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Showing posts with label 1979. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1979. Show all posts

Insurance Case Digest: Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance Co. v. Woodworks Inc (1979)

G.R. No. L-25317 August 6, 1979
Lessons Applicable: Estoppel and credit extension (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: Section 77 of the Insurance Code

FACTS:
  • July 21, 1960: Woodworks, Inc. was issued a fire policy for its building machinery and equipment by Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance Co. for P500K covering July 21, 1960 to July 21, 1961.  Woodworks did not pay the premium totalling to P10,593.36.
  • April 19, 1961: It was alleged that Woodworks notified Philippine Phoenix the cancellation of the Policy so Philippine Phoenix credited P3,110.25 for the unexpired period of 94 days and demanded in writing the payment of P7,483.11 
  • Woodworks refused stating that it need not pay premium "because the Insurer did not stand liable for any indemnity during the period the premiums were not paid." 
  • Philippine Phoenix filed with the CFI to recover its earned premium of P7,483.11
    • Woodworks: to pay the premium after the issuance of the policy put an end to the insurance contract and rendered the policy unenforceable
  • CFI: favored Philippine Phoenix
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid insurance contract despite no premium payment was paid

HELD: NO. Reversed

  • Policy provides for pre-payment of premium. To constitute an extension of credit there must be a clear and express agreement therefor and there nust be acceptance of the extension - none here
  • Since the premium had not been paid, the policy must be deemed to have lapsed.
  • failure to make a payment of a premium or assessment at the time provided for, the policy shall become void or forfeited, or the obligation of the insurer shall cease, or words to like effect, because the contract so prescribes and because such a stipulation is a material and essential part of the contract. This is true, for instance, in the case of life, health and accident, fire and hail insurance policies
  • Explicit in the Policy itself is plaintiff's agreement to indemnify defendant for loss by fire only "after payment of premium" Compliance by the insured with the terms of the contract is a condition precedent to the right of recovery.
  • The burden is on an insured to keep a policy in force by the payment of premiums, rather than on the insurer to exert every effort to prevent the insured from allowing a policy to elapse through a failure to make premium payments. 

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-25317


FIRST DIVISION


G.R. No. L-25317 August 6, 1979


PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
WOODWORKS, INC., defendant-appellant.


Zosimo Rivas for appellant.


Manuel O. Chan for appellee.


MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:


This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of October 4, 1965 on a pure question of law and "because the issues raised are practically the same as those in CA-G.R. No. 32017-R" between the same parties, which case had been forwarded to us on April 1, 1964. The latter case, "Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance Inc. vs. Woodworks, Inc.," docketed in this Court as L-22684, was decided on August 31, 1967 and has been reported in 20 SCRA 1270.


Specifically, this action is for recovery of unpaid premium on a fire insurance policy issued by plaintiff, Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance Company, in favor of defendant Woodworks, Inc.


The following are the established facts:


On July 21, 1960, upon defendant's application, plaintiff issued in its favor Fire Insurance Policy No. 9749 for P500,000.00 whereby plaintiff insured defendant's building, machinery and equipment for a term of one year from July 21, 1960 to July 21, 1961 against loss by fire. The premium and other charges including the margin fee surcharge of P590.76 and the documentary stamps in the amount of P156.60 affixed on the Policy, amounted to P10,593.36.


It is undisputed that defendant did not pay the premium stipulated in the Policy when it was issued nor at any time thereafter.


On April 19, 1961, or before the expiration of the one-year term, plaintiff notified defendant, through its Indorsement No. F-6963/61, of the cancellation of the Policy allegedly upon request of defendant. 1 The latter has denied having made such a request. In said Indorsement, plaintiff credited defendant with the amount of P3,110.25 for the unexpired period of 94 days, and claimed the balance of P7,483.11 representing ,learned premium from July 21, 1960 to 18th April 1961 or, say 271 days." On July 6, 1961, plaintiff demanded in writing for the payment of said amount. 2 Defendant, through counsel, disclaimed any liability in its reply- letter of August 15, 1961, contending, in essence, that it need not pay premium "because the Insurer did not stand liable for any indemnity during the period the premiums were not paid." 3


On January 30, 1962, plaintiff commenced action in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV (Civil Case No. 49468), to recover the amount of P7,483.11 as "earned premium." Defendant controverted basically on the theory that its failure "to pay the premium after the issuance of the policy put an end to the insurance contract and rendered the policy unenforceable." 4


On September 13, 1962, judgment was rendered in plaintiff's favor "ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P7,483.11, with interest thereon at the rate of 6%, per annum from January 30, 1962, until the principal shall have been fully paid, plus the sum of P700.00 as attorney's fees of the plaintiff, and the costs of the suit." From this adverse Decision, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as heretofore stated, certified the case to us on a question of law.


The errors assigned read:


1. The lower court erred in sustaining that Fire Insurance Policy, Exhibit A, was a binding contract even if the premium stated in the policy has not been paid.


2. That the lower court erred in sustaining that the premium in Insurance Policy, Exhibit B, became an obligation which was demandable even after the period in the Policy has expired.


3. The lower court erred in not deciding that a premium not paid is not a debt enforceable by action of the insurer.


We find the appeal meritorious.


Insurance is "a contract whereby one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event." 5 The consideration is the "premium". "The premium must be paid at the time and in the way and manner specified in the policy and, if not so paid, the policy will lapse and be forfeited by its own terms." 6


The provisions on premium in the subject Policy read:


THIS POLICY OF INSURANCE WITNESSETH, THAT in consideration of — MESSRS. WOODWORKS, INC. — hereinafter called the Insured, paying to the PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC., hereinafter called the Company, the sum of — PESOS NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX ONLY — the Premium for the first period hereinafter mentioned. ...


xxx xxx xxx


THE COMPANY HEREBY AGREES with the Insured ... that if the Property above described, or any part thereof, shall be destroyed or damaged by Fire or Lightning after payment of Premium, at any time between 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the TWENTY FIRST day of JULY One Thousand Nine Hundred and SIXTY and 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the TWENTY FIRST day of JULY One Thousand Nine Hundred and SIXTY ONE. ... (Emphasis supplied)


Paragraph "2" of the Policy further contained the following condition:


2. No payment in respect of any premium shall be deemed to be payment to the Company unless a printed form of receipt for the same signed by an Official or duly-appointed Agent of the Company shall have been given to the Insured.


Paragraph "10" of the Policy also provided:


10. This insurance may be terminated at any time at the request of the Insured, in which case the Company will retain the customary short period rate for the time the policy has been in force. This insurance may also at any time be terminated at the option of the Company, on notice to that effect being given to the Insured, in which case the Company shall be liable to repay on demand a ratable proportion of the premium for the unexpired term from the date of the cancelment.


Clearly, the Policy provides for pre-payment of premium. Accordingly; "when the policy is tendered the insured must pay the premium unless credit is given or there is a waiver, or some agreement obviating the necessity for prepayment." 7 To constitute an extension of credit there must be a clear and express agreement therefor." 8


From the Policy provisions, we fail to find any clear agreement that a credit extension was accorded defendant. And even if it were to be presumed that plaintiff had extended credit from the circumstances of the unconditional delivery of the Policy without prepayment of the premium, yet it is obvious that defendant had not accepted the insurer's offer to extend credit, which is essential for the validity of such agreement.


An acceptance of an offer to allow credit, if one was made, is as essential to make a valid agreement for credit, to change a conditional delivery of an insurance policy to an unconditional delivery, as it is to make any other contract. Such an acceptance could not be merely a mental act or state of mind, but would require a promise to pay made known in some manner to defendant. 9


In this respect, the instant case differs from that involving the same parties entitled Philippine Phoenix Surety & Insurance Inc. vs. Woodworks, Inc., 10 where recovery of the balance of the unpaid premium was allowed inasmuch as in that case "there was not only a perfected contract of insurance but a partially performed one as far as the payment of the agreed premium was concerned." This is not the situation obtaining here where no partial payment of premiums has been made whatsoever.


Since the premium had not been paid, the policy must be deemed to have lapsed.


The non-payment of premiums does not merely suspend but put, an end to an insurance contract, since the time of the payment is peculiarly of the essence of the contract. 11


... the rule is that under policy provisions that upon the failure to make a payment of a premium or assessment at the time provided for, the policy shall become void or forfeited, or the obligation of the insurer shall cease, or words to like effect, because the contract so prescribes and because such a stipulation is a material and essential part of the contract. This is true, for instance, in the case of life, health and accident, fire and hail insurance policies. 12


In fact, if the peril insured against had occurred, plaintiff, as insurer, would have had a valid defense against recovery under the Policy it had issued. Explicit in the Policy itself is plaintiff's agreement to indemnify defendant for loss by fire only "after payment of premium," supra. Compliance by the insured with the terms of the contract is a condition precedent to the right of recovery.


The burden is on an insured to keep a policy in force by the payment of premiums, rather than on the insurer to exert every effort to prevent the insured from allowing a policy to elapse through a failure to make premium payments. The continuance of the insurer's obligation is conditional upon the payment of premiums, so that no recovery can be had upon a lapsed policy, the contractual relation between the parties having ceased. 13


Moreover, "an insurer cannot treat a contract as valid for the purpose of collecting premiums and invalid for the purpose of indemnity." 14


The foregoing findings are buttressed by section 77 of the Insurance Code (Presidential Decree No. 612, promulgated on December 18, 1974), which now provides that no contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.


WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and plaintiff's complaint hereby dismissed.


Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.


Makasiar, J., is on leave.





#Footnotes


1 Exhibits "E" and "F", parag. 6, Complaint.


2 Exhibit "C".


3 Exhibit "D".


4 Parag. 7, Answer.


5 Sec. 2, Act No. 2427 (The Insurance Law).


6 Glaraga vs. Sun Life Assurance Co., 49 Phil. 737 (1926).


7 Couch on Insurance, 2nd Vol. I, p. 376, par. (9:4).


8 Rogers vs. Great-West L.A. Co. CA 8 Minn 158 F 2d 474.


9 Gillen v. Bayfield, 329 Mo. 681, 46 S.W. 2d 571, cited in Insurance Law and Practice by John Alan Appleman, Vol. 14, p. 270.


10 20 SCRA 1270 (1967).


11 National Leather Co., Inc., vs. U.S. Life Insurance Co., 87 Phil. 410 (1950).


12 Mutual Fire Co. vs. Maple, 60 Or 359, 119 p. 484; 43 Am. Jur. 2d., pp. 630-631.


13 Insurance Law & Practice by John Alan Appleman, Vol. 14, p. 381.


14 Insurance Law & Practice by John Alan Appleman, Vol. 15, p. 331.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Grand Union Supermarket et al., v. Jose J. Espino, Jr., et al., (1979)


G.R. No. L-48250 December 28, 1979

Lessons Applicable: Public humiliation (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, Art. 26,Art. 2214, New Civil Code

FACTS:

  • Jose J. Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc, together with his wife and two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket in Makati
  • Finding a cylindrical "rat tail" file which he needed for his hobby, he picked it up and held it fearing it might get lost because of its tiny size
  • While shopping, they saw the maid of Jose's aunt so as he talked, he placed the rat tail in his breast pocket partly exposed 
  • At the check-out counter, he paid for their purchases worth P77 but forgot to pay the file
  • As he was exiting the supermarket, he was approached by Guard Ebreo regarding the file in his pocket.  He quickly apologized saying "I'm Sorry" and he turned towards the cashier to pay.  But, he was stopped and instead was brought to the rear of the supermarket when he was asked to fill out an Incident Report labeling him as "Shoplifter"
  • His wife joined him since he was taking so long and they were brought to the first checkout counter where Ms. Nelia Santos-Fandino's desk was.  She made a remark:"Ano, nakaw na naman ito".  Jose told Ms. Fandino that he was going to pay for the file because he needed it but she replied "That is all they say, the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say... They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them."
  • Jose objected stating he is a regular customer of the supermarket
  • He gave P5 to pay for the P3.85 cost of the file but Ms. Fandino said the P5 was his fine which will be rewarded to the guard.  People were staring at them.  He took the file and paid the file at the nearest checkout counter with P50 and got out as fast as they could.  His first impulse was to go back to the supermarket that night to throw rocks at its glass windows. But reason prevailed over passion and he thought that justice should take its due course.
  • He filed against Grand Union Supermarket et al. founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prays for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney s fees and 'expenses of litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5 fine
  •  CFI: dismissed
  • CA: reversed and granted damages of P75,000 by way of moral damages, P25,000 as exemplary damages, and P5,000 as attorney's fee
ISSUE: W/N Grand Union Supermarket should be liable for public humiliation founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code

HELD: YES. Grand Union Supermarket ordered to pay, jointly and severally moral damages P5,000 and P2,000 as and for attorney's fees; and to return the P5 fine

  • Jose did not intend to steal the file and that is act of picking up the file from the open shelf was not criminal nor done with malice or criminal intent for on the contrary, he took the item with the intention of buying and paying for it
    • personal circumstances:
      • graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P. Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein; honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946; a Philippine government pensionado of the United States for six months; member of the Philippine veterans Legion; author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press; member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy Washington
  • Jose was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident
  • Fine branding him as a thief which was not right nor justified
  • the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code
  • It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person
    • Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code)
  • His forgetfullness led to his embarassment and humiliation thereby causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. His act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament.
  • Grand Union Supermarket  acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their property, a right which the law accords to them. - eliminate the grant of exemplary damages 

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-48250


FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-48250 December 28, 1979

GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET, INC. and NELIA SANTOS FANDINO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE J. ESPINO JR., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

GUERRERO, J.

This is a petition tor certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated September 26, 1977 rendered in CA-G.R. No. 55186-R entitled "Jose J. Espino, Jr., plaintiff-appellant. versus Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. and Nelia Santos-Fandino, defendants-appellees," the dispositive portion of which states;

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and set aside. Defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff-jointly and severally, the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) by way of moral damages. Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fee, Costs of both instances shall be taxed against the defendant defendants.

The facts of the case are as stated in the decision of the respondent court to wit:

"Upon the evidence, and from the findings of the lower court, it appears that in the morning of August 22, 1970, plaintiff Jose J. Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc., and his wife and their two daughters went to shop at the defendants' South Supermarket in Makati. While his wife was shopping at the groceries section, plaintiff browsed around the other parts of the market. Finding a cylindrical "rat tail" file which he needed in his hobby and had been wanting to buy, plaintiff picked up that item from one of the shelves. He held it in his hand thinking that it might be lost, because of its tiny size, if he put it in his wife's grocery cart. In the course of their shopping, plaintiff and his wife saw the maid of plaintiff's aunt. While talking to this maid, plaintiff stuck the file into the front breast pocket of his shirt with a good part of the merchandise exposed.

"At the check-out counter, the plaintiff paid for his wife's purchases which amounted to P77.00, but he forgot to pay for the file. As he was leaving by the exit of the supermarket on his way to his car, carrying two bags of groceries and accompanied by his wife and two daughter, plaintiff was approached by a uniformed guard of the supermarket who said: "Excuse me, Mr., I think you have something in your pocket which you have not paid for." (p. 5, tsn, Aug. 13, 1971), pointing to his left front breast pocket. Suddenly reminded of the file, plaintiff apologized thus: "I am sorry," and he turned back toward the cashier to pay for the file. But the guard stopped him and led him instead toward the rear of the supermarket. The plaintiff protested but the guard was firm saying: "No, Mr., please come with me. It is the procedure of the supermarket to bring people that we apprehend to the back of the supermarket" (p. 8, Ibid). The time was between 9 and 10 o'clock. A crowd of customers on their way into the supermarket saw the plaintiff being stopped and led by a uniformed guard toward the rear of the supermarket. Plaintiff acquiesced and signaled to his wife and daughters to wait.

"Into a cubicle which was immediately adjacent to the area where deliveries to the supermarket were being made, the plaintiff was ushered. The guard directed him to a table and gave the file to the man seated at the desk. Another man stood beside the plaintiff. The man at the desk looked at the plaintiff and the latter immediately explained the circumstances that led to the finding of the file in his possession. The man at the desk pulled out a sheet of paper and began to ask plaintiff's name, age, residence and other personal data. Plaintiff was asked to make a brief statement, and on the sheet of paper or "Incident Report" he wrote down the following: "While talking to my aunt's maid with my wife, I put this item in my shirt pocket. I forgot to check it out with my wife's items" (Exhibit A). Meanwhile, the plaintiff's wife joined him and asked what had taken him so long.

"The guard who had accosted plaintiff took him back inside the supermarket in the company of his wife. Plaintiff and his wife were directed across the main entrance to the shopping area, down the line of check-out counters, to a desk beside the first checkout counter. To the woman seated at the desk, who turned out to be defendant Nelia Santos-Fandino, the guard presented the incident report and the file, Exhibit B. Defendant Fandino read the report and addressing the guard remarked: "Ano, nakaw na naman ito" (p. 22, Id.). Plaintiff explained and narrated the incident that led to the finding of the file in his pocket, telling Fandino that he was going to pay for the file because he needed it. But this defendant replied: "That is all they say, the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say... They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them." (p. 23, Id). Plaintiff objected and said that he was a regular customer of the supermarket.

"Extracting a P5.00 bill from his pocket, plaintiff told Fandino that he was paying for the file whose cost was P3.85. Fandino reached over and took the P5.00 bill from plaintiff with these words: "We are fining you P5.00. That is your the fine." Plaintiff was shocked. He and his wife objected vigorously that he was not a common criminal, and they wanted to get back the P5.00. But Fandino told them that the money would be given as an incentive to the guards who apprehend pilferers. People were milling around them and staring at the plaintiff. Plaintiff gave up the discussion. He drew a P50.00 bill and took back the file. Fandino directed him to the nearest check-out counter where he had to fall in line. The people who heard the exchange of words between Fandino and plaintiff continued to stare at him. At the trial, plaintiff expressed his embarrassment and humiliation thus: " I felt as though I wanted to disappear into a hole on the ground" (p. 34, Id.). After paying for the file, plaintiff and his wife walked as fast as they could out of the supermarket. His first impulse was to go back to the supermarket that night to throw rocks at its glass windows. But reason prevailed over passion and he thought that justice should take its due course.

"Plaintiff was certain during the trial that when he signed the incident report, Exhibit A, inside the cubicle at the back of the supermarket only his brief statement of the facts (Exhibit A-2), aside from his name and personal circumstances, was written thereon. He swore that the following were not in the incident report at, the time he signed it:

Exhibit A-I which says opposite the stenciled word SUBJECT "Shoplifting"

Exhibit A-3 which says opposite the stenciled words Action Taken: Released by Mrs. Fandino after paying the item.

Exhibit A-4 which says opposite the stenciled words Remarks Noted: "Grd. Ebreo requested Grd. Paunil to apprehend subject shoplifter.

Private respondent's complaint filed on October 8, 1970 is founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prays for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney s fees and 'expenses of litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5.00 fine. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch XIX dismissed the complaint, Interposing the appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed and set aside the appealed judgment, granting and damages as earlier stated.

Not satisfied with the decision of the respondent court, petitioners instituted the present petition and submits the following grounds and/or assignment of errors, to wit:

I

Respondent Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages to the respondent Espino under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, considering that —

A.     Respondent Espino was guilty of theft;

B.     Petitioners legitimately exercised their right of defense of property within the context of Article 429 of the Civil Code negating the application of Articles 19 and 21 of the same Code;

C.     Petitioners acted upon probable cause in stopping and investigating respondent Espino for shoplifting and as held in various decisions in the United States on shoplifting, a merchant who acts upon probable cause should not be held liable in damages by the suspected shoplifter;

D.     Petitioners did not exercise their right maliciously, wilfully or in bad faith; and/or

E.     The proximate cause of respondent Espino's alleged injury or suffering was his own negligence or forgetfulness; petitioners acted in good faith.

II

Assuming arguendo that petitioners are hable for moral and exemplary damages, the award of P75,000.00 for moral damages and P25,000.00 for exemplary damages by the respondent Court of Appeals is not legally justified and/or is grossly excessive in the premises.

III

The award of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees by the respondent Court of Appeals is unjustified and unwarranted under Article 2199 of the Civil Code.

We agree with the holding of the respondent appellate court that "the evidence sustains the court's finding that the plaintiff had absolutely no intention to steal the file." The totality of the facts and circumstances as found by the Court of Appeals unerringly points to the conclusion that private respondent did not intend to steal the file and that is act of picking up the file from the open shelf was not criminal nor done with malice or criminal intent for on the contrary, he took the item with the intention of buying and paying for it.

This Court needs only to stress the following undisputed facts which strongly and convincingly uphold the conclusion that private respondent was not "shoplifting." Thus, the facts that private respondent after picking the cylindrical "rat-tail" file costing P3.85 had placed it inside his left front breast pocket with a good portion of the item exposed to view and that he did not conceal it in his person or hid it from sight as well as the fact that he paid the purchases of his wife amounting to P77.00 at the checkout counter of the Supermarket, owed that he was not acting suspiciously or furtively. And the circumstance that he was with his family consisting of his wife Mrs. Caridad Jayme Espino, and their two daughters at the time negated any criminal intent on his part to steal. Moreover, when private respondent was approached by the guard of the Supermarket as he was leaving by the exit to his car who told him, "Excuse me, Mr., I think you have something in your pocket which you have not paid for," Espino, immediately apologized and answered, "I am sorry," which indicated his sincere apology or regrets. He turned back towards the cashier to pay for the file which proved his honesty sincerity and good faith in buying the item, and not to shoplift the same. His brief statement on the sheet of paper called the Incident Report where private respondent wrote the following: "While talking to my aunt's maid with my wife, I put this item in in my shirt pocket. I forgot to check it out with my wife's item," was an instant and contemporaneous explanation of the incident.

Considering further the personal circumstances of the private respondent. his education, position and character showing that he is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P. Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein; honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946; a Philippine government pensionado of the United States for six months; member of the Philippine veterans Legion; author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press; member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy Washington, We are fully convinced, as the trial and appellate courts were, that private respondent did not intend to steal the article costing P3.85. Nothing in the records intimates or hints whatsoever that private respondent has had any police record of any sort much less suspicion of stealing or shoplifting.

We do not lay down here any hard-and-fast rule as to what act or combination of acts constitute the crime of shoplifting for it must be stressed that each case must be considered and adjudged on a case-to-case basis and that in the determination of whether a person suspected of shoplifting has in truth and in fact committed the same, all the attendant facts and circumstances should be considered in their entirety and not from any single fact or circumstance from which to impute the stigma of shoplifting on any person suspected and apprehended therefor.

We likewise concur with the Court of Appeals that "(u)pon the facts and under the law, plaintiff has clearly made the cause of action for damages against the defendants. Defendants wilfully caused loss or injury to plaintiff in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, making them amenable to damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code." 2

That private respondent was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident. The Incident Report (Exhibit A) with the entries thereon under Exhibit A-1 which says opposite the stenciled word SUBJECT: "Shoplifting," Exhibit A-3 which says opposite the stenciled words Action Taken: Relesed by Mrs. Fandino after paying the item," Exhibit A-4 which says opposite the stenciled words Remarks Noted: Grd. Ebreo requested Grd. Paunil to apprehend subject shoplifter," established the opinion, judgment or thinking of the management of petitioner's supermarket upon private respondent's act of picking up the file. ln plain words, private respondent was regarded and pronounced a shoplifter and had committed "shoplifting."

We also affirm the Court of Appeals' finding that petitioner Nelia Santos Fandino, after reading the incident report, remarked the following: "Ano, nakaw na naman ito". Such a remark made in the presence of private respondent and with reference to the incident report with its entries, was offensive to private respondent's dignity and defamatory to his character and honesty. When Espino explained that he was going to pay the file but simply forgot to do so, Fandino doubted the explanation. saying: "That is all what they say, the people whom we caught not paying for the goods say... they all intended to pay for the things that are found to them." Private respondent objected and said that he was a regular customer of the Supermarket.

The admission of Fandino that she required private respondent to pay a fine of P5.00 and did in fact take the P5.00 bill of private respondent tendered by the latter to pay for the file, as a fine which would be given as an incentive to the guards who apprehend pilferers clearly proved that Fandino branded private respondent as a thief which was not right nor justified.

The testimony of the guard that management instructed them to bring the suspected customers to the public area for the people to see those kind of customers in order that they may be embarassed (p. 26, tsn, Sept. 30, 1971); that management wanted "the customers to be embarrassed in public so that they will not repeat the stealing again" (p. 2, tsn, Dec. 10, 1971); that the management asked the guards "to bring these customers to different cashiers in order that they will know that they are pilferers" (p. 2, Ibid.) may indicate the manner or pattern whereby a confirmed or self-confessed shoplifter is treated by the Supermarket management but in the case at bar, there is no showing that such procedure was taken in the case of the private respondent who denied strongly and vehemently the charge of shoplifting.

Nonetheless, the false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. We rule that under the facts of the case at bar, petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).

Private respondent is entitled to damages but We hold that the award of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for moral damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00, for exemplary damages is unconscionable and excessive.

While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code). In the case at bar, there is no question that the whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file. It was his forgetfullness in checking out the item and paying for it that started the chain of events which led to his embarassment and humiliation thereby causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament. We do not believe that private respondent was intentionally paraded in order to humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business depended for its success and patronage the good will of the buying public which can only be preserved and promoted by good public relations.

As succinctly expressed by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc, vs. Legaspi, 12 SCRA 598, the purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, both punishment or correction. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante and, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.

In Our considered estimation and assessment, moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) is reasonable and just to award to private respondent.

The grant of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages is unjustified. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, New Civil Code). Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they could be adjudicated (Art. 2223, New Civil Code). Considering that exemplary damages are awarded for wanton acts, that they are penal in character granted not by way of compensation but as a punishment to the offender and as a warning to others as a sort of deterrent, We hold that the facts and circumstances of the case at bar do not warrant the grant of exemplary damages.

Petitioners acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their property, a right which the law accords to them. Under Article 429, New Civil Code, the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has a right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof and for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. And since a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office exempts him from civil or criminal liability, petitioner may not be punished by imposing exemplary damages against him. We agree that petitioners acted upon probable cause in stopping and investigating private respondent for taking the file without paying for it, hence, the imposition of exemplary damages as a warning to others by way of a deterrent is without legal basis. We, therefore, eliminate the grant of exemplary damages to the private respondent.

In the light of the reduction of the damages, We hereby likewise reduce the original award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified. Petitioners are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to private respondent moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as and for attorney's fees; and further, to return the P5.00 fine to private respondent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur,

Teehankee (Chairman), took no part.

#Footnotes

1      Special Second Division, A. Reyes, J., ponente; with M. Serrano and H. Gutierrez, J., JJ., concurring.

2      Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 21.      Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: ... (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. ..

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Porfirio P. Cinco v. Hon. Mateo Canonoy et al. (1979)

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31 and Article 2176 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
  • Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident
  • At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
    (b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered
  • City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
  • CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for
  • nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
  • Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant
  • primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society
  • The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. 
  • Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
  • Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
  • Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property
  • word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-33171

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February 25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil hability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, stations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on aquasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Annexes "N" and "O", Petition,
2 Annex "P", Petition.
3 p. 84, Rollo.
4 p. 17, Ibid.
5 Article 2180, Civil Code.
6 Cited in Garcia vs. Florido 52 SCRA 420, 424-425 (1973).
7 See Barredo vs, Garcia 73 Phil. 607, at 620, supra.