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Showing posts with label 1984. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1984. Show all posts

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO VDA. DE LA CRUZ, LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA ROSA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Carlos C. Serapio for private respondents.



MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a review of the Decision and Resolution of the then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, decreeing registration of a parcel of land in private respondents' favor. The land in question, Identified as Lot 2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, Obando Cadastre, under Plan Ap-03-000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan, and has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondents have converted it into a fishpond.

In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.

After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which found that "through indubitable evidence (Applicants) and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application" and are, therefore, entitled to registration. It further opined that "since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands. "

Before this instance, the principal issues posed are: (1) whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public land; and (2) whether or not applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.

The parties, through their respective counsel, stipulated that the land is within an unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, as shown by BF Map LC No. 637, dated March 1, 1927. 1 No evidence has been submitted that the land has been released or subsequently classified despite an Indorsement, dated November 17, 1976, of the District Forester, to the Director of Forest Development, containing the following recommendation:

Subject area requested for release was verified and found to be within the Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot inspection conducted by a representative of this Office, it disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent producing fishponds. Two houses of light materials were erected within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.

In view thereof, and in fairness to the applicant considering the investment introduced therein this Office believes that the release is in order,

Recommended for approval and be disposed of in accordance with the Public Land Law. 2

The Government's case is meritorious.

In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 3 This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, 4 and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 5

The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, 6 if omission there was, in fact.

While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that an lands comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely Identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System.

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 7

The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is reversed and the application for registration in Land Registration Case No. N299-V-76 of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to the availment by the applicants of the proper administrative remedy. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-40207


FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.

Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.

Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.



MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.

The holographic Will reads in full as follows:

My Last will and Testament

In the name of God, Amen.

I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and testament.

1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable monument to perpetuate my memory.

xxx xxx xxx

The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:

Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.

ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.

After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3, reading in part:

The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by one and the same person. Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be admitted to probate although the alterations and/or insertions or additions above-mentioned were not authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner contends that the oppositors are estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the ground that they themselves agreed thru their counsel to submit the Document to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties did not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be in estoppel.

The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertions, alterations and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".

WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity for interpretation."

From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave an Identical commentary when he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,

The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in his commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new Civil Code was derived:

... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la sentencia que no declara la nulidad de un testamento olografo que contenga palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones no salvadas por el testador bajo su firnia segun previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal omision solo puede afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al testamento mismo, ya por estar esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de aquel que determine las condiciones necesarias para la validez del testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva del testamento, vinieran a anular este, y ya porque el precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha de entenderse en perfecta armonia y congruencia con el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado que declara nulas las adiciones apostillas entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y tachados en las escrituras matrices, siempre que no se salven en la forma prevenida, paro no el documento que las contenga, y con mayor motivo cuando las palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros accidentes de ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia alguna(l).

Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en este ultimo fallo, es preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4 alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la express voluntad del testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento olografo por no estar salvada por el testador la enmienda del guarismo ultimo del año en que fue extendido 3 (Emphasis ours).

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Relova, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur. Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a sole question of law, is bound by the trial court's factual finding that the peculiar alterations in the holographic will crossing out Rosa's name and instead inserting her brother Gregorio's name as sole heir and "sole executrix" were made by the testatrix in her own handwriting. (I find it peculiar that the testatrix who was obviously an educated person would unthinkingly make such crude alterations instead of consulting her lawyer and writing an entirely new holographic wig in order to avoid any doubts as to her change of heir. It should be noted that the first alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as sole heir is not even initialed by the testatrix. Only the second alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as "sole executrix" is initialed.) Probate of the radically altered will replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since the same was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the executrix as mandatorily required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. The original unaltered will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot, however, be given effect in view of the trial court's factual finding that the testatrix had by her own handwriting substituted Gregorio for Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole heir. The net result is that the testatrix left no valid will and both Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill succeed to her intestate estate.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur. Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a sole question of law, is bound by the trial court's factual finding that the peculiar alterations in the holographic will crossing out Rosa's name and instead inserting her brother Gregorio's name as sole heir and "sole executrix" were made by the testatrix in her own handwriting. (I find it peculiar that the testatrix who was obviously an educated person would unthinkingly make such crude alterations instead of consulting her lawyer and writing an entirely new holographic wig in order to avoid any doubts as to her change of heir. It should be noted that the first alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as sole heir is not even initialed by the testatrix. Only the second alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as "sole executrix" is initialed.) Probate of the radically altered will replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since the same was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the executrix as mandatorily required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. The original unaltered will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot, however, be given effect in view of the trial court's factual finding that the testatrix had by her own handwriting substituted Gregorio for Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole heir. The net result is that the testatrix left no valid will and both Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill succeed to her intestate estate.

Torts and Damages Case Digest: St. Louis Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals (1984)


G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984

Lessons Applicable:  Violation of Human Dignity and Privacy (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code, Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code

FACTS:

  • St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 an advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". 
  • Doctor Aramil wrote to St. Louis Realty about the mistake and stating how it has affected his professional and personal integrity as he has invited in several occasions numerous medical colleagues, medical students and friends to my house.  Because of it he received sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your house," "how much are you renting from the Arcadios?" "like your wife portrayed in the papers as belonging to another husband," etc., have resulted in no little mental anguish on my part.  He I have referred the matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine Medical Association and their final advice is pending upon my submission of supporting ownership papers.
  • Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising received the letter.  He stopped publication of the advertisement. contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies but no rectification or apology was published
  • February 20, 1969: Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000
  • March 10: t. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times
  • March 18, 1969: new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house was published in the Manila Times but there was no apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.
  • March 29: Aramil filed his complaint for damages
  • April 15, 1969: St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times a "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches
  • trial court: awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees
    • St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy
  • CA: Affirmed - St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code 
ISSUE: W/N St. Louis Realty should be held liable under Art. 21 and 26.

HELD: YES. Affirmed

  • St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
  • Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-46061


SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents.

Romeo Z. Comia for petitioner.

Roman R. Bersamin for private respondent.



AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.

St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below the photograph was the following write-up:

Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and determination, they bought a lot and built their dream house ... for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-class subdivision planned for wholesome family living.

The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty the following letter of protest:

Dear Sirs:

This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issues of the Sunday Times which boldly depicted my house at the above-mentioned address and implying that it belonged to another person. I am not aware of any permission or authority on my part for the use of my house for such publicity.

This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain and much more the apparent distortions therein are I believe not only transgression to my private property but also damaging to my prestige in the medical profession I have had invited in several occasions numerous medical colleagues, medical students and friends to my house and after reading your December 15 advertisement some of them have uttered some remarks purporting doubts as to my professional and personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your house," "how much are you renting from the Arcadios?", " like your wife portrayed in the papers as belonging to another husband," etc., have resulted in no little mental anguish on my part.

I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine Medical Association and their final advice is pending upon my submission of supporting ownership papers.

I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action against your corporation unless you could satisfactorily explain this matter within a week upon receipt of this letter.

The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published.

On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000 (Exh. D). In its answer dated March 10, St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times (Exh. 3).

It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.

On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:

This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which appeared in the Manila Times issue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila Times issues rectification of the same ad that appeal of December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was mistakenly used as a background for the featured homeowner's the Arcadio family.

The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real house in the background, as was intended all along.

Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting Presiding Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan as ponente, and Justices Sixto A. Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.

The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps.

In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises and conjectures. This contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts found by the trial court. Those factual findings are binding on this Court.

St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article 26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief".

The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Transportation Case Digest: Samar Mining Co., Inc. v. Nordeutcher Lloyd, et. al.(1984)

G.R. No. L-28673 October 23, 1984
Lessons Applicable: Bill of Lading (Transportation)
Laws Applicable: Article 1736, Article 1738,Article 1884,Article 1889,Article 1892,Article 1909

FACTS:
  • Samar Mining Company, Inc. imported1 crate of welded wedge wire sieves shipped through Nordeutscher Lloyd
    • Bill of Lading No. 18:
      • transshipped at port of discharge: davao
      • Section 1, paragraph 3 of Bill of Lading No. 18
        • The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay, loss or damage occurring before the goods enter ship's tackle to be loaded or after the goods leave ship's tackle to be discharged, transshipped or forwarded ...
        • Section 11:
          • Whenever the carrier or m aster may deem it advisable or in any case where the goods are placed at carrier's disposal at or consigned to a point where the ship does not expect to load or discharge, the carrier or master may, without notice, forward the whole or any part of the goods before or after loading at the original port of shipment, ... This carrier, in making arrangements for any transshipping or forwarding vessels or means of transportation not operated by this carrier shall be considered solely the forwarding agent of the shipper and without any other responsibility whatsoever even though the freight for the whole transport has been collected by him. ... Pending or during forwarding or transshipping the carrier may store the goods ashore or afloat solely as agent of the shipper and at risk and expense of the goods and the carrier shall not be liable for detention nor responsible for the acts, neglect, delay or failure to act of anyone to whom the goods are entrusted or delivered for storage, handling or any service incidental thereto 
  • When the goods arrived in the port of Davao, it was delivered in good order and condition to the bonded warehouse of AMCYL but it was not delivered and received by Samar Mining Company, Inc.
  • Samar filed a claim against Nordeutscher and C.F. Sharp who brought in AMCYL as third party defendant
  • RTC: favored Samar
    • Nordeutscher and C.F. Sharp laible but may enforce judgment against AMCYL
ISSUE: W/N the stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in its actual custody is valid

HELD: YES. Reversed

  • Article 1736.       The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738. - applicable
  • Article 1738.       The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them. - no applicable since article contemplates a situation where the goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier
  • Article 1884.       The agent is bound by his acceptance to carry out the agency, and is liable for the damages which, through his non-performance, the principal may suffer.
  • Article 1889.       The agent shall be liable for damages if, there being a conflict between his interests and those of the principal, he should prefer his own.
  • Article 1892.       The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so; but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:

    (1)    When he was not given the power to appoint one;

    (2)    When he was given such power but without designating the person and the person appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolvent
  • Article 1909.       The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence which shall be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not for a compensation.
  • The records fail to reveal proof of negligence, deceit or fraud committed by appellant or by its representative in the Philippines. Neither is there any showing of notorious incompetence or insolvency on the part of AMCYT, which acted as appellant's substitute in storing the goods awaiting transshipment

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-28673


SECOND DIVISION


G.R. No. L-28673 October 23, 1984


SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY, INC., defendants-appellants.



CUEVAS, J.:


This is an appeal taken directly to Us on certiorari from the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, finding defendants carrier and agent, liable for the value of goods never delivered to plaintiff consignee. The issue raised is a pure question of law, which is, the liability of the defendants, now appellants, under the bill of lading covering the subject shipment.


The case arose from an importation made by plaintiff, now appellee, SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC., of one (1) crate Optima welded wedge wire sieves through the M/S SCHWABENSTEIN a vessel owned by defendant-appellant NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD, (represented in the Philippines by its agent, C.F. SHARP & CO., INC.), which shipment is covered by Bill of Lading No. 18 duly issued to consignee SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC. Upon arrival of the aforesaid vessel at the port of Manila, the aforementioned importation was unloaded and delivered in good order and condition to the bonded warehouse of AMCYL. 1 The goods were however never delivered to, nor received by, the consignee at the port of destination — Davao.


When the letters of complaint sent to defendants failed to elicit the desired response, consignee herein appellee, filed a formal claim for P1,691.93, the equivalent of $424.00 at the prevailing rate of exchange at that time, against the former, but neither paid. Hence, the filing of the instant suit to enforce payment. Defendants-appellants brought in AMCYL as third party defendant.


The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendants to pay the amount of P1,691.93 plus attorney's fees and costs. However, the Court stated that defendants may recoup whatever they may pay plaintiff by enforcing the judgment against third party defendant AMCYL which had earlier been declared in default. Only the defendants appealed from said decision.


The issue at hand demands a close scrutiny of Bill of Lading No. 18 and its various clauses and stipulations which should be examined in the light of pertinent legal provisions and settled jurisprudence. This undertaking is not only proper but necessary as well because of the nature of the bill of lading which operates both as a receipt for the goods; and more importantly, as a contract to transport and deliver the same as stipulated therein. 2 Being a contract, it is the law between the parties thereto 3 who are bound by its terms and conditions 4 provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. 5


Bill of Lading No. 18 sets forth in page 2 thereof 6 that one (1) crate of Optima welded wedge wire sieves was received by the carrier NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD at the "port of loading" which is Bremen, Germany, while the freight had been prepaid up to the port of destination or the "port of discharge of goods in this case, Davao, the carrier undertook to transport the goods in its vessel, M/S SCHWABENSTEIN only up to the "port of discharge from ship-Manila. Thereafter, the goods were to be transshipped by the carrier to the port of destination or "port of discharge of goods The stipulation is plainly indicated on the face of the bill which contains the following phrase printed below the space provided for the port of discharge from ship", thus: 
if goods are to be transshipped at port of discharge, show destination under the column for "description of contents" 7


As instructed above, the following words appeared typewritten under the column for "description of contents": 


PORT OF DISCHARGE OF GOODS: DAVAO 
FREIGHT PREPAID 8


It is clear, then, that in discharging the goods from the ship at the port of Manila, and delivering the same into the custody of AMCYL, the bonded warehouse, appellants were acting in full accord with the contractual stipulations contained in Bill of Lading No. 18. The delivery of the goods to AMCYL was part of appellants' duty to transship the goods from Manila to their port of destination-Davao. The word "transship" means:


to transfer for further transportation from one ship or conveyance to another 9


The extent of appellant carrier's responsibility and/or liability in the transshipment of the goods in question are spelled out and delineated under Section 1, paragraph 3 of Bill of Lading No. 18, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£


The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay, loss or damage occurring before the goods enter ship's tackle to be loaded or after the goods leave ship's tackle to be discharged, transshipped or forwarded ... (Emphasis supplied)


and in Section 11 of the same Bill, which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£


Whenever the carrier or m aster may deem it advisable or in any case where the goods are placed at carrier's disposal at or consigned to a point where the ship does not expect to load or discharge, the carrier or master may, without notice, forward the whole or any part of the goods before or after loading at the original port of shipment, ... This carrier, in making arrangements for any transshipping or forwarding vessels or means of transportation not operated by this carrier shall be considered solely the forwarding agent of the shipper and without any other responsibility whatsoever even though the freight for the whole transport has been collected by him. ... Pending or during forwarding or transshipping the carrier may store the goods ashore or afloat solely as agent of the shipper and at risk and expense of the goods and the carrier shall not be liable for detention nor responsible for the acts, neglect, delay or failure to act of anyone to whom the goods are entrusted or delivered for storage, handling or any service incidental thereto (Emphasis supplied) 10


Defendants-appellants now shirk liability for the loss of the subject goods by claiming that they have discharged the same in full and good condition unto the custody of AMCYL at the port of discharge from ship — Manila, and therefore, pursuant to the aforequoted stipulation (Sec. 11) in the bill of lading, their responsibility for the cargo had ceased. 11


We find merit in appellants' stand. The validity of stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in its actual custody has been upheld by Us in PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. UNITED STATES LINES, 22 SCRA 674 (1968). Said case matches the present controversy not only as to the material facts but more importantly, as to the stipulations contained in the bill of lading concerned. As if to underline their awesome likeness, the goods in question in both cases were destined for Davao, but were discharged from ship in Manila, in accordance with their respective bills of lading.


The stipulations in the bill of lading in the PHOENIX case which are substantially the same as the subject stipulations before Us, provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£


The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any loss or damage to the goods while the goods are not in its actual custody. (Par. 2, last subpar.)


xxx xxx xxx


The carrier or master, in making arrangements with any person for or in connection with all transshipping or forwarding of the goods or the use of any means of transportation or forwarding of goods not used or operated by the carrier, shall be considered solely the agent of the shipper and consignee and without any other responsibility whatsoever or for the cost thereof ... (Par. 16). 12


Finding the above stipulations not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, We sustained their validity 13 Applying said stipulations as the law between the parties in the aforecited case, the Court concluded that: têñ.£îhqwâ£


... The short form Bill of Lading ( ) states in no uncertain terms that the port of discharge of the cargo is Manila, but that the same was to be transshipped beyond the port of discharge to Davao City. Pursuant to the terms of the long form Bill of Lading ( ), appellee's responsibility as a common carrier ceased the moment the goods were unloaded in Manila and in the matter of transshipment, appellee acted merely as an agent of the shipper and consignee. ... (Emphasis supplied) 14


Coming now to the case before Us, We hold, that by the authority of the above pronouncements, and in conformity with the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code, Section 11 of Bill of Lading No. 18 and the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof are valid stipulations between the parties insofar as they exempt the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods while the same are not in the latter's actual custody.


The liability of the common carrier for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods transported from a foreign country to the Philippines is governed primarily by the New Civil Code. 15 In all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. 16 A careful perusal of the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers (Section 4, Title VIII, Book IV) directs our attention to Article 1736 thereof, which reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£


Article 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738.


Article 1738 referred to in the foregoing provision runs thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£


Article 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them.


There is no doubt that Art. 1738 finds no applicability to the instant case. The said article contemplates a situation where the goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier. The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to their port of destination, and were stored in the warehouse of a third party when last seen and/or heard of. However, Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. Under said article, the carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. In sales, actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of corporeal possession by the seller, and the actual apprehension of corporeal possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. 17 By the same token, there is actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to remove the goods. 18 The court a quo found that there was actual delivery to the consignee through its duly authorized agent, the carrier.


It becomes necessary at this point to dissect the complex relationship that had developed between appellant and appellee in the course of the transactions that gave birth to the present suit. Two undertakings appeared embodied and/or provided for in the Bill of Lading 19 in question. The first is FOR THE TRANSPORT OF GOODS from Bremen, Germany to Manila. The second, THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF THE SAME GOODS from Manila to Davao, with appellant acting as agent of the consignee. 20 At the hiatus between these two undertakings of appellant which is the moment when the subject goods are discharged in Manila, its personality changes from that of carrier to that of agent of the consignee. Thus, the character of appellant's possession also changes, from possession in its own name as carrier, into possession in the name of consignee as the latter's agent. Such being the case, there was, in effect, actual delivery of the goods from appellant as carrier to the same appellant as agent of the consignee. Upon such delivery, the appellant, as erstwhile carrier, ceases to be responsible for any loss or damage that may befall the goods from that point onwards. This is the full import of Article 1736, as applied to the case before Us.


But even as agent of the consignee, the appellant cannot be made answerable for the value of the missing goods, It is true that the transshipment of the goods, which was the object of the agency, was not fully performed. However, appellant had commenced said performance, the completion of which was aborted by circumstances beyond its control. An agent who carries out the orders and instructions of the principal without being guilty of negligence, deceit or fraud, cannot be held responsible for the failure of the principal to accomplish the object of the agency, 21 This can be gleaned from the following provisions of the New Civil Code on the obligations of the agent: têñ.£îhqwâ£


Article 1884. The agent is bound by his acceptance to carry out the agency, and is liable for the damages which, through his non-performance, the principal may suffer.


xxx xxx xxx


Article 1889. The agent shall be liable for damages if, there being a conflict between his interests and those of the principal, he should prefer his own.


Article 1892. The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so; but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:


(1) When he was not given the power to appoint one;


(2) When he was given such power but without designating the person and the person appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolvent.


xxx xxx xxx


Article 1909. The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence which shall be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not for a compensation.


The records fail to reveal proof of negligence, deceit or fraud committed by appellant or by its representative in the Philippines. Neither is there any showing of notorious incompetence or insolvency on the part of AMCYT, which acted as appellant's substitute in storing the goods awaiting transshipment.


The actions of appellant carrier and of its representative in the Philippines being in full faith with the lawful stipulations of Bill of Lading No. 18 and in conformity with the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers, agency and contracts, they incur no liability for the loss of the goods in question.


WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED. Plaintiff-appellee's complaint is hereby DISMISSED.


No costs.


SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët


Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, concur.


Aquino, J., concurs in the result.


Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.





Footnotes


1 Transcript of Stenographic Notes, August 3, 1967, pp. 1-2.


2 12 Am Ju 2d p. 782; Phoenix Ass. Co., Ltd. vs. United States Lines, 22 SCRA 674, 678.


3 Article 1159, New Civil Code.


4 Article 1308, New Civil Code.


5 Article 1306, New Civil Code.


6 Exhibit "A".


7 Ibid,


8 Ibid.


9 Webster's Third International Dictionary, (unabridged).


10 Op cit.


11 Appellants' Brief page 5


12 Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. United States Lines, 22 SCRA 674, 679-680.


13 Ibid., page 682.


14 Ibid., page 681.


15 Articles 1732, 1753 and 1766, New Civil Code.


16 Article 1766, New Civil Code.


17 Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, citing Andrada vs. Argel, 65 O.G. 1054.


18 Words and Phrases 676, citing Yazoo & MVR Company vs. Altman, 187 SW 656, 657.


19 Bill of Lading No. 18, page 2.


20 Bill of Lading No. 18, Section 11.


21 Gutierrez Hermanos vs. Oria Hermanos, 30 Phil. 491.

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Director of Lands v. CA (1984)

G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS: 
  • Land situated in Obando, Bulacan
  • May 10, 1976: The Valerianos claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through:
    • inheritance - 1918; and 
    • purchase - May 2, 1958
  • Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain
  • Land was found to be an Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927.  However, on-the-spot inspection conducted by a representative of this Office, disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent producing fishponds. 2 houses of light materials were erected within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.
  • CA Affirmed RTC: in favor of the Valerianos
ISSUES:
  1. W/N the Courts can reclassify public land - NO
  2. W/N the Valerianos are entitled to judicial confirmation of title - NO
HELD: CA reverse

  1. NO 
  • In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction
    • The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. 
    • In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
     2.  NO
  • Regalian doctrine: all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 
  • if land is w/in the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System
  • Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
    • The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
  • Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification 
    • . In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.