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Showing posts with label March 20. Show all posts
Showing posts with label March 20. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. Nos. 105965-70 March 20, 2001

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 105965-70.  March 20, 2001

GEORGE UY, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PUNO, J.:

Before the Court is the Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

The Court stated in its decision dated August 9, 1999:

“In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court.  The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.”

It explained in the resolution of February 22, 2000 that:

“(t)he clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.  The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan…" And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsman's and Special Prosecutor's authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.”

Seeking clarification of the foregoing ruling, respondent Ombudsman raises the following points:

“(1) The jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not parallel to or equated with the broader jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;

(2) The phrase "primary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" is not a delimitation of its jurisdiction solely to Sandiganbayan cases; and

(3) The authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases before the Sandiganbayan cannot be confused with the broader investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Office of the Ombudsman.”

Thus, the matter that needs to be discussed herein is the scope of the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation and the subsequent prosecution of criminal offenses in the light of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act [RA] 6770).

We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.

The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770.  Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, thus:

“Sec. 15.  Powers, Functions and Duties.--The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

x x x”

Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman under the latter’s supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  It states:

“Sec. 11.  Structural Organization.— x x x

x x x

(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff.  The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.

(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:

(a)     To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;

(b)     To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and

(c)     To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.”

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.  It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts.  It has been held that the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.[1]

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.  The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts.  The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees.  Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.[2]

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770.  The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.[3] Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases.  The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants.[4] To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.  Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control.[5] The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman.  In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.[6] A review of the development of our Ombudsman laws reveals this intent.

The concept of Ombudsman originated in Sweden in the early 19th century, referring to an officer appointed by the legislature to handle the people’s grievances against administrative and judicial actions.  He was primarily tasked with receiving complaints from persons aggrieved by administrative action or inaction, conducting investigation thereon, and making recommendations to the appropriate administrative agency based on his findings.  He relied mainly on the power of persuasion and the high prestige of the office to effect his recommendations.[7]

In this jurisdiction, several Ombudsman-like agencies were established by past Presidents to serve as the people’s medium for airing grievances and seeking redress against abuses and misconduct in the government.  These offices were conceived with the view of raising the standard in public service and ensuring integrity and efficiency in the government.  In May 1950, President Elpidio Quirino created the Integrity Board charged with receiving complaints against public officials for acts of corruption, dereliction of duty and irregularity in office, and conducting a thorough investigation of these complaints.  The Integrity Board was succeeded by several other agencies which performed basically the same functions of complaints-handling and investigation.  These were the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission under President Ramon Magsaysay, the Presidential Committee on Administration Performance Efficiency under President Carlos Garcia, the Presidential Anti-Graft Committee under President Diosdado Macapagal, and the Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations and the Office of the Citizens Counselor, both under President Ferdinand Marcos.  It was observed, however, that these agencies failed to realize their objective for they did not enjoy the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function as government critic.  Furthermore, their powers extended to no more than fact-finding and recommending.[8]

Thus, in the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the members of the Constitutional Convention saw the need to constitutionalize the office of an Ombudsman, to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its recommendations.[9] The 1973 Constitution mandated the legislature to create an office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan.  Its powers shall not be limited to receiving complaints and making recommendations, but shall also include the filing and prosecution of criminal, civil or administrative case before the appropriate body in case of failure of justice.  Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution read:

“Sec. 6.  The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative case before the proper court or body.”

Implementing this constitutional provision, President Marcos, on June 11, 1978, exercising his power under Proclamation 1081, enacted Presidential Decree (PD) 1487 creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan.  Its principal task was to “investigate, on complaint, any administrative act[10] of any administrative agency[11] including any government-owned or controlled corporation.”[12] The Tanodbayan also had the duty to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or body if he has reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner resulting in a failure of justice.[13] It should be noted, however, that the prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was to be done by the Tanodbayan through the Special Prosecutor who, according to PD 1486,[14] had the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file information for and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of said court.  The Special Prosecutor was then under the control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice.[15]

Shortly after its enactment, PD 1487 was amended by PD 1607 which took effect on December 10, 1978.  The amendatory law broadened the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative acts of administrative agencies by authorizing it to conduct an investigation on its own motion or initiative, even without a complaint from any person.[16] The new law also expanded the prosecutory function of the Tanodbayan by creating the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor in the Office of the Tanodbayan and placing under his direction and control the Special Prosecutor who had the “exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein.”[17] Thus, the law provided that if the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency.[18]

On July 18, 1979, PD 1630 was enacted further amending PD 1487 and PD 1607.  PD 1630 reorganized the Office of the Tanodbayan and transferred the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan himself.  Thus, the Tanodbayan was empowered to directly conduct preliminary investigation, file information and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and other courts.  The amendment gave the Tanodbayan the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file information therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases.[19] Section 10 of PD 1630 provided:

“Sec. 10.  Powers.--The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:

(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any government-owned or controlled corporation;

x x x

(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he may file the necessary information or complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative agency and prosecute the same.”

Section 18 further stated:

“Sec. 18.  Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.--If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall conduct the necessary investigation and shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency.”

With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created.  The present Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and to notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.[20] He possesses the following powers, functions and duties:

“1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;

2.  Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

3.  Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

4.  Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

5.  Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

6.  Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

7.  Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

8.  Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.”[21]

As a new Office of the Ombudsman was established, the then existing Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor which continued to function and exercise its powers as provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution.[22]

The frameworks for the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor were laid down by President Corazon Aquino in Executive Order (EO) 243 and EO 244, both passed on July 24, 1987.

In September 1989, Congress passed RA 6770 providing for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman.  As in the previous laws on the Ombudsman, RA 6770 gave the present Ombudsman not only the duty to receive and relay the people's grievances, but also the duty to investigate and prosecute for and in their behalf, civil, criminal and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees as embodied in Sections 15 and 11 of the law.

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and process the people's complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel.  The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees.  The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.  Recognizing the importance of this power, the Court cannot derogate the same by limiting it only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.  It is apparent from the history and the language of the present law that the legislature intended such power to apply not only to cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those within the jurisdiction of regular courts.  The Court observed in the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[23]

“A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.

x x x

Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law governing the then Tanodbayan when Republic Act No. 6770 was enacted providing for the functional and structural organization of the present Office of the Ombudsman.  This later law retained in the Ombudsman the power of the former Tanodbayan to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  x x x.”

Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public officers and employees.  The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou[24] that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.  Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman provides:

“The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman.  In cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined (therein).[25] The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.”

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and its resolution dated February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., I concur in the result.

Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Pardo, J., I dissent.  See attached.

De Leon, Jr., J.,  I join the dissenting opinion of Justice B. P. Pardo.

Insurance Case Digst: Sales de Gonzaga v. Crown Life Insurance Co. (1952)


G.R. No. L-4197    March 20, 1952

Lessons Applicable: Effect of Non-Payment (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: 

FACTS:

  • September 26, 1939: Crown Life Insurance Co. whose home office is based in Toronto, Canada issued to Ramon Gonzaga through its branch office in Manila a 20-year endowment policy for P15,000 which had an annual premium of P591. 
  • Payment was only until September 6, 1941 because of the outbreak of the war since Crown is an enemy corp. order to be closed during the Japanese occupation.  However, despite that it offered a privilege to accept premium payments in the place of its employee in Ermita but of which Gonzaga did not avail.
  • Through the automatic premium loan clause, it continued until June 12, 1943
  • May 1, 1945: It reopened but still Gonzaga did not pay although there was a reinstatement clause providing certain conditions within three years from the date of lapse on application of the insured
  • June 27, 1945: Gonzaga died from an accident
  • Crown refused to pay because of the lapse of premium payment
  • RTC: against Gonzaga
ISSUE: W/N Gonzaga's widow can claim despite the absence of premium payment during the outbreak of the war

HELD: NO. Affirmed

  • Non-payment at the day involves absolute forfeiture is such be the terms of the contract
  • failure to notify the postal address during the war is not an excuse
    • There is no duty when the law forbids and there is no obligation without corresponding right enjoyed by another
  • opening of an interim office partook of the nature of the privilege to the policy holders to keep their policies operative rather than a duty to them under the contract

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-4197



EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4197     March 20, 1952

FIDELA SALES DE GONZAGA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE CROWN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

TUASON, J.:

This is one more case wherein the question of the effects of war in a pre-war insurance contracts is presented.

Reduced to their absolute essentials, the facts are that, on September 26, 1939 the Crown Life Insurance Co., whose home office is in Toronto, Canada, issued to Ramon Gonzaga through its branch office in Manila a 20-year endowment policy for P15,000. The insured paid in due time the agreed yearly premium, which was P591.00, for three consecutive years, the last payment having been effected on September 6, 1941. On account of the outbreak of war, no premiums were paid after that date, although the policy was continued in force up to June 12, 1943, under its automatic premium loan clause.

Ramon Gonzaga died on June 27, 1945 from an accident. Unsuccessful in her attempt to collect the amount of the policy his widow and the beneficiary named in the policy began this suit on December 18, 1947. The defendant set up the defense that the policy had lapsed by non-payment of the stipulated premiums of the stipulated dates. And the trial court in a carefully written decision ruled against the plaintiff.

Since this action was decided by the court below, several cases analogous to this one in its main characteristics have come up before this Court. (Paz Lopez de Constantino vs. Asia Life Insurance Company,1 G.R. No. L-1669; Agustina Peralta vs. Asia Life Insurance Company,2 G.R. No. L-1670; James McGuire vs. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co;3 G. R. No. L-3581; National Leather Co; Inc. vs. The United States Life Insurance Co.,4 G.R. No. L-2668; Victoria Hidalgo Vda. de Carrero, et al., vs. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co.,5 G. R. No. L-3032; and West Coast Life Insurance Co. vs. Patricio H. Gubagaras,6 G. R. No. L-2810) In Paz Lopez de Constantinos. Asia Life Insurance Company, G. R. No. L-1669, the leading case, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice Bengzon, adopted this doctrine:

The case, therefore, is one in which time is material and of the essence of the contract. Non-payment at the day involves absolute forfeiture is such be the terms of the contract, as is the case here. Courts cannot with safety vary the stipulation of the parties by introducing equities for the relief of the insured against their own negligence.

The aforecited decisions are decisive of the proposition that non-payment of premiums by reason of war puts an end to the contract.

There is, however, one aspect of the case at bar not raised before and upon which the plaintiff rest her case in the alternative.

In its answer, the defendant alleged that "through its General Agents, Hanson, Orth and Stevenson, Inc., it had its offices open in the city of Manila during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines." Taking advantage of this allegation, and ignoring her own in her complaint - that "for the whole duration of the (war) and from thence to sometime thereafter, that is, in October, 1945, . . . defendant closed its business in the Islands, and had absolutely no agency or representative here to represent it, with authority to collect premiums from the Insured." - the plaintiff asserts that it was the defendant's duty to notify her husbands of its postal address during the war, and that its failure to do so excused deliquency in the payment of the premiums. The plaintiff cites the provision of the contract which states that "all premiums subsequent to the first year are payable to the Company's authorized cashier at the place stated in the fourth page hereof, or at such other place instead thereof as may be designated from time to time by noticed to the Company mailed to the Insured at his last known post office address."

The evidence on this feature of the case reveals that, the defendant being an enemy corporation, its offices, which were housed at the Chaco building when the hostilities broke out, were ordered closed by the Japanese Military authorities in January 1942, and the officers of Hanson, Orth and Stevenson, Inc., defendants general agents, being American citizens, were entered. In addition, on August 25 the Japanese administration issued "Instruction No. 71" by which enemy alien insurance companies were expressly prohibited from doing business.

But before that instruction was promulgated Hanson, Orth and Stevenson, had opened in the house of one of their Filipino employees on Gonzales Street in Ermita an office with skeleton force, all Filipinos, for the purpose of receiving premiums from their policy holders; and notwithstanding the prohibition that office was not closed.

In the face of the Japanese Military decrees, which found sanctions in international law, the failure of the defendant or its Filipino employees to advise the insured of the defendant's new address did not work as a forfeiture of the right to have the premiums satisfied promptly. While clandestine transactions between the parties during the war might be binding, it was not obligatory on the insurer, and it was well-nigh risky for its employees, to send out notices to its widely scattered policy holders, what with the postal service under the control and administration of the ruthless occupants.

There is no duty when the law forbids; and there is no obligation without corresponding right enjoyed by another. The insured had no right to demand that the defendant maintain an office during the war, and the defendant was not obligated to do so. Had the defendant not opened any office at all during the occupation and stopped receiving premiums absolutely, the plaintiff's position would not have been any better or worse for the closing and suspension of the defendant's business. Had the plaintiff's husband actually tendered his premiums and the defendant's employees rejected them, he could not have insisted on the payment as a matter of right. Stated otherwise, the defendant's opening of an interim office partook of the nature of the privilege to the policy holders to keep their policies operative rather than a duty to them under the contract.

Of this privilege, incidentally, Gonzaga could have taken advantage if he was really intent on preserving his policy. Uncontroverted or admitted is the fact that the defendant's agent, through whom he had been insured, lived in Malabon, Rizal, and was his close acquaintance; and so were some of the defendant's Filipino employees who handled the insurance business of Hanson, Orth and Stevenson during the occupation. And Gonzaga admittedly come to Manila on a visit every now and then, and could have, without difficulty, contacted any of those people.

For another thing, the policy carried a clause providing for its reinstatement under certain conditions within three years from the date of lapse on application of the insured. The present policy lapsed on June 12, 1943, the Company's Manila branch was reopened on May 1, 1945 and resumed regular business through the same general agents at the Wilson Building on Juan Luna Street, Manila and Ramon Gonzaga died on June 27, 1945. It is undoubted that Gonzaga knew all that. It is not denied that he was an employee in the United States Navy, that the united States Navy had an office in the same Wilson Building, and that he came at least twice a month to that office for his salary.

Both in law and in reason, the action was properly dismissed and the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.


Endnotes:
1 47 Off. Gaz. Supp. 12, p. 428.

2 87 Phil. 248.

3 87 Phil. 370.

4 87 Phil. 410; 48 Off. Gaz. 142.

5 87 Phil. 460.

6 Oct. 10, 1950.