the period when a corporation becomes subject to the minimum corporate income tax, thus:

(5) Specific Rules for Determining the Period When a Corporation Becomes Subject to the MCIT (minimum corporate income tax) -

For purposes of the MCIT, the taxable year in which business operations commenced shall be the year in which the domestic corporation registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

Firms which were registered with BIR in 1994 and earlier years shall be covered by the MCIT beginning January 1, 1998.

 x x x

The intent of Congress relative to the minimum corporate income tax is to grant a four (4)-year suspension of tax payment to newly formed corporations. Corporations still starting their business operations have to stabilize their venture in order to obtain a stronghold in the industry. It does not come as a surprise then when many companies reported losses in their initial years of operations. The following are excerpts from the Senate deliberations:

Senator Romulo: x x x Let me go now to the minimum corporate income tax, which is on page 45 of the Journal, which is to minimize tax evasion on those corporations which have been declaring losses year in and year out. Here, the tax rate is three-fourths, three quarter of a percent or .75% applied to corporations that do not report any taxable income on the fourth year of their business operation. Therefore, those that do not report income on the first, second and third year are not included here.

Senator Enrile: We assume that this is the period of stabilization of new company that is starting in business.

Senator Romulo: That is right. 

Thus, in order to allow new corporations to grow and develop at the initial stages of their operations, the lawmaking body saw the need to provide a grace period of four years from their registration before they pay their minimum corporate income tax.

Significantly, on February 23, 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7906, otherwise known as the Thrift Banks Act of 1995. It took effect on March 18, 1995. This law provides for the regulation of the organization and operations of thrift banks. Under Section 3, thrift banks include savings and mortgage banks, private development banks, and stock savings and loans associations organized under existing laws.

On June 15, 1999, the BIR issued Revenue Regulation No. 4-95 implementing certain provisions of the said R.A. No. 7906. Section 6 provides:

Sec. 6. Period of exemption. All thrift banks created and organized under the provisions of the Act shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes, fees, and charges of whatever nature and description, except the corporate income tax imposed under Title II of the NIRC and as specified in Section 2(A) of these regulations, for a period of five (5) years from the date of commencement of operations; while for thrift banks which are already existing and operating as of the date of effectivity of the Act (March 18, 1995), the tax exemption shall be for a period of five (5) years reckoned from the date of such effectivity.

For purposes of these regulations, date of commencement of operations shall be understood to mean the date when the thrift bank was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the date when the Certificate of Authority to Operate was issued by the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, whichever comes later.

x x x

As mentioned earlier, petitioner bank was registered with the BIR in 1961. However, in 1987, it was found insolvent by the Monetary Board of the BSP and was placed under receivership. After twelve (12) years, or on June 23, 1999, the BSP issued to it a Certificate of Authority to Operate as a thrift bank. Earlier, or on January 21, 1999, it registered with the BIR. Then it filed with the SEC its Articles of Incorporation which was approved on June 22, 1999.

It is clear from the above-quoted provision of Revenue Regulations No. 4-95 that the date of commencement of operations of a thrift bank is the date it was registered with the SEC or the date when the Certificate of Authority to Operate was issued to it by the Monetary Board of the BSP, whichever comes later.

Let it be stressed that Revenue Regulations No. 9-98, implementing R.A. No. 8424 imposing the minimum corporate income tax on corporations, provides that for purposes of this tax, the date when business operations commence is the year in which the domestic corporation registered with the BIR. However, under Revenue Regulations No. 4-95, the date of commencement of operations of thrift banks, such as herein petitioner, is the date the particular thrift bank was registered with the SEC or the date when the Certificate of Authority to Operate was issued to it by the Monetary Board of the BSP, whichever comes later.

Clearly then, Revenue Regulations No. 4-95, not Revenue Regulations No. 9-98, applies to petitioner, being a thrift bank. It is, therefore, entitled to a grace period of four (4) years counted from June 23, 1999 when it was authorized by the BSP to operate as a thrift bank. Consequently, it should only pay its minimum corporate income tax after four (4) years from 1999.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77177 is hereby REVERSED. Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is directed to refund to petitioner bank the sum of P33,816,164.00 prematurely paid as minimum corporate income tax.

SO ORDERED.

Tax Case Digest: Manila Bank v. CIR (2006)

SECOND DIVISION
Manila Bank v. CIR (2006)
G.R. No. 168118 August 28, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Lessons Applicable: 4-year grace period is based on the registration and commencement (not only for newly formed corporation), MCIT law encourages new business

Laws Applicable: MCIT

FACTS:
  • Manila Bank, after 12 years of being prohibited to operate due to insolvency by the Monetary Board of the BSP, is granted to operate as a thrift bank.
  • It paid its taxed for 1999. 
  • Then, it asked the BIR whether it is entitled to the 4-year grace period before it shall be subject to MCIT.
  • BIR confirmed its entitlement.
  • It filed a claim for refund erroneously paid as MCIT in 1999.
  • Due to inaction, it filed a Petition for Review with the CTA who denied it since it is not a new corporation and has continued its registration with the SEC and BIR.
ISSUE: W/N Manila Bank is entitled to a 4-year grace period.

HELD: Yes. GRANT the petition.
  • The intent of the Congress relative to the MCIT is to grant 4-year grace period so that newly formed corporate can stabilize itself in order to obtain a stronghold in the industry.  
  • Rev. Reg. No. 4-95 clearly provides that the date of commencement of the operations of a thrift bank is the date that it was registered with the SEC or the date when the certificate of authority to operate was issued by the Monetary Board of the BSP, whichever comes later.
  • Rev. Reg. No. 4-98, implementing RA 8424 imposing MCIT provides for purposes of this tax, date when business operations commence is the year which the company is registered with the BIR, thus in this case only on June 23, 1999

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Heirs of Borlado v. Vda. De Bulan G.R. 114118 (2001)

G.R. No. 114118  August 28, 2001

Lessons Applicable: Definition and Concept of Damages (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: 

FACTS:
  • April 15, 1942: Serapio Borlado sold the lot to Francisco Bacero 
  • February 1948: His widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, as legal guardian of her minor children, sold the lot to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon and they declared the lot in the name of Bulan for Tax Declaration purposes and  obtained the continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive possession of the lot until November 4, 1972 when heirs of Simeon Borlado forcibly entered and wrested physical possession from them.
  • November 23, 1972: Spouses filed with the MTC a complaint for ejectment 
  • MTC: in favor of the spouses.  The heirs were ordered to vacated the lot and pay 100 cavans of palay annually from 1972 until they vacate the premises and P5K for attorneys fees and cost of suit
  • RTC: dismissed for lack of cause of action in a decision
  • CA: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N the 100 cavans of palay is an acceptable form of damages

HELD: NO. Affirm with modification.  Deleting the 100 cavans of palay for lack of basis.

  • “Palay” is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 114118


FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 114118  August 28, 2001

HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO, namely, ADELAIDA BORLADO, LORETO BORLADO, REYNALDO BORLADO, RICARDO BORLADO, FRANCISCO BORLADO and ALADINO DORADO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SALVACION VDA. DE BULAN, BIENVENIDO BULAN, JR., NORMA B. CLARITO and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CAPIZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of cause of action and ordering as vacated the restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case; and

“1. Plaintiffs to be jointly and solidarily liable to defendants the quantity of one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until plaintiffs vacate the premises of the land in question;

“2. Declaring defendants as owner of the land and entitled to possession;

“3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the sum of P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and

“4. To pay the costs of the suit.

“SO ORDERED.

“Roxas City, Philippines, March 18, 1988.

                                                                                                                                                                   “(Sgd.) JONAS A. ABELLAR
                                                                                                                                                                                      “J u d g e”[2]

The Facts

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

“The records show that plaintiffs-appellants[3] (petitioners) are the heirs of Simeon Borlado whose parents were Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan.  The original owner of the lot in question, Lot No. 2097 of the Pontevedra Cadastre, Maayon, Capiz, was Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners.

“On 15 April 1942, Serapio sold the lot to Francisco Bacero (Exh. “C”, p. 247, MTC Record) for Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00).  After the death of Francsico on 26 February 1948, his widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, in her capacity as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: Nicolas, Valentin and Luzviminda, all surnamed Bacero and forced heirs of Francisco Bacero sold it (the lot) to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 August 1954 (Exh. 65, pp. 243-245, id.).

“Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale and even prior thereto, actual possession of Lot No. 2057 was with the vendees-spouses Bulans in view of a loan obtained by Francisco Bacero from them in December 1947 (Exh. “65”, supra).  Exercising their right of ownership under the Deed of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de Bulan declared the lot in her name in 1900 for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2232 (Exh. “F”, p. 254, Record [MTC]).  She paid the corresponding taxes as evidenced by the Tax Receipts marked as Exhibits “K”, “J”, “I”, “G”, “F” and “H” (pp. 248-253, Record, id.).  Salvacion and her co-defendants-appellees’[4] possession of the lot was continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until November 4, 1972, when petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them.

“On 23 November 1972, respondents filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz a complaint for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. A-1, against petitioners (p. 1, id.).  The ejectment case was decided in favor of the respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents, tenants, privies and members of their families were ordered to vacate Lot No. 2079 and deliver possession to the respondents together with all improvements and standing crops; to pay said respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually from 1972 to the present or in the total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay; and to pay the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as reimbursement for the amount respondents had paid their lawyer to protect their rights; and, the costs of suit (Exh. “57”, pp. 256-261, id.).  Instead of appealing the adverse decision to the Court of First Instance (now RTC), on 8 November 1983, petitioners filed the present case with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-4887. This case was dismissed for lack of cause of action in a decision, the decretal portion of which was quoted earlier.”[5]

On 24 November 1993, the Court of  Appeals  promulgated its decision affirming  in toto the appealed decision.[6]

Hence, this appeal.[7]

The Issue

The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were the owners of the lot in question.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition. The issue is factual.  In an appeal via certiorari, we may not review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.[8] When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,[9] unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule.[10]

Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions.[11] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[12] It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.[13] A question of fact would arise in such event.[14] Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration.[15]

Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until they vacate the premises of the land in question.

The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages.  We cannot sustain the award.  “Palay” is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.

El Fallo del Tribunal

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 18980 with modification that petitioners’ liability to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until petitioners vacate the land in question is deleted, for lack of basis.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1] In CA-G. R. CV No. 18980, promulgated on November  24, 1993, Guerrero, B., J., ponente, Herrera M. and Francisco, C., JJ., concurring. Petition, Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 27-37.

[2] Petition, Annex “B”, Rollo, pp. 38-48.

[3] Plaintiffs-appellants are hereafter referred to as petitioners.

[4] Defendants-appellees are hereafter referred to as respondents.

[5] Petition, Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 27-37.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed on 16 April 1994, posted by registered mail (Rollo, pp. 8-23).  On 10 February 1999, we gave due course to the petition (Rollo, pp. 108-109).

[8] Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 320 [1998]; Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 834 [1998]; Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 85 [2000], citing Congregation of the of the Virgin Mary v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 591 [1998] and Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, supra; Arriola v. Mahilum, G. R. No. 123490, August  9, 2000; Bolanos v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 122950, November 20, 2000.

[9] Atillo v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 546 [1997].

[10] Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc., 306 SCRA 762, 774-775 [1999].

[11] Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734, 743 [1998].

[12] Trade Unions of the Philippines v. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 586 [1995].

[13] Trade Unions of the Philippines v. Laguesma, supra, Note 12.

[14] Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 93 [1991]; Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,125 Phil. 701[1967]; Pilar Dev. Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 215 [1986]; Aroyo v. Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, 132 Phil. 9 [1968]; Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 224 [1992].

[15] Hi-Precision  Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim Kim Steel Builders, Inc. 228 SCRA 397 [1993]; Navarro v. Commission on  Elections, 228 SCRA 596 [1993].