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Showing posts with label criminal procedure case digest. Show all posts
Showing posts with label criminal procedure case digest. Show all posts

Crim Pro Case Digest: Mijares v. Ranada (2005)

G.R. No. 139325             April 12, 2005

Lessons Applicable: In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
  • May 9 1991: a complaint was filed by ten Filipino citizens representing a class of 10,000 members who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate)
  • US District Court and Affirmed by US CA: awarded them $1,964,005,859.90
  • Petitioners filed Complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment
  • Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees paying only P410
  • Petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation
  •  RTC: estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately P472 and dismissing the case without prejudice
  •  Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
     
ISSUE: W/N the enforcement of a foreign judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation

HELD: NO. (But belongs to "other actions not involving property") petition is GRANTED.
  • There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title
  • However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.  Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.
  • There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment.  They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
  • As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law.  The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: "rest and quietness." If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.
  • Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals:
    • In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.  If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.  However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
  • An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
  • The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. It is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."  The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.

Crim Pro Case Digest: Merida Waterworks District v. Bacarro (2008)

G.R. No. 165993 September 30, 2008

Lessons Applicable: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, Doctrine of exhaustion

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
  • Merida Water District, a government-owned and controlled corporation4 that operates the water utility services in the municipality of Merida, Leyte conducted a public hearing for the purpose of increasing the water rate
  • March 7, 2002: Merida Water District received a letter from the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) that on March 5, 2002, the LWUA Board of Trustees, per Board Resolution No. 63, series of 2002, confirmed Merida Water District’s proposed water rates.
  • September 3, 2002: Merida implemented a water rate increase of P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption.
  • February 13, 2003: consumers of Merida Water District, filed a Petition for Injunction, etc. because the rates are contrary to the rate increase agreed upon during the public hearing
  • Merida filed a motion to dismiss (then later motion for reconsideration) with the RTC due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended by P.D. Nos. 768 and 1479 - denied
  • Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CA (then later motion for reconsideration) - denied
  • Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC
ISSUE: W/N there is lack of jurisdiction with the RTC since the primary jurisdiction should belong to the NWRB under P.D. No. 1067.  (The NWRB does not exercise exclusive jurisdiction)

HELD: YES.  petition is GRANTED
  • petitioners failed to cite any law which impliedly grants the NWRB original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve a dispute regarding the increase of water rates. A grant of exclusive jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of a statute in the absence of a clear legislative intent to that effect. An administrative agency with quasi-judicial power is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction should be interpreted in strictissimi juris."
  • The doctrine of exhaustion does not apply when jurisdiction is exclusive. An administrative agency’s exclusive jurisdiction over a certain dispute renders the courts without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same at that stage. The doctrine of exhaustion applies "where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial intervention is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. To cite Abe-Abe v. Manta as the authority to support the allegation that the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a water rate increase is a strained construction of this Court’s pronouncements. Thus, petitioners’ contention that the RTC has no jurisdiction because the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the increase of water rates is clearly without merit.
  • One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so… It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.  
  • Although the doctrine of exhaustion does not preclude in all cases a party from seeking judicial relief, cases where its observance has been disregarded require a strong showing of the inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending harm.  Respondents justify their failure to observe the administrative process on the following exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: (1) patent illegality; and (2) a denial of due process. However, respondents fail to show that the instant case merits the application of these exceptions.
  • Jurisprudence affirming the failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion due to a denial of due process involves instances when the party seeking outright judicial intervention was denied the opportunity to be heard.  Here, respondents admit that Merida Water District conducted a public hearing. . The existence of a hearing for this purpose renders the allegation of a denial of due process without merit.  The failure of the respondents to show that the instant case falls within the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion necessitates in the due observance of exhausting the proper administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention.

Crim Pro Case Digest: Simon v. Chua G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011

G.R. No. 157547   February 23, 2011

Lessons Applicable: Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
  • December 1996: Eduard Simon issued a check to Elvin Chan a Landbank Check dated December 26, 1996 worth P336,000.00
  • December 26, 1996: It was dishonored due to account closed.
  • After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary attachmen - MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment
  • Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia because there is already a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 - granted by the MeTC
  •  Chan appealed to the CA - reversed and set aside the decision of the MeTC
ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed due to litis pendentia because the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case renders Chan's civil action to recover as an independent civil action

HELD: YES.  Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC
  • Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
  • Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee.  The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught. However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22.  Applying Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 200 that  the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed
  • DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez (different facts): issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable
    • In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code
    • In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check