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Showing posts with label October 19. Show all posts
Showing posts with label October 19. Show all posts

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People v. Wong Cheng (1922)

People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
G.R. No.L-18924 October 19, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS:
·         appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
·         Lower court dismissed the case

ISSUE: W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters

HELD: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
YES.
·         2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law
  1. French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
  1. English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed.
·         As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs.
·         mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
·         to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924             October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
          In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
          The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed the case.
          The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
          The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
          There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
          In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
          . . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
          In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
          . . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .
          It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
          . . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.
          Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
          Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
          As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
          There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
          We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
          But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
          . . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.
          The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-26743 October 19, 1927



EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26743 October 19, 1927

THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee , vs. FIDELITY & SURETY COMPANY OF THE PHIL., Defendant-Appellant.


MALCOLM, J.:

The purpose of this action is through the reformation of a written instrument of guaranty upon the ground of mistake - the alleged mistake consisting of the substitution of the words "Laguna Coconut Oil Co." for "Bank of the Philippine Islands" - to obtain for the Bank of the Philippine Islands a judgment for P55,000, with interest, against the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands. The case is an old friend of the courts which has been with us twice before, and which, are ungracious enough in our welcome to hope, has been seen by the court for the last time.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The original action was commenced by the Bank of the Philippine Islands against the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. and the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands on August 25, 1922. The Fidelity and Surety Company interposed a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint which was sustained by the trial court. The plaintiff thereupon filed an amended complaint. The Fidelity and Surety Company again demurred to the amended complaint, and again it was sustained. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court where the ruling was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings (44 Phil., 618). Thus ended the preliminary skirmish.

On the return of the record to the lower court, the Fidelity and Surety Company filed an answer. The Laguna Coconut Oil Co. made no defense, and judgment by default was obtained against it. The case was submitted to the court upon a stipulation of facts. Upon the pleadings and the agreed facts, the trial court rendered judgment against the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands for the full amount of the note, with interest. From this judgment, the Fidelity and Surety Company appealed to be well taken, for the principal reason that the action involved a reformation of the contract of guaranty, which was not put in issue by the pleadings. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the action dismissed, "without prejudice to the bringing of another action upon the same cause." (48 Phil., 5.) Thus ended a major engagement between the parties.

On October 20, 1925, the Bank of Philippine Islands commenced a new action against the defendant, the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The defendant demurred. The trial court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant answered. Evidence was produced on behalf of the plaintiff. The judgment was in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P50,000 plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs. It is from this judgment that the defendant has appealed, assigning six errors which, it is alleged, were committed by the trial court. Our decision should now conclude the judicial warfare.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On April 26, 1920, the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. executed in favor of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc., the following promissory note:

    LAGUNA COCONUT OIL CO.
    Vegetable Oil Manufacturers
    Manila, P. I.

        P50,000

        One month after date, we promise to pay to the Philippine Vegetable Company, Inc., or order at the City of Manila, Philippine Island, the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency; value received.

        In case of non-payment of this note at maturity, we agree to pay interest at the rate of nine per cent (9%) per annum on the said amount and the further sum of P5,000 in full, without any deduction as and for costs, expenses and attorney's fees for collection whether actually incurred or not.

        Manila, Philippine Islands, April 26, 1920.

        LAGUNA COCONUT OIL CO.         
        BY (Sgd.) BALDOMERO COSME President         

    On May 3, 1920, the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands made a notation on the note reading as follows:

    MANILA,           May 3, 1920          

    For value, received, we hereby obligate ourselves to hold the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. harmless against loss for having discounted the foregoing note at the value stated therein.

    FIDELITY AND SURETY CO. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

    By (Sgd.) J. ELMER DELANEY         
    Vice-President         
    Cedula F-3443, Jan. 2,1920, Manila, P.I.         

            Attest:

    (Sdg.) A.D. TANNER         
    Secretary-Treasurer         
    Cedula F-3447, Jan. 2, 1920, Manila, P. I.         

On May 4, 1920, the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company endorsed the note in blank and delivered it to the Bank of the Philippine Islands. It is possible that the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company was paid the sum of P50,000 therefor. At least after maturity of the note, demand for its payment was made on the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, and the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, all of whom refused to pay, the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. being admittedly insolvent. The correspondence of the bank with the Fidelity and Surety Company is in the record, and is emphasized by the plaintiff as indicative of responsibility assumed by the defendant, but is objected to by the defendant as for minor importance.

The effort of the plaintiff on its last appearance in the trial court was to connect up the promissory note of P50,000 with an existing obligation of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company in the form of another promissory note. The evidence was also intended to demonstrate that a clear error had been committed when reference was made to the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. in the notation on the note. The plaintiff's theory was confirmed by the trial judge. His Honor emphasized that the note could not have been discounted by the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and that this must logically have been done by the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Without paying particular attention to certain of the assignment of errors, let us ascertain if this position is tenable and if the plaintiff has made out its case.

OPINION

According to section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a written agreement is presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. The Civil Code has articles to the same effect. However, the Code of Civil Procedure permits evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing in the following case: Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the pleadings. This provision of our local law was construed by the United States Supreme Court in the well-known case of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company vs. Government of the Philippine Islands ([1917], 247 U. S.385). It was there announced that the courts of equity will reform a written contract where, owing to mutual mistake, the language used therein did not fully or accurately express the agreement and intent of the parties. It was also stated that the relief by way of reformation will not be granted unless the proof of mutual mistake be "of the clearest and most satisfactory character." The court finally said that the evidence introduced by the appellant met these stringent requirements.

Our local decisions have applied the rule that the amount of evidence necessary to sustain a prayer for relief where it is sought to impugn a fact in a document is always more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. (Centenera vs. Garcia Palicio [1915], 29 Phil., 470; Mendozana vs. Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. and De Garay [1921], 41 Phil., 475.) Has the plaintiff carried the burden of proof in this manner and to this extent? That is the question.

In reaching out to consider the possibilities of the case, we are first confronted with the language of the court when the case was last here. Mr. Justice Ostrand, in the course of the opinion in that instance, observed: "The writing upon which the action is brought does not in terms show any obligation in favor of the plaintiff and the action can only be maintained upon the theory that the writing does not express the true intent of the parties. We may surmise that the guarantee in question was intended for the benefit of the party who subsequently discounted the note, but we cannot be certain." It was then pointed out that the note may have been merely an accommodation note, and that the guaranty may have been intended for the protection of the maker. However, the parties have not seen fit to take advantage of this suggestion.

An examination of the note and the guaranty discloses that in the notation to the note the word "hold" is interlined. This indicates that the Vice-President of the Fidelity and Surety Company had his particular attention called to the language of the note, and corrected the typewritten matter by inserting in ink the word quoted. That the writer of the notation fell into a further error in obligating the company to the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. may be possible. That the writer may have had in mind to use the words Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc. may also be possible. The names of the two parties before the guarantor were Laguna Coconut Oil Co. and Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc. The guaranteeing company could mot very well have assumed that the Bank of the Philippine Islands at a later date was contemplating discounting the note.

It is also apparent on the face of the note that it was to draw interest at maturity. This fact would disprove discount of the note by the Bank of the Philippine Islands on or before May 3, 1920. In truth, it is not certain that the bank ever did discount the note. At least, plaintiff in its second amended complaint averred that the promissory note "was discounted by Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc."

The bookkeeping entries of the bank are hardly competent against a stranger to the transaction, such as the defendant in this case. Moreover, it will not escape notice that one entry at least in plaintiff's Exhibit E has been changed by erasing the words "y Fidelity and Surety Co. of the Phil. Islands" and substituting "Philippine Vegetable Oil Co. garatizado p. Fidelity & Surety Co. of the Phil. Islands." The book entries taken at their face value are not conclusive.

The correspondence between the parties fails to disclose either an express or implied admission that the defendant had executed the guaranty in question in favor of the plaintiff bank. There is nothing in these exhibits from which any such admission can be inferred. An attempt to interpret the correspondence merely leads open further into the field of speculation. Yet the rule is that an admission or declaration to be competent must have been expressed in definite, certain, and unequivocal language. (1 R. C. L., 481.) Here the exhibits are couched in language which is neither definite, certain, nor unequivocal for nowhere do they contain an admission of a guaranty made by the defendant company for the protection of the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

To justify the reformation of a written instrument upon the ground of mistake, the concurrence of three things are necessary: First, that the mistake should be of a fact; second, that the mistake should be proved by clear and convincing evidence; and, third, that the mistake should be common to both parties to the instrument. The rule is, as has been above stated, that the mistake must be mutual. There may have been a mistake here. It would, however, seem to be straining the natural course of events to hold the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands a party to that mistake.

It may be that the majority has not approached a decision in this case in a spirit of tolerant sympathy. The plaintiff has filed three distinct and conflicting complaints. It has not remained loyal to any one theory of the case. For instance, it has alleged at various times that the guaranty of the defendant was in favor of the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and that the guaranty was in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands; that the note was discounted by the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company and that the note was discounted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands; that there was no mutual mistake and that there was mutual mistake. The court was thus justified in its statement when the case was here before when it said: In view of the fact that the case has been pending for several years, that it has been before this court once before, and that the plaintiff has had ample opportunity to remedy the defect in its pleadings, we would be warranted in definitely absolving the appellant from the complaint, but the majority of the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff should be given another opportunity to prosecute its claim."

With all the various pleadings, all the various incidents, all the various facts, all the various legal principles, and all the various possibilities to the forefront, we cannot bring ourselves to conclude that the plaintiff, by proof of the clearest and most satisfactory character constituting more than a preponderance of the evidence, has established a mutual mistake. Instead, the proof is left far behind that goal.

In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be reversed, and the proceedings definitely dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs in either instance. This order will also serve to deny the two motions of reconsideration filed by the appellee.

Johnson, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.







Separate Opinions



AVANCEÑA, C.J., STREET, VILLAMOR and ROMUALDEZ, JJ., dissenting:

In the opinion of the undersigned this is a clear case for reformation of an instrument and enforcement of the same as reformed. The contract which is the subject of the action is found in the indorsement of the defendant Fidelity and Surety Company appended to a note for P50,000, signed by the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and payable to the Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., Inc. The indorsement referred to reads as follows:

MANILA, May 3, 1920          

For value received, we hereby obligated ourselves to hold the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. harmless against loss for having discounted the foregoing note at the value stated therein.

FIDELITY AND SURETY CO. OF THE P.I.       
BY J. ELMER DELANEY"        

This contract has already been the subject of a former action by the same plaintiff against the same defendant and the Coconut Oil Co.; but in that case reformation of the contract was not sought and this court held that, as the contract did not purport to bind the defendant Surety Company to the Bank of the Philippine Islands no recovery could be had thereon by the bank. But at the same time the decision was made without prejudice to another action, the idea evidently being that an action could be maintained for the reformation and enforcement of the instrument.

The parties concerned are now before us in an action seeking in effect reformation and enforcement of the contract as reformed, though in the petitory part of the complaint it is not put exactly in that way. Under the facts proved and prayer for general relief, a right to obtain reformation and enforcement of the reformed contract is evident.

An examination of the indorsement, or contract, which is the subject of the action shows that the Fidelity and Surety Company acknowledges that it has received value for placing its signature on said indorsement, thereby nominally obligating itself to hold that Laguna Coconut Oil Co. (sic?) harmless against loss for having discounted the note. Although the mistake is not obvious to the superficial reader, the words used make an impossible situation and completely frustrate the manifest intention of the parties. It is proved as a fact that the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. was debtor to the Philippine Vegetable Oil Co. and that the note to which the indorsement of guaranty is appended was given for that indebtedness. That an error was made in the wording of the indorsement is obvious and undeniable. The intention of the contracting parties could only have been that the Fidelity and Surety Company should hold harmless the person or entity discounting the note. The plaintiff did in fact discount said note on the faith of this indorsement, and the instrument should be reformed so as to give expression to the liability of the defendant company to the bank.

In dealing with this situation, it should not be forgotten that the defendant company evidently intended to obligate itself to someone or other, and the attitude of the court should be favorable to the giving of effect to the intention of the parties rather than favorable to its frustration. By the decision of the court in this case, the Fidelity and Surety Company is entirely free from the obligation of guaranty in respect to this note, although it received value for that very undertaking. We therefore dissent.

Insurance Case Digest: Valenzuela v. CA (1990)


G.R. No. 83122   October 19, 1990

Lessons Applicable: Effect of Non-Payment (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: Art. 19,Art. 20,Art. 21, Art. 2200 of the new Civil Code;Section 77 of the Insurance Code

FACTS:

  • Valenzuela, General Agent of Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc authorized to sell in behalf of Philamgen solicited marine insurance from Delta Motors, Inc. amounting to P4.4M  entitling him to a 32% commission or P1.6M
  • 1976-1978: premium payments of P1,946,886 were paid directly to Philamgen.  Philamgen wanted a 50% share of Valenzuela's commission but Valenzuela refused.
  • Because of his refusal, the officers of Philamgen reversed his commission due him, placed agency transactions on a cash and carry basis thus removing the 60-day credit for premiums due, threatened to cancel policies issued by his agency and leaked out the news that he has substantial accounts with Philamgen.
  • December 27, 1978: His agency with Philamgen was terminated
  • Valenzuela sought relief from the RTC
  • RTC: favored Valenzuela with reinstatement, commission with interest, monthly compensatory damages, moral damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit
  • CA modified by holding Philamgen and Valenzuela jointly and severally liable for the premium
ISSUE: W/N Valuenuela should be NOT be held liable since non-payment of the premium renders the policy invalid

HELD: YES. petition is GRANTED. RTC reinstated with modification that upon satisfaction of the judgment, contractual relationship is terminated

  • The principal may not defeat the agent's right to indemnification by a termination of the contract of agency. Where the principal terminates or repudiates the agent's employment in violation of the contract of employment and without cause ... the agent is entitled to receive either the amount of net losses caused and gains prevented by the breach, or the reasonable value of the services rendered. Thus, the agent is entitled to prospective profits which he would have made except for such wrongful termination provided that such profits are not conjectural, or speculative but are capable of determination upon some fairly reliable basis. 
  • If a principal violates a contractual or quasi-contractual duty which he owes his agent, the agent may as a rule bring an appropriate action for the breach of that duty. The agent may in a proper case maintain an action at law for compensation or damages 
  • question of whether or not the agency agreement is coupled with interest is helpful to the petitioners' cause but is not the primary and compelling reason 
  • Section 77 of the Insurance Code, the remedy for the non-payment of premiums is to put an end to and render the insurance policy not binding
  • unless premium is paid, an insurance contract does not take effect
  • since admittedly the premiums have not been paid, the policies issued have lapsed
    • to sue Valenzuela for the unpaid premiums would be the height of injustice and unfair dealing
  • Under Article 2200 of the new Civil Code, "indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain."

Negotiable Instruments Case Digest: BPI v. Fidelity &Surety Co. (1927)


G.R. No. L-26743 October 19, 1927
Lessons Applicable: Consideration and Accomodation Party (Negotiable Instruments Law)

FACTS: Laguna Coconut Oil (guaranteed by Fidelity  and  Surety)  > Phil. Veg Oil (indorsed in blank)> BPI = BPI against ? (Laguna/Phil. Veg. Oil/Fidelity and Surety)
  • Laguna  Coconut  Oil  Company  executed  the  following  promissory  note  in favor of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: 

P50,000.00. 


One  month  after  date  we  promise  to  pay  to  the  Philippine  Vegetable  Oil Company,  Inc.,  or  order  at  City  of  Manila,  Philippine  Islands,  the  sum  of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), Philippine currency; value received. 
In case of non-payment of this note at maturity, we are to pay interest at 
the  rate  of  nine  per  cent  (9%)  per  annum  on  the  said  amount  and  the further  sum  of  P5,000  in  full,  without  any  deduction  as  and  for  costs, expenses  and  attorney's  fees  for  collection  whether  actually  incurred  or not. 
Manila, Philippine Islands, April 26, 1920. 
LAGUNA COCONUT OIL CO. 
By BALDOMERO COSME 

President 

  • May 3, 1920: Fidelity  &  Surety  Company made the following notation on the note: 



For  value  received,  we  hereby  obligate  ourselves  to  hold  the  Laguna 

Cocoanut Oil Co. harmless against loss for having discounted the foregoing 

note at the value stated therein. 

  • May 4, 1920: Philippine  Vegetable  Oil  Company  indorsed  the  note  to  BPI in blank

  • BPI instituted actions against Laguna  Oil (insolvent) and  Fidelity Surety

  • RTC:  against  Fidelity  and  Surety  and  demanded  it  to  pay  the note  

    • “BPI”  should  have  been placed in the indorsement rather than “Laguna Oil”

ISSUE: W/N Fidelity Surely should be the only one liable for having made the notation as guarantee and not an accomodation party 
HELD: YES.


  • Trial court's judgment  as  it  stands  clearly  involves  a reformation of the contract of guaranty and it is elementary that the facts upon  which  relief  by  reformation  is  sought  must  be  put  in  issue  by  the pleadings.    

    • court  of  equity  cannot  reform  an instrument except on allegations, which make out a case for the equitable remedy asked.

      • fails  to  express  the  real  agreement; or  

      • mutual  mistake

      • on  account  of  fraud  of  one them 

      • fraud  or  inequitable  condition  on  one  side  and  mistake  on  the other

    • In this connection it should be borne in mind that contracts of suretyship and guarantee are strictly construed in favor of the surety or guarantor.

  • Unless  otherwise stated in the instrument, a negotiable promissory note implied prima facie valuable  consideration  moving  to  the  maker  whether  the  words  "value received" appear in it or not.  

    • An  accommodation  note  showing  on  its  face  in  express  terms  that  it  had been issued for no consideration would be of little or no use to the payee, and for that reason, if for no other, practically all accommodation notes are so drawn as to either express or imply a valuable consideration prima facie.