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Showing posts with label accomodation party. Show all posts
Showing posts with label accomodation party. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-26743 October 19, 1927



EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26743 October 19, 1927

THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee , vs. FIDELITY & SURETY COMPANY OF THE PHIL., Defendant-Appellant.


MALCOLM, J.:

The purpose of this action is through the reformation of a written instrument of guaranty upon the ground of mistake - the alleged mistake consisting of the substitution of the words "Laguna Coconut Oil Co." for "Bank of the Philippine Islands" - to obtain for the Bank of the Philippine Islands a judgment for P55,000, with interest, against the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands. The case is an old friend of the courts which has been with us twice before, and which, are ungracious enough in our welcome to hope, has been seen by the court for the last time.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The original action was commenced by the Bank of the Philippine Islands against the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. and the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands on August 25, 1922. The Fidelity and Surety Company interposed a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint which was sustained by the trial court. The plaintiff thereupon filed an amended complaint. The Fidelity and Surety Company again demurred to the amended complaint, and again it was sustained. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court where the ruling was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings (44 Phil., 618). Thus ended the preliminary skirmish.

On the return of the record to the lower court, the Fidelity and Surety Company filed an answer. The Laguna Coconut Oil Co. made no defense, and judgment by default was obtained against it. The case was submitted to the court upon a stipulation of facts. Upon the pleadings and the agreed facts, the trial court rendered judgment against the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands for the full amount of the note, with interest. From this judgment, the Fidelity and Surety Company appealed to be well taken, for the principal reason that the action involved a reformation of the contract of guaranty, which was not put in issue by the pleadings. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the action dismissed, "without prejudice to the bringing of another action upon the same cause." (48 Phil., 5.) Thus ended a major engagement between the parties.

On October 20, 1925, the Bank of Philippine Islands commenced a new action against the defendant, the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The defendant demurred. The trial court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant answered. Evidence was produced on behalf of the plaintiff. The judgment was in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P50,000 plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs. It is from this judgment that the defendant has appealed, assigning six errors which, it is alleged, were committed by the trial court. Our decision should now conclude the judicial warfare.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On April 26, 1920, the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. executed in favor of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc., the following promissory note:

    LAGUNA COCONUT OIL CO.
    Vegetable Oil Manufacturers
    Manila, P. I.

        P50,000

        One month after date, we promise to pay to the Philippine Vegetable Company, Inc., or order at the City of Manila, Philippine Island, the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency; value received.

        In case of non-payment of this note at maturity, we agree to pay interest at the rate of nine per cent (9%) per annum on the said amount and the further sum of P5,000 in full, without any deduction as and for costs, expenses and attorney's fees for collection whether actually incurred or not.

        Manila, Philippine Islands, April 26, 1920.

        LAGUNA COCONUT OIL CO.         
        BY (Sgd.) BALDOMERO COSME President         

    On May 3, 1920, the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands made a notation on the note reading as follows:

    MANILA,           May 3, 1920          

    For value, received, we hereby obligate ourselves to hold the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. harmless against loss for having discounted the foregoing note at the value stated therein.

    FIDELITY AND SURETY CO. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

    By (Sgd.) J. ELMER DELANEY         
    Vice-President         
    Cedula F-3443, Jan. 2,1920, Manila, P.I.         

            Attest:

    (Sdg.) A.D. TANNER         
    Secretary-Treasurer         
    Cedula F-3447, Jan. 2, 1920, Manila, P. I.         

On May 4, 1920, the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company endorsed the note in blank and delivered it to the Bank of the Philippine Islands. It is possible that the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company was paid the sum of P50,000 therefor. At least after maturity of the note, demand for its payment was made on the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, and the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, all of whom refused to pay, the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. being admittedly insolvent. The correspondence of the bank with the Fidelity and Surety Company is in the record, and is emphasized by the plaintiff as indicative of responsibility assumed by the defendant, but is objected to by the defendant as for minor importance.

The effort of the plaintiff on its last appearance in the trial court was to connect up the promissory note of P50,000 with an existing obligation of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company in the form of another promissory note. The evidence was also intended to demonstrate that a clear error had been committed when reference was made to the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. in the notation on the note. The plaintiff's theory was confirmed by the trial judge. His Honor emphasized that the note could not have been discounted by the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and that this must logically have been done by the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Without paying particular attention to certain of the assignment of errors, let us ascertain if this position is tenable and if the plaintiff has made out its case.

OPINION

According to section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a written agreement is presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. The Civil Code has articles to the same effect. However, the Code of Civil Procedure permits evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing in the following case: Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the pleadings. This provision of our local law was construed by the United States Supreme Court in the well-known case of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company vs. Government of the Philippine Islands ([1917], 247 U. S.385). It was there announced that the courts of equity will reform a written contract where, owing to mutual mistake, the language used therein did not fully or accurately express the agreement and intent of the parties. It was also stated that the relief by way of reformation will not be granted unless the proof of mutual mistake be "of the clearest and most satisfactory character." The court finally said that the evidence introduced by the appellant met these stringent requirements.

Our local decisions have applied the rule that the amount of evidence necessary to sustain a prayer for relief where it is sought to impugn a fact in a document is always more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. (Centenera vs. Garcia Palicio [1915], 29 Phil., 470; Mendozana vs. Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. and De Garay [1921], 41 Phil., 475.) Has the plaintiff carried the burden of proof in this manner and to this extent? That is the question.

In reaching out to consider the possibilities of the case, we are first confronted with the language of the court when the case was last here. Mr. Justice Ostrand, in the course of the opinion in that instance, observed: "The writing upon which the action is brought does not in terms show any obligation in favor of the plaintiff and the action can only be maintained upon the theory that the writing does not express the true intent of the parties. We may surmise that the guarantee in question was intended for the benefit of the party who subsequently discounted the note, but we cannot be certain." It was then pointed out that the note may have been merely an accommodation note, and that the guaranty may have been intended for the protection of the maker. However, the parties have not seen fit to take advantage of this suggestion.

An examination of the note and the guaranty discloses that in the notation to the note the word "hold" is interlined. This indicates that the Vice-President of the Fidelity and Surety Company had his particular attention called to the language of the note, and corrected the typewritten matter by inserting in ink the word quoted. That the writer of the notation fell into a further error in obligating the company to the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. may be possible. That the writer may have had in mind to use the words Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc. may also be possible. The names of the two parties before the guarantor were Laguna Coconut Oil Co. and Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc. The guaranteeing company could mot very well have assumed that the Bank of the Philippine Islands at a later date was contemplating discounting the note.

It is also apparent on the face of the note that it was to draw interest at maturity. This fact would disprove discount of the note by the Bank of the Philippine Islands on or before May 3, 1920. In truth, it is not certain that the bank ever did discount the note. At least, plaintiff in its second amended complaint averred that the promissory note "was discounted by Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc."

The bookkeeping entries of the bank are hardly competent against a stranger to the transaction, such as the defendant in this case. Moreover, it will not escape notice that one entry at least in plaintiff's Exhibit E has been changed by erasing the words "y Fidelity and Surety Co. of the Phil. Islands" and substituting "Philippine Vegetable Oil Co. garatizado p. Fidelity & Surety Co. of the Phil. Islands." The book entries taken at their face value are not conclusive.

The correspondence between the parties fails to disclose either an express or implied admission that the defendant had executed the guaranty in question in favor of the plaintiff bank. There is nothing in these exhibits from which any such admission can be inferred. An attempt to interpret the correspondence merely leads open further into the field of speculation. Yet the rule is that an admission or declaration to be competent must have been expressed in definite, certain, and unequivocal language. (1 R. C. L., 481.) Here the exhibits are couched in language which is neither definite, certain, nor unequivocal for nowhere do they contain an admission of a guaranty made by the defendant company for the protection of the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

To justify the reformation of a written instrument upon the ground of mistake, the concurrence of three things are necessary: First, that the mistake should be of a fact; second, that the mistake should be proved by clear and convincing evidence; and, third, that the mistake should be common to both parties to the instrument. The rule is, as has been above stated, that the mistake must be mutual. There may have been a mistake here. It would, however, seem to be straining the natural course of events to hold the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands a party to that mistake.

It may be that the majority has not approached a decision in this case in a spirit of tolerant sympathy. The plaintiff has filed three distinct and conflicting complaints. It has not remained loyal to any one theory of the case. For instance, it has alleged at various times that the guaranty of the defendant was in favor of the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and that the guaranty was in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands; that the note was discounted by the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company and that the note was discounted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands; that there was no mutual mistake and that there was mutual mistake. The court was thus justified in its statement when the case was here before when it said: In view of the fact that the case has been pending for several years, that it has been before this court once before, and that the plaintiff has had ample opportunity to remedy the defect in its pleadings, we would be warranted in definitely absolving the appellant from the complaint, but the majority of the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff should be given another opportunity to prosecute its claim."

With all the various pleadings, all the various incidents, all the various facts, all the various legal principles, and all the various possibilities to the forefront, we cannot bring ourselves to conclude that the plaintiff, by proof of the clearest and most satisfactory character constituting more than a preponderance of the evidence, has established a mutual mistake. Instead, the proof is left far behind that goal.

In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be reversed, and the proceedings definitely dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs in either instance. This order will also serve to deny the two motions of reconsideration filed by the appellee.

Johnson, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.







Separate Opinions



AVANCEÑA, C.J., STREET, VILLAMOR and ROMUALDEZ, JJ., dissenting:

In the opinion of the undersigned this is a clear case for reformation of an instrument and enforcement of the same as reformed. The contract which is the subject of the action is found in the indorsement of the defendant Fidelity and Surety Company appended to a note for P50,000, signed by the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and payable to the Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., Inc. The indorsement referred to reads as follows:

MANILA, May 3, 1920          

For value received, we hereby obligated ourselves to hold the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. harmless against loss for having discounted the foregoing note at the value stated therein.

FIDELITY AND SURETY CO. OF THE P.I.       
BY J. ELMER DELANEY"        

This contract has already been the subject of a former action by the same plaintiff against the same defendant and the Coconut Oil Co.; but in that case reformation of the contract was not sought and this court held that, as the contract did not purport to bind the defendant Surety Company to the Bank of the Philippine Islands no recovery could be had thereon by the bank. But at the same time the decision was made without prejudice to another action, the idea evidently being that an action could be maintained for the reformation and enforcement of the instrument.

The parties concerned are now before us in an action seeking in effect reformation and enforcement of the contract as reformed, though in the petitory part of the complaint it is not put exactly in that way. Under the facts proved and prayer for general relief, a right to obtain reformation and enforcement of the reformed contract is evident.

An examination of the indorsement, or contract, which is the subject of the action shows that the Fidelity and Surety Company acknowledges that it has received value for placing its signature on said indorsement, thereby nominally obligating itself to hold that Laguna Coconut Oil Co. (sic?) harmless against loss for having discounted the note. Although the mistake is not obvious to the superficial reader, the words used make an impossible situation and completely frustrate the manifest intention of the parties. It is proved as a fact that the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. was debtor to the Philippine Vegetable Oil Co. and that the note to which the indorsement of guaranty is appended was given for that indebtedness. That an error was made in the wording of the indorsement is obvious and undeniable. The intention of the contracting parties could only have been that the Fidelity and Surety Company should hold harmless the person or entity discounting the note. The plaintiff did in fact discount said note on the faith of this indorsement, and the instrument should be reformed so as to give expression to the liability of the defendant company to the bank.

In dealing with this situation, it should not be forgotten that the defendant company evidently intended to obligate itself to someone or other, and the attitude of the court should be favorable to the giving of effect to the intention of the parties rather than favorable to its frustration. By the decision of the court in this case, the Fidelity and Surety Company is entirely free from the obligation of guaranty in respect to this note, although it received value for that very undertaking. We therefore dissent.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-34539 July 14, 1986

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34539 July 14, 1986

EULALIO PRUDENCIO and ELISA T. PRUDENCIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, RAMON C. CONCEPCION and MANUEL M. TAMAYO, partners of the defunct partnership Concepcion & Tamayo Construction Company, JOSE TORIBIO, Atty-in-Fact of Concepcion & Tamayo Construction Company, and THE DISTRICT ENGINEER, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, respondents.

Fernando R. Mangubat, Jr. for respondent PNB.



GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review seeking to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, affirming the order of the trial court which dismissed the petitioners' complaint for cancellation of their real estate mortgage and held them jointly and severally liable with the principal debtors on a promissory note which they signed as accommodation makers.

The factual background of this case is stated in the decision of the appellate court:

Appellants are the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila, and covered by T.C.T. 35161 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. On October 7, 1954, this property was mortgaged by the appellants to the Philippine National Bank, hereinafter called PNB, to guarantee a loan of P1,000.00 extended to one Domingo Prudencio.

Sometime in 1955, the Concepcion & Tamayo Construction Company, hereinafter called Company, had a pending contract with the Bureau of Public Works, hereinafter called the Bureau, for the construction of the municipal building in Puerto Princess, Palawan, in the amount of P36,800.00 and, as said Company needed funds for said construction, Jose Toribio, appellants' relative, and attorney-in-fact of the Company, approached the appellants asking them to mortgage their property to secure the loan of P10,000.00 which the Company was negotiating with the PNB.

After some persuasion appellants signed on December 23, 1955 the 'Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage', mortgaging their said property to the PNB to guaranty the loan of P10,000.00 extended to the Company. The terms and conditions of the original mortgage for Pl,000.00 were made integral part of the new mortgage for P10,000.00 and both documents were registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila. The promissory note covering the loan of P10,000.00 dated December 29, 1955, maturing on April 27, 1956, was signed by Jose Toribio, as attorney-in-fact of the Company, and by the appellants. Appellants also signed the portion of the promissory note indicating that they are requesting the PNB to issue the Check covering the loan to the Company. On the same date (December 23, 1955) that the 'Amendment of Real Estate' was executed, Jose Toribio, in the same capacity as attorney-in- fact of the Company, executed also the 'Deed of Assignment' assigning all payments to be made by the Bureau to the Company on account of the contract for the construction of the Puerto Princesa building in favor of the PNB.

This assignment of credit to the contrary notwithstanding, the Bureau; with approval, of the PNB, conditioned, however that they should be for labor and materials, made three payments to the Company on account of the contract price totalling P11,234.40. The Bureau's last request for P5,000.00 on June 20, 1956, however, was denied by the PNB for the reason that since the loan was already overdue as of April 28, 1956, the remaining balance of the contract price should be applied to the loan.

The Company abandoned the work, as a consequence of which on June 30, 1956, the Bureau rescinded the construction contract and assumed the work of completing the building. On November 14, 1958, appellants wrote the PNB contending that since the PNB authorized payments to the Company instead of on account of the loan guaranteed by the mortgage there was a change in the conditions of the contract without the knowledge of appellants, which entitled the latter to a cancellation of their mortgage contract.

Failing in their bid to have the real estate mortgage cancelled, appellants filed on June 27, 1959 this action against the PNB, the Company, the latter's attorney-in-fact Jose Toribio, and the District Engineer of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, seeking the cancellation of their real estate mortgage. The complaint was amended to exclude the Company as defendant, it having been shown that its life as a partnership had already expired and, in lieu thereof, Ramon Concepcion and Manuel M. Tamayo, partners of the defunct Company, were impleaded in their private capacity as defendants.

After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment, denying the prayer in the complaint that the petitioners be absolved from their obligation under the mortgage contract and that the said mortgage be released or cancelled. The petitioners were ordered to pay jointly and severally with their co-makers Ramon C. Concepcion and Manuel M. Tamayo the sum of P11,900.19 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint on June 27, 1959 until fully paid and Pl,000.00 attorney's fees.

The decision also provided that if the judgment was not satisfied within 90 days from its receipt, the mortgaged properties together with all the improvements thereon belonging to the petitioners would be sold at public auction and applied to the judgment debt.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in toto stating that, as accommodation makers, the petitioners' liability is that of solidary co-makers and that since "the amounts released to the construction company were used therein and, therefore, were spent for the successful accomplishment of the work constructed for, the authorization made by the Philippine National Bank of partial payments to the construction company which was also one of the solidary debtors cannot constitute a valid defense on the part of the other solidary debtors. Moreover, those who rendered services and furnished materials in the construction are preferred creditors and have a lien on the price of the contract." The appellate court further held that PNB had no obligation whatsoever to notify the petitioners of its authorizing the three payments in the total amount of Pll,234.00 in favor of the Company because aside from the fact that the petitioners were not parties to the deed of assignment, there was no stipulation in said deed making it obligatory on the part of the PNB to notify the petitioners everytime it authorizes payment to the Company. It ruled that the petitioners cannot ask to be released from the real estate mortgage.

In this petition, the petitioners raise the following issues which they present in the form of errors:

I. First Assignment of Error.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HEREIN PETITIONERS WERE SOLIDARY CO-DEBTORS INSTEAD OF SURETIES:

II. Second Assignment of Error.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT RELEASED FROM THEIR OBLIGATION TO THE RESPONDENT PNB, WHEN THE PNB, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF PETITIONERS, CHANGED THE TENOR AND CONDITION OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF PAYMENTS MADE BY THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR; CONCEPCION & TAMAYO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; AND RELEASED TO SUCH PRINCIPAL DEBTOR PAYMENTS FROM THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC WORKS WHICH WERE MORE THAN ENOUGH TO WIPE OUT THE INDEBTEDNESS TO THE PNB.

The petitioners contend that as accommodation makers, the nature of their liability is only that of mere sureties instead of solidary co-debtors such that "a material alteration in the principal contract, effected by the creditor without the knowledge and consent of the sureties, completely discharges the sureties from all liability on the contract of suretyship. " They state that when respondent PNB did not apply the initial and subsequent payments to the petitioners' debt as provided for in the deed of assignment, they were released from their obligation as sureties and, therefore, the real estate mortgage executed by them should have been cancelled.

Section 29 of the Negotiable Instrument Law provides:

Liability of accommodation party. —An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party.

In the case of Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Aruego (102 SCRA 530, 539), we held that "... in lending his name to the accommodated party, the accommodation party is in effect a surety. ... . " However, unlike in a contract of suretyship, the liability of the accommodation party remains not only primary but also unconditional to a holder for value such that even if the accommodated party receives an extension of the period for payment without the consent of the accommodation party, the latter is still liable for the whole obligation and such extension does not release him because as far as a holder for value is concerned, he is a solidary co- debtor.

Expounding on the nature of the liability of an accommodation petition party under the aforequoted section, we ruled in Ang Tiong v. Ting (22 SCRA 713, 716):

3. That the appellant, again assuming him to be an accommodation indorser, may obtain security from the maker to protect himself against the danger of insolvency of the latter, cannot in any manner affect his liability to the appellee, as the said remedy is a matter of concern exclusively between accommodation indorser and accommodated party. So that the appellant stands only as a surety in relation to the maker, granting this to be true for the sake of argument, is immaterial to the claim of the appellee, and does not a whit diminish nor defeat the rights of the latter who is a holder for value. The liability of the appellant remains primary and unconditional. To sanction the appellant's theory is to give unwarranted legal recognition to the patent absurdity of a situation where an indorser, when sued on an instrument by a holder in due course and for value, can escape liability on his indorsement by the convenient expedient of interposing the defense that he is a mere accommodation indorser.

There is, therefore, no question that as accommodation makers, petitioners would be primarily and unconditionally liable on the promissory note to a holder for value, regardless of whether they stand as sureties or solidary co-debtors since such distinction would be entirely immaterial and inconsequential as far as a holder for value is concerned. Consequently, the petitioners cannot claim to have been released from their obligation simply because the time of payment of such obligation was temporarily deferred by PNB without their knowledge and consent. There has to be another basis for their claim of having been freed from their obligation. The question which should be resolved in this instant petition, therefore, is whether or not PNB can be considered a holder for value under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law such that the petitioners must be necessarily barred from setting up the defense of want of consideration or some other personal defenses which may be set up against a party who is not a holder in due course.

A holder for value under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is one who must meet all the requirements of a holder in due course under Section 52 of the same law except notice of want of consideration. (Agbayani, Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 1964, p. 208). If he does not qualify as a holder in due course then he holds the instrument subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable (Section 58, Negotiable Instruments Law).

In the case at bar, can PNB, the payee of the promissory note be considered a holder in due course?

Petitioners contend that the payee PNB is an immediate party and, therefore, is not a holder in due course and stands on no better footing than a mere assignee.

In those cases where a payee was considered a holder in due course, such payee either acquired the note from another holder or has not directly dealt with the maker thereof. As was held in the case of Bank of Commerce and Savings v. Randell (186 NorthWestern Reporter 71):

We conclude, therefore, that a payee who receives a negotiable promissory note, in good faith, for value, before maturity, and without any notice of any infirmity, from a holder, not the maker. to whom it was negotiated as a completed instrument, is a holder in due course within the purview of a Negotiable Instruments law, so as to preclude the defense of fraud and failure of consideration between the maker and the holder to whom the instrument, was delivered.

Similarly, in the case of Stone v. Goldberg & Lewis (60 Southern Reporter 748) on rehearing and quoting Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, it was held:

It is a general principle of the law merchant that, as between the immediate parties to a negotiable instrument-the parties between whom there is a privity-the consideration may be inquired into; and as to them the only superiority of a bill or note over other unsealed evidence of debt is that it prima facie imports a consideration.

Although as a general rule, a payee may be considered a holder in due course we think that such a rule cannot apply with respect to the respondent PNB. Not only was PNB an immediate party or in privy to the promissory note, that is, it had dealt directly with the petitioners knowing fully well that the latter only signed as accommodation makers but more important, it was the Deed of Assignment executed by the Construction Company in favor of PNB which principally moved the petitioners to sign the promissory note also in favor of PNB. Petitioners were made to believe and on that belief entered into the agreement that no other conditions would alter the terms thereof and yet, PNB altered the same. The Deed of Assignment specifically provided that Jose F. Toribio, on behalf of the Company, "have assigned, transferred and conveyed and by these presents, do assign, transfer and convey unto the said Philippine National Bank, its successors and assigns all payments to be received from the Bureau of Public Works on account of contract for the construction of the Puerto Princesa Municipal Building in Palawan, involving the total amount of P 36,000.00" and that "This assignment shall be irrevocable and subject to the terms and conditions of the promissory note and or any other kind of documents which the Philippine National Bank have required or may require the assignor to execute to evidence the above-mentioned obligation."

Under the terms of the above Deed, it is clear that there are no further conditions which could possibly alter the agreement without the consent of the petitioners such as the grant of greater priority to obligations other than the payment of the loan due to the PNB and part of which loan was guaranteed by the petitioners in the amount of P10,000.00.

This, notwithstanding, PNB approved the Bureau's release of three payments directly to the Company instead of paying the same to the Bank. This approval was in violation of the Deed of Assignment and without any notice to the petitioners who stood to lose their property once the promissory note falls due without the same having been paid because the PNB, in effect, waived payments of the first three releases. From the foregoing circumstances, PNB can not be regarded as having acted in good faith which is also one of the requisites of a holder in due course under Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The PNB knew that the promissory note which it took from the accommodation makers was signed by the latter because of full reliance on the Deed of Assignment, which, PNB had no intention to comply with strictly. Worse, the third payment to the Company in the amount of P4,293.60 was approved by PNB although the promissory note was almost a month overdue, an act which is clearly detrimental to the petitioners.

We, therefore, hold that respondent PNB is not a holder in due course. Thus, the petitioners can validly set up their personal defense of release from the real estate mortgage against PNB. The latter, in authorizing the third payment to the Company after the promissory note became due, in effect, extended the term of the payment of the note without the consent of the accommodation makers who stand as sureties to the accommodated party and to all other parties who are not holders in due course or who do not derive their right from the same, including PNB.

It may be argued that the Prudencios could have mortgaged their property even without the promissory note. The records show, however, that they would not have mortgaged the lot were it not for the sake of the Company whose attorney-in-fact was their relative. The spouses did not need the money for themselves.

The attorney-in-fact tried twice to convince the Prudencios to mortgage their property in order to secure a loan in favor of the Company but the Prudencios refused. It was only when the deed of assignment was shown to the spouses that they consented to the mortgage and signed the promissory note in the Bank's favor.

Article 2085 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid mortgage contract. Petitioners do not dispute the validity of the mortgage. They only want to have it cancelled because the Bank violated the deed of assignment and extended the period of time of payment of the promissory note without the petitioners' consent and to the latter's detriment.

The mortgage cannot be separated from the promissory note for it is the latter which is the basis of determining whether the mortgage should be foreclosed or cancelled. Without the promissory note which determines the amount of indebtedness there would have been no basis for the mortgage.

True, if the Bank had not been the assignee, then the petition petitioners would be obliged to pay the Bank as their creditor on the promissory note, irrespective of whether or not the deed of assignment had been violated. However, the assignee and the creditor in this case are one and the same—the Bank itself. When the Bank violated the deed of assignment, it prejudiced itself because its very violation was the reason why it was not paid on time in its capacity as creditor in the promissory note. It would be unfair to make the petitioners now answer for the debt or to foreclose on their property.

Neither can PNB justify its acts on the ground that the Bureau of Public Works approved the deed of assignment with the condition that the wages of laborers and materials needed in the construction work must take precedence over the payment of the promissory note. In the first place, PNB did not need the approval of the Bureau. But even if it did, it should have informed the petitioners about the amendment of the deed of assignment. Secondly, the wages and materials have already been paid. That issue is academic. What is in dispute is who should bear the loss in this case. As between the petitioners and the Bank, the law and the equities of the case favor the petitioners, And thirdly, the wages and materials constitute a lien only on the constructed building but do not enjoy preference over the loan unless there is a liquidation proceeding such as in insolvency or settlement of estate. (See Philippine Savings Bank v. Lantin, 124 SCRA 476). There were remedies available at the time if the laborers and the creditors had not been paid. The fact is, they have been paid. Hence, when the PNB accepted the condition imposed by the Bureau without the knowledge or consent of the petitioners, it amended the deed of assignment which, as stated earlier, was the principal reason why the petitioners consented to become accommodation makers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered absolving the petitioners from liability on the promissory note and under the mortgage contract. The Philippine National Bank is ordered to release the real estate mortgage constituted on the property of the petitioners and to pay the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Negotiable Instruments Case Digest: BPI v. Fidelity &Surety Co. (1927)


G.R. No. L-26743 October 19, 1927
Lessons Applicable: Consideration and Accomodation Party (Negotiable Instruments Law)

FACTS: Laguna Coconut Oil (guaranteed by Fidelity  and  Surety)  > Phil. Veg Oil (indorsed in blank)> BPI = BPI against ? (Laguna/Phil. Veg. Oil/Fidelity and Surety)
  • Laguna  Coconut  Oil  Company  executed  the  following  promissory  note  in favor of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: 

P50,000.00. 


One  month  after  date  we  promise  to  pay  to  the  Philippine  Vegetable  Oil Company,  Inc.,  or  order  at  City  of  Manila,  Philippine  Islands,  the  sum  of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), Philippine currency; value received. 
In case of non-payment of this note at maturity, we are to pay interest at 
the  rate  of  nine  per  cent  (9%)  per  annum  on  the  said  amount  and  the further  sum  of  P5,000  in  full,  without  any  deduction  as  and  for  costs, expenses  and  attorney's  fees  for  collection  whether  actually  incurred  or not. 
Manila, Philippine Islands, April 26, 1920. 
LAGUNA COCONUT OIL CO. 
By BALDOMERO COSME 

President 

  • May 3, 1920: Fidelity  &  Surety  Company made the following notation on the note: 



For  value  received,  we  hereby  obligate  ourselves  to  hold  the  Laguna 

Cocoanut Oil Co. harmless against loss for having discounted the foregoing 

note at the value stated therein. 

  • May 4, 1920: Philippine  Vegetable  Oil  Company  indorsed  the  note  to  BPI in blank

  • BPI instituted actions against Laguna  Oil (insolvent) and  Fidelity Surety

  • RTC:  against  Fidelity  and  Surety  and  demanded  it  to  pay  the note  

    • “BPI”  should  have  been placed in the indorsement rather than “Laguna Oil”

ISSUE: W/N Fidelity Surely should be the only one liable for having made the notation as guarantee and not an accomodation party 
HELD: YES.


  • Trial court's judgment  as  it  stands  clearly  involves  a reformation of the contract of guaranty and it is elementary that the facts upon  which  relief  by  reformation  is  sought  must  be  put  in  issue  by  the pleadings.    

    • court  of  equity  cannot  reform  an instrument except on allegations, which make out a case for the equitable remedy asked.

      • fails  to  express  the  real  agreement; or  

      • mutual  mistake

      • on  account  of  fraud  of  one them 

      • fraud  or  inequitable  condition  on  one  side  and  mistake  on  the other

    • In this connection it should be borne in mind that contracts of suretyship and guarantee are strictly construed in favor of the surety or guarantor.

  • Unless  otherwise stated in the instrument, a negotiable promissory note implied prima facie valuable  consideration  moving  to  the  maker  whether  the  words  "value received" appear in it or not.  

    • An  accommodation  note  showing  on  its  face  in  express  terms  that  it  had been issued for no consideration would be of little or no use to the payee, and for that reason, if for no other, practically all accommodation notes are so drawn as to either express or imply a valuable consideration prima facie.

Negotiable Instruments Case Digest: Prudencio v. CA (1986)

G.R. No. L-34539 July 14, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Consideration and Accomodation Party; Holder in Due Course (Negotiable Instruments)

FACTS:
  • Oct 7 1954: Eulalio and Elisa Prudencios, registered owners of a parcel of land mortgaged to Philippine National Bank (PNB) to guarantee a loan of P1,000.00 extended to Domingo Prudencio
  • 1955: Concepcion & Tamayo Construction Company (Concepcion) had a pending contract with the Bureau of Public Works (Bureau) for the construction of the municipal building in Puerto Princess, Palawan amounting to P36,800.00 
    • In need of funds, Jose Toribio, Concepcions' relative, and attorney-in-fact of the Company, approached PNB to mortgage their property to secure the loan of P10,000.00 w/ PNB.
    • The terms and conditions of the original mortgage for Pl,000.00 were made integral part of the new mortgage for P10,000.00 and both documents were registered with the Register of Deeds
    • Dec 23 1955:
      • promissory note covering the loan of P10,000.00 dated Dec 29 1955, maturing on Apr 27 1956, was signed by Jose Toribio, as attorney-in-fact of the Company, and by the Prudencios'
      • Deed of Assignment assigning all payments to be made by the Bureau to the Co. on account of the contract for the construction in favor of the PNB.
        • PNB approved the Bureau's release of 3 payments directly to Concepcion for material and labor instead of paying the same to the Bank on account of the contract price totalling P11,234.40 without the knowledge of the Prudencios'
        • PNB did not apply the initial and subsequent payments to the Prudencios' debt as provided for in the deed of assignment
  • Jun 30 1956: Concepcion abandoned their work so Bureau rescinded the construction contract and assumed the work of completing
  • Jun 27 1959: Concepcion filed to cancelled their mortgage
    • complaint was amended to exclude the Company as defendant, it having been shown that its life as a partnership had already expired and, in lieu thereof, Ramon Concepcion and Manuel M. Tamayo, partners of the defunct Company, were impleaded in their private capacity as defendants.
  • CA affirmed  RTC: Denied
    • no stipulation in the deed making it obligatory on the part of the PNB to notify the petitioners everytime it authorizes payment to the Company
  • Prudencios' contend that as accommodation makers, the nature of their liability is only that of mere sureties instead of solidary co-debtors such that "a material alteration in the principal contract, effected by the creditor without the knowledge and consent of the sureties, completely discharges the sureties from all liability on the contract of suretyship. 
ISSUE: 
  1. W/N the Prudencios' as accomodating party are liable as solidary debtors so real estate mortgage executed by them CANNOT be cancelled
  2. W/N PNB was a holder in due course

HELD: Petition is Granted.  CA reversed.

 1. YES
  • Section 29 of the Negotiable Instrument Law
    • Liability of accommodation party. —An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party.
  • Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Aruego: liability of the accommodation party remains not only primary but also unconditional to a holder for value
  • remedy is a matter of concern exclusively between accommodation indorser and accommodated party
2. NO
  • payee PNB is an immediate party and, therefore, is NOT a holder in due course and stands on no better footing than a mere assignee
    • holder in due course - payee either acquired the note from another holder or has not directly dealt with the maker thereof
  • PNB, in effect, waived payments of the first three releases
    • PNB can not be regarded as having acted in good faith which is also one of the requisites of a holder in due course under Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
    • It was only when the deed of assignment was shown to the spouses that they consented to the mortgage and signed the promissory note in the Bank's favor.

Negotiable Instruments Case Digest: Travel-On v. CA (1992)

G.R. No. L-56169 June 26, 1992
Lessons Applicable: Consideration and Accomodation Party (Negotiable Instruments)

FACTS:
  • Arturo S. Miranda 
    • had a revolving credit line with Travel-On. Inc. (Travel-On), a travel agency selling airline tickets on commission basis for and in behalf of different airline companies
    • procured tickets from Travel-On on behalf of airline passengers and derived commissions therefrom.
  • June 14 1972: Travel-On filed bef. the CFI to collect 6 checks issued by Miranda totaling P115,000.00
  • August 5 1969 - January 16 1970:  Travel-On sold and delivered airline tickets to Miranda w/ total price of P278,201.57
    • paid in cash and 6 checks = P115,000 - all dishonored by the drawee banks
    • March 1972: paid P10,000.00 reducing his debts to P105,000
  • Miranda: checks were issued for to "accommodate" Travel-On's General Manager to show the BOD of Travel-On that their receivables were still good
    • Travel-On's witness, Elita Montilla: related to situations where its passengers needed money in Hongkong, and upon request of Travel-On, Miranda would contact his friends in Hongkong to advance Hongkong money to the passenger
  • CA affirmed CFI: ordered Travel-On to pay Miranda P8,894.91 representing net overpayments by private respondent, moral damages of P10,000.00 (later increased to P50,000 by CFI and reduced by CA to P20,000) for the wrongful issuance of the writ of attachment and for the filing of this case, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs of the suit - decision was because Travel-On did not show that Miranda had an outstanding balance of P115,000.00 
ISSUE: W/N Miranda is liable for the 6 dishonored checks because there was no accomodation

HELD: YES. GRANT due course to the Petition for Review on Certiorari and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the CA and trial court
  •  failed to give due importance the checks themselves as evidence of the debt
    • check which is regular on its face is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration and every person whose signature appears thereon is deemed to have become a party thereto for value.
    • negotiable instrument is presumed to have been given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration unless otherwise contradicted and overcome by other competent evidence
    • Those checks in themselves constituted evidence of indebtedness of Miranda, evidence not successfully overturned or rebutted by private respondent.
  • While the Negotiable Instruments Law does refer to accommodation transactions, no such transaction was here shown
    • Sec. 29. Liability of accommodation party. — An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party.
    • Having issued or indorsed the check, the accommodating party has warranted to the holder in due course that he will pay the same according to its tenor. 
    • Travel-On obviously was not an accommodated party; it realized no value on the checks which bounced.