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Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO VDA. DE LA CRUZ, LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA ROSA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Carlos C. Serapio for private respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a review of the Decision and Resolution of the then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, decreeing registration of a parcel of land in private respondents' favor. The land in question, Identified as Lot 2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, Obando Cadastre, under Plan Ap-03-000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan, and has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondents have converted it into a fishpond.

In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.

After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which found that "through indubitable evidence (Applicants) and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application" and are, therefore, entitled to registration. It further opined that "since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands. "

Before this instance, the principal issues posed are: (1) whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public land; and (2) whether or not applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.

The parties, through their respective counsel, stipulated that the land is within an unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, as shown by BF Map LC No. 637, dated March 1, 1927. 1 No evidence has been submitted that the land has been released or subsequently classified despite an Indorsement, dated November 17, 1976, of the District Forester, to the Director of Forest Development, containing the following recommendation:

Subject area requested for release was verified and found to be within the Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot inspection conducted by a representative of this Office, it disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent producing fishponds. Two houses of light materials were erected within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.

In view thereof, and in fairness to the applicant considering the investment introduced therein this Office believes that the release is in order,

Recommended for approval and be disposed of in accordance with the Public Land Law. 2

The Government's case is meritorious.

In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 3 This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, 4 and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 5

The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, 6 if omission there was, in fact.

While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that an lands comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely Identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System.

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 7

The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is reversed and the application for registration in Land Registration Case No. N299-V-76 of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to the availment by the applicants of the proper administrative remedy. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part

Torts and Damages Case Digest: Singapore Airlines v. Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, et al. (1983)

G.R. No. L-47739 June 22, 1983
Lessons Applicable: Unjust dismissal (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

August 21, 1974: Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment Engineer Officer with the opportunity to undergo a B-707 I conversion training course requiring him to enter into a bond with Singapore Airlines Limited for 5 years
Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave without approval of the application during the second year, SIA filed suit for damages against Cruz and his surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions
RTC: dismissed the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction

ISSUE: W/N properly cognizable by Courts of justice and not by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission

HELD: YES. records are hereby ordered remanded to the proper Branch of the Regional Trial Court

jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts
Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters
petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law
complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se but on the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had to suffer
The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.
Additionally, there is a secondary issue involved that is outside the pale of competence of Labor Arbiters. Is the liability of Villanueva one of suretyship or one of guaranty? Unquestionably, this question is beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-47739

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47739 June 22, 1983

SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner,

vs.

HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO as Presiding Judge of Branch XVIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, CARLOS E. CRUZ and B. E. VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala Pecson, Azucena & Bengzon Law Offices for petitioner.

Celso P. Mariano Law Office for private respondent Carlos Cruz.

Romeo Comia for private respondent B. E. Villanueva.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On the basic issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner company has elevated to us for review the two Orders of respondent Judge dated October 28, 1977 and January 24, 1978 dismissing petitioner's complaint for damages in the first Order, and denying its Motion for Reconsideration in the second.

On August 21, 1974, private respondent Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment by petitioner as Engineer Officer with the opportunity to undergo a B-707 I conversion training course," which he accepted on August 30, 1974. An express stipulation in the letter-offer read:

3. BONDING. As you win be provided with conversion training you are required to enter into a bond with SIA for a period of 5 years. For this purpose, please inform me of the names and addresses of your sureties as soon as possible.

Twenty six days thereafter, or on October 26, 1974, Cruz entered into an "Agreement for a Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore Airlines Limited" wherein it was stipulated among others:

4. The Engineer Officer shall agree to remain in the service of the Company for a period of five years from the date of commencement of such aforesaid conversion training if so required by the Company.

5. In the event of the Engineer Officer:

1. Leaving the service of the company during the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above, or

2. Being dismissed or having his services terminated by the company for misconduct,

the Engineer Officer and the Sureties hereby bind themselves jointly and severally to pay to the Company as liquidated damages such sums of money as are set out hereunder:

(a) during the first year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above ...................................................................................... $ 67,460/

(b) during the second year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above ................................................................................. $ 53,968/

(c) during the third year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above ...................................................................................... $ 40,476/

(d) during the fourth year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above .................................................................................. $ 26,984/

(e) during the fifth year of the period of five years referred to in Clause 4 above ....................................................................................... $ 13,492/

6. The provisions of Clause 5 above shall not apply in a case where an Engineer Officer has his training terminated by the Company for reasons other than misconduct or where, subsequent to the completion of training, he -

1. loses his license to operate as a Flight Engineer due to medical reasons which can in no way be attributable to any act or omission on his part;

2. is unable to continue in employment with the Company because his employment pass or work permit, as the case may be, has been withdrawn or has not been renewed due to no act or omission on his part;

3. has his services terminated by the Company as a result of being replaced by a national Flight Engineer;

4. has to leave the service of the Company on valid compassionate grounds stated to and accepted by the Company in writing. 1

Cruz signed the Agreement with his co-respondent, B. E. Villanueva, as surety.

Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave without approval of the application during the second year of the Period of five years, petitioner filed suit for damages against Cruz and his surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid Agreement. Petitioner sought the payment of the following sums: liquidated damages of $53,968.00 or its equivalent of P161,904.00 (lst cause of action); $883.91 or about P2,651.73 as overpayment in salary (2nd clause of action); $61.00 or about P183.00 for cost of uniforms and accessories supplied by the company plus $230.00, or roughly P690.00, for the cost of a flight manual (3rd cause of action); and $1,533.71, or approximately P4,601.13 corresponding to the vacation leave he had availed of but to which he was no longer entitled (4th cause Of action); exemplary damages attorney's fees; and costs.

In his Answer, Cruz denied any breach of contract contending that at no time had he been required by petitioner to agree to a straight service of five years under Clause 4 of the Agreement (supra) and that he left the service on "valid compassionate grounds stated to and accepted by the company so that no damages may be awarded against him. And because of petitioner-plaintiff's alleged ungrounded causes of action, Cruz counterclaimed for attorney's fees of P7,000.00.

The surety, Villanueva, in his own Answer, contended that his undertaking was merely that of one of two guarantors not that of surety and claimed the benefit of excussion, if at an found liable. He then filed a cross-claim against Cruz for damages and for whatever amount he may be held liable to petitioner-plaintiff, and a counterclaim for actual, exemplary, moral and other damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses against petitioner-plaintiff.

The issue of jurisdiction having been raised at the pre-trial conference, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda on that question, which they complied with in due time. On October 28, 1977, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order dismissing the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction stating.

2. The present case therefore involves a money claim arising from an employer-employee relation or at the very least a case arising from employer-employee relations, which under Art. 216 of the Labor Code is vested exclusively with the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission. 2

Reconsideration thereof having been denied in the Order of January 24, 1978, petitioner availed of the present recourse. We gave due course.

We are here confronted with the issue of whether or not this case is properly cognizable by Courts of justice or by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission.

Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-employee relations, and the latest amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters, 3 in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law.

Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz of his job as the latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work but on the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had to suffer.

Squarely in point is the ruling enunciated in the case of Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc.4 the pertinent portion of which reads:

Although the acts complied of seemingly appear to constitute "matter involving employee employer" relations as Quisaba's dismiss was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relations, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismiss and the consequent effects of such

Civil law consists of that 'mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations ... that exist between members of a society for the protection of private interest (1 Sanchez Roman 3).

The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismiss was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which makers a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, No. 10 (Cf, Philippine Refining Co. vs. Garcia, L-21962, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 107).

Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the labor Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.

Additionally, there is a secondary issue involved that is outside the pale of competence of Labor Arbiters. Is the liability of Villanueva one of suretyship or one of guaranty? Unquestionably, this question is beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. The records are hereby ordered remanded to the proper Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to which this case belongs, for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex "B ", p. 12, CFI Records.

2 p. 112, Ibid.

3 Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.

(a) The labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;

4. Cases involving household services and

5. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code.

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

4 68 SCRA 771 (1974).

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Director of Lands v. CA (1984)

G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:

Land situated in Obando, Bulacan
May 10, 1976: The Valerianos claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through:

inheritance - 1918; and
purchase - May 2, 1958

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain
Land was found to be an Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot inspection conducted by a representative of this Office, disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent producing fishponds. 2 houses of light materials were erected within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.
CA Affirmed RTC: in favor of the Valerianos

ISSUES:

W/N the Courts can reclassify public land - NO
W/N the Valerianos are entitled to judicial confirmation of title - NO

HELD: CA reverse

In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction

The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts.
In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

2. NO

Regalian doctrine: all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
if land is w/in the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership

The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.

Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification

. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.