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Showing posts with label 1963. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1963. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-16749


EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

x x x           x x x           x x x

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

x x x           x x x           x x x

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

x x x           x x x           x x x

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.

x x x           x x x           x x x

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Francisco v. GSIS (1963)


G.R. No. L-18287             March 30, 1963

Lessons Applicable: Cases where Moral damages are allowed (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 2208,Article 2220

FACTS:

  • October 10, 1956: Trinidad J. Francisco, in consideration of a loan in the amount of P400,000 out of which the sum of P336,100 was released to her, mortgaged in favor of the Government Service Insurance System a parcel of land containing an area of 18,232 square meters within 10 years in monthly installments of P3,902.41, and with interest of 7% per annum compounded monthly.
  • January 6, 1959: GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage
  • February 20, 1959: Trinidad's father Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of GSIS propsing to pay P30,000 and pay the balance from the P5,000 monthly rentals less P350 for the necessary expenses. 
    • GSIS Board approved the request
  • February 28, 1959: Atty. Francisco remitted a check for P30,000 and an official receipt was issued
  • March 4, 1960: Trinidad remitted P44,121.29 and soon, P24,604.81.  All were issued a receipt
  • Then the System sent 3 letters asking for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness since the 1-year redemption period has expired
  • Atty. Francisco sent a letter of protest requesting the proper corrections since their proposal have already commenced
  • GSIS contends that for the foreclosure done, Francisco should pay attorney's fees of P35,644.14, publication expenses, filing fee of P301.00, and surcharge of P23.64 so remittances were not enough
  • GSIS filed for specific performance
  • RTC: Atty. Francisco's offer was unqualifiedly accepted, and was binding
    • called attention to the unconscionability of defendant's charging the attorney's fees, totalling over P35,000.00; and this point appears well-taken, considering that the foreclosure was merely extra-judicial, and the attorneys' work was limited to requiring the sheriff to effectuate the foreclosure
ISSUE: W/N Francisco should be awarded Moral damages where there is breach of contract regarding the redemption proposal but no malicious intent

HELD: NO. Affirmed.

  • Nor was there error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages, not only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify to her social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code
  • There is no basis for awarding exemplary damages either, because this species of damages is only allowed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages, none of which have been allowed in this case, for reasons herein before discussed
  • As to attorneys' fees, we agree with the trial court's stand that in view of the absence of gross and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, and there being none of the other grounds enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, such absence precludes a recovery. The award of attorneys' fees is essentially discretionary in the trial court, and no abuse of discretion has been shown. 

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-18287


EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18287             March 30, 1963

TRINIDAD J. FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, defendant-appellant.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-18155             March 30, 1963

TRINIDAD J. FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, defendant-appellee.

Vicente J. Francisco for plaintiff-appellee.
The Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal by the Government Service Insurance System from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Hon. Angel H. Mojica, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 2088-P, entitled "Trinidad J. Francisco, plaintiff, vs. Government Service Insurance System, defendant", the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) Declaring null and void the consolidation in the name of the defendant, Government Service Insurance System, of the title of the VIC-MARI Compound; said title shall be restored to the plaintiff; and all payments made by the plaintiff, after her offer had been accepted by the defendant, must be credited as amortizations on her loan; and (b) Ordering the defendant to abide by the terms of the contract created by plaintiff's offer and it's unconditional acceptance, with costs against the defendant.

The plaintiff, Trinidad J. Francisco, likewise appealed separately (L-18155), because the trial court did not award the P535,000.00 damages and attorney's fees she claimed. Both appeals are, therefore, jointly treated in this decision.

The following facts are admitted by the parties: On 10 October 1956, the plaintiff, Trinidad J. Francisco, in consideration of a loan in the amount of P400,000.00, out of which the sum of P336,100.00 was released to her, mortgaged in favor of the defendant, Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as the System) a parcel of land containing an area of 18,232 square meters, with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as Vic-Mari Compound, located at Baesa, Quezon City, payable within ten (10) years in monthly installments of P3,902.41, and with interest of 7% per annum compounded monthly.

On 6 January 1959, the System extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on the ground that up to that date the plaintiff-mortgagor was in arrears on her monthly installments in the amount of P52,000.00. Payments made by the plaintiff at the time of foreclosure amounted to P130,000.00. The System itself was the buyer of the property in the foreclosure sale.

On 20 February 1959, the plaintiff's father, Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of the defendant corporation, Mr. Rodolfo P. Andal, the material portion of which recited as follows:

Yesterday, I was finally able to collect what the Government owed me and I now propose to pay said amount of P30,000 to the GSIS if it would agree that after such payment the foreclosure of my daughter's mortgage would be set aside. I am aware that the amount of P30,000 which I offer to pay will not cover the total arrearage of P52,000 but as regards the balance, I propose this arrangement: for the GSIS to take over the administration of the mortgaged property and to collect the monthly installments, amounting to about P5,000, due on the unpaid purchase price of more than 31 lots and houses therein and the monthly installments collected shall be applied to the payment of Miss Francisco's arrearage until the same is fully covered. It is requested, however, that from the amount of the monthly installments collected, the sum of P350.00 be deducted for necessary expenses, such as to pay the security guard, the street-caretaker, the Meralco Bill for the street lights and sundry items.

It will be noted that the collectible income each month from the mortgaged property, which as I said consists of installments amounting to about P5,000, is more than enough to cover the monthly amortization on Miss Francisco's loan. Indeed, had she not encountered difficulties, due to unforeseen circumstances, in collecting the said installments, she could have paid the amortizations as they fell due and there would have been really no need for the GSIS to resort to foreclosure.

The proposed administration by the GSIS of the mortgaged property will continue even after Miss Francisco's account shall have been kept up to date. However, once the arrears shall have been paid, whatever amount of the monthly installments collected in excess of the amortization due on the loan will be turned over to Miss Francisco.

I make the foregoing proposal to show Francisco's sincere desire to work out any fair arrangement for the settlement of her obligation. I trust that the GSIS, under the broadminded policies of your administration, would give it serious consideration.

Sincerely,.                   

s/ Vicente J. Francisco
t/ VICENTE J. FRANCISCO

On the same date, 20 February 1959, Atty. Francisco received the following telegram:.

VICENTE FRANCISCO
SAMANILLO BLDG. ESCOLTA.

GSIS BOARD APPROVED YOUR REQUEST RE REDEMPTION OF FORECLOSED PROPERTY OF YOUR DAUGHTER

ANDAL"                             

On 28 February 1959, Atty. Francisco remitted to the System, through Andal, a check for P30,000.00, with an accompanying letter, which reads:

I am sending you herewith BPI Check No. B-299484 for Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) in accordance with my letter of February 20th and your reply thereto of the same date, which reads:

GSIS BOARD APPROVED YOUR REQUEST RE REDEMPTION OF FORECLOSED PROPERTY OF YOUR DAUGHTER

x x x           x x x           x x x

The defendant received the amount of P30,000.00, and issued therefor its official receipt No. 1209874, dated 4 March 1959. It did not, however, take over the administration of the compound. In the meantime, the plaintiff received the monthly payments of some of the occupants thereat; then on 4 March 1960, she remitted, through her father, the amount of P44,121.29, representing the total monthly installments that she received from the occupants for the period from March to December 1959 and January to February 1960, minus expenses and real estate taxes. The defendant also received this amount, and issued the corresponding official receipt.

Remittances, all accompanied by letters, corresponding to the months of March, April, May, and June, 1960 and totalling P24,604.81 were also sent by the plaintiff to the defendant from time to time, all of which were received and duly receipted for.

Then the System sent three (3) letters, one dated 29 January 1960, which was signed by its assistant general manager, and the other two letters, dated 19 and 26 February 1960, respectively, which were signed by Andal, asking the plaintiff for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness, since according to the System the one-year period for redemption had expired.

In reply, Atty. Francisco sent a letter, dated 11 March 1960, protesting against the System's request for proposal of payment and inviting its attention to the concluded contract generated by his offer of 20 February 1959, and its acceptance by telegram of the same date, the compliance of the terms of the offer already commenced by the plaintiff, and the misapplication by the System of the remittances she had made, and requesting the proper corrections.

By letter, dated 31 May 1960, the defendant countered the preceding protest that, by all means, the plaintiff should pay attorney's fees of P35,644.14, publication expenses, filing fee of P301.00, and surcharge of P23.64 for the foreclosure work done; that the telegram should be disregarded in view of its failure to express the contents of the board resolution due to the error of its minor employees in couching the correct wording of the telegram. A copy of the excerpts of the resolution of the Board of Directors (No. 380, February 20, 1959) was attached to the letter, showing the approval of Francisco's offer —

... subject to the condition that Mr. Vicente J. Francisco shall pay all expenses incurred by the GSIS in the foreclosure of the mortgage.

Inasmuch as, according to the defendant, the remittances previously made by Atty. Francisco were allegedly not sufficient to pay off her daughter's arrears, including attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in foreclosing the mortgage, and the one-year period for redemption has expired, said defendant, on 5 July 1960, consolidated the title to the compound in its name, and gave notice thereof to the plaintiff on 26 July 1960 and to each occupant of the compound.

Hence, the plaintiff instituted the present suit, for specific performance and damages. The defendant answered, pleading that the binding acceptance of Francisco's offer was the resolution of the Board, and that Andal's telegram, being erroneous, should be disregarded. After trial, the court below found that the offer of Atty. Francisco, dated 20 February 1959, made on behalf of his daughter, had been unqualifiedly accepted, and was binding, and rendered judgment as noted at the start of this opinion.

The defendant-appellant corporation assigns six (6) errors allegedly committed by the lower court, all of which, however, are resolvable on the single issue as to whether or not the telegram generated a contract that is valid and binding upon the parties.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 

We find no reason for altering the conclusion reached by the court below that the offer of compromise made by plaintiff in the letter, Exhibit "A", had been validly accepted, and was binding on the defendant. The terms of the offer were clear, and over the signature of defendant's general manager, Rodolfo Andal, plaintiff was informed telegraphically that her proposal had been accepted. There was nothing in the telegram that hinted at any anomaly, or gave ground to suspect its veracity, and the plaintiff, therefore, can not be blamed for relying upon it. There is no denying that the telegram was within Andal's apparent authority, but the defense is that he did not sign it, but that it was sent by the Board Secretary in his name and without his knowledge. Assuming this to be true, how was appellee to know it? Corporate transactions would speedily come to a standstill were every person dealing with a corporation held duty-bound to disbelieve every act of its responsible officers, no matter how regular they should appear on their face. This Court has observed in Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co., 38 Phil. 634, 654-655, that —

In passing upon the liability of a corporation in cases of this kind it is always well to keep in mind the situation as it presents itself to the third party with whom the contract is made. Naturally he can have little or no information as to what occurs in corporate meetings; and he must necessarily rely upon the external manifestations of corporate consent. The integrity of commercial transactions can only be maintained by holding the corporation strictly to the liability fixed upon it by its agents in accordance with law; and we would be sorry to announce a doctrine which would permit the property of a man in the city of Paris to be whisked out of his hands and carried into a remote quarter of the earth without recourse against the corporation whose name and authority had been used in the manner disclosed in this case. As already observed, it is familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other agent, to do acts within the scope of an apparent authority, and thus holds him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any one who has in good faith dealt with the corporation through such agent, be estopped from denying his authority; and where it is said "if the corporation permits" this means the same as "if the thing is permitted by the directing power of the corporation."

It has also been decided that —

A very large part of the business of the country is carried on by corporations. It certainly is not the practice of persons dealing with officers or agents who assume to act for such entities to insist on being shown the resolution of the board of directors authorizing the particular officer or agent to transact the particular business which he assumes to conduct. A person who knows that the officer or agent of the corporation habitually transacts certain kinds of business for such corporation under circumstances which necessarily show knowledge on the part of those charged with the conduct of the corporate business assumes, as he has the right to assume, that such agent or officer is acting within the scope of his authority. (Curtis Land & Loan Co. vs. Interior Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118 N.W. 853, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1068; as cited in 2 Fletcher's Encyclopedia, Priv. Corp. 263, perm. Ed.)

Indeed, it is well-settled that —

If a private corporation intentionally or negligently clothes its officers or agents with apparent power to perform acts for it, the corporation will be estopped to deny that such apparent authority is real, as to innocent third persons dealing in good faith with such officers or agents. (2 Fletcher's Encyclopedia, Priv. Corp. 255, Perm. Ed.)

Hence, even if it were the board secretary who sent the telegram, the corporation could not evade the binding effect produced by the telegram..

The defendant-appellant does not disown the telegram, and even asserts that it came from its offices, as may be gleaned from the letter, dated 31 May 1960, to Atty. Francisco, and signed "R. P. Andal, general manager by Leovigildo Monasterial, legal counsel", wherein these phrases occur: "the telegram sent ... by this office" and "the telegram we sent your" (emphasis supplied), but it alleges mistake in couching the correct wording. This alleged mistake cannot be taken seriously, because while the telegram is dated 20 February 1959, the defendant informed Atty. Francisco of the alleged mistake only on 31 May 1960, and all the while it accepted the various other remittances, starting on 28 February 1959, sent by the plaintiff to it in compliance with her performance of her part of the new contract.

The inequity of permitting the System to deny its acceptance become more patent when account is taken of the fact that in remitting the payment of P30,000 advanced by her father, plaintiff's letter to Mr. Andal quoted verbatim the telegram of acceptance. This was in itself notice to the corporation of the terms of the allegedly unauthorized telegram, for as Ballentine says:

Knowledge of facts acquired or possessed by an officer or agent of a corporation in the course of his employment, and in relation to matters within the scope of his authority, is notice to the corporation, whether he communicates such knowledge or not. (Ballentine, Law on Corporations, section 112.)

since a corporation cannot see, or know, anything except through its officers.

Yet, notwithstanding this notice, the defendant System pocketed the amount, and kept silent about the telegram not being in accordance with the true facts, as it now alleges. This silence, taken together with the unconditional acceptance of three other subsequent remittances from plaintiff, constitutes in itself a binding ratification of the original agreement (Civil Code, Art. 1393).

ART. 1393. Ratification may be effected expressly or tacitly. It is understood that there is a tacit ratification if, with knowledge of the reason which renders the contract voidable and such reason having ceased, the person who has a right to invoke it should execute an act which necessarily implies an intention to waive his right.

Nowhere else do the circumstances call more insistently for the application of the equitable maxim that between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss..

The defendant's assertion that the telegram came from it but that it was incorrectly worded renders unnecessary to resolve the other point on controversy as to whether the said telegram constitutes an actionable document..

Since the terms offered by the plaintiff in the letter of 20 February 1959 (Exhibit "A") provided for the setting aside of the foreclosure effected by the defendant System, the acceptance of the offer left the account of plaintiff in the same condition as if no foreclosure had taken place. It follows, as the lower court has correctly held, that the right of the System to collect attorneys' fees equivalent to 10% of the due (P35,694.14) and the expenses and charges of P3,300.00 may no longer be enforced, since by the express terms of the mortgage contract, these sums were collectible only "in the event of foreclosure."

The court a quo also called attention to the unconscionability of defendant's charging the attorney's fees, totalling over P35,000.00; and this point appears well-taken, considering that the foreclosure was merely extra-judicial, and the attorneys' work was limited to requiring the sheriff to effectuate the foreclosure. However, in view of the parties' agreement to set the same aside, with the consequential elimination of such incidental charges, the matter of unreasonableness of the counsel fees need not be labored further.

Turning now to the plaintiff's separate appeal (Case G.R. No. L-18155): Her prayer for an award of actual or compensatory damages for P83,333.33 is predicated on her alleged unrealized profits due to her inability to sell the compound for the price of P750,000.00 offered by one Vicente Alunan, which sale was allegedly blocked because the System consolidated the title to the property in its name. Plaintiff reckons the amount of P83,333.33 by placing the actual value of the property at P666,666.67, a figure arrived at by assuming that the System's loan of P400,000.00 constitutes 60% of the actual value of the security. The court a quo correctly refused to award such actual or compensatory damages because it could not determine with reasonable certainty the difference between the offered price and the actual value of the property, for lack of competent evidence. Without proof we cannot assume, or take judicial notice, as suggested by the plaintiff, that the practice of lending institutions in the country is to give out as loan 60% of the actual value of the collateral. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that the price offered by Alunan was payable in installments covering five years, so that it may not actually represent true market values.

Nor was there error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages, not only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify to her social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code (Ventanilla vs. Centeno, L-14333, 28 Jan. 1961; Fores vs. Miranda, L-12163, 4 March 1959).

There is no basis for awarding exemplary damages either, because this species of damages is only allowed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages, none of which have been allowed in this case, for reasons herein before discussed (Art. 2234, Civil Code; Velayo vs. Shell Co. of P.I., L-7817, Res. July 30, 1957; Singson, et al. vs. Aragon and Lorza, L-5164, Jan. 27, 1953, 49 O.G. No. 2, 515).

As to attorneys' fees, we agree with the trial court's stand that in view of the absence of gross and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, and there being none of the other grounds enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, such absence precludes a recovery. The award of attorneys' fees is essentially discretionary in the trial court, and no abuse of discretion has been shown.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant Government Service Insurance System, in G.R. No.L-18287.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Insurance Case Digest: Saura Import & Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Surety Co., Inc. (1963)


G.R. No. L-15184   May 31, 1963
Lessons Applicable: Mortgagor (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: 

FACTS:

  • Saura Import & Export Co Inc., mortgaged to the Phil. National Bank, a parcel of land.
  • The mortgage was amended to guarantee an increased amount, bringing the total mortgaged debt to P37,000
  • On the land mortgage is a building owned by Saura Import & Export Co Inc. which was insured with Philippine International Surety (Insurer) even before the mortgage contract so it was required to endorse to mortgagee PNB
  • October 15, 1954: Barely 13 days after the issuance of the fire insurance policy, the insurer cancelled it.  Notice of the cancellation was given to PNB (mortgagee). But Saura (insured) was not informed. 
  • April 6, 1955: The building and all its contents worth P40,685.69 were burned so Saura filed a claim with the Insurer and mortgagee Bank
  • RTC: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N Philippine International Surety should be held liable for the claim because notice to only the mortgagee is not substantial

HELD:YES. Appealed from is hereby reversed.  Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., to pay Saura Import & Export Co., Inc., P29,000
  • It was the primary duty of Philippine International Surety to notify the insured, but it did not
  • If a mortgage or lien exists against the property insured, and the policy contains a clause stating that loss, if any, shall be payable to such mortgagee or the holder of such lien as interest may appear, notice of cancellation to the mortgagee or lienholder alone is ineffective as a cancellation of the policy to the owner of the property.
  • liability attached principally the insurance company, for its failure to give notice of the cancellation of the policy to Saura
  • it is unnecessary to discuss the errors assigned against appellee bank

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-15184


EN BANC

DECISION

G.R. No. L-15184   May 31, 1963

SAURA IMPORT & EXPORT CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SURETY CO., INC., and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendants-appellees.

Saura, Magno & Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Tolentino, Garcia and D. R. Cruz for defendant-appellee Philippine International Surety Co., Inc.

Paredes, J.:

Instant case was certified by the Court of Appeals to Us, it appearing that the issues involved are purely of law.

On December 26, 1952, the Saura Import & Export Co Inc., mortgaged to the Phil. National Bank, a parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 40445 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao, issued in its name, to secure the payment of promissory note of P27,000.00 (Exhs. P, B-2). On April 30, 1953, the mortgage was amended to guarantee an increased amount, bringing the total mortgaged debt to P37,000.00 (Exhs. P-2, B-3). The provisions of the mortgaged contact, pertinent to the resolution of the present case, provide as follows —

2. . . . he shall insure the mortgaged property at all times against fire and earthquake for an amount and with such company satisfactory to the Mortgagee, indorsing to the latter the corresponding policies; he shall keep the mortgaged property in good condition, making repairs and protecting walls that may be necessary; . . .

x x x x x x x x x

Erected on the land mortgaged, was a building of strong materials owned by the mortgagor Saura Import & Export Co., Inc., which had always been covered by insurance, many years prior to the mortgage contract. Pursuant to the requirement, Saura insured the building and its contents with the Philippine International Surety, an insurance firm acceptable to mortgagee Bank, for P29,000.00 against fire for the period of one year from October 2, 1954. As required therefor, the insurance policy was endorsed to the mortgagee PNB, in a Memo which states —

Loss if any, payable to the Philippine National Bank as their interest may appear, subject to the terms, conditions and warranties of this policy (Exh. A).

The policy was delivered to the mortgagee Bank by Saura. On October 15, 1954, barely thirteen (13) days after the issuance of the fire insurance policy (October 2, 1954), the insurer cancelled the same, effective as of the date of issue (Exh. A-2). Notice of the cancellation was given to appellee bank in writing, sent by Registered Mail and personally addressed to Fortunato Domingo, Branch Manager of the appellee Bank's Davao Branch, and was received by the Bank on November 8, 1954. On April 6, 1955, the building and its contents, worth P40,685.69 were burned. On April 11, 1955, Saura filed a claim with the Insurer and mortgagee Bank. Upon the presentation of notice of loss with the PNB, Saura learned for the first time that the policy had previously been cancelled on October 2, 1954, by the insurer, when Saura's folder in the Bank's filed was opened and the notice of cancellation (original and duplicate) sent by the Insurer to the Bank, was found. Upon refusal of the Insurer Philippine International Surety to pay the amount of the insurance, Civil Case No. 26847 was filed with the Manila CFI against the Insurer, and the PNB was later included as party defendant, after it had refused to prosecute the case jointly with Saura Import & Export Co., Inc.

At the trial, it was established that neither the Insurer nor the mortgagee Bank informed the plaintiff Saura of the cancellation of the policy. On April 30, 1957, the court a quo rendered the following judgment —

. . . IN VIEW WHEREOF, complaint dismissed; costs against the plaintiff; but as there is no proof on the counterclaim of the Philippines International Surety, the same is also dismissed.Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.

A motion to reconsider the above judgment, seasonably presented on May 14, 1957, was subsequently denied. The decision rendered and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration constitute the subject of the instant appeal by plaintiff Saura on the three alleged errors, which converge on the correctness of the ruling, wholly dismissing the complaint absolving both the insurance company and the bank from liability.

In the determination of liabilities of the parties herein, let us look into the general principles of insurance, in matters of cancellations of policy by the insurer. Fire insurance policies and other contracts of insurance upon property, in addition to the common provision for cancellation of the policy upon request of the insured, generally provide for cancellation by the insurer by notice to the insured for a prescribed period, which is usually 5 days, and the return of the unearned portion of the premium paid by the insured, such provision for cancellation upon notice being authorized by statutes in some jurisdiction, either specifically or as a provision of an adopted standard form of policy. The purpose of provisions or stipulations for notice to the insured, is to prevent the cancellation of the policy, without allowing the insured ample opportunity to negotiate for other insurance in its stead. The form and sufficiency of a notice of cancellation is determined by policy provisions. In order to form the basis for the cancellation of a policy, notice to the insured n not be in any particular form, in the absence of a statute or policy provision prescribing such form, and it is sufficient, so long as it positively and unequivocally indicates to the insured, that it is the intention of the company that the policy shall cease to be binding. Where the policy contains no provisions that a certain number of days notice shall be given, a reasonable notice and opportunity to obtain other insurance must be given. Actual personal notice to the insured is essential to a cancellation under a provision for cancellation by notice. The actual receipt by the insured of a notice of cancellation is universally recognized as a condition precedent to a cancellation of the policy by the insurer, and consequently a letter containing notice of cancellation which is mailed by the insurer but not received by the insured, is ineffective as cancellation (29 Am. Jur. pp. 732-741).

The policy in question (Exh. A), does not provide for the notice, its form or period. The Insurance Law, Act No. 2427, does not likewise provide for such notice. This being the case, it devolves upon the Court to apply the generally accepted principles of insurance, regarding cancellation of the insurance policy by the insurer. From what has been heretofore stated, actual notice of cancellation in a clear and unequivocal manner, preferably in writing, in view of the importance of an insurance contract, should be given by the insurer to the insured, so that the latter might be given an opportunity to obtain other insurance for his own protection. The notice should be personal to the insured and not to and/or through any unauthorized person by the policy. In the case at bar, the defendant insurance company, must have realized the paramount importance of sending a notice of cancellation, when it sent the notice of cancellation of the policy to the defendant bank (as mortgagee), but not to the insured with which it (insurance company) had direct dealing. It was the primary duty of the defendant-appellee insurance company to notify the insured, but it did not. It should be stated that the house and its contents were burned on April 6, 1955, at the time when the policy was enforced (October 2, 1954 to October 2, 1955); and that under the facts, as found by the trial court, to which We are bound, it is evident that both the insurance company and the appellee bank failed, wittingly or unwittingly, to notify the insured appellant Saura of the cancellation made xcnpF.

Of course, the defendant insurance company contends that it gave notice to the defendant-appellee bank as mortgagee of the property, and that was already a substantial compliance with its duty to notify the insured of the cancellation of the policy. But notice to the bank, as far appellant herein is concerned, is not effective notice.

If a mortgage or lien exists against the property insured, and the policy contains a clause stating that loss, if any, shall be payable to such mortgagee or the holder of such lien as interest may appear, notice of cancellation to the mortgagee or lienholder alone is ineffective as a cancellation of the policy to the owner of the property. (Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Caumisar, 218 Ky. 378, 391 SW 776, cited in 29 Am. Jur. p. 743).

Upon authority of the above case, therefore, the liability of the insurance company becomes a fact.

It may be argued that in the appeal brief of appellant, no error has been assigned against the insurance company and no prayer is found therein asking that it be made liable. It must be noted, however, that the case was dismissed the lower court and the main object of the appeal is to secure a reversal of the said judgment. This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Thus it was held:

While an assignment of error which is required by law or rule of court has been held essential to appellate review, only those assigned will be considered, there are a number of cases which appear to accord to the appellate court a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned. And an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error. (Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 198-199).

Although assigned errors apparently appear to be directed against the appellee bank alone, they in essence, seek a reversal of the decision on dismissal, entered by the lower court, which in the main has for its purpose the finding of liability on the policy. In the course of our examination of the records of the case, the decision and the errors assigned, We found that liability attached principally the insurance company, for its failure to give notice of the cancellation of the policy to herein appellant itself.

Because of the conclusions reached, We find it unnecessary to discuss the errors assigned against appellee bank.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another is entered, condemning the defendant-appellee Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., to pay Saura Import & Export Co., Inc., appellant herein, the sum of P29,000.00, the amount involved in Policy No. 429, subject-matter of the instant case. Without costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Labrador, J., took no part. .

Insurance Case Digest: Del Rosario v. Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc. (1963)

G.R. No. L-16215            June 29, 1963
Lessons Applicable: Ambiguous Provisions Interpreted Against Insurer (Insurance)

FACTS:
  • April 13, 1957: Simeon del Rosario, father of the insured who died from drowning filed a claim for payment with Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc. but it refused to pay more than P1,000 php so a case was filed with the RTC for the P2,000 balance stating that under the policy they are entitled to P1,000 to P3,000 as indemnity
  • RTC: entitled to recover P3,000 - policy does not positively state any definite amount, there is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow greater indemnity
ISSUE: W/N Simeon is entitled to recover P3,000 

HELD: YES.
  • terms in an insurance policy, which are ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain are to be construed strictly against, the insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the dominant purpose of indemnity or payment to the insured, especially where a forfeiture is involved
  • reason for this rule is that the "insured usually has no voice in the selection or arrangement of the words employed and that the language of the contract is selected with great care and deliberation by expert and legal advisers employed by, and acting exclusively in the interest of, the insurance company

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-16215

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16215             June 29, 1963
SIMEON DEL ROSARIO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE EQUITABLE INSURANCE AND CASUALTY CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
Vicente J. Francisco and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiff-appellee.
K. V. Faylona for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On February 7, 1957, the defendant Equitable Insurance and Casualty Co., Inc., issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario, alias Paquito Bolero, son of herein plaintiff-appellee, binding itself to pay the sum of P1,000.00 to P3,000.00, as indemnity for the death of the insured. The pertinent provisions of the Policy, recite:
Part I. Indemnity For Death
If the insured sustains any bodily injury which is effected solely through violent, external, visible and accidental means, and which shall result, independently of all other causes and within sixty (60) days from the occurrence thereof, in the Death of the Insured, the Company shall pay the amount set opposite such injury:
Section 1. Injury sustained other than those specified below unless excepted hereinafter. . . . . . . .
P1,000.00
Section 2. Injury sustained by the wrecking or disablement of a railroad passenger car or street railway car in or on which the Insured is travelling as a farepaying passenger. . . . . . . .
P1,500.00
Section 3. Injury sustained by the burning of a church, theatre, public library or municipal administration building while the Insured is therein at the commencement of the fire. . . . . . . .
P2,000.00
Section 4. Injury sustained by the wrecking or disablement of a regular passenger elevator car in which the Insured is being conveyed as a passenger (Elevator in mines excluded) P2,500.00
Section 5. Injury sustained by a stroke of lightning or by a cyclone. . . . . . . .
P3,000.00
x x x           x x x           x x x
Part VI. Exceptions
This policy shall not cover disappearance of the Insured nor shall it cover Death, Disability, Hospital fees, or Loss of Time, caused to the insured:
. . . (h) By drowning except as a consequence of the wrecking or disablement in the Philippine waters of a passenger steam or motor vessel in which the Insured is travelling as a farepaying passenger; . . . .
A rider to the Policy contained the following:
IV. DROWNING
It is hereby declared and agreed that exemption clause Letter (h) embodied in PART VI of the policy is hereby waived by the company, and to form a part of the provision covered by the policy.
On February 24, 1957, the insured Francisco del Rosario, alias Paquito Bolero, while on board the motor launch "ISLAMA" together with 33 others, including his beneficiary in the Policy, Remedios Jayme, were forced to jump off said launch on account of fire which broke out on said vessel, resulting in the death of drowning, of the insured and beneficiary in the waters of Jolo. 
On April 13, 1957, Simeon del Rosario, father of the insured, and as the sole heir, filed a claim for payment with defendant company, and on September 13, 1957, defendant company paid to him (plaintiff) the sum of P1,000.00, pursuant to Section 1 of Part I of the policy. The receipt signed by plaintiff reads —
RECEIVED of the EQUITABLE INSURANCE & CASUALTY CO., INC., the sum of PESOS — ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) Philippine Currency, being settlement in full for all claims and demands against said Company as a result of an accident which occurred on February 26, 1957, insured under out ACCIDENT Policy No. 7136, causing the death of the Assured.
In view of the foregoing, this policy is hereby surrendered and CANCELLED.
LOSS COMPUTATION
Amount of Insurance                 P1,000.00
__________
v v v v v
On the same date (September 13, 1957), Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, wrote defendant company acknowledging receipt by his client (plaintiff herein), of the P1,000.00, but informing said company that said amount was not the correct one. Atty. Francisco claimed —
The amount payable under the policy, I believe should be P1,500.00 under the provision of Section 2, part 1 of the policy, based on the rule of pari materia as the death of the insured occurred under the circumstances similar to that provided under the aforecited section.
Defendant company, upon receipt of the letter, referred the matter to the Insurance Commissioner, who rendered an opinion that the liability of the company was only P1,000.00, pursuant to Section 1, Part I of the Provisions of the policy (Exh. F, or 3). Because of the above opinion, defendant insurance company refused to pay more than P1,000.00. In the meantime, Atty. Vicente Francisco, in a subsequent letter to the insurance company, asked for P3,000.00 which the Company refused, to pay. Hence, a complaint for the recovery of the balance of P2,000.00 more was instituted with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City, Branch VII), praying for it further sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs.
Defendant Insurance Company presented a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the demand or claim is set forth in the complaint had already been released, plaintiff having received the full amount due as appearing in policy and as per opinion of the Insurance Commissioner. An opposition to the motion to dismiss, was presented by plaintiff, and other pleadings were subsequently file by the parties. On December 28, 1957, the trial court deferred action on the motion to dismiss until termination of the trial of the case, it appearing that the ground thereof was not indubitable. In the Answer to the complaint, defendant company practically admitted all the allegations therein, denying only those which stated that under the policy its liability was P3,000.00.
On September 1, 1958, the trial court promulgated an Amended Decision, the pertinent portions of which read —
x x x           x x x           x x x
Since the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties show that it was not their intention that the payment of P1,000.00 to the plaintiff and the signing of the loss receipt exhibit "1" would be considered as releasing the defendant completely from its liability on the policy in question, said intention of the parties should prevail over the contents of the loss receipt "1" (Articles 1370 and 1371, New Civil Code).
". . . . Under the terms of this policy, defendant company agreed to pay P1,000.00 to P3,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the insured. The insured died of drowning. Death by drowning is covered by the policy the pertinent provisions of which reads as follows:
x x x           x x x           x x x
"Part I of the policy fixes specific amounts as indemnities in case of death resulting from "bodily injury which is effected solely thru violence, external, visible and accidental means" but, Part I of the Policy is not applicable in case of death by drowning because death by drowning is not one resulting from "bodily injury which is affected solely thru violent, external, visible and accidental means" as "Bodily Injury" means a cut, a bruise, or a wound and drowning is death due to suffocation and not to any cut, bruise or wound."
x x x           x x x           x x x
Besides, on the face of the policy Exhibit "A" itself, death by drowning is a ground for recovery apart from the bodily injury because death by bodily injury is covered by Part I of the policy while death by drowning is covered by Part VI thereof. But while the policy mentions specific amounts that may be recovered for death for bodily injury, yet, there is not specific amount mentioned in the policy for death thru drowning although the latter is, under Part VI of the policy, a ground for recovery thereunder. Since the defendant has bound itself to pay P1000.00 to P3,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the insured but the policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in case of death by drowning, there is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow greater indemnity.
x x x           x x x           x x x
. . . plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover P3,000.00. The defendant had already paid the amount of P1,000.00 to the plaintiff so that there still remains a balance of P2,000.00 of the amount to which plaintiff is entitled to recover under the policy Exhibit "A".
The plaintiff asks for an award of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. However, since it is evident that the defendant had not acted in bad faith in refusing to pay plaintiff's claim, the Court cannot award plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby reconsiders and sets aside its decision dated July 21, 1958 and hereby renders judgment, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos and to pay the costs.
The above judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals on three (3) counts. Said Court, in a Resolution dated September 29, 1959, elevated the case to this Court, stating that the genuine issue is purely legal in nature.
All the parties agree that indemnity has to be paid. The conflict centers on how much should the indemnity be. We believe that under the proven facts and circumstances, the findings and conclusions of the trial court, are well taken, for they are supported by the generally accepted principles or rulings on insurance, which enunciate that where there is an ambiguity with respect to the terms and conditions of the policy, the same will be resolved against the one responsible thereof. It should be recalled in this connection, that generally, the insured, has little, if any, participation in the preparation of the policy, together with the drafting of its terms and Conditions. The interpretation of obscure stipulations in a contract should not favor the party who cause the obscurity (Art. 1377, N.C.C.), which, in the case at bar, is the insurance company.
. . . . And so it has been generally held that the "terms in an insurance policy, which are ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain . . . are to be construed strictly against, the insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the dominant purpose of indemnity or payment to the insured, especially where a forfeiture is involved," (29 Am. Jur. 181) and the reason for this rule is that the "insured usually has no voice in the selection or arrangement of the words employed and that the language of the contract is selected with great care and deliberation by expert and legal advisers employed by, and acting exclusively in the interest of, the insurance company" (44 C.J.S. 1174). Calanoc v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-8151, Dec. 16, 1955.
. . . . Where two interpretations, equally fair, of languages used in an insurance policy may be made, that which allows the greater indemnity will prevail. (L'Engel v. Scotish Union & Nat. F. Ins. Co., 48 Fla. 82, 37 So. 462, 67 LRA 581 111 Am. St. Rep. 70, 5 Ann. Cas. 749).
At any event, the policy under consideration, covers death or disability by accidental means, and the appellant insurance company agreed to pay P1,000.00 to P3,000.00. is indemnity for death of the insured.
In view of the conclusions reached, it would seem unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the appeal.
The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., reserves his vote.