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Showing posts with label March 28. Show all posts
Showing posts with label March 28. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 157309 March 28, 2008

THIRD DIVISION

MARLOU L. VELASQUEZ v. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION

G.R. No. 157309 March 28, 2008



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D E C I S I O N





REYES, R.T., J.:





PARTIES may not impugn the effectivity of a contract, after much benefit has been gained to the prejudice of another. They are bound by the obligations they expressly set out to do.



Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City,[2] holding petitioner Marlou Velasquez liable under his letter of undertaking to respondent Solidbank Corporation.



The Facts



Petitioner is engaged in the export business operating under the name Wilderness Trading. Respondent is a domestic banking corporation organized under Philippine laws.



The case arose out of a business transaction for the sale of dried sea cucumber for export to South Korea between Wilderness Trading, as seller, and Goldwell Trading of Pusan, South Korea, as buyer. To facilitate payment of the products, Goldwell Trading opened a letter of credit in favor of Wilderness Trading in the amount of US$87,500.00[3] with the Bank of Seoul, Pusan, Korea.



On November 12, 1992, petitioner applied for credit accommodation with respondent bank for pre-shipment financing. The credit accommodation was granted. Petitioner was successful in his first two export transactions both drawn on the letter of credit. The third export shipment, however, yielded a different result.



On February 22, 1993, petitioner submitted to respondent the necessary documents for his third shipment. Wanting to be paid the value of the shipment in advance, petitioner negotiated for a documentary sight draft to be drawn on the letter of credit, chargeable to the account of Bank of Seoul. The sight draft represented the value of the shipment in the amount of US$59,640.00.[4]



As a condition for the issuance of the sight draft, petitioner executed a letter of undertaking in favor of respondent. Under the terms of the letter of
undertaking, petitioner promised that the draft will be accepted and paid by Bank of Seoul according to its tenor. Petitioner also held himself liable if the sight draft was not accepted. The letter of undertaking provided:



SOLIDBANK CORPORATION Feb. 22, 1993

32 Borromeo Street

Cebu City



Gentlemen:Re: PURCHASE OF ONE DOC. SIGHT DRAFT DRAWN UNDER LC#M2073210NS00040 FOR US$59,640.00 UNDER OUR CEBP93/102.



In consideration of your negotiating the above described draft(s), we hereby warrant that the above referred to draft(s) and accompanying documents are genuine and accurately represent the facts stated therein and that the draft(s) will be accepted and paid in accordance with its/their tenor. We further undertake and agree, jointly and severally, to hold you free and harmless from and to defend all actions, claims and demands whatsoever, and to pay on demand all damages, actual or compensatory, including attorneys fees, in case of suit, at least equal to __% of the amount due, which you may suffer arising by reason of or on account of your negotiating the above draft(s) because of the following discrepancies or reasons or any other discrepancy or reason whatever:



1)B/L MARKED SAID TO CONTAIN & SHIPPERS LOAD, STOWAGE & COUNT.

2)LATE SHIPMENT.

3)QUANTITY SHIPPED @ US$14.00 OVERDRAWN BY 0.06 TON.

4)NO INSPECTION CERTIFICATE PRESENTED.



We hereby undertake to pay on demand the full amount of the draft(s) or any unpaid balance of the draft(s), with interest at the prevailing rate of today from the date of negotiation, plus all charges and expenses whatsoever incurred in connection therewith. You shall neither be obligated to contest or dispute any refusal to accept or to pay the whole or any part of the above draft(s) nor to proceed in anyway against the drawee thereof, the issuing bank, or against any indorser thereof before making a demand on us for the payment of the whole or any unpaid balance of the draft(s).[5] (Emphasis added)



By virtue of the letter of undertaking, respondent advanced the value of the shipment which, at the current rate of exchange at that time was P1,495,115.16, less bank charges, to petitioner. Respondent then sent all the documents pertinent to the export transaction to the Bank of Seoul.







Respondent failed to collect on the sight draft as it was dishonored by non-acceptance by the Bank of Seoul. The reasons given for the dishonor were late shipment, forged inspection certificate, and absence of countersignature of the negotiating bank on the inspection certificate.[6] Goldwell Trading likewise issued a stop payment order on the sight draft because most of the bags of dried sea cucumber exported by petitioner contained soil.



Due to the dishonor of the sight draft and the stop payment order, respondent demanded restitution of the sum advanced.[7] Petitioner failed to heed the demand.



On June 3, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money[8] with the RTC in Cebu City. In his answer, petitioner alleged that his liability under the sight draft was extinguished when respondent failed to protest its non-acceptance, as required under the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). He also alleged that the letter of undertaking is not binding because it is a superfluous document, and that he did not violate any of the provisions of the letter of credit.[9]



RTC and CA Dispositions



On September 25, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment[10] in favor of respondent with the following fallo:



IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant:











(1)      to pay the plaintiff the principal sum of P1,495, 115.16 plus interest at 20% per annum counted from February 22, 1993 up to the time the entire amount shall have been fully paid;



(2)      to pay attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due the plaintiff; and



(3)      to pay the costs.



SO ORDERED.[11]



The RTC ratiocinated:



This court is not convinced with the defendants argument that because of plaintiffs failure to protest the dishonor of the sight draft, his liability is extinguished because his liability remains under the letter of undertaking which he signed and without which plaintiff would not have advanced or credited to him the amount.



Section 152 of the Negotiable Instruments Law under which defendant claims extinguishment of his liability to plaintiff is not a bar to the filing of other appropriate remedies which the aggrieved party may pursue to vindicate his rights and in this instant case, plaintiff wants his right vindicated by virtue of the letter of undertaking which defendant signed. By the letter of undertaking, defendant bound himself to pay on demand all damages including attorneys fees which plaintiff may suffer arising by reason of or on account of negotiating the above draft because of the following discrepancies or any other discrepancy or reasons whatsoever and further to pay on demand full amount of any unpaid balance with interest at the prevailing rate. He should be bound to the fulfillment of what he expressly obligated himself to do and perform in the letter of undertaking without which, plaintiff would not have advance (sic) and credited to him the amount in the draft. He should not enrich himself at the expense of plaintiff.[12] (Emphasis added)



Disagreeing, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA.



On June 27, 2002, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision, disposing as follows:



WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendant-appellant Marlou L. Velasquez is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellee Solidbank Corporation, the following: (1) the principal amount of One Million Four Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand One Hundred Fifteen and Sixteen Centavos (P1,495,115.16) plus interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum from February 22, 1993 until fully paid, (2) attorneys fees equivalent to five percent (5%) of the total amount due, and (3) costs of the suit.



SO ORDERED.[13]



In ruling against petitioner, the CA opined:



The fact that said draft was dishonored and not paid by the Bank of Seoul-Korea, (sic) it is incumbent upon defendant-appellant Velasquez to comply with his obligation under the Letter of Undertaking. He cannot be allowed to impugn the contract of undertaking he entered into by saying that it was a superfluous document, and therefore, not binding on him. The contract of undertaking is the law between them, and must be enforced accordingly. This is in accord with Article 1159 of the New Civil Code, which provides that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. And parties to a contract are bound to the fulfillment of what has expressly been stipulated therein, regardless of the fact that it turn (sic) out to be financially disadvantageous.[14]



x x x x



The fact that Defendant-appellant benefited from the advance payment made by Plaintiff appellee, (sic) it is incumbent upon him to return what he received because the purpose of the advance payment was not attained and/or realized, as the sight draft was not paid accordingly, otherwise, it will result to unjust enrichment on the part of Defendant-appellant at the expense of Plaintiff-appellee, in violation of Articles 19 and 22 of the New Civil Code. The doctrine of unjust enrichment and restitution simply means that the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others.[15] (Emphasis added)



Petitioner moved for reconsideration[16] but his motion was denied.[17] Hence, the present recourse.



Issues



Petitioner raises twin issues for Our consideration, to wit:



THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, NOT HERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT, IN THAT:



I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE ON THE ACCESSORY CONTRACT, THE LETTER OF UNDERTAKING, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER WAS ALREADY RELEASED FROM LIABILITY UNDER THE SIGHT DRAFT, THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW AND THE CIVIL CODE.



II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD PETITIONER LIABLE UNDER THE ACCESSORY CONTRACT, THE LETTER OF UNDERTAKING, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO PROOF WHATSOEVER THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED EITHER THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT, THE SIGHT DRAFT, OR EVEN THE LETTER OF UNDERTAKING.[18] (Underscoring supplied)



The main issue is whether or not petitioner should be held liable to respondent under the sight draft or the letter of undertaking. There is no dispute that petitioner duly signed and executed these documents. It is likewise admitted that the sight draft was dishonored by non acceptance by the Bank of Seoul.



Our Ruling



The petition is without merit.



Petitioner is not liable under the sight draft but he is liable under his letter of undertaking; liability under the letter of undertaking was not extinguished by non-protest of the dishonor of the sight draft.



Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable under either the sight draft or the letter of undertaking. He claims that the failure of respondent to protest the dishonor of the sight draft under Section 152 of the NIL discharged him from liability under the negotiable instrument. It is also contended that his liability under the letter of undertaking is that of a mere guarantor; that the letter of undertaking is only an accessory contract to the sight draft. Since he was discharged from liability under the sight draft, he cannot be held liable under the letter of undertaking.



For its part, respondent counters that petitioners liability springs from the letter of undertaking, independently of the sight draft. It would not have advanced the amount without the letter of undertaking. According to respondent, the letter of undertaking is an independent agreement and not merely an accessory contract. To permit petitioner to escape liability under the letter of undertaking would result in unjust enrichment.



Petitioners liability under the letter of undertaking is independent from his liability under the sight draft. He may be held liable under either the sight draft or the letter of undertaking or both.



Admittedly, petitioner was discharged from liability under the sight draft when respondent failed to protest it for non-acceptance by the Bank of Seoul. A sight draft made payable outside the Philippines is a foreign bill of exchange.[19] When a foreign bill is dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment, protest is necessary to hold the drawer and indorsers liable. Verily, respondents failure to protest the non-acceptance of the sight draft resulted in the discharge of petitioner from liability under the instrument.



Section 152 of the NIL is explicit:



Section 152. In what cases protest necessary. Where a foreign bill appearing on its face to be such is dishonored by non-acceptance, it must be duly protested for non-acceptance, and where such a bill which has not been previously dishonored by non-acceptance, is dishonored by non-payment, it must be duly protested for non-payment. If it is not so protested, the drawer and indorsers are discharged. Where a bill does not appear on its face to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dishonor is unnecessary. (Emphasis added)



Petitioner, however, can still be made liable under the letter of undertaking. It bears stressing that it is a separate contract from the sight draft. The liability of petitioner under the letter of undertaking is direct and primary. It is independent from his liability under the sight draft. Liability subsists on it even if the sight draft was dishonored for non-acceptance or non-payment.



Respondent agreed to purchase the draft and credit petitioner its value upon the undertaking that he will reimburse the amount in case the sight draft is dishonored. The bank would certainly not have agreed to grant petitioner an advance export payment were it not for the letter of undertaking. The consideration for the letter of undertaking was petitioners promise to pay respondent the value of the sight draft if it was dishonored for any reason by the Bank of Seoul.



We cannot accept petitioners thesis that he is only a mere guarantor under the letter of credit. Petitioner cannot be both the primary debtor and the guarantor of his own debt. This is inconsistent with the very purpose of a guarantee which is for the creditor to proceed against a third person if the debtor defaults in his obligation. Certainly, to accept such an argument would make a mockery of commercial transactions.



Petitioner bound himself liable to respondent under the letter of undertaking if the sight draft is not accepted. He also warranted that the sight draft is genuine; will be paid by the issuing bank in accordance with its tenor; and that he will be held liable for the full amount of the draft upon demand, without necessity of proceeding against the drawee bank.[20] Petitioner breached his undertaking when the Bank of Seoul dishonored the sight draft and Goldwell Trading ordered a stop payment order on it for discrepancies in the export documents.



Petitioner is liable without need for respondent to establish collateral facts such as violations of the letter of credit.



It is also argued that petitioner cannot be held liable under the letter of undertaking because respondent failed to prove that he violated any of the provisions in the letter of credit or that sixty (60) of the seventy-one (71) bags shipped to Goldwell Trading contained soil instead of dried sea cucumber.



We cannot agree. Respondent need not prove that petitioner violated the provisions of the letter of credit in order to be held liable under the letter of undertaking. Parties are bound to fulfill what has been expressly stipulated in the contract.[21] Petitioners liability under the letter of undertaking is clear. He is liable to respondent if the sight draft is not accepted by the Bank of Seoul. Mere non-acceptance of the sight draft is sufficient for liability to attach. Here, the sight draft was dishonored for non-acceptance. The non-acceptance of the sight draft triggered petitioners liability under the letter of undertaking.



Records also show that the Bank of Seoul found discrepancies in the documents submitted by petitioner. Goldwell Trading issued a stop payment order because the products shipped were defective. It found that most of the bags shipped contained soil instead of dried sea cucumber. If petitioner disputes the finding of Goldwell Trading, he can file a case against said company but he cannot dispute his liability under either the sight draft or the letter of undertaking.





As We see it, this is a straightforward case of collection of sum of money on the basis of a letter of undertaking. Respondent advanced the export payment to petitioner on the understanding that the draft will be honored and paid. The draft was dishonored. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be held liable to respondent bank.



WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED.



SO ORDERED.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: De la Pena v. CA (1994)

G.R. No. L-81827   March 28, 1994
Lessons Applicable: Unfounded Suits (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: 

FACTS:

  • Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land in Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte for which he filed Homestead Application with the Bureau of Lands
  • Potenciano Nazaret also filed the same over the same lot.
  • Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over 6 lots to Pantaleon de la Peña 
  • Director of Lands directed Potenciano to apply for the portion himself w/in 60 days but he did not 
  • Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 1/2-hectare to Michael Doble who sold it to Ricardo Tan 
  • Upon a survey by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that Tan's lot was smaller than what he had bougth while De la Peña's lot was bigger than what he had bought.  Tan built a fence on his reclaimed portion but Dela Peña keeps on destroying it.
  • Ricardo Tan then transferred the lot to Herotido Tan
  • Dela Peña filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan amended to Herotido Tan
  • RTC and MTC: favored Dela Peña
  • Dela Peña instituted action for reconveyance with damages with the RTC
  • RTC: rejected. counterclaim was granted and Dela Peña was ordered to pay P6,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, P15,000 for moral damages and the costs of the proceedings
  • CA: affirmed stating that fraud and misrepresentation was not substantiated
ISSUE: W/N Dela Peña should be liable for moral damages, attorney's fees and cost of proceedings.

HELD: NO. AFFIRMED, with the sole modification that the award for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, and moral damages is DELETED

  • award for attorney's fees and moral damages  is unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other party. The right to litigate is so precious that a Penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-81827


FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-81827   March 28, 1994

PANTALEON DE LA PEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEROTIDO TAN, respondents.

Bienvenido D. Cariaga for petitioner.

Arsenio A. Latasa for private respondent.



BELLOSILLO, J.:

PANTALEON DELA PEÑA, petitioner herein, claiming preferential right to acquire ownership over a 3/4-hectare portion of Lot No. 5714-C, imputes fraud and misrepresentation to private respondent Herotido Tan in securing Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 and OCT No. P-7923 over the same. The action for reconveyance earlier filed by de la Peña was denied both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. For reasons herein set forth, the present petition must also fail.

Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land in Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte (previously Padada, Tanwalang, Davao), designated as Lot No. 5714, for which he filed Homestead Application No. 192495 (E-100806) with the Bureau of Lands. A certain Potenciano Nazaret likewise filed an application for the same lot. As a result, a case docketed as
B. L. Conflict No. 57 (N) arose in the Bureau of Lands wherein Nazaret's application and that of Ciriaco Reducto were "conflicted." Prior thereto however, by means of a "Deed of Relinquishment" dated 21 July 1946, 1 Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over six (6) hectares (later increased to eight [8]) of Lot 5714 to petitioner Pantaleon de la Peña who thereafter entered his appearance in the administrative case when the portion transferred to him remained included in the homestead applications of Ciriaco Reducto and Potenciano Nazaret. After it was ascertained in a field verification that petitioner had a better right to acquire the portion claimed by him being its actual occupant and cultivator, the Director of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the portion himself within sixty (60) days after its survey or else "lose his preferential right thereto." 2 However, no such application was filed.

Meanwhile, on 7 March 1950, Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 1/2-hectare portion of Lot 5714 to Michael Doble 3 who in turn sold his rights in 1956 to Ricardo Tan, 4 herein private respondent's father. The portion sold to Michael Doble, and later on acquired by Ricardo Tan, became the western boundary of de la Peña's land.

On 24 and 25 August 1970, a survey was conducted by Engr. Pedro Sta. Cruz and Subdivision Plan Csd-11-001883-D 5 was prepared and approved by the Bureau of Lands wherein the portion acquired by petitioner was designated as Lot No. 5714-D, while that bought by Ricardo Tan was identified as Lot No. 5714-C. As a result of the survey, it was discovered that the land occupied by petitioner was bigger by 3/4 of a hectare than what he actually bought and paid for from Ciriaco. On the other hand, the land ceded to Doble (later acquired by Tan) was "very much smaller" than what he actually bought. Although the
3/4-hectare portion was part of the area acquired by Doble in 1950, it was petitioner de la Peña who cultivated the same without objection from Doble. However, when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot on 2 March 1956, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but petitioner kept destroying it; hence, the start of a boundary dispute.

On 5 May 1975, Ricardo Tan transferred his rights over Lot 5714-C to his son, private respondent Herotido Tan, by means of "Affidavit of Relinquishment." 6 But the conflict over the 3/4-hectare portion continued. In an effort to resolve the conflict, a relocation survey was agreed upon except that the parties failed to agree on a common surveyor. Consequently, each party had to hire his own. Petitioner's surveyor conducted a relocation survey on 18 April 1977, while respondent's surveyor conducted his own five (5) days later. After it was determined that the 3/4-hectare portion was within Lot 5714-C of private respondent, the latter built a fence around the property to prevent petitioner from entering. The sugarcane and bananas planted by petitioner were destroyed in the process.

On 29 April 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan in the Municipal Trial Court of Sulop. 7 When it was discovered that private respondent Herotido Tan was the registered owner of Lot 5714-C under OCT No. P-7923 8 which was issued pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 dated 15 September 1975, the complaint was accordingly amended to implead him.

The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner. 9 It concluded that petitioner had prior possession of the disputed 3/4-hectare portion and that he was prevented from entering the same by the fence constructed by private respondent. Stressing that "ownership is not the issue" but "only prior, physical and uninterrupted occupation and possession of the litigated area," the MTC ordered private respondent and his father, together with all other persons claiming under them, to vacate the litigated portion and restore possession to petitioner. The decision was affirmed on appeal by the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Davao del Sur. 10

On 18 July 1977, during the pendency of the forcible entry case, petitioner instituted the present action for reconveyance with damages against private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City. 11 Petitioner alleged that private respondent fraudulently registered the 3/4-hectare portion actually cultivated by him when the former stated in his free patent application that "the land applied for is not claimed or occupied by any other person." In addition, petitioner denied that a survey was conducted in 1970; if at all, it was merely a "table survey." Incidentally, it was discovered in the survey that the area of petitioner's actual occupation exceeded that which he bought from Ciriaco Reducto in 1946.

After trial, the court rejected petitioner's denial of the 1970 Survey on the ground that he was already estopped from contesting it when he offered Subdivision Plan CSD-11-001883-D in evidence. Therefore, since the disputed 3/4-hectare portion was not part of the area bought and paid for in 1946 by petitioner, the latter was not entitled to reconveyance. Petitioner was declared a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith who was "enjoying freely the use of government property" without even applying for the same nor paying taxes thereon. His prayer for P5,000.00 as actual damages for the sugarcane and bananas destroyed on the disputed portion was denied. Instead, private respondent's counterclaim was granted and petitioner was ordered to pay P6,000.00 in attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, P15,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs of the proceedings. 12

Petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals 13 reiterating his allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and, at the same time, contending that the judgment in the forcible entry case constituted res judicata on the action for reconveyance.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision in toto 14 ruling that petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. On the contrary, as found by the lower court, the evidence showed that the requisites for the procurement of a free patent and original certificate of title were regularly complied with, i.e., a free patent application filed with the Bureau of Lands together with the affidavits of the applicant and two (2) witnesses, and giving notice of the application; the holding of an ocular inspection by the Land Examiner from the Bureau of Lands; the latter's recommendation for the approval of the application; and, the promulgation of the order for the issuance of the free patent on the basis of which an original certificate of title can be issued.

On the issue of res judicata, respondent Court of Appeals ruled that the fact that petitioner obtained a favorable judgment in the forcible entry case was not conclusive and did not ipso facto entitle him to a similar favorable judgment in the reconveyance case for the reason that while prior physical possession was the sole issue in the forcible entry case, that of lawful ownership or possession de jure was the issue disputed in the reconveyance case. Hence, the petition before us.

We dismiss the petition and adopt as our own the conclusions reached by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals. In addition, we hold that petitioner Pantaleon de la Peña has absolutely no standing to institute the present suit for reconveyance.

It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. 15 In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual occupation since January 1947. 16 However, petitioner's possession is not one that could ripen into ownership. Title to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. It must be noted that the dispute regarding the 3/4-hectare portion started even before a free patent and OCT could be issued to private respondent in 1975. As early as 1956, the controversy already began between petitioner and private respondent's father. Hence, petitioner's possession falls short of the required period. Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit.

Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State. 17 In such cases, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the law. 18 Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance.

However, we are inclined to delete the award for attorney's fees, moral damages and expenses of litigation. As correctly argued by petitioner, an award for attorney's fees and moral damages on the sole basis of an action later declared to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other party is improper. 19 The right to litigate is so precious that a Penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. 20

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 21 December 1987 of respondent Court of Appeals sustaining that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City dated 23 April 1984 is AFFIRMED, with the sole modification that the award for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, and moral damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.



#Footnotes

1      Orig. Rec., p. 70.

2      Id., pp. 72-73.

3      See Exh. "1" ("Quitclaim Deed"), Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.

4      See Exh. "2" ("Quitclaim Deed"), Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.

5      See Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.

6 See Exh. "5," Folder of Exhibits.

7      Civil Case No. 62.

8      Exh. "6," Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.

9      Decision penned by Judge Rosalina L. Montejo, dated 20 February 1979.

10     Decision penned by Judge Marcelino M. Francisco, dated 3 November 1980, in Civil Case No. 1448.

11     De la Peña v. Tan, Civil Case No. 1176.

12     Decision penned by Judge Juan L. Montejo, dated 23 April 1984; Orig. Rec., pp. 290-312.

13     De la Peña v. Tan, CA-G.R. CV No. 04379.

14     Decision penned by Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombos-de la Fuente, concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Alfredo L. Benipayo, dated 21 December 1987; Rollo, pp. 29-35.

15     Tomas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79328, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 627, 633; Esconde v. Barlongay, G.R. No. 67583, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 603, 611; Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio, et al., 104 Phil. 126 (1958); Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 92 Phil. 826 (1953); Azurin v. Quitoriano, et al., 81 Phil. 261 (1948).

16     Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 16.

17     Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 (1936).

18     See Sec. 101 of CA 141 (Public Land Act); Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1158 (1957); Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 946, 953 (1955).

19     Siasat v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67889, 10 October 1985, 139 SCRA 238, 250; R & B Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64515, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 736, 745; Salao v. Salao, No. L-26699, 16 March 1976, 70 SCRA 65, 86; Ramos v. Ramos, No. L-19872, 3 December 1974, 61 SCRA 284, 306; Mercader v. Manila Polo Club, 99 Phil. 981, 985 (1956).

20     Albenson Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 30; Garcia v. Gonzales, No. L-48184, 12 March 1990, 183 SCRA 72, 81; Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Mendez, G.R. No. 66419, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 593, 601.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-81827


FIRST DIVISION


G.R. No. L-81827 March 28, 1994


PANTALEON DE LA PEÑA, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEROTIDO TAN, respondents.


Bienvenido D. Cariaga for petitioner.


Arsenio A. Latasa for private respondent.





BELLOSILLO, J.:


PANTALEON DELA PEÑA, petitioner herein, claiming preferential right to acquire ownership over a 3/4-hectare portion of Lot No. 5714-C, imputes fraud and misrepresentation to private respondent Herotido Tan in securing Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 and OCT No. P-7923 over the same. The action for reconveyance earlier filed by de la Peña was denied both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. For reasons herein set forth, the present petition must also fail.


Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land in Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte (previously Padada, Tanwalang, Davao), designated as Lot No. 5714, for which he filed Homestead Application No. 192495 (E-100806) with the Bureau of Lands. A certain Potenciano Nazaret likewise filed an application for the same lot. As a result, a case docketed as
B. L. Conflict No. 57 (N) arose in the Bureau of Lands wherein Nazaret's application and that of Ciriaco Reducto were "conflicted." Prior thereto however, by means of a "Deed of Relinquishment" dated 21 July 1946, 1 Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over six (6) hectares (later increased to eight [8]) of Lot 5714 to petitioner Pantaleon de la Peña who thereafter entered his appearance in the administrative case when the portion transferred to him remained included in the homestead applications of Ciriaco Reducto and Potenciano Nazaret. After it was ascertained in a field verification that petitioner had a better right to acquire the portion claimed by him being its actual occupant and cultivator, the Director of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the portion himself within sixty (60) days after its survey or else "lose his preferential right thereto." 2 However, no such application was filed.


Meanwhile, on 7 March 1950, Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 1/2-hectare portion of Lot 5714 to Michael Doble 3 who in turn sold his rights in 1956 to Ricardo Tan, 4 herein private respondent's father. The portion sold to Michael Doble, and later on acquired by Ricardo Tan, became the western boundary of de la Peña's land.


On 24 and 25 August 1970, a survey was conducted by Engr. Pedro Sta. Cruz and Subdivision Plan Csd-11-001883-D 5 was prepared and approved by the Bureau of Lands wherein the portion acquired by petitioner was designated as Lot No. 5714-D, while that bought by Ricardo Tan was identified as Lot No. 5714-C. As a result of the survey, it was discovered that the land occupied by petitioner was bigger by 3/4 of a hectare than what he actually bought and paid for from Ciriaco. On the other hand, the land ceded to Doble (later acquired by Tan) was "very much smaller" than what he actually bought. Although the
3/4-hectare portion was part of the area acquired by Doble in 1950, it was petitioner de la Peña who cultivated the same without objection from Doble. However, when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot on 2 March 1956, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but petitioner kept destroying it; hence, the start of a boundary dispute.


On 5 May 1975, Ricardo Tan transferred his rights over Lot 5714-C to his son, private respondent Herotido Tan, by means of "Affidavit of Relinquishment." 6 But the conflict over the 3/4-hectare portion continued. In an effort to resolve the conflict, a relocation survey was agreed upon except that the parties failed to agree on a common surveyor. Consequently, each party had to hire his own. Petitioner's surveyor conducted a relocation survey on 18 April 1977, while respondent's surveyor conducted his own five (5) days later. After it was determined that the 3/4-hectare portion was within Lot 5714-C of private respondent, the latter built a fence around the property to prevent petitioner from entering. The sugarcane and bananas planted by petitioner were destroyed in the process.


On 29 April 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan in the Municipal Trial Court of Sulop. 7 When it was discovered that private respondent Herotido Tan was the registered owner of Lot 5714-C under OCT No. P-7923 8 which was issued pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 dated 15 September 1975, the complaint was accordingly amended to implead him.


The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner. 9 It concluded that petitioner had prior possession of the disputed 3/4-hectare portion and that he was prevented from entering the same by the fence constructed by private respondent. Stressing that "ownership is not the issue" but "only prior, physical and uninterrupted occupation and possession of the litigated area," the MTC ordered private respondent and his father, together with all other persons claiming under them, to vacate the litigated portion and restore possession to petitioner. The decision was affirmed on appeal by the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Davao del Sur. 10


On 18 July 1977, during the pendency of the forcible entry case, petitioner instituted the present action for reconveyance with damages against private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City. 11 Petitioner alleged that private respondent fraudulently registered the 3/4-hectare portion actually cultivated by him when the former stated in his free patent application that "the land applied for is not claimed or occupied by any other person." In addition, petitioner denied that a survey was conducted in 1970; if at all, it was merely a "table survey." Incidentally, it was discovered in the survey that the area of petitioner's actual occupation exceeded that which he bought from Ciriaco Reducto in 1946.


After trial, the court rejected petitioner's denial of the 1970 Survey on the ground that he was already estopped from contesting it when he offered Subdivision Plan CSD-11-001883-D in evidence. Therefore, since the disputed 3/4-hectare portion was not part of the area bought and paid for in 1946 by petitioner, the latter was not entitled to reconveyance. Petitioner was declared a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith who was "enjoying freely the use of government property" without even applying for the same nor paying taxes thereon. His prayer for P5,000.00 as actual damages for the sugarcane and bananas destroyed on the disputed portion was denied. Instead, private respondent's counterclaim was granted and petitioner was ordered to pay P6,000.00 in attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, P15,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs of the proceedings. 12


Petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals 13 reiterating his allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and, at the same time, contending that the judgment in the forcible entry case constituted res judicata on the action for reconveyance.


The Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision in toto 14 ruling that petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. On the contrary, as found by the lower court, the evidence showed that the requisites for the procurement of a free patent and original certificate of title were regularly complied with, i.e., a free patent application filed with the Bureau of Lands together with the affidavits of the applicant and two (2) witnesses, and giving notice of the application; the holding of an ocular inspection by the Land Examiner from the Bureau of Lands; the latter's recommendation for the approval of the application; and, the promulgation of the order for the issuance of the free patent on the basis of which an original certificate of title can be issued.


On the issue of res judicata, respondent Court of Appeals ruled that the fact that petitioner obtained a favorable judgment in the forcible entry case was not conclusive and did not ipso facto entitle him to a similar favorable judgment in the reconveyance case for the reason that while prior physical possession was the sole issue in the forcible entry case, that of lawful ownership or possession de jure was the issue disputed in the reconveyance case. Hence, the petition before us.


We dismiss the petition and adopt as our own the conclusions reached by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals. In addition, we hold that petitioner Pantaleon de la Peña has absolutely no standing to institute the present suit for reconveyance.


It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. 15 In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual occupation since January 1947. 16 However, petitioner's possession is not one that could ripen into ownership. Title to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. It must be noted that the dispute regarding the 3/4-hectare portion started even before a free patent and OCT could be issued to private respondent in 1975. As early as 1956, the controversy already began between petitioner and private respondent's father. Hence, petitioner's possession falls short of the required period. Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit.


Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State. 17 In such cases, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the law. 18 Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance.


However, we are inclined to delete the award for attorney's fees, moral damages and expenses of litigation. As correctly argued by petitioner, an award for attorney's fees and moral damages on the sole basis of an action later declared to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other party is improper. 19 The right to litigate is so precious that a Penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. 20


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 21 December 1987 of respondent Court of Appeals sustaining that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City dated 23 April 1984 is AFFIRMED, with the sole modification that the award for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, and moral damages is DELETED.


SO ORDERED.


Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.





#Footnotes


1 Orig. Rec., p. 70.


2 Id., pp. 72-73.


3 See Exh. "1" ("Quitclaim Deed"), Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.


4 See Exh. "2" ("Quitclaim Deed"), Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.


5 See Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.


6 See Exh. "5," Folder of Exhibits.


7 Civil Case No. 62.


8 Exh. "6," Folder of Exhibits for Defendant.


9 Decision penned by Judge Rosalina L. Montejo, dated 20 February 1979.


10 Decision penned by Judge Marcelino M. Francisco, dated 3 November 1980, in Civil Case No. 1448.


11 De la Peña v. Tan, Civil Case No. 1176.


12 Decision penned by Judge Juan L. Montejo, dated 23 April 1984; Orig. Rec., pp. 290-312.


13 De la Peña v. Tan, CA-G.R. CV No. 04379.


14 Decision penned by Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombos-de la Fuente, concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Alfredo L. Benipayo, dated 21 December 1987; Rollo, pp. 29-35.


15 Tomas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79328, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 627, 633; Esconde v. Barlongay, G.R. No. 67583, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 603, 611; Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio, et al., 104 Phil. 126 (1958); Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 92 Phil. 826 (1953); Azurin v. Quitoriano, et al., 81 Phil. 261 (1948).


16 Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 16.


17 Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 (1936).


18 See Sec. 101 of CA 141 (Public Land Act); Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1158 (1957); Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 946, 953 (1955).


19 Siasat v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67889, 10 October 1985, 139 SCRA 238, 250; R & B Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64515, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 736, 745; Salao v. Salao, No. L-26699, 16 March 1976, 70 SCRA 65, 86; Ramos v. Ramos, No. L-19872, 3 December 1974, 61 SCRA 284, 306; Mercader v. Manila Polo Club, 99 Phil. 981, 985 (1956).


20 Albenson Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 30; Garcia v. Gonzales, No. L-48184, 12 March 1990, 183 SCRA 72, 81; Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Mendez, G.R. No. 66419, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 593, 601.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Preciolita V. Corliss v. The Manila Railroad Co. (1969)

G.R. No. L-21291               March 28, 1969
Lessons Applicable: Pater familias (Torts and Negligence)

FACTS:
  • Feb 21, 1957 near midnight: although the conductor applied the brakes Ralph W. Corliss' jeep collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company 
    • in his eagerness to beat, despite the tooting of the horn and the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation
  • Case was filed by Preciolita V. Corliss, 21 year old widow
ISSUE: W/N the Manila Railroad Co. is negligent

HELD: NO. Decision is affirmed
  • negligence - The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury.
  • Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
  • The weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a signal of danger to those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their own, ignore such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility
  • Corliss Jr., who undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken place
  • it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on.  A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner 

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-21291

G.R. No. L-21291               March 28, 1969
PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellant.
Moises C. Nicomedes for plaintiff-appellant.
The Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
            Youth, the threshold of life, is invariably accompanied by that euphoric sense of well-being, and with reason. The future, bright with promise, looms ahead. One's powers are still to be tested, but one feels ready for whatever challenge may come his way. There is that heady atmosphere of self-confidence, at times carried to excess. The temptation to take risks is there, ever so often, difficult, if not impossible, to resist. There could be then a lessening of prudence and foresight, qualities usually associated with age. For death seems so remote and contingent an event. Such is not always the case though, and a slip may be attended with consequences at times unfortunate, even fatal.
            Some such thought apparently was in the mind of the lower court when it dismissed the complaint for recovery of damages filed by plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita V. Corliss whose husband, the late Ralph W. Corliss, was, at the tender age of twenty-one, the victim of a grim tragedy, when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company, close to midnight on the evening of Feb 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that the deceased "in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation." 1
            The negligence imputed to defendant-appellee was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the concept of damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40. An examination of the evidence of record fails to yield a basis for a reversal of the decision appealed from. We affirm.
            According to the decision appealed from, there is no dispute as to the following: "In December 1956, plaintiff, 19 years of age, married Ralph W. Corliss Jr., 21 years of age, ...; that Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base; that at the time of the accident, he was driving the fatal jeep; that he was then returning in said jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, to the Base; and that Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the Base Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns." 2
            Then came a summary of the testimony of two of the witnesses for plaintiff-appellant. Thus: "Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff, substantially declared in his deposition, ..., that at the time of the accident, he also awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and that while there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop — dead stop. Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see the train coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident." 3 Also: "Virgilio de la Paz, another witness of the plaintiff, testified that on the night of February 21, 1957, he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field. He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He helped the P.C. soldier. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him." 4
            After which reference was made to the testimony of the main witness for defendant-appellee, Teodorico Capili, "who was at the engine at the time of the mishap," and who "testified that before the locomotive, which had been previously inspected and found to be in good condition approached, the crossing, that is, about 300 meters away, he blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep suddenly spurt and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks." 5
            1. The above finding as to the non-existence of negligence attributable to defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company comes to us encased in the armor of what admittedly appears to be a careful judicial appraisal and scrutiny of the evidence of record. It is thus proof against any attack unless sustained and overwhelming. Not that it is invulnerable, but it is likely to stand firm in the face of even the most formidable barrage.
            In the more traditional terminology, the lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great respect. After all, the lower court had the opportunity of weighing carefully what was testified to and apparently did not neglect it. There is no affront to justice then if its finding be accorded acceptance subject of course the contingency of reversal if error or errors, substantial in character, be shown in the conclusion thus arrived at. It is a fair statement of the governing, principle to say that the appellate function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the result reached by the trial court.
            As was held in a 1961 decision: "We have already ruled, that when the credibility of witnesses is the one at issue, the trial court's judgment as to their degree of credence deserves serious consideration by this Court." 6 An earlier expression of the same view is found in Jai-Alai Corporation v. Ching Kiat: "After going over the record, we find no reason for rejecting the findings of the court below. The questions raised hinge on credibility and it is well-settled that in the absence of compelling reasons, its determination is best left to the trial judge why had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand." 7
            In a 1964 opinion, we adhered to such an approach. Thus: "'Nothing in the record suggests any arbitrary or abusive conduct on the part of the trial judge in the formulation of the ruling. His conclusion on the matter is sufficiently borne out by the evidence presented. We are denied, therefore, the prerogative to disturb that finding, consonant to the time honored tradition of the Tribunal to hold trial judges better situated to make conclusions on questions of fact'." 8On this ground alone we can rest the affirmance of the judgment appealed from.lâwphi1.ñet
            2. Nor is the result different even if no such presumption were indulged in and the matter examined as if we were exercising original and not appellate jurisdiction. The sad and deplorable situation in which plaintiff-appellant now finds herself, to the contrary notwithstanding we find no reason for reversing the judgment of the lower court.
            This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done. 9 Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.
            The above Civil Code provision, which is a reiteration of that found in the Civil Code of Spain, formerly applicable in this jurisdiction, 10 had been interpreted in earlier decisions. Thus, in Smith v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 11 Manresa was cited to the following effect "'Among the questions most frequently raised and upon which the majority of cases have been decided with respect to the application of this liability, are those referring to the determination of the damage or prejudice, and to the fault or negligence of the person responsible therefor. These are the two indispensable factors in the obligations under discussion, for without damage or prejudice there can be no liability, and although this element is present no indemnity can be awarded unless arising from some person's fault or negligence'."
            Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo 12 and United States v. Barias.13 Cooley' formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: "Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be: "The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury." There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. 14 Thus: "Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances."
            To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to defendant-appellee, and the action of plaintiff-appellee must necessary fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened on defendant-appellee had not arisen.
            3. Plaintiff-appellant, in her brief, however, would seek a reversal of the judgment appealed from on the ground that there was a failure to appreciate the true situation. Thus the first three assigned errors are factual in character. The third assigned error could be summarily disposed of. It would go against the evidence to maintain the view that the whistle was not sounded and the brakes not applied at a distance of 300 meters before reaching the crossing.
            The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower court to hold that the crossing bars not having been put down and there being no guard at the gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the time of the accident. For one cannot just single out circumstance and then confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance. Considered separately, neither of the two above errors assigned would call for a judgment different in character. Nor would a combination of acts allegedly impressed with negligence suffice to alter the result. The quantum of proof required still not been met. The alleged errors fail of their said effect. The case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it had not been improved. There is no justification for reversing the judgment of the lower court.
            It cannot be stressed too much that the decisive considerations are too variable, too dependent in the lid analysis upon a common sense estimate of the situation as it presented itself to the parties for us to be able to say that this or that element having been isolated, negligence is shown. The factors that enter the judgment are too many and diverse for us to imprison them in a formula sufficient of itself to yield the correct answer to the multi-faceted problems the question of negligence poses. Every case must be dependent on its facts. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in the light of what could reasonably be expected of the parties. If the objective standard of prudence be met, then negligence is ruled out.
            In this particular case, it would be to show less than fidelity to the controlling facts to impute negligence to defendant-appellee. The first three errors assigned certainly do not call for that conclusion.
            4. The fourth assigned error is deserving of a more extended treatment. Plaintiff-appellant apparently had in mind this portion of the opinion of the lower court: "The weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a signal of danger to those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their own, ignore such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility. Corliss Jr., who undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken place." 15
            Her assignment of error, however, would single out not the above excerpt from the decision appealed from but what to her is the apparent reliance of the lower court on Mestres v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co16 and United States v. Manlabat & Pasibi. 17 In the Manabat case, the doctrine announced by this Court follows: "A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs and injury results. Considering the purposes and the general methods adopted for the management of railroads and railroad trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track." The Mestres doctrine in a suit arising from a collision between an automobile and a street car is substantially similar. Thus: "It may be said, however, that, where a person is nearing a street crossing toward which a car is approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and avoid a collision who can most readily adjust himself to the exigencies of the case, and where such person can do so more readily, the motorman has a right to presume that such duty will be performed."
            It is true, as plaintiff-appellant would now allege that there has been a drift away from the apparent rigid and inflexible doctrine thus set forth in the two above cases evidenced by Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 18 the controlling facts of which, however, are easily distinguishable from what had been correctly ascertained in the present case. Such a deviation from the earlier principle announced is not only true of this jurisdiction but also of the United States.
            This is made clear by Prosser. Speaking of a 1927 decision by Justice Holmes, he had the following to say: "Especially noteworthy in this respect is the attempt Mr. Justice Holmes, in Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. Goodman, to 'lay down a standard once for all,' which would require an automobile driver approaching a railroad crossing with an obstructed view to stop, look and listen, and if he cannot be sure otherwise that no train is coming to get out of the car. The basic idea behind this is sound enough: it is by no means proper care to cross a railroad track without taking reasonable precautions against a train, and normally such precautions will require looking, hearing, and a stop, or at least slow speed, where the view is obstructed." 19
            Then, barely seven years later, in 1934, came Pakora v. Wabash Railway20 where, according to Prosser, it being shown that "the only effective stop must be made upon the railway tracks themselves, in a position of obligation danger, the court disregarded any such uniform rule, rejecting the 'get out of the car' requirement as 'an uncommon precaution, likely to be futile and sometimes even dangerous,' and saying that the driver need not always stop. 'Illustrations such as these,' said Mr. Justice Cardozo 'bear witness to the need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law.... Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or normal." 21
            What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was set forth earlier that each and every, case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is undeniable then that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.
            What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower court: "Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. failed to do." 22
            WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 29, 1962 dismissing the complaint, is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1Decision, Record on Appeal, P. 49.
2Ibid, pp. 45-46.
3Ibid, p. 46.
4Ibid, p. 47.
5Ibid.
6Medina v. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-15113, January 28, 1961. To the same effect is the ruling in Gutierrez v. Villegas, L-17117, July 31, 1963.
7L-7969, March 30, 1960.
8Arrieta v. National Rice & Corn Corp., L-15645, January 31, 1964. This case was cited with approval in Perez v. Araneta, L-18414, July 15, 1968.
9Article 2176.
10Article 1902.
1155 Phil. 517, 523 (1930).
1223 Phil. 212, 223 (1912). This case was cited with approval in U.S. v. Reodique (32 Phil. 418 [1915]). The Reodique case in turn was relied upon in People v. Nocum, (77 Phil 1018 [1947]).
1323 Phil. 434 (1912).
1435 Pac. 549 (1894). Negligence as a concept has a well-understood meaning in both American and Spanish law. It may not be amiss to state that according to the prevailing American doctrine, there is an objective test for negligence which according to 2 Harper and James in their treatise on The Law of Torts (1956), citing the Restatement of Torts in "conduct ... which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." (At p. 896). Prosser on Torts, the third edition of which was published in 1964, is of the same mind. (At p. 149). Terry and Edgerton viewed the matter similarly. Cf. Terry, Negligence, 29 Harv. Law Rev. 40 (1915); Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertece and Indifference, 39 Harv. Law Rev. 849 (1926). The above authors show the influence of Holmes in their definitions of the Law of Negligence. According to Holmes in his classic, The Common Law (1881): "Thus the standard represents the general level of moral judgment of the community, what it feels ought ordinarily to be done, and not necessarily what is ordinarily done, although in practice the two would very often come to the same thing." (At p. 110).
15Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 50.
1632 Phil. 496 (1915).
1728 Phil. 560, 565 (1914).
1859 Phil. 758 (1934). Cf. however Aguilar v. People (71 Phil. 426), a 1941 decision, where there is a reiteration of the principle "that a person in control of an automobile who approaches a railroad track and desires to cross it is bound to take that precaution and that control over the car as to be able to stop it almost immediately upon the appearance of the train, ...." (At P. 428). This decision cited U.S. v. Mananquil, 42 Phil. 90 (1921); U.S. v. Manabat, 28 Phil 560 (1914); and Yamada v. Manila Railroad Co., 33 Phil. 8 (1915).
19Prosser, The Law of Torts, 3rd ed., 210 (1964)
20292 US 98.
21Prosser, op cit., 210-211 (1964).
22Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 50-51.