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Showing posts with label February 8. Show all posts
Showing posts with label February 8. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 178090 February 8, 2010

SECOND DIVISION
Panasonic v. CIR (2010)
G.R. No. 178090 February 8, 2010
ABAD, J.:

This petition for review puts in issue the May 23, 2007 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) en banc in CTA EB 239, entitled Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which affirmed the denial of petitioners claim for refund.

The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (Panasonic) produces and exports plain paper copiers and their sub-assemblies, parts, and components. It is registered with the Board of Investments as a preferred pioneer enterprise under the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. It is also a registered value-added tax (VAT) enterprise.

From April 1 to September 30, 1998 and from October 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999, petitioner Panasonic generated export sales amounting to US$12,819,475.15 and US$11,859,489.78, respectively, for a total of US$24,678,964.93. Believing that these export sales were zero-rated for VAT under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 8424 (1997 NIRC), Panasonic paid input VAT of P4,980,254.26 and P4,388,228.14 for the two periods or a total of P9,368,482.40 attributable to its zero-rated sales.

Claiming that the input VAT it paid remained unutilized or unapplied, on March 12, 1999 and July 20, 1999 petitioner Panasonic filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) two separate applications for refund or tax credit of what it paid. When the BIR did not act on the same, Panasonic filed on December 16, 1999 a petition for review with the CTA, averring the inaction of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) on its applications.

After trial or on August 22, 2006 the CTAs First Division rendered judgment, denying the petition for lack of merit. The First Division said that, while petitioner Panasonics export sales were subject to 0% VAT under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1) of the 1997 NIRC, the same did not qualify for zero-rating because the word zero-rated was not printed on Panasonics export invoices. This omission, said the First Division, violates the invoicing requirements of Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations (RR) 7-95.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, on January 5, 2007 petitioner Panasonic appealed the First Divisions decision to the CTA en banc. On May 23, 2007 the CTA en banc upheld the First Divisions decision and resolution and dismissed the petition. Panasonic filed a motion for reconsideration of the en banc decision but this was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the present petition in accordance with R.A. 9282.

The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CTA en banc correctly denied petitioner Panasonics claim for refund of the VAT it paid as a zero-rated taxpayer on the ground that its sales invoices did not state on their faces that its sales were zero-rated.

The Courts Ruling
The VAT is a tax on consumption, an indirect tax that the provider of goods or services may pass on to his customers. Under the VAT method of taxation, which is invoice-based, an entity can subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT it paid on its purchases, inputs and imports. For example, when a seller charges VAT on its sale, it issues an invoice to the buyer, indicating the amount of VAT he charged. For his part, if the buyer is also a seller subjected to the payment of VAT on his sales, he can use the invoice issued to him by his supplier to get a reduction of his own VAT liability. The difference in tax shown on invoices passed and invoices received is the tax paid to the government. In case the tax on invoices received exceeds that on invoices passed, a tax refund may be claimed.

Under the 1997 NIRC, if at the end of a taxable quarter the seller charges output taxes equal to the input taxes that his suppliers passed on to him, no payment is required of him. It is when his output taxes exceed his input taxes that he has to pay the excess to the BIR. If the input taxes exceed the output taxes, however, the excess payment shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions or from the acquisition of capital goods, any excess over the output taxes shall instead be refunded to the taxpayer.

Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and services. The tax rate in this case is set at zero. When applied to the tax base or the selling price of the goods or services sold, such zero rate results in no tax chargeable against the foreign buyer or customer. But, although the seller in such transactions charges no output tax, he can claim a refund of the VAT that his suppliers charged him. The seller thus enjoys automatic zero rating, which allows him to recover the input taxes he paid relating to the export sales, making him internationally competitive.

For the effective zero rating of such transactions, however, the taxpayer has to be VAT-registered and must comply with invoicing requirements. Interpreting these requirements, respondent CIR ruled that under Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 42-2003, the taxpayers failure to comply with invoicing requirements will result in the disallowance of his claim for refund. RMC 42-2003 provides:
A-13. Failure by the supplier to comply with the invoicing requirements on the documents supporting the sale of goods and services will result to the disallowance of the claim for input tax by the purchaser-claimant.

If the claim for refund/TCC is based on the existence of zero-rated sales by the taxpayer but it fails to comply with the invoicing requirements in the issuance of sales invoices (e.g., failure to indicate the TIN), its claim for tax credit/refund of VAT on its purchases shall be denied considering that the invoice it is issuing to its customers does not depict its being a VAT-registered taxpayer whose sales are classified as zero-rated sales. Nonetheless, this treatment is without prejudice to the right of the taxpayer to charge the input taxes to the appropriate expense account or asset account subject to depreciation, whichever is applicable. Moreover, the case shall be referred by the processing office to the concerned BIR office for verification of other tax liabilities of the taxpayer.

Petitioner Panasonic points out, however, that in requiring the printing on its sales invoices of the word zero-rated, the Secretary of Finance unduly expanded, amended, and modified by a mere regulation (Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95) the letter and spirit of Sections 113 and 237 of the 1997 NIRC, prior to their amendment by R.A. 9337.  Panasonic argues that the 1997 NIRC, which applied to its payments specifically Sections 113 and 237required the VAT-registered taxpayers receipts or invoices to indicate only the following information:

(1) A statement that the seller is a VAT-registered person, followed by his taxpayer's identification number (TIN);
(2) The total amount which the purchaser pays or is obligated to pay to the seller with the indication that such amount includes the value-added tax;
(3) The date of transaction, quantity, unit cost and description of the goods or properties or nature of the service; and
(4) The name, business style, if any, address and taxpayers identification number (TIN) of the purchaser, customer or client.

Petitioner Panasonic points out that Sections 113 and 237 did not require the inclusion of the word zero-rated for zero-rated sales covered by its receipts or invoices. The BIR incorporated this requirement only after the enactment of R.A. 9337 on November 1, 2005, a law that did not yet exist at the time it issued its invoices.

But when petitioner Panasonic made the export sales subject of this case, i.e., from April 1998 to March 1999, the rule that applied was Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95, otherwise known as the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations, which the Secretary of Finance issued on December 9, 1995 and took effect on January 1, 1996. It already required the printing of the word zero-rated on the invoices covering zero-rated sales. When R.A. 9337 amended the 1997 NIRC on November 1, 2005, it made this particular revenue regulation a part of the tax code. This conversion from regulation to law did not diminish the binding force of such regulation with respect to acts committed prior to the enactment of that law.

Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 proceeds from the rule-making authority granted to the Secretary of Finance under Section 245 of the 1977 NIRC (Presidential Decree 1158) for the efficient enforcement of the tax code and of course its amendments. The requirement is reasonable and is in accord with the efficient collection of VAT from the covered sales of goods and services. As aptly explained by the CTAs First Division, the appearance of the word zero-rated on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be refunding money it did not collect.

Further, the printing of the word zero-rated on the invoice helps segregate sales that are subject to 10% (now 12%) VAT from those sales that are zero-rated. Unable to submit the proper invoices, petitioner Panasonic has been unable to substantiate its claim for refund.

Petitioner Panasonics citation of Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue is misplaced. Quite the contrary, it strengthens the position taken by respondent CIR. In that case, the CIR denied the claim for tax refund on the ground of the taxpayers failure to indicate on its invoices the BIR authority to print. But Sec. 4.108-1 required only the following to be reflected on the invoice:

1. The name, taxpayers identification number (TIN) and address of seller;
2. Date of transaction;
3. Quantity, unit cost and description of merchandise or nature of service;
4. The name, TIN, business style, if any, and address of the VAT-registered purchaser, customer or client;
5. The word zero-rated imprinted on the invoice covering zero-rated sales; and
6. The invoice value or consideration.

This Court held that, since the BIR authority to print is not one of the items required to be indicated on the invoices or receipts, the BIR erred in denying the claim for refund. Here, however, the ground for denial of petitioner Panasonics claim for tax refundthe absence of the word zero-rated on its invoicesis one which is specifically and precisely included in the above enumeration. Consequently, the BIR correctly denied Panasonics claim for tax refund.

This Court will not set aside lightly the conclusions reached by the CTA which, by the very nature of its functions, is dedicated exclusively to the resolution of tax problems and has accordingly developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority. Besides, statutes that grant tax exemptions are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Tax refunds in relation to the VAT are in the nature of such exemptions. The general rule is that claimants of tax refunds bear the burden of proving the factual basis of their claims. Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation. Therefore, statutes that allow exemptions are construed strictly against the grantee and liberally in favor of the government.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Tax Case Digest: Panasonic v. CIR (2010)

SECOND DIVISION
Panasonic v. CIR (2010)
G.R. No. 178090 February 8, 2010
ABAD, J.

Lessons Applicable: invoice requirements

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
  • Petitioner Panasonic, a VAT-registered enterprise who believing that its export sales are zero-rated sales, paid input VAT.  
  • Since its input VAT is unutilized, it filed a claim for refund on tax credit.
  • CTA denied since its invoice was not printed with "zero-rated"
ISSUE: W/N Panasonic qualifies for zero-rated sales and can refund its unutilized input VAT

HELD: petition is DENIED. NO.
  • VAT is a tax on consumption, an indirect tax that the provider of goods or services may pass on to his customers. Under the VAT method of taxation, which is invoice-based, an entity can subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT it paid on its purchases, inputs and imports.  
  • Under the 1997 NIRC, if at the end of a taxable quarter the seller charges output taxes equal to the input taxes that his suppliers passed on to him, no payment is required of him. It is when his output taxes exceed his input taxes that he has to pay the excess to the BIR. If the input taxes exceed the output taxes, however, the excess payment shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions or from the acquisition of capital goods, any excess over the output taxes shall instead be refunded to the taxpayer.
  • Under RMC 42-2003, failure to comply with invoicing requirements will result in the disallowance of his claim for refund.  Since Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 is effective then, it should comply with word zero-rated for zero-rated sales covered by its receipts or invoices.
  • It also became part of 1997 NIRC on November 1, 2005 not diminishing the binding force of the prior enactment.
  • The requirement is reasonable and in accord with efficient collection of VAT preventing false claims and help segregate sales.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 172966 February 8, 2007


SECOND DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES  vs. EUGENIO PILIIN y GARCIA

G.R. No. 172966             February 8, 2007

Tinga, J.:

          For automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated   31 March 2006, affirming with modification the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) Decision[2] convicting Eugenio Piliin (appellant) for the crime of murder.

On 1 December 1997, an Information[3] for murder of Rodrigo Zayenis (Rodrigo) was filed against appellant, Alex Yu (Yu) and Giovanni Caballes (Caballes)  before the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna.  It reads:

That on or about 7:20 in the evening of November 19, 1997 at Jose Rizal St., Municipality of Siniloan, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused EUGENIO PILIIN, while conveniently armed with a Cal. 38 Revolver (paltic) handgun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with the other accused, Alex A. Yu and Giovanni E. Caballes, who acted as lookouts, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and the commission of the crime was committed during nighttime, in consideration of a price, reward and promise and in disregard of the respect due to the offended party/victim, being an Assisstant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot and hit RODRIGO B. ZAYENIS on the head, thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal gunshot wou[n]d which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.

That the [qualifying] and aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and the crime was committed during [nighttime], were all present.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The three accused pleaded not guilty.  Thereafter, upon motion of the prosecution, this Court ordered a change of venue and the case was transferred to Branch 275 of RTC Las Piñas.[4]

During the trial that ensued, the prosecution sought to establish the following facts.  On 19 November 1997, at around 7:20 p.m., Rodrigo, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna,  arrived  at  the  gate of his house in Siniloan, Laguna, aboard an owner-type jeep he was driving. His wife, Norma Zayenis (Norma), who was inside the house at the time, went out to open the gate. When Rodrigo was about to park his jeep, a man, later identified as appellant, suddenly approached him, poked his gun, and fired at him, hitting the left side of his neck.  Rodrigo fell unconscious and the man quickly ran away.[5]  Rodrigo was initially brought to two (2) hospitals in Laguna, but for reasons not appearing on record, he was refused admission. He was then brought to St. Luke’s Hospital in Quezon City, where he fell into coma and succumbed to a gunshot wound.[6]

          The police received a tip from an informant that three persons were involved in the shooting incident, two of whom acted as lookouts.  Appellant was invited for questioning in connection with a carnapped tricycle.  He later confessed to the killing of Rodrigo and implicated Yu and Caballes as his co-perpetrators.  He also identified the house at Libis ng Nayon Resort, Bgy. Paagahan, Mabitac, Laguna where the firearm used was kept. The police proceeded to the resort and found Yu and Caballes sleeping inside a room. They were apprehended.  The police also recovered the firearm, a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson, on the bedside.[7]  

          A paraffin test was conducted and appellant was found positive for gun powder nitrates.[8]

           During the custodial investigation, the three (3) accused executed three (3) separate extra-judicial confessions,[9] admitting their complicity in the killing of Rodrigo.

       

          On 24 November 1997, a criminal complaint[10] was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Siniloan Famy, Laguna.  A preliminary investigation was conducted.  In a Resolution[11] dated 27 November 1997, Judge Solemnidad Evasco-Urriza forwarded the case to the Office of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information.

          The evidence of the defense consisted of the testimonies of the three (3) accused who denied knowing the victim Rodrigo, much less their involvement in the crime.   They each interposed alibi as their defense.

          Appellant claimed that he was at the “peryahan” in Bgy. San Miguel, Mabitac, Laguna in the evening of 19 November 1997.  He allegedly  arrived  at  around  7:15 p.m.  and  went home at 10:00 p.m.

An hour later, his grandfather asked him to go to the Barangay Hall and answer questions about a missing tricycle.  When he returned home, the police went to his house at 2:00 a.m. and asked him again about the tricycle.  He was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Famy, Laguna and detained.  At 5:30 a.m., he was transferred to the detention cell in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.  Three (3) hours after, he was brought to the provincial hospital for examination.  When he returned to the detention cell, he was then asked to sign a document.  When he refused to sign, he was mauled by two (2) policemen.  He was then forced to sign the document.[12]

          Yu was allegedly on duty as a lifeguard of a resort owned by Tirso dela Cruz on 19 November 1997.  His shift ended at 7:00 p.m. after which he ate dinner and went to sleep.  At around 5:00 a.m., he was arrested by police operatives on charge of carnapping.  Upon reaching the Sta. Cruz police station, he was asked to sign a document in exchange for his release.  After signing, the policemen informed Yu that he was a suspect in the murder of Rodrigo.  He was likewise brought to the hospital for examination and brought back to his detention cell.[13]

          Caballes narrated that he and his brother, Alvin, were sleeping at Yu’s house at around 7:20 p.m. on 19 November 1997. Upon waking up the following day, he saw Alvin being invited by the police

officers for questioning.  He then volunteered to accompany Alvin.  While in the precinct, he was asked to write his name on a blank sheet of paper.  Caballes, together with Yu, was brought to the hospital and then transferred to the detention cell in Sta. Cruz and eventually to the Provincial Jail.[14]

After trial, appellant was found guilty for murder.  The two other accused, Yu and Caballes were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.  The trial court considered the extrajudicial confessions of the three accused as inadmissible on the ground that they were not adequately informed of their constitutional right to engage a counsel of their own choice.[15]  The court a quo nevertheless found that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to convict appellant.  It relied on the testimony of the widow, Norma, who positively identified appellant as the one who shot her husband.  The trial court appreciated the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime in sentencing appellant to the penalty of death for the crime of murder.

The records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on automatic review. However, pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo,[16] this Court issued a Resolution[17] dated 24 August 2004 transferring the case to the Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming the RTC decision, with modification that the death penalty be reduced to reclusion perpetua.  The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City (Branch 275) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that (i) the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant Eugenio Piliin is lowered to reclusion perpetual; (ii) the award of moral damages and civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 each; and (iii) accused-appellant Eugenio Piliin is ordered to pay to the heirs of the deceased Rodrigo B. Zayenis the sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The appellate court ruled out the aggravating circumstance of nighttime when it modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

The two issues presented before us are: (1) whether the trial court erred in convicting appellant of murder and (2) whether the trial court erred in disregarding appellant’s defense of alibi.  The Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the People, did not contest before this Court the non-appreciation of nighttime as an aggravating circumstance.

          Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish the existence  of  treachery.   According  to appellant, the witness failed to

see the inception of the attack because she was in the act of opening the gate for her husband when the latter was shot.  She lacked knowledge of the attending circumstances prior to the shooting incident.  Hence, the trial court’s finding of treachery becomes speculative.[19]

          The conviction of appellant, as well as the appreciation of treachery, was based on the testimony of Norma, an eyewitness to the shooting of her husband.  We reiterate the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on us.  The trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is accorded great respect because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses on the stand.[20]

The trial court properly appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.  There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in their execution, without risk to himself arising from the defenses which the offended party might make.[21]  To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed.[22]  The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders the latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack.[23]  Appellant’s wife witnessed the incident from its inception up to its consummation. She testified:

Q-        Madam Witness, at about 7:20 in the evening of November 19, 1997, do you recall where were you then?

A-        I was inside our house and I went out of the house to open our gate, Sir.

Q-        When was that?

A-        More or less 7:20 in the evening.

Q-        What was the reason why you went outside to open the gate?

A-        Because my husband will enter our gate and park his jeep inside.

Q-        Who is your husband?

A-        Fiscal Rodrigo B. Zayenis, Sir.

Q-        And while you were then opening your gate, do you remember what happened next, if any?

A-        My husband was on the act of parking his jeepney when one person suddenly arrived holding a gun.

Q-        What happened next when you noticed one person suddenly appeared?

A-        That person, Sir, who appeared approached my husband and poked his gun and fired at him.

Q-        What happened to your husband when this person shot your husband?

A-        He lost consciousness, and I ran towards him to help him.

Q-        Do you know where was your husband hit?  What part of his body, if you remember?

A-        On the left side. (Witness pointing on her left neck).

Q-        How many times did this man shot [sic] your husband?

A-        As far as I can remember, one (1) shot.

Q-        After this man shot your husband, what did this man do?

A-        He ran away.[24]

In this case, the victim was about to park his car when appellant suddenly appeared and shot him without any warning.  The attack was so sudden that the latter had no opportunity to repel it or defend himself.  It can readily be inferred that the manner of the attack adopted by appellant manifested treachery.  Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the weapon used and the nature of the injury inflicted, which pertained to the lone gunshot fatally wounding appellant, established that appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the particular mode of attack to ensure the commission of the offense with impunity.

  Appellant insists that he was in Barangay San Miguel, Mabitac, Laguna from 7:20 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., while the shooting incident took place in Siniloan, Laguna at 7:20 p.m.  It was physically impossible for him to have been present in Siniloan, which is seven (7) kilometers away from Mabitac.  The Solicitor General maintains that alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the witness, who does not show any ill-motive on her part to testify falsely.  He further asserts that it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime.

The appellate court correctly rejected the defense of alibi set up by appellant. For alibi to be credible, the accused must not only prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense but must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at that time.[25]  In the case at bar, appellant claims that he was in Mabitac, which was seven (7) kilometers away from the locus criminis. The appellate court noted that it was not impossible for appellant to traverse this distance. Moreover, his alibi is uncorroborated.  Alibi is a weak defense in light of the positive identification by an eyewitness to the offense.[26]  Norma categorically identified appellant as the man who shot her husband.  She testified, thus:

FISCAL MANGROBANG:

Q-         Madam Witness, did you recognize who was the man who shot your husband during that particular date and time?

A-        Yes, sir.  I was able to recognize the face of the man.

Q-        Would you describe the lighting condition at that time when this man shot your husband?

A-        It was properly lighted because there was light from the bakery and from the post.

Q-        How far were you from this man who shot your husband?

A-        More or less two (2) meters.



Q-        Would you describe this man which you saw who shot your husband?

A-        He is fair complexion[ed] with short hair and with [a] moustache.



Q-        If you see again this man who shot your husband, would you be able to recognize him?

A-        Yes, sir.



Q-        Will you please look around and point to him?

A-        He is Eugenio Piliin. (Witness points to a man who stands up and identified himself to be Eugenio Piliin).[27]

 There is no showing that she has ill motive to testify falsely against appellant. On the contrary, her relationship to the victim strengthens her credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit. Their natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating a person other than the true offender.[28]

WHEREFORE,  the  decision  of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of EUGENIO PILIIN y GARCIA of the crime of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, as well as ordering him to pay  to  the heirs of  Rodrigo  Zayenis   P50,000.00  as

indemnity for death, P50,000.00 for moral damages, and P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People v. Piliin

People v. Piliin
G.R. No. 172966  February 8, 2007

Lesson Applicable: treachery, aggravating circumstance of nighttime,



FACTS:

·         November 19, 1997 7:20 pm: Rodrigo, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna,  arrived at the gate of his house in Siniloan, Laguna, driving his owner-type jeep. His wife, Norma Zayenis went out to open the gate. As he was about to park, Piliin suddenly approached him, poked his gun, and fired at him, hitting the left side of his neck.  Rodrigo fell unconscious and the man quickly ran away

·         Rodrigo was brought to 2 hospitals in Laguna, but was refused admission so he was brought to St. Luke’s Hospital in Quezon City, where he fell into coma and succumbed to a gunshot wound.

·         The police received a tip from an informant that 3 persons were involved in the shooting incident, 2 of whom acted as lookouts.  Piliin was invited for questioning in connection with a carnapped tricycle.  He later confessed to the killing of Rodrigo and implicated Yu and Caballes as his co-perpetrators.  He also identified the house at Libis ng Nayon Resort, Laguna where the firearm used was kept . The police proceeded to the resort and apprehended Yu and Caballes who were sleeping inside a room and also recovered a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson on the bedside.  Paraffin test on Piliin was positive for gun powder nitrates.

·         Norma positively identified Piliin as the one who shot her husband

·         Piliin’s Alibi: November 19, 1997 7:15 p.m, he was at the “peryahan” in Bgy. San Miguel, Mabitac, Laguna and went home at 10:00 pm.  At 11:00 pm, his grandfather asked him to go to the barangay hall to answer the questions of the police about . When he returned home, the police went to his house at 2:00 a.m. and brought him to the Municipal hall.  At 5:30 am, he was transferred to the detention cell in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. 3 hours after, he was brought to the provincial hospital for examination.  When he returned to the detention cell, he was then asked to sign a document.  He was mauled and forced to sign the document.

·         Yu’s alibi: His shift as a lifeguard of a resort owned by Tirso dela Cruz on ended November 19, 1997 7:00 pm so he ate dinner and went to sleep.  At 5:00 am, he was arrested on charge of carnapping.  Upon reaching the Sta. Cruz police station, he was asked to sign a document in exchange for his release.  After signing, the policemen informed him that he was a suspect in the murder of Rodrigo.  He was brought to the hospital for examination and brought back to his detention cell.

·         Caballes’ Alibi: He and his brother, Alvin, slept at Yu’s house. Upon waking up on November 20, 1997, he saw Alvin being invited by the police officers for questioningso he volunteered to accompany Alvin.  While in the precinct, he was asked to write his name on a blank sheet of paper.  Then together with Yu, he was brought to the hospital and then transferred to the detention cell in Sta. Cruz.

·         RTC:  Piliin guilty for murder. Yu and Caballes were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.  Extrajudicial confessions were inadmissible on the ground that they were not adequately informed of their constitutional right to engage a counsel of their own choice.  Appreciated the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime in sentencing appellant to the penalty of death for the crime of murder.

·         CA: Affirmed RTC but ruled out the aggravating circumstance of nighttime

·         Piliin argues that the prosecution failed to establish the existence  of treachery because Norma was in the act of opening the gate for her husband when the latter was shot.  She lacked knowledge of the attending circumstances prior to the shooting incident.

ISSUE: W/N there is treachery

HELD: YES. CA Affirmed.

·         There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in their execution, without risk to himself arising from the defenses which the offended party might make.

·         To establish treachery, 2 elements must concur:

    (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself

§  He suddenly appeared and shot him without any warning so Rodrigo had no opportunity to repel it or defend himself

    (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed

§  weapon used and the nature of the injury inflicted, which pertained to the lone gunshot fatally wounding Rodrigo, established that Piliin deliberately and consciously adopted the particular mode of attack to ensure the commission of the offense with impunity

·         The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders the latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack

·         Norma witnessed the incident from its inception up to its consummation