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Showing posts with label February 9. Show all posts
Showing posts with label February 9. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 92288 February 9, 1993

SECOND DIVISION

 G.R. No. 92288 February 9, 1993

BRITISH AIRWAYS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Twelfth Division, and FIRST INTERNATIONAL TRADING AND GENERAL SERVICES, respondents.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for petitioner.

Monina P. Lee for private respondent.



NOCON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision dated November 15, 1989 of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the decision of the trial court 2 in ordering petitioner British Airways, Inc. to pay private respondent First International Trading and General Services actual damages, moral damages, corrective or exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs as well as the Resolution dated February 15, 1990 3 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the appealed decision.

It appears on record that on February 15, 1981, private respondent First International Trading and General Services Co., a duly licensed domestic recruitment and placement agency, received a telex message from its principal ROLACO Engineering and Contracting Services in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to recruit Filipino contract workers in behalf of said principal. 4

During the early part of March 1981, said principal paid to the Jeddah branch of petitioner British Airways, Inc. airfare tickets for 93 contract workers with specific instruction to transport said workers to Jeddah on or before March 30, 1981.

As soon as petitioner received a prepaid ticket advice from its Jeddah branch to transport the 93 workers, private respondent was immediately informed by petitioner that its principal had forwarded 93 prepaid tickets. Thereafter, private respondent instructed its travel agent, ADB Travel and Tours. Inc., to book the 93 workers with petitioner but the latter failed to fly said workers, thereby compelling private respondent to borrow money in the amount of P304,416.00 in order to purchase airline tickets from the other airlines as evidenced by the cash vouchers (Exhibits "B", "C" and "C-1 to C-7") for the 93 workers it had recruited who must leave immediately since the visas of said workers are valid only for 45 days and the Bureau of Employment Services mandates that contract workers must be sent to the job site within a period of 30 days.

Sometime in the first week of June, 1981, private respondent was again informed by the petitioner that it had received a prepaid ticket advice from its Jeddah branch for the transportation of 27 contract workers. Immediatety, private respondent instructed its travel agent to book the 27 contract workers with the petitioner but the latter was only able to book and confirm 16 seats on its June 9, 1981 flight. However, on the date of the scheduled flight only 9 workers were able to board said flight while the remaining 7 workers were rebooked to June 30, 1981 which bookings were again cancelled by the petitioner without any prior notice to either private respondent or the workers. Thereafter, the 7 workers were rebooked to the July 4,1981 flight of petitioner with 6 more workers booked for said flight. Unfortunately, the confirmed bookings of the 13 workers were again cancelled and rebooked to July 7, 1981.

On July 6, 1981, private respondent paid the travel tax of the said workers as required by the petitioner but when the receipt of the tax payments was submitted, the latter informed private respondent that it can only confirm the seats of the 12 workers on its July 7, 1981 flight. However, the confirmed seats of said workers were again cancelled without any prior notice either to the private respondent or said workers. The 12 workers were finally able to leave for Jeddah after private respondent had bought tickets from the other airlines.

As a result of these incidents, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner demanding compensation for the damages it had incurred by the latter's repeated failure to transport its contract workers despite confirmed bookings and payment of the corresponding travel taxes.

On July 23, 1981, the counsel of private respondent sent another letter to the petitioner demanding the latter to pay the amount of P350,000.00 representing damages and unrealized profit or income which was denied by the petitioner.

On August 8, 1981, private respondent received a telex message from its principal cancelling the hiring of the remaining recruited workers due to the delay in transporting the workers to Jeddah. 5

On January 27, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 82-4653.

On the other hand, petitioner, alleged in its Answer with counterclaims that it received a telex message from Jeddah on March 20, 1981 advising that the principal of private respondent had prepaid the airfares of 100 persons to transport private respondent's contract workers from Manila to Jeddah on or before March 30, 1981. However, due to the unavailability of space and limited time, petitioner had to return to its sponsor in Jeddah the prepaid ticket advice consequently not even one of the alleged 93 contract workers were booked in any of its flights.

On June 5, 1981, petitioner received another prepaid ticket advice to transport 16 contract workers of private respondent to Jeddah but the travel agent of the private respondent booked only 10 contract workers for petitioner's June 9, 1981 flight. However, only 9 contract workers boarded the scheduled flight with 1 passenger not showing up as evidenced by the Philippine Airlines' passenger manifest for Flight BA-020 (Exhibit "7", "7-A", "7-B" and "7-C"). 6

Thereafter, private respondent's travel agent booked seats for 5 contract workers on petitioner's July 4, 1981 flight but said travel agent cancelled the booking of 2 passengers while the other 3 passengers did not show up on said flight.

Sometime in July 1981, the travel agent of the private respondent booked 7 more contract workers in addition to the previous 5 contract workers who were not able to board the July 4, 1981 flight with the petitioner's July 7, 1981 flight which was accepted by petitioner subject to reconfirmation.

However on July 6, 1981, petitioner's computer system broke down which resulted to petitioner's failure to get a reconfirmation from Saudi Arabia Airlines causing the automatic cancellation of the bookings of private respondent's 12 contract workers. In the morning of July 7, 1981, the computer system of the petitioner was reinstalled and immediately petitioner tried to reinstate the bookings of the 12 workers with either Gulf Air or Saudi Arabia Airlines but both airlines replied that no seat was available on that date and had to place the 12 workers on the wait list. Said information was duly relayed to the private respondent and the 12 workers before the scheduled flight.

After due trial on or on August 27, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court renders judgment:

1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the sum of P308,016.00;

2. Ordering defendant to pay moral damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P20,000.00;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff P10,000.00 by way of corrective or exemplary damages;

4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff 30% of its total claim for and as attorney's fees; and

5. To pay the costs. 7

On March 13, 1986, petitioner appealed said decision to respondent appellate court after the trial court denied its Motion for Reconsideration on February 28, 1986.

On November 15, 1989, respondent appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against the appellant. 8

On December 9, 1989, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied.

Hence, this petition.

It is the contention of petitioner that private respondent has no cause of action against it there being no perfected contract of carriage existing between them as no ticket was ever issued to private respondent's contract workers and, therefore, the obligation of the petitioner to transport said contract workers did not arise. Furthermore, private respondent's failure to attach any ticket in the complaint further proved that it was never a party to the alleged transaction.

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

Private respondent had a valid cause of action for damages against petitioner. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other. 9 Petitioner's repeated failures to transport private respondent's workers in its flight despite confirmed booking of said workers clearly constitutes breach of contract and bad faith on its part. In resolving petitioner's theory that private respondent has no cause of action in the instant case, the appellate court correctly held that:

In dealing with the contract of common carriage of passengers for purpose of accuracy, there are two (2) aspects of the same, namely: (a) the contract "to carry (at some future time)," which contract is consensual and is necessarily perfected by mere consent (See Article 1356, Civil Code of the Philippines), and (b) the contract "of carriage" or "of common carriage" itself which should be considered as a real contract for not until the carrier is actually used can the carrier be said to have already assumed the obligation of a carrier. (Paras, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. V, p. 429, Eleventh Ed.)

In the instant case, the contract "to carry" is the one involved which is consensual and is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.

There is no dispute as to the appellee's consent to the said contract "to carry" its contract workers from Manila to Jeddah. The appellant's consent thereto, on the other hand, was manifested by its acceptance of the PTA or prepaid ticket advice that ROLACO Engineering has prepaid the airfares of the appellee's contract workers advising the appellant that it must transport the contract workers on or before the end of March, 1981 and the other batch in June, 1981.

Even if a PTA is merely an advice from the sponsors that an airline is authorized to issue a ticket and thus no ticket was yet issued, the fact remains that the passage had already been paid for by the principal of the appellee, and the appellant had accepted such payment. The existence of this payment was never objected to nor questioned by the appellant in the lower court. Thus, the cause or consideration which is the fare paid for the passengers exists in this case.

The third essential requisite of a contract is an object certain. In this contract "to carry", such an object is the transport of the passengers from the place of departure to the place of destination as stated in the telex.

Accordingly, there could be no more pretensions as to the existence of an oral contract of carriage imposing reciprocal obligations on both parties.

In the case of appellee, it has fully complied with the obligation, namely, the payment of the fare and its willingness for its contract workers to leave for their place of destination.

On the other hand, the facts clearly show that appellant was remiss in its obligation to transport the contract workers on their flight despite confirmation and bookings made by appellee's travelling agent.

xxx xxx xxx

Besides, appellant knew very well that time was of the essence as the prepaid ticket advice had specified the period of compliance therewith, and with emphasis that it could only be used if the passengers fly on BA. Under the circumstances, the appellant should have refused acceptance of the PTA from appellee's principal or to at least inform appellee that it could not accommodate the contract workers.

xxx xxx xxx

While there is no dispute that ROLACO Engineering advanced the payment for the airfares of the appellee's contract workers who were recruited for ROLACO Engineering and the said contract workers were the intended passengers in the aircraft of the appellant, the said contract "to carry" also involved the appellee for as recruiter he had to see to it that the contract workers should be transported to ROLACO Engineering in Jeddah thru the appellant's transportation. For that matter, the involvement of the appellee in the said contract "to carry" was well demonstrated when
the appellant upon receiving the PTA immediately advised the appellee thereof. 10

Petitioner also contends that the appellate court erred in awarding actual damages in the amount of P308,016.00 to private respondent since all expenses had already been subsequently reimbursed by the latter's principal.

In awarding actual damages to private respondent, the appellate court held that the amount of P308,016.00 representing actual damages refers to private respondent's second cause of action involving the expenses incurred by the latter which were not reimbursed by ROLACO Engineering. However, in the Complaint 11 filed by private respondent, it was alleged that private respondent suffered actual damages in the amount of P308,016.00 representing the money it borrowed from friends and financiers which is P304,416.00 for the 93 airline tickets and P3,600.00 for the travel tax of the 12 workers. It is clear therefore that the actual damages private respondent seeks to recover are the airline tickets and travel taxes it spent for its workers which were already reimbursed by its principal and not for any other expenses it had incurred in the process of recruiting said contract workers. Inasmuch as all expenses including the processing fees incurred by private respondent had already been paid for by the latter's principal on a staggered basis as admitted in open court by its managing director, Mrs. Bienvenida Brusellas. 12 We do not find anymore justification in the appellate court's decision in granting actual damages to private respondent.

Thus, while it may be true that private respondent was compelled to borrow money for the airfare tickets of its contract workers when petitioner failed to transport said workers, the reimbursements made by its principal to private respondent failed to support the latter's claim that it suffered actual damages as a result of petitioner's failure to transport said workers. It is undisputed that private respondent had consistently admitted that its principal had reimbursed all its expenses.

Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that:

Except as provided by law or by stipulations, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Furthermore, actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. 13

However, private respondent is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages for the injury suffered as a result of petitioner's failure to transport the former's workers because of the latter's patent bad faith in the performance of its obligation. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court:

As evidence had proved, there was complete failure on the part of the appellant to transport the 93 contract workers of the appellee on or before March 30, 1981 despite receipt of the payment for their airfares, and acceptance of the same by the appellant, with specific instructions from the appellee's principal to transport the contract workers on or before March 30, 1981. No previous notice was ever registered by the appellant that it could not comply with the same. And then followed the detestable act of appellant in unilaterally cancelling, booking and rebooking unreasonably the flight of appellee's contract workers in June to July, 1981 without prior notice. And all of these actuations of the appellant indeed constitute malice and evident bad faith which had caused damage and besmirched the reputation and business image of the appellee. 14

As to the alleged damages suffered by the petitioner as stated in its counterclaims, the record shows that no claim for said damages was ever made by the petitioner immediately after their alleged occurrence therefore said counterclaims were mere afterthoughts when private respondent filed the present case.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages be deleted from said decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 92244 February 9, 1993



SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 92244   February 9, 1993

NATIVIDAD GEMPESAW, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:

From the adverse decision * of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 16447), petitioner, Natividad Gempesaw, appealed to this Court in a Petition for Review, on the issue of the right of the drawer to recover from the drawee bank who pays a check with a forged indorsement of the payee, debiting the same against the drawer's account.
The records show that on January 23, 1985, petitioner filed a Complaint against the private respondent Philippine Bank of Communications (respondent drawee Bank) for recovery of the money value of eighty-two (82) checks charged against the petitioner's account with the respondent drawee Bank on the ground that the payees' indorsements were forgeries. The Regional Trial Court, Branch CXXVIII of Caloocan City, which tried the case, rendered a decision on November 17, 1987 dismissing the complaint as well as the respondent drawee Bank's counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in a decision rendered on February 22, 1990, affirmed the decision of the RTC on two grounds, namely (1) that the plaintiff's (petitioner herein) gross negligence in issuing the checks was the proximate cause of the loss and (2) assuming that the bank was also negligent, the loss must nevertheless be borne by the party whose negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. On March 5, 1990, the petitioner filed this petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court setting forth the following as the alleged errors of the respondent Court: 1
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRAWER IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE RESULTING INJURY TO THE DRAWEE BANK, AND THE DRAWER IS PRECLUDED FROM SETTING UP THE FORGERY OR WANT OF AUTHORITY.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND RULING THAT IT IS THE GROSS AND INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUDULENT ACTS OF THE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE RESPONDENT BANK IN FORGING THE SIGNATURE OF THE PAYEES AND THE WRONG AND/OR ILLEGAL PAYMENTS MADE TO PERSONS, OTHER THAN TO THE INTENDED PAYEES SPECIFIED IN THE CHECKS, IS THE DIRECT AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE TO PETITIONER WHOSE SAVING (SIC) ACCOUNT WAS DEBITED.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE RESPONDENT BANK TO RESTORE OR RE-CREDIT THE CHECKING ACCOUNT OF THE PETITIONER IN THE CALOOCAN CITY BRANCH BY THE VALUE OF THE EIGHTY-TWO (82) CHECKS WHICH IS IN THE AMOUNT OF P1,208,606.89 WITH LEGAL INTEREST.
From the records, the relevant facts are as follows:
Petitioner Natividad O. Gempesaw (petitioner) owns and operates four grocery stores located at Rizal Avenue Extension and at Second Avenue, Caloocan City. Among these groceries are D.G. Shopper's Mart and D.G. Whole Sale Mart. Petitioner maintains a checking account numbered 13-00038-1 with the Caloocan City Branch of the respondent drawee Bank. To facilitate payment of debts to her suppliers, petitioner draws checks against her checking account with the respondent bank as drawee. Her customary practice of issuing checks in payment of her suppliers was as follows: the checks were prepared and filled up as to all material particulars by her trusted bookkeeper, Alicia Galang, an employee for more than eight (8) years. After the bookkeeper prepared the checks, the completed checks were submitted to the petitioner for her signature, together with the corresponding invoice receipts which indicate the correct obligations due and payable to her suppliers. Petitioner signed each and every check without bothering to verify the accuracy of the checks against the corresponding invoices because she reposed full and implicit trust and confidence on her bookkeeper. The issuance and delivery of the checks to the payees named therein were left to the bookkeeper. Petitioner admitted that she did not make any verification as to whether or not the checks were delivered to their respective payees. Although the respondent drawee Bank notified her of all checks presented to and paid by the bank, petitioner did not verify he correctness of the returned checks, much less check if the payees actually received the checks in payment for the supplies she received. In the course of her business operations covering a period of two years, petitioner issued, following her usual practice stated above, a total of eighty-two (82) checks in favor of several suppliers. These checks were all presented by the indorsees as holders thereof to, and honored by, the respondent drawee Bank. Respondent drawee Bank correspondingly debited the amounts thereof against petitioner's checking account numbered 30-00038-1. Most of the aforementioned checks were for amounts in excess of her actual obligations to the various payees as shown in their corresponding invoices. To mention a few:
. . . 1) in Check No. 621127, dated June 27, 1984 in the amount of P11,895.23 in favor of Kawsek Inc. (Exh. A-60), appellant's actual obligation to said payee was only P895.33 (Exh. A-83); (2) in Check No. 652282 issued on September 18, 1984 in favor of Senson Enterprises in the amount of P11,041.20 (Exh. A-67) appellant's actual obligation to said payee was only P1,041.20 (Exh. 7); (3) in Check No. 589092 dated April 7, 1984 for the amount of P11,672.47 in favor of Marchem (Exh. A-61) appellant's obligation was only P1,672.47 (Exh. B); (4) in Check No. 620450 dated May 10, 1984 in favor of Knotberry for P11,677.10 (Exh. A-31) her actual obligation was only P677.10 (Exhs. C and C-1); (5) in Check No. 651862 dated August 9, 1984 in favor of Malinta Exchange Mart for P11,107.16 (Exh. A-62), her obligation was only P1,107.16 (Exh. D-2); (6) in Check No. 651863 dated August 11, 1984 in favor of Grocer's International Food Corp. in the amount of P11,335.60 (Exh. A-66), her obligation was only P1,335.60 (Exh. E and E-1); (7) in Check No. 589019 dated March 17, 1984 in favor of Sophy Products in the amount of P11,648.00 (Exh. A-78), her obligation was only P648.00 (Exh. G); (8) in Check No. 589028 dated March 10, 1984 for the amount of P11,520.00 in favor of the Yakult Philippines (Exh. A-73), the latter's invoice was only P520.00 (Exh. H-2); (9) in Check No. 62033 dated May 23, 1984 in the amount of P11,504.00 in favor of Monde Denmark Biscuit (Exh. A-34), her obligation was only P504.00 (Exhs. I-1 and I-2). 2
Practically, all the checks issued and honored by the respondent drawee bank were crossed checks. 3Aside from the daily notice given to the petitioner by the respondent drawee Bank, the latter also furnished her with a monthly statement of her transactions, attaching thereto all the cancelled checks she had issued and which were debited against her current account. It was only after the lapse of more two (2) years that petitioner found out about the fraudulent manipulations of her bookkeeper.
All the eighty-two (82) checks with forged signatures of the payees were brought to Ernest L. Boon, Chief Accountant of respondent drawee Bank at the Buendia branch, who, without authority therefor, accepted them all for deposit at the Buendia branch to the credit and/or in the accounts of Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam. Ernest L. Boon was a very close friend of Alfredo Y. Romero. Sixty-three (63) out of the eighty-two (82) checks were deposited in Savings Account No. 00844-5 of Alfredo Y. Romero at the respondent drawee Bank's Buendia branch, and four (4) checks in his Savings Account No. 32-81-9 at its Ongpin branch. The rest of the checks were deposited in Account No. 0443-4, under the name of Benito Lam at the Elcaño branch of the respondent drawee Bank.
About thirty (30) of the payees whose names were specifically written on the checks testified that they did not receive nor even see the subject checks and that the indorsements appearing at the back of the checks were not theirs.
The team of auditors from the main office of the respondent drawee Bank which conducted periodic inspection of the branches' operations failed to discover, check or stop the unauthorized acts of Ernest L. Boon. Under the rules of the respondent drawee Bank, only a Branch Manager and no other official of the respondent drawee bank, may accept a second indorsement on a check for deposit. In the case at bar, all the deposit slips of the eighty-two (82) checks in question were initialed and/or approved for deposit by Ernest L. Boon. The Branch Managers of the Ongpin and Elcaño branches accepted the deposits made in the Buendia branch and credited the accounts of Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam in their respective branches.
On November 7, 1984, petitioner made a written demand on respondent drawee Bank to credit her account with the money value of the eighty-two (82) checks totalling P1,208.606.89 for having been wrongfully charged against her account. Respondent drawee Bank refused to grant petitioner's demand. On January 23, 1985, petitioner filed the complaint with the Regional Trial Court.
This is not a suit by the party whose signature was forged on a check drawn against the drawee bank. The payees are not parties to the case. Rather, it is the drawer, whose signature is genuine, who instituted this action to recover from the drawee bank the money value of eighty-two (82) checks paid out by the drawee bank to holders of those checks where the indorsements of the payees were forged. How and by whom the forgeries were committed are not established on the record, but the respective payees admitted that they did not receive those checks and therefore never indorsed the same. The applicable law is the Negotiable Instruments Law 4(heretofore referred to as the NIL). Section 23 of the NIL provides:
When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.
Under the aforecited provision, forgery is a real or absolute defense by the party whose signature is forged. A party whose signature to an instrument was forged was never a party and never gave his consent to the contract which gave rise to the instrument. Since his signature does not appear in the instrument, he cannot be held liable thereon by anyone, not even by a holder in due course. Thus, if a person's signature is forged as a maker of a promissory note, he cannot be made to pay because he never made the promise to pay. Or where a person's signature as a drawer of a check is forged, the drawee bank cannot charge the amount thereof against the drawer's account because he never gave the bank the order to pay. And said section does not refer only to the forged signature of the maker of a promissory note and of the drawer of a check. It covers also a forged indorsement, i.e., the forged signature of the payee or indorsee of a note or check. Since under said provision a forged signature is "wholly inoperative", no one can gain title to the instrument through such forged indorsement. Such an indorsement prevents any subsequent party from acquiring any right as against any party whose name appears prior to the forgery. Although rights may exist between and among parties subsequent to the forged indorsement, not one of them can acquire rights against parties prior to the forgery. Such forged indorsement cuts off the rights of all subsequent parties as against parties prior to the forgery. However, the law makes an exception to these rules where a party is precluded from setting up forgery as a defense.
As a matter of practical significance, problems arising from forged indorsements of checks may generally be broken into two types of cases: (1) where forgery was accomplished by a person not associated with the drawer - for example a mail robbery; and (2) where the indorsement was forged by an agent of the drawer. This difference in situations would determine the effect of the drawer's negligence with respect to forged indorsements. While there is no duty resting on the depositor to look for forged indorsements on his cancelled checks in contrast to a duty imposed upon him to look for forgeries of his own name, a depositor is under a duty to set up an accounting system and a business procedure as are reasonably calculated to prevent or render difficult the forgery of indorsements, particularly by the depositor's own employees. And if the drawer (depositor) learns that a check drawn by him has been paid under a forged indorsement, the drawer is under duty promptly to report such fact to the drawee bank. 5For his negligence or failure either to discover or to report promptly the fact of such forgery to the drawee, the drawer loses his right against the drawee who has debited his account under a forged indorsement. 6In other words, he is precluded from using forgery as a basis for his claim for re-crediting of his account.
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the checks were filled up and completed by her trusted employee, Alicia Galang, and were given to her for her signature. Her signing the checks made the negotiable instrument complete. Prior to signing the checks, there was no valid contract yet.
Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument to the payee for the purpose of giving effect thereto. 7The first delivery of the instrument, complete in form, to the payee who takes it as a holder, is called issuance of the instrument. 8Without the initial delivery of the instrument from the drawer of the check to the payee, there can be no valid and binding contract and no liability on the instrument.
Petitioner completed the checks by signing them as drawer and thereafter authorized her employee Alicia Galang to deliver the eighty-two (82) checks to their respective payees. Instead of issuing the checks to the payees as named in the checks, Alicia Galang delivered them to the Chief Accountant of the Buendia branch of the respondent drawee Bank, a certain Ernest L. Boon. It was established that the signatures of the payees as first indorsers were forged. The record fails to show the identity of the party who made the forged signatures. The checks were then indorsed for the second time with the names of Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam, and were deposited in the latter's accounts as earlier noted. The second indorsements were all genuine signatures of the alleged holders. All the eighty-two (82) checks bearing the forged indorsements of the payees and the genuine second indorsements of Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam were accepted for deposit at the Buendia branch of respondent drawee Bank to the credit of their respective savings accounts in the Buendia, Ongpin and Elcaño branches of the same bank. The total amount of P1,208,606.89, represented by eighty-two (82) checks, were credited and paid out by respondent drawee Bank to Alfredo Y. Romero and Benito Lam, and debited against petitioner's checking account No. 13-00038-1, Caloocan branch.
As a rule, a drawee bank who has paid a check on which an indorsement has been forged cannot charge the drawer's account for the amount of said check. An exception to this rule is where the drawer is guilty of such negligence which causes the bank to honor such a check or checks. If a check is stolen from the payee, it is quite obvious that the drawer cannot possibly discover the forged indorsement by mere examination of his cancelled check. This accounts for the rule that although a depositor owes a duty to his drawee bank to examine his cancelled checks for forgery of his own signature, he has no similar duty as to forged indorsements. A different situation arises where the indorsement was forged by an employee or agent of the drawer, or done with the active participation of the latter. Most of the cases involving forgery by an agent or employee deal with the payee's indorsement. The drawer and the payee often time shave business relations of long standing. The continued occurrence of business transactions of the same nature provides the opportunity for the agent/employee to commit the fraud after having developed familiarity with the signatures of the parties. However, sooner or later, some leak will show on the drawer's books. It will then be just a question of time until the fraud is discovered. This is specially true when the agent perpetrates a series of forgeries as in the case at bar.
The negligence of a depositor which will prevent recovery of an unauthorized payment is based on failure of the depositor to act as a prudent businessman would under the circumstances. In the case at bar, the petitioner relied implicitly upon the honesty and loyalty of her bookkeeper, and did not even verify the accuracy of amounts of the checks she signed against the invoices attached thereto. Furthermore, although she regularly received her bank statements, she apparently did not carefully examine the same nor the check stubs and the returned checks, and did not compare them with the same invoices. Otherwise, she could have easily discovered the discrepancies between the checks and the documents serving as bases for the checks. With such discovery, the subsequent forgeries would not have been accomplished. It was not until two years after the bookkeeper commenced her fraudulent scheme that petitioner discovered that eighty-two (82) checks were wrongfully charged to her account, at which she notified the respondent drawee bank.
It is highly improbable that in a period of two years, not one of Petitioner's suppliers complained of non-payment. Assuming that even one single complaint had been made, petitioner would have been duty-bound, as far as the respondent drawee Bank was concerned, to make an adequate investigation on the matter. Had this been done, the discrepancies would have been discovered, sooner or later. Petitioner's failure to make such adequate inquiry constituted negligence which resulted in the bank's honoring of the subsequent checks with forged indorsements. On the other hand, since the record mentions nothing about such a complaint, the possibility exists that the checks in question covered inexistent sales. But even in such a case, considering the length of a period of two (2) years, it is hard to believe that petitioner did not know or realize that she was paying more than she should for the supplies she was actually getting. A depositor may not sit idly by, after knowledge has come to her that her funds seem to be disappearing or that there may be a leak in her business, and refrain from taking the steps that a careful and prudent businessman would take in such circumstances and if taken, would result in stopping the continuance of the fraudulent scheme. If she fails to take steps, the facts may establish her negligence, and in that event, she would be estopped from recovering from the bank. 9
One thing is clear from the records - that the petitioner failed to examine her records with reasonable diligence whether before she signed the checks or after receiving her bank statements. Had the petitioner examined her records more carefully, particularly the invoice receipts, cancelled checks, check book stubs, and had she compared the sums written as amounts payable in the eighty-two (82) checks with the pertinent sales invoices, she would have easily discovered that in some checks, the amounts did not tally with those appearing in the sales invoices. Had she noticed these discrepancies, she should not have signed those checks, and should have conducted an inquiry as to the reason for the irregular entries. Likewise had petitioner been more vigilant in going over her current account by taking careful note of the daily reports made by respondent drawee Bank in her issued checks, or at least made random scrutiny of cancelled checks returned by respondent drawee Bank at the close of each month, she could have easily discovered the fraud being perpetrated by Alicia Galang, and could have reported the matter to the respondent drawee Bank. The respondent drawee Bank then could have taken immediate steps to prevent further commission of such fraud. Thus, petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause of her loss. And since it was her negligence which caused the respondent drawee Bank to honor the forged checks or prevented it from recovering the amount it had already paid on the checks, petitioner cannot now complain should the bank refuse to recredit her account with the amount of such checks. 10Under Section 23 of the NIL, she is now precluded from using the forgery to prevent the bank's debiting of her account.
The doctrine in the case of Great Eastern Life Insurance Co. vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank 11is not applicable to the case at bar because in said case, the check was fraudulently taken and the signature of the payee was forged not by an agent or employee of the drawer. The drawer was not found to be negligent in the handling of its business affairs and the theft of the check by a total stranger was not attributable to negligence of the drawer; neither was the forging of the payee's indorsement due to the drawer's negligence. Since the drawer was not negligent, the drawee was duty-bound to restore to the drawer's account the amount theretofore paid under the check with a forged payee's indorsement because the drawee did not pay as ordered by the drawer.
Petitioner argues that respondent drawee Bank should not have honored the checks because they were crossed checks. Issuing a crossed check imposes no legal obligation on the drawee not to honor such a check. It is more of a warning to the holder that the check cannot be presented to the drawee bank for payment in cash. Instead, the check can only be deposited with the payee's bank which in turn must present it for payment against the drawee bank in the course of normal banking transactions between banks. The crossed check cannot be presented for payment but it can only be deposited and the drawee bank may only pay to another bank in the payee's or indorser's account.
Petitioner likewise contends that banking rules prohibit the drawee bank from having checks with more than one indorsement. The banking rule banning acceptance of checks for deposit or cash payment with more than one indorsement unless cleared by some bank officials does not invalidate the instrument; neither does it invalidate the negotiation or transfer of the said check. In effect, this rule destroys the negotiability of bills/checks by limiting their negotiation by indorsement of only the payee. Under the NIL, the only kind of indorsement which stops the further negotiation of an instrument is a restrictive indorsement which prohibits the further negotiation thereof.
Sec. 36. When indorsement restrictive. - An indorsement is restrictive which either
(a) Prohibits further negotiation of the instrument; or
xxx xxx xxx
In this kind of restrictive indorsement, the prohibition to transfer or negotiate must be written in express words at the back of the instrument, so that any subsequent party may be forewarned that ceases to be negotiable. However, the restrictive indorsee acquires the right to receive payment and bring any action thereon as any indorser, but he can no longer transfer his rights as such indorsee where the form of the indorsement does not authorize him to do so. 12
Although the holder of a check cannot compel a drawee bank to honor it because there is no privity between them, as far as the drawer-depositor is concerned, such bank may not legally refuse to honor a negotiable bill of exchange or a check drawn against it with more than one indorsement if there is nothing irregular with the bill or check and the drawer has sufficient funds. The drawee cannot be compelled to accept or pay the check by the drawer or any holder because as a drawee, he incurs no liability on the check unless he accepts it. But the drawee will make itself liable to a suit for damages at the instance of the drawer for wrongful dishonor of the bill or check.
Thus, it is clear that under the NIL, petitioner is precluded from raising the defense of forgery by reason of her gross negligence. But under Section 196 of the NIL, any case not provided for in the Act shall be governed by the provisions of existing legislation. Under the laws of quasi-delict, she cannot point to the negligence of the respondent drawee Bank in the selection and supervision of its employees as being the cause of the loss because negligence is the proximate cause thereof and under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, she may not be awarded damages. However, under Article 1170 of the same Code the respondent drawee Bank may be held liable for damages. The article provides -
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
There is no question that there is a contractual relation between petitioner as depositor (obligee) and the respondent drawee bank as the obligor. In the performance of its obligation, the drawee bank is bound by its internal banking rules and regulations which form part of any contract it enters into with any of its depositors. When it violated its internal rules that second endorsements are not to be accepted without the approval of its branch managers and it did accept the same upon the mere approval of Boon, a chief accountant, it contravened the tenor of its obligation at the very least, if it were not actually guilty of fraud or negligence.
Furthermore, the fact that the respondent drawee Bank did not discover the irregularity with respect to the acceptance of checks with second indorsement for deposit even without the approval of the branch manager despite periodic inspection conducted by a team of auditors from the main office constitutes negligence on the part of the bank in carrying out its obligations to its depositors. Article 1173 provides -
The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstance of the persons, of the time and of the place. . . .
We hold that banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and confidence of the public in general is of paramount importance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must be a high degree of diligence, if not the utmost diligence. Surely, respondent drawee Bank cannot claim it exercised such a degree of diligence that is required of it. There is no way We can allow it now to escape liability for such negligence. Its liability as obligor is not merely vicarious but primary wherein the defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees is of no moment.
Premises considered, respondent drawee Bank is adjudged liable to share the loss with the petitioner on a fifty-fifty ratio in accordance with Article 172 which provides:
Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts according to the circumstances.
With the foregoing provisions of the Civil Code being relied upon, it is being made clear that the decision to hold the drawee bank liable is based on law and substantial justice and not on mere equity. And although the case was brought before the court not on breach of contractual obligations, the courts are not precluded from applying to the circumstances of the case the laws pertinent thereto. Thus, the fact that petitioner's negligence was found to be the proximate cause of her loss does not preclude her from recovering damages. The reason why the decision dealt on a discussion on proximate cause is due to the error pointed out by petitioner as allegedly committed by the respondent court. And in breaches of contract under Article 1173, due diligence on the part of the defendant is not a defense.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of evidence to determine the exact amount of loss suffered by the petitioner, considering that she partly benefited from the issuance of the questioned checks since the obligation for which she issued them were apparently extinguished, such that only the excess amount over and above the total of these actual obligations must be considered as loss of which one half must be paid by respondent drawee bank to herein petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Criminal Law Case Digest: Calimutan v. People


Calimutan v. People
G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006

Lesson:  Proof beyond reasonable doubt, Defense of Stranger, Proximate Cause, intentional felonies and culpable felonies

Laws Applicable: Art. 3, Art. 4, Par. 1

FACTS:
·         February 4, 1996 around 10 am: Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar but as they were headed home, they crossed paths with Calimutan and Michael Bulalacao.
·         Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9 inches,  had a grudge against Bulalacao, a 15 year-old boy of 5ft. for suspecting that he threw stones at the his house on a previous night so he punched him
·         Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre, Calimutan picked a stone, as big as a man’s fist and hitting Cantre at the left side of his back not noticing that Bulalacao was already able to ran away.
o    Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and Calimutan desisted from any other act of violence
·         Witness Sañano then brought Cantre home where he complained of backache and also of stomach ache and was unable to eat
·         By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb
o    Having no vehicle, they could not bring him to a doctor so his mother just continue to wipe him with a piece of cloth and brought him some food when he asked. 
o    After eating a little, he vomited. 
o    Shortly after complaining again of his backache and stomach ache, he died.
·         The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of Death, issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning
·         With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, an autopsy was done by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez which showed that there was internal hemorrhage and massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by a blunt object like a stone.
·         RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide
·         RTC: Essentially adopting the prosecution’s account of the incident, held that Calimutan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide with a penalty of imprisonment from 8 years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of P50,000 as compensatory damages and the sum of P50,000 as moral damages
o    NOT defense of stranger , because after the boxing Bulalacao, he was able to run thereby the unlawful aggression by Cantre ceased
o    The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a treacherous
o    criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended
·         CA: Affirmed RTC
·         Calimutan filed a petition for review on certiorari contending that the dissimilar findings on the cause of death constituted reasonable doubt

ISSUE: W/N he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide

HELD: NO. MODIFIED Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death and P50,000.00 as moral damages

·         Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (NOT absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error)
o    Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and although it does not necessarily bind the courts, it is accorded great weight and probative value
§  may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the Cantre which resulted in the latter’s death
·         Proximate cause - cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and WITHOUT which the result would NOT have occurred
o    Prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan.
·         Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts
·         Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in particular:
o    (1) intentional felonies - existence of malicious intent
§  act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice)
o    (2) culpable felonies - absence of malicious intent
§  act or omission of the offender is NOT malicious
§  the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill
·         Absence of intent, Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
o    Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 152133


G.R. No. 152133             February 9, 2006
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001,affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide, allegedly committed as follows –
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to impact which caused his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant for the arrest of petitioner Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally released after posting sufficient bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide charged against him.7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano, companion of the victim Cantre when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back. Witness Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon, and witness Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen.8
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he reported the following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food particles.
x x x x
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan.13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony of the accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with the victim Cantre and witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the enraged man would turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and victim Cantre chased after them, but witness Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to the police authorities and sought their help in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan and, instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after the stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16 essentially adopting the prosecution’s account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in defense of his companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to run. While it appears that the victim was the unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already ceased after Michael was able to run and there was no more need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be held criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s illegal acts merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide rendered by the RTC against petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained by the victim was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown that the internal injury sustained by the victim was the result of the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the laceration of the victim’s spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the victim’s death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to testify in court hence she was not even able to identify and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was not made available for cross-examination on the accuracy and correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh. "C") of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined by the defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food poisoning, as reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their witness to belie the report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect because it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002,18 denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues raised therein had already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said death, arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first physician of the government who conducted an examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the second government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and with these findings of two (2) government physicians whose findings are at variance with each other materially, it is humbly contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the culpability of the petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in the case at bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error.20
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before the RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and consistently explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area was hit with a blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert witness, whose "competency and academic qualification and background" was admitted by the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of medicine germane to the issues involved in a case.22
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it does not necessarily bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded it great weight and probative value. Having testified as to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of an ordinary person. They may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be seriously considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also support the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following manner –
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding and disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of attachment of internal organs, especially at the source of its blood supply and at the point where blood vessels change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to trauma applied from any direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in the peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration, stretch-stress, contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the organ is protected at its upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of its superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist area. The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already been ruptured or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26 –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is the most frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and blows incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ described as vulnerable, superficial, and fragile – even without causing any other external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of the laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC that none of the external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."27
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and Belen Cantre, had adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and physical condition of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much weight and probative value for the following reasons –
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well as in the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she suspected food poisoning as the cause of death, she held back from making a categorical statement that it was so. In the post-mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the immediate cause of death was "Cardio-Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing that further laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without such confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that – a suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement30 in which she had explained her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of PHILIP B. CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I didn’t state that he was a case of food poisoning. And in the Certification, I even recommended that an examination be done to confirm that suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion, measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the history of the victim and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in the cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my hand in search for any clotting inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of the cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where was it located?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his body, his SPLEEN could be injured?
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC31 how he conducted the autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows –
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of the victim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other matters did you do in connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.
x x x x
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury of the abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term traumatic injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as they make causes of death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like this particular case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic injury is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the body of the victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim Cantre, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that her testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if produced.32 As this Court already expounded in the case ofPeople v. Jumamoy33 –
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure to present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC, perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the defense from calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would be adverse to the case presented by the prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless imprudence –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate the view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the significance of such circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, on the one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Sañano were on their way home from a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.

In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and the defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does take into account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the victim Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away from the victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.3
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being done with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.