Torts and Damages Case Digest: Singapore Airlines v. Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, et al. (1983)

G.R. No. L-47739 June 22, 1983
Lessons Applicable: Unjust dismissal (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable: 

FACTS:

• August 21, 1974: Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment Engineer Officer with the opportunity to undergo a B-707 I conversion training course requiring him to enter into a bond with Singapore Airlines Limited for 5 years 
• Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave without approval of the application during the second year, SIA filed suit for damages against Cruz and his surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions 
• RTC: dismissed the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction
  

ISSUE: W/N properly cognizable by Courts of justice and not by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission

HELD: YES. records are hereby ordered remanded to the proper Branch of the Regional Trial Court

• jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts
• Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters
• petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law
• complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se but on the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had to suffer
• The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.
• Additionally, there is a secondary issue involved that is outside the pale of competence of Labor Arbiters. Is the liability of Villanueva one of suretyship or one of guaranty? Unquestionably, this question is beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Ernesto Medina et al., v. Hon. Floreliana Castro-Bartolome (1982)

G.R. No. L-59825 September 11, 1982

Lessons Applicable: Unjust dismissal (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable: 

FACTS:

• Cosme de Aboitiz, acting in his capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer of the defendant Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc., went to the Pepsi-Cola Plant in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and without any provocation, shouted and maliciously humiliated Ernesto Medina and Jose G. Ong:
• GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP ... YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED (referring to Ernesto Medina). YOU TOO ARE FIRED! '(referring to Jose Ong ) for having allegedly delayed the use of promotional crowns
• effected on the very day that plaintiffs were awarded rings of loyalty to the Company, 5 days before Christmas and on the day when the employees' Christmas party was held so that when Medina and Ong went home that day and found their wives and children already dressed up for the party, they didn't know what to do and so they cried unashamedly
• A joint criminal complaint for oral defamation against Aboitiz
• Provincial Fiscal: dismissed the complaint since uttered not to slander but to express anger and displeasure 
• Petition for Review with the office of the Secretary of Justice (now Ministry of Justice): reversed
• Aboitiz filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was dismissed since the complaint for civil damages is clearly not based on an employer-employee relationship but on the manner of plaintiffs' dismissal and the effects flowing therefrom
• This case was filed on May 10, 1979. The amendatory decree, P.D. 1367, which took effect on May 1, 1978 and which provides that Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages, now expressly confers jurisdiction on the courts in these cases, specifically under the plaintiff's causes of action
• alreadly settled by jurisprudence that mere asking for reinstatement does not remove from the CFI jurisdiction over the damages
• The case must involve unfair labor practices to bring it within the jurisdiction of the CIR (now NLRC)
• A second motion to dismiss was filed  because of the promulgation of P.D. No. 1691 amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and Batasan Pambansa Bldg. 70 which took effect on May 1, 1980, amending Art. 248 of the Labor Code.
• jurisdiction over employee-employer relations and claims of workers have been removed from the Courts of First Instance

ISSUE: W/N the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought

HELD: NO. petition is granted

• simple action for damages for tortuous acts is governed by the Civil Code and not the Labor Code 

Separate Opinions

• AQUINO, J.,dissenting:
• I dissent with due deference to the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Abad Santos
• The two signed on January 5, 1978 letters of resignation and quitclaims and were paid P93,063 and P84,386 as separation pay, respectively
• More than a month after their dismissal, or on January 27, 1978, Medina and Ong filed with the Ministry of Labor, a complaint for illegal dismissal - dismissed that complaint because of their resignation and quitclaim.
• 17 days after that order of dismissal, or on May 10, 1979,  filed for damages
• In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for damages is correct because the claims of Medina and Ong were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, as originally provided in article 217 of the Labor Code and as reaffirmed in Presidential Decree No. 1691. Medina and Ong could not split their cause of action against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola.