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Showing posts with label September 1. Show all posts
Showing posts with label September 1. Show all posts

Insurance Case Digest: Garcia v. Hongkong Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (1923)


G.R. No. 20341           September 1, 1923

Lessons Applicable: Effect of Lack of Insurable Interest (Insurance)
Laws Applicable:  

FACTS:

  • August 30, 1919: Garcia executed a mortgage to the Philippine National Bank on the merchandise allegedly insured by Hongkong Fire & Marine Insurance Co. and with the consent of the latter endorsed the policy to PNB 
  • PNB informed Hongkong Fire through exchange of letters.  Hongkong failed to notify PNB or Garcia that it was for the building and not the merchandise.
  • February 6, 1920: Fire took place and destroyed the merchandise so Garcia filed a claim which was refused.
  • RTC: favored Garcia
ISSUE: W/N 

HELD: the lower court is affirmed

  • as a matter of fair dealing, it should have notified the Bank that the policy was on the building. It will be noted that the letters in question were all written several months before the fire.
  • Under these circumstances it seems clear and manifest that the insured, as well as the manager of the National Bank at Legaspi, who was interested in the policy, because the same secured a loan of P6,000 made to Domingo Garcia, and the corporation of Wise & Co., Ltd., which represented the insurance company, have been in the belief that it was not the building but the merchandise that was insured, for the reason that none of them paid attention to the context of the policy.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 20341


EN BANC

G.R. No. 20341           September 1, 1923

DOMINGO GARCIA and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
THE HONGKONG FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE CO., LTD., defendant-appellant.

William and Ferrier for appellant.
Roman Lacson for the appellee Bank.
Vicente de Vera for the other appellee.

STATEMENT

After formal pleas, the plaintiff's allege that on the 19th of March, 1918, in the City of Manila, the plaintiff, Domingo Garcia, then a merchant and owner of a bazaar known as "Las Novedades" in the district of Legaspi, municipality and Province of Albay, entered into a contract with the defendant whereby it insured his merchandise in the sum of P15,000 at a premium of P300 per annum; that in consideration of such premium, the defendant issued its fire insurance policy No. 1951 in favor of the plaintiff, not on the merchandise in the building, but on the building which contained the merchandise; that for such reason the policy does not contain the true agreement and intent of the parties; that the plaintiff was not the owner of, and did not have any interest in, the building; and that the policy was so issued through error, carelessness and negligence of the defendant.

That on august 30, 1919, Garcia executed a mortgage to the plaintiff Bank on the merchandise insured by the defendant, and that with the consent of the defendant, the plaintiff endorsed the policy to the Bank; that on February 6, 1920, and while the policy was in force and effect, a fire took place which destroyed the merchandise in the building of the value of P20,000, together with the building itself; that demand was made upon the defendant for the payment of P15,000, as provided for in the policy, and that payment was refused. Wherefore, plaintiffs pray judgment for that amount, with legal interest from the date of filing of the complaint, and costs.

For answer, the defendant admits the formal allegations of the complaint, and denies generally and specifically all other allegations.

As a result of the trial, the lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, as prayed for in the complaint, from which the defendant appeals and contends that the lower court erred in denying its motion to make the complaint more definite and certain; in permitting Garcia over its objection to testify to the contents of certain documents; in refusing to strike them from the record; in finding that the defendant, through its agent, knew that it was the merchandise which was insured and not the building; in failing to find the plaintiffs, and Garcia in particular, guilty of negligence; in finding that the defendant committed error in making out the policy to cover the building rather than the merchandise; in rendering the judgment; and in denying defendant's motion for a new trial.


JOHNS, J.:

It appears that the policy was in the English language, of which the plaintiff Garcia is ignorant. When he received it he noticed that the amount P15,000 was correct, and never personally made a further investigation. He was the exclusive owner of the merchandise in the building which, at the time of the fire, was of the probable value of P20,000. He did not own or claim any interest in the building. Desiring to have his merchandise insured for P15,000, he wrote a letter to "El Pilar," requesting that firm to have it insured, as a result of which, the policy in questions was issued and delivered to him, and it was issued on the building with Garcia did not own, and did not cover the merchandise which he did own. Desiring to obtain a loan from the Philippine National Bank, Garcia later delivered and assigned the policy to the plaintiff Bank as collateral security for a loan. Upon receipt of the policy, and as one of the conditions for the making of the loan, the Bank, through its manager, addressed the following letter to the agents of the defendant on August 6, 1919:

We beg to advise that the merchandise insured by you against fire in favor of Mr. Domingo Garcia of Legaspi, Albay, P. I., for P15,000 for which you issued policy No. 1951, has been mortgaged to this bank together with the policy to secure a credit and loans not to exceed P6,000 in all.

We would appreciate very much if you have our claims against the property and policy covering it, on account of the mortgage, entered in your records and advise us accordingly.

Hoping to hear from you soon, we are,

Very truly yours,

This was answered by the agents August 14, 1919, as follows:

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed favor of the 6th inst., informing us that the Hongkong Fire Insurance Company, Ltd.'s Policy in the name of Mr. Domingo Garcia, for the sum of P15,000 has been mortgaged to your goodselves. In order that this transaction made by officially recorded, it will be necessary to make an endorsement upon the original policy, and we shall be glad, therefore, if you will return this document to us as soon as convenient.

We are, Dear Sirs,

Yours faithfully.

August 18, 1919, the Bank wrote the following letter to the agents:

Complying with your request of the 13th ultimo, we beg to inclose herewith policy No. 1951 in favor of Mr. Domingo Garcia, Legaspi, Albay, for P15,000, which has been mortgaged to this Bank to secure a credit and loan of not exceed P6,000 in all, for your proper indorsement.

Trusting to have your prompt action in this matter, we are,

Very respectfully yours.

September 1, 1919, the agents wrote the Bank as follows:

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favour of the 18th ultimo, enclosing Hongkong Fire Insurance Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.'s Policy No. 1951, in the name of Mr. Domingo Garcia, and in accordance with your request have endorsed same in your favour, and beg to return the document herewith. Please be good enough to acknowledge safe receipt in due course and oblige.

Yours faithfully.

It clearly appears that where the word "merchandise" was written in the letter of August 6th above quoted, some other word had been previously written and erased, and the word "merchandise" was the written, as it now appears.

It is contended that when the letter was written, the Bank, which then had the possession of the policy, knew that it covered the building and did not insure the merchandise. That, having such knowledge, it was the duty of the Bank to notify the defendant, and having failed to do so, it cannot now contend that the policy was issued through a mistake. The fact remains that the defendant, through its agents, received this letter, and that it recites:

We beg to advise that the merchandise insured by you against fire in favor of Mr. Domingo Garcia, etc.

That was a personal notice to the defendant of the fact that the policy was on the merchandise. It is pointed out that the Bank and not the defendant then had the policy, and, for such reason, the Bank did not have notice of the error. Although the policy was in possession of the Bank, the defendant had among its own records all of the data and information upon which the policy was issued, and, as a matter of fact, its agents knew or should have known the kind of property insured.

It is possible that when the Bank wrote the letter, it knew of the error in the issuance of the policy. But that is a matter of inference or conjecture only. Outside of the appearance of the letter itself, there is no evidence that the Bank had any acknowledge of the error.

Garcia had his dealings with the officials of the branch Bank at Legaspi where he was doing business as a merchant, of which the officials of that Bank had knowledge. Under such facts, the presumption of knowledge, if any, on the part of the Bank would be that the policy was on the merchandise. Be that as it may, when the defendant received the letter from the Bank, it knew from its own records that the policy was issued on the building, and, as a matter of fair dealing, it should have notified the Bank that the policy was on the building. It will be noted that the letters in question were all written several months before the fire.

In the final analysis, Garcia wanted insurance upon a stock of goods, which he owned, and he received and paid for a policy on a building, which he did not own, and while the policy was in force and effect, both the building, which he did not own, and the stock of merchandise, which he did own, were completely destroyed by fire. Garcia was a well known merchant, and his merchandise was in the building described in the policy.

For some unknown reason, the party who applied for the insurance at the instance and request of Garcia was not called as a witness, and, as stated, that answer of the defendant is confined to general denial, and it did not offer any evidence.

In a well-written opinion, the trial court analyzed the evidence and made findings of fact upon which it rendered judgment for the plaintiff. It is claimed that the letters and the copy of the telegram introduced in evidence were hearsay and not competent. If for no other purpose, they were competent to show that Garcia wanted insurance on his merchandise and the reason why he wanted it.

The defense is purely technical, and is founded upon the contention that plaintiff cannot recover, because the policy covers loss on a building, and does not cover loss of merchandise.

It is very apparent that a mistake was made in the issuance of the policy.

In its opinion the trial court says:

Under these circumstances it seems clear and manifest that the insured, as well as the manager of the National Bank at Legaspi, who was interested in the policy, because the same secured a loan of P6,000 made to Domingo Garcia, and the corporation of Wise & Co., Ltd., which represented the insurance company, have been in the belief that it was not the building but the merchandise that was insured, for the reason that none of them paid attention to the context of the policy.

The opinion of the trial court further points out that, under the pleadings and proof, there is ground for the contention that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover on the policy for the loss of the building.

All things considered, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Street, J., dissents.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: US v. Baggay (1911)

G.R. No. 6659   September 1, 1911
Lessons Applicable: Insanity (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
  • October 14, 1909: During the holding a song service called "buni", the non-Christian Baggay Jr. attacked a woman Bil-liingan with a bolo inflicting a serious wound on her head causing her to die immediately.
    • He inflicted the same to the women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan.
  • February 15
    • provincial fiscal filed a complaint for murder
      • This cause was instituted separately from the other for lesiones
  • RTC: Baggay was suffering from mental aberration and was exempt from criminal liability but obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court.
  • court declared said appeal out of order and dismissed it
  • counsel for Baggay resorted to this court with a petition praying that a writ be issued directing judge Chanco, to admit the appeal and forward it, at the same time annulling all action taken for execution of the judgments rendered in the causes for murder and for lesiones
  • Attorney-General: writ inappropriate and that it should be remedy of mandamus
ISSUE: W/N Baggay was exempt from criminal liability making him exempt from civil liability as well

HELD: NO.
  • Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
    Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable
  • Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject to the following:

(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.
  • even when they hold the accused exempt from criminal liability, must fix the civil liability of the persons charged with watching over and caring for him or the liability of the demented person him self with his property for reparation of the damage and indemnification for the harm done
    • UNLESS: the offended party or the heirs of the person murdered expressly renounce such reparation or indemnification

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. 6659

EN BANC

DECISION

G.R. No. 6659   September 1, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BAGGAY, JR., defendant-appellant.

Roman Lacson, for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey, for appellee.


Torres, J.:

This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28, 1910, whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court.

About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he likewise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan.

For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur, dated February 15, charging the non-Christian Baggay, jr., with murder, because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was instituted separately from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to this court.

By another writing of June 27, the same counsel asked for immediate suspension of execution of the judgment, because it had been appealed and had not become final. He also requested annulment of the sale at public auction of the property attached by the sheriff or his deputy under order of the court, for making indemnification with the defendant's property in accordance with said judgment, as the attachment had been executed upon the property of the non-Christian woman named Dioalan and of other persons, and not upon that of the defendant.

In opposition thereto, the provincial fiscal on the 30th of the same month requested in writing that the appeal from this judgment filed by the counsel for the defense be not admitted or carried forward, representing that it was out of order as having been submitted beyond the limit; for the very day said judgment was rendered, April 28, 1910, the accused's counsel, Sotero Serrano, was verbally notified thereof, and it is therefore untrue that he was notified only on June 17 of said year, on which date he read and examined the case and without the clerk's knowledge signed the same, making it appear that he was notified on that date, June 17, what he had known since April 28 of the judgment, of which the judge had verbally informed him, although the latter did not then have him sign it.

In reply to this motion of the provincial fiscal, the defense requested that the appeal filed be admitted and carried for ward, representing that, when the court verbally announced his decision to defendant's counsel, the judgment had not yet been entered, and therefore neither the defendant nor his counsel could be notified thereof in legal form until said date, June 17.

Passing upon this motion on August 2, 1910, the court declared said appeal out of order and dismissed it; and, furthermore, denied the petition for suspension of judgment, as said judgment had become final.

Thereupon, counsel for the defendant resorted to this court with a petition praying that a writ be issued directing said judge, Chanco, to admit the appeal and forward it, at the same time annulling all action taken for execution of the judgments rendered in the causes for murder and for lesiones. After consideration thereof, the Attorney-General, on behalf of said judge and of the provincial fiscal, requested that this remedy be declared out of order, as the issuance of such writ against the judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and much more against the provincial fiscal, was not in accordance with law; but this court by order of November 15 saw fit to declare said remedy ofmandamus to be in order and issued a written order directing the judge of the Court of First Instance to immediately admit the appeal filed in these two causes and to forward all the records to this higher court. At the same time he was instructed to refrain absolutely from executing said judgments or causing them to be executed while said appeals were pending, a prohibition that was extended to the provincial sheriff, his agents and representatives, until further order from this court. Upon notification of the foregoing and in compliance therewith, the judge by order of November 22 admitted the appeal filed by counsel for the defense both in the cause for murder and in that for lesiones.

The question raised on the appeal filed in this case by counsel for the insane defendant, Baggay, Jr., is solely whether he, notwithstanding that he was held exempt from criminal liability, has nevertheless incurred civil liability, with obligation to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman and to pay the costs.

Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable.

Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject to the following:

(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.

True it is that civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts.

According to the law, the persons in the first place liable. are those who have the insane party under their care or guardianship, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part; but if the demented person or imbecile lack a guardian or some person charged with his care, if the latter be insolvent, then his own property must meet the civil liability of indemnifying or repairing the damage done, and for this reason judges and courts in rendering judgment in a criminal cause prosecuted against an insane or demented person, even when they hold the accused exempt from criminal liability, must fix the civil liability of the persons charged with watching over and caring for him or the liability of the demented person him self with his property for reparation of the damage and indemnification for the harm done, unless the offended party or the heirs of the person murdered expressly renounce such reparation or indemnification.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law, affirmation thereof is proper, and it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant

Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur. .