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Showing posts with label October 23. Show all posts
Showing posts with label October 23. Show all posts

Transportation Case Digest: Servando v. Philippine Steam Navigation Co. (1982)


G.R. No. L-36481-2 October 23, 1982

Lessons Applicable: Contract of Adhesion (Transportation)
Laws Applicable: Article 1736, Article 1174

FACTS:

  • Clara Uy Bico (1,528 cavans of rice worth P40,907.50) and Amparo Servando (44 cartons of colored paper toys and general merchandise worth P1,070.50) loaded on board Philippine Steam Navigation Co.'s vessel, FS-176 for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental
    • Bill of Lading: 
      • Clause 14.  Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ...
  • Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of November 18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs
    • 2 pm: warehouse was razed by fire
  • Before the fire, 907 cavans of rice were delivered by Uy Bico  
  • Uy Bico and Servando filed a claim for the value but was rejected by Philippine Steam
  • CFI: favored UY Bico and Sercando
    • delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736
ISSUE: W/N Philippine Steam should not be liable because of the stipulation in the bill of lading exempting it from fortuitous event

HELD: YES. set aside

  • Agreement was in iteration of 
    • Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
  • 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor." In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event.
  • nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier ,incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-36481-2


SECOND DIVISION


G.R. No. L-36481-2 October 23, 1982


AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO, plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., defendant-appellant.


Zoilo de la Cruz, Jr. & Associate for plaintiff-appellee Amparo Servando.


Benedicto, Sumbingco & Associate for appellee Clara Uy Bico.


Ross, Salcedo, del Rosario, Bito & Misa for defendant-appellant.


ESCOLIN, J.:


This appeal, originally brought to the Court of Appeals, seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. 7354 and 7428, declaring appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.


The Court of Appeals certified the case to Us because only pure questions of law are raised therein.


The facts culled from the pleadings and the stipulations submitted by the parties are as follows:


On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel, FS-176, for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, the following cargoes, to wit:


Clara Uy Bico —


1,528 cavans of rice valued


at P40,907.50;


Amparo Servando —


44 cartons of colored paper,


toys and general merchandise valued at P1,070.50;


as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant. 1


Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of November 18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin, destroying appellees' cargoes. Before the fire, however, appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice 2 Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant.


On the bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:


WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:


1. In case No. 7354, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff Amparo C. Servando the aggregate sum of P1,070.50 with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, and to pay the costs.


2. In case No. 7428, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff Clara Uy Bico the aggregate sum of P16,625.00 with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, and to pay the costs.


Article 1736 of the Civil Code imposes upon common carriers the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in their possession "until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738. "


The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant.


It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question, the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment by inserting therein the following stipulation:


Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ...


We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or public policy.


Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign the same. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated June 29, 1979, 3 where the same issue was resolved in this wise:


While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket (Exh. '12'), he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent." (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).


Besides, the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code:


Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.


Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. The Partidas, 4 the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers.'


In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor." In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event.


There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier ,incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.


Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever over the same.


The lower court in its decision relied on the ruling laid down in Yu Biao Sontua vs. Ossorio 6, where this Court held the defendant liable for damages arising from a fire caused by the negligence of the defendant's employees while loading cases of gasoline and petroleon products. But unlike in the said case, there is not a shred of proof in the present case that the cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom's warehouse was in any way attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees. Under the circumstances, the appellant is plainly not responsible.


WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside. No costs.


SO ORDERED.


Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.








Separate Opinions





AQUINO, J., concurring:


I concur. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them".


From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day, when the warehouse was burned, Amparo C. Servando and Clara Uy Bico, the consignees, had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her.


Moreover, the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator.


No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin.


Under those circumstances, it would not be legal and just to hold the carrier liable to the consignees for the loss of the goods. The consignees should bear the loss which was due to a fortuitous event.








Separate Opinions


AQUINO, J., concurring:


I concur. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them".


From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day, when the warehouse was burned, Amparo C. Servando and Clara Uy Bico, the consignees, had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her.


Moreover, the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator.


No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin.


Under those circumstances, it would not be legal and just to hold the carrier liable to the consignees for the loss of the goods. The consignees should bear the loss which was due to a fortuitous event.


Footnotes


1 Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H.


2 Par. IV, Complaint; p. 23, Record on Appeal.


Page 836


3 91 SCRA 224.


4 Law 11, Title 33, Partida 7.


5 Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola.


6 43 Phil. 511.


Transportation Case Digest: Samar Mining Co., Inc. v. Nordeutcher Lloyd, et. al.(1984)

G.R. No. L-28673 October 23, 1984
Lessons Applicable: Bill of Lading (Transportation)
Laws Applicable: Article 1736, Article 1738,Article 1884,Article 1889,Article 1892,Article 1909

FACTS:
  • Samar Mining Company, Inc. imported1 crate of welded wedge wire sieves shipped through Nordeutscher Lloyd
    • Bill of Lading No. 18:
      • transshipped at port of discharge: davao
      • Section 1, paragraph 3 of Bill of Lading No. 18
        • The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay, loss or damage occurring before the goods enter ship's tackle to be loaded or after the goods leave ship's tackle to be discharged, transshipped or forwarded ...
        • Section 11:
          • Whenever the carrier or m aster may deem it advisable or in any case where the goods are placed at carrier's disposal at or consigned to a point where the ship does not expect to load or discharge, the carrier or master may, without notice, forward the whole or any part of the goods before or after loading at the original port of shipment, ... This carrier, in making arrangements for any transshipping or forwarding vessels or means of transportation not operated by this carrier shall be considered solely the forwarding agent of the shipper and without any other responsibility whatsoever even though the freight for the whole transport has been collected by him. ... Pending or during forwarding or transshipping the carrier may store the goods ashore or afloat solely as agent of the shipper and at risk and expense of the goods and the carrier shall not be liable for detention nor responsible for the acts, neglect, delay or failure to act of anyone to whom the goods are entrusted or delivered for storage, handling or any service incidental thereto 
  • When the goods arrived in the port of Davao, it was delivered in good order and condition to the bonded warehouse of AMCYL but it was not delivered and received by Samar Mining Company, Inc.
  • Samar filed a claim against Nordeutscher and C.F. Sharp who brought in AMCYL as third party defendant
  • RTC: favored Samar
    • Nordeutscher and C.F. Sharp laible but may enforce judgment against AMCYL
ISSUE: W/N the stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in its actual custody is valid

HELD: YES. Reversed

  • Article 1736.       The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738. - applicable
  • Article 1738.       The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them. - no applicable since article contemplates a situation where the goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier
  • Article 1884.       The agent is bound by his acceptance to carry out the agency, and is liable for the damages which, through his non-performance, the principal may suffer.
  • Article 1889.       The agent shall be liable for damages if, there being a conflict between his interests and those of the principal, he should prefer his own.
  • Article 1892.       The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so; but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:

    (1)    When he was not given the power to appoint one;

    (2)    When he was given such power but without designating the person and the person appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolvent
  • Article 1909.       The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence which shall be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not for a compensation.
  • The records fail to reveal proof of negligence, deceit or fraud committed by appellant or by its representative in the Philippines. Neither is there any showing of notorious incompetence or insolvency on the part of AMCYT, which acted as appellant's substitute in storing the goods awaiting transshipment

Jurisprudence: G.R. No. L-28673


SECOND DIVISION


G.R. No. L-28673 October 23, 1984


SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY, INC., defendants-appellants.



CUEVAS, J.:


This is an appeal taken directly to Us on certiorari from the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, finding defendants carrier and agent, liable for the value of goods never delivered to plaintiff consignee. The issue raised is a pure question of law, which is, the liability of the defendants, now appellants, under the bill of lading covering the subject shipment.


The case arose from an importation made by plaintiff, now appellee, SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC., of one (1) crate Optima welded wedge wire sieves through the M/S SCHWABENSTEIN a vessel owned by defendant-appellant NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD, (represented in the Philippines by its agent, C.F. SHARP & CO., INC.), which shipment is covered by Bill of Lading No. 18 duly issued to consignee SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC. Upon arrival of the aforesaid vessel at the port of Manila, the aforementioned importation was unloaded and delivered in good order and condition to the bonded warehouse of AMCYL. 1 The goods were however never delivered to, nor received by, the consignee at the port of destination — Davao.


When the letters of complaint sent to defendants failed to elicit the desired response, consignee herein appellee, filed a formal claim for P1,691.93, the equivalent of $424.00 at the prevailing rate of exchange at that time, against the former, but neither paid. Hence, the filing of the instant suit to enforce payment. Defendants-appellants brought in AMCYL as third party defendant.


The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendants to pay the amount of P1,691.93 plus attorney's fees and costs. However, the Court stated that defendants may recoup whatever they may pay plaintiff by enforcing the judgment against third party defendant AMCYL which had earlier been declared in default. Only the defendants appealed from said decision.


The issue at hand demands a close scrutiny of Bill of Lading No. 18 and its various clauses and stipulations which should be examined in the light of pertinent legal provisions and settled jurisprudence. This undertaking is not only proper but necessary as well because of the nature of the bill of lading which operates both as a receipt for the goods; and more importantly, as a contract to transport and deliver the same as stipulated therein. 2 Being a contract, it is the law between the parties thereto 3 who are bound by its terms and conditions 4 provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. 5


Bill of Lading No. 18 sets forth in page 2 thereof 6 that one (1) crate of Optima welded wedge wire sieves was received by the carrier NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD at the "port of loading" which is Bremen, Germany, while the freight had been prepaid up to the port of destination or the "port of discharge of goods in this case, Davao, the carrier undertook to transport the goods in its vessel, M/S SCHWABENSTEIN only up to the "port of discharge from ship-Manila. Thereafter, the goods were to be transshipped by the carrier to the port of destination or "port of discharge of goods The stipulation is plainly indicated on the face of the bill which contains the following phrase printed below the space provided for the port of discharge from ship", thus: 
if goods are to be transshipped at port of discharge, show destination under the column for "description of contents" 7


As instructed above, the following words appeared typewritten under the column for "description of contents": 


PORT OF DISCHARGE OF GOODS: DAVAO 
FREIGHT PREPAID 8


It is clear, then, that in discharging the goods from the ship at the port of Manila, and delivering the same into the custody of AMCYL, the bonded warehouse, appellants were acting in full accord with the contractual stipulations contained in Bill of Lading No. 18. The delivery of the goods to AMCYL was part of appellants' duty to transship the goods from Manila to their port of destination-Davao. The word "transship" means:


to transfer for further transportation from one ship or conveyance to another 9


The extent of appellant carrier's responsibility and/or liability in the transshipment of the goods in question are spelled out and delineated under Section 1, paragraph 3 of Bill of Lading No. 18, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£


The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay, loss or damage occurring before the goods enter ship's tackle to be loaded or after the goods leave ship's tackle to be discharged, transshipped or forwarded ... (Emphasis supplied)


and in Section 11 of the same Bill, which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£


Whenever the carrier or m aster may deem it advisable or in any case where the goods are placed at carrier's disposal at or consigned to a point where the ship does not expect to load or discharge, the carrier or master may, without notice, forward the whole or any part of the goods before or after loading at the original port of shipment, ... This carrier, in making arrangements for any transshipping or forwarding vessels or means of transportation not operated by this carrier shall be considered solely the forwarding agent of the shipper and without any other responsibility whatsoever even though the freight for the whole transport has been collected by him. ... Pending or during forwarding or transshipping the carrier may store the goods ashore or afloat solely as agent of the shipper and at risk and expense of the goods and the carrier shall not be liable for detention nor responsible for the acts, neglect, delay or failure to act of anyone to whom the goods are entrusted or delivered for storage, handling or any service incidental thereto (Emphasis supplied) 10


Defendants-appellants now shirk liability for the loss of the subject goods by claiming that they have discharged the same in full and good condition unto the custody of AMCYL at the port of discharge from ship — Manila, and therefore, pursuant to the aforequoted stipulation (Sec. 11) in the bill of lading, their responsibility for the cargo had ceased. 11


We find merit in appellants' stand. The validity of stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in its actual custody has been upheld by Us in PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. UNITED STATES LINES, 22 SCRA 674 (1968). Said case matches the present controversy not only as to the material facts but more importantly, as to the stipulations contained in the bill of lading concerned. As if to underline their awesome likeness, the goods in question in both cases were destined for Davao, but were discharged from ship in Manila, in accordance with their respective bills of lading.


The stipulations in the bill of lading in the PHOENIX case which are substantially the same as the subject stipulations before Us, provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£


The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any loss or damage to the goods while the goods are not in its actual custody. (Par. 2, last subpar.)


xxx xxx xxx


The carrier or master, in making arrangements with any person for or in connection with all transshipping or forwarding of the goods or the use of any means of transportation or forwarding of goods not used or operated by the carrier, shall be considered solely the agent of the shipper and consignee and without any other responsibility whatsoever or for the cost thereof ... (Par. 16). 12


Finding the above stipulations not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, We sustained their validity 13 Applying said stipulations as the law between the parties in the aforecited case, the Court concluded that: têñ.£îhqwâ£


... The short form Bill of Lading ( ) states in no uncertain terms that the port of discharge of the cargo is Manila, but that the same was to be transshipped beyond the port of discharge to Davao City. Pursuant to the terms of the long form Bill of Lading ( ), appellee's responsibility as a common carrier ceased the moment the goods were unloaded in Manila and in the matter of transshipment, appellee acted merely as an agent of the shipper and consignee. ... (Emphasis supplied) 14


Coming now to the case before Us, We hold, that by the authority of the above pronouncements, and in conformity with the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code, Section 11 of Bill of Lading No. 18 and the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof are valid stipulations between the parties insofar as they exempt the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods while the same are not in the latter's actual custody.


The liability of the common carrier for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods transported from a foreign country to the Philippines is governed primarily by the New Civil Code. 15 In all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. 16 A careful perusal of the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers (Section 4, Title VIII, Book IV) directs our attention to Article 1736 thereof, which reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£


Article 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738.


Article 1738 referred to in the foregoing provision runs thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£


Article 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them.


There is no doubt that Art. 1738 finds no applicability to the instant case. The said article contemplates a situation where the goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier. The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to their port of destination, and were stored in the warehouse of a third party when last seen and/or heard of. However, Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. Under said article, the carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. In sales, actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of corporeal possession by the seller, and the actual apprehension of corporeal possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. 17 By the same token, there is actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to remove the goods. 18 The court a quo found that there was actual delivery to the consignee through its duly authorized agent, the carrier.


It becomes necessary at this point to dissect the complex relationship that had developed between appellant and appellee in the course of the transactions that gave birth to the present suit. Two undertakings appeared embodied and/or provided for in the Bill of Lading 19 in question. The first is FOR THE TRANSPORT OF GOODS from Bremen, Germany to Manila. The second, THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF THE SAME GOODS from Manila to Davao, with appellant acting as agent of the consignee. 20 At the hiatus between these two undertakings of appellant which is the moment when the subject goods are discharged in Manila, its personality changes from that of carrier to that of agent of the consignee. Thus, the character of appellant's possession also changes, from possession in its own name as carrier, into possession in the name of consignee as the latter's agent. Such being the case, there was, in effect, actual delivery of the goods from appellant as carrier to the same appellant as agent of the consignee. Upon such delivery, the appellant, as erstwhile carrier, ceases to be responsible for any loss or damage that may befall the goods from that point onwards. This is the full import of Article 1736, as applied to the case before Us.


But even as agent of the consignee, the appellant cannot be made answerable for the value of the missing goods, It is true that the transshipment of the goods, which was the object of the agency, was not fully performed. However, appellant had commenced said performance, the completion of which was aborted by circumstances beyond its control. An agent who carries out the orders and instructions of the principal without being guilty of negligence, deceit or fraud, cannot be held responsible for the failure of the principal to accomplish the object of the agency, 21 This can be gleaned from the following provisions of the New Civil Code on the obligations of the agent: têñ.£îhqwâ£


Article 1884. The agent is bound by his acceptance to carry out the agency, and is liable for the damages which, through his non-performance, the principal may suffer.


xxx xxx xxx


Article 1889. The agent shall be liable for damages if, there being a conflict between his interests and those of the principal, he should prefer his own.


Article 1892. The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so; but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:


(1) When he was not given the power to appoint one;


(2) When he was given such power but without designating the person and the person appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolvent.


xxx xxx xxx


Article 1909. The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence which shall be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether the agency was or was not for a compensation.


The records fail to reveal proof of negligence, deceit or fraud committed by appellant or by its representative in the Philippines. Neither is there any showing of notorious incompetence or insolvency on the part of AMCYT, which acted as appellant's substitute in storing the goods awaiting transshipment.


The actions of appellant carrier and of its representative in the Philippines being in full faith with the lawful stipulations of Bill of Lading No. 18 and in conformity with the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers, agency and contracts, they incur no liability for the loss of the goods in question.


WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED. Plaintiff-appellee's complaint is hereby DISMISSED.


No costs.


SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët


Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, concur.


Aquino, J., concurs in the result.


Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.





Footnotes


1 Transcript of Stenographic Notes, August 3, 1967, pp. 1-2.


2 12 Am Ju 2d p. 782; Phoenix Ass. Co., Ltd. vs. United States Lines, 22 SCRA 674, 678.


3 Article 1159, New Civil Code.


4 Article 1308, New Civil Code.


5 Article 1306, New Civil Code.


6 Exhibit "A".


7 Ibid,


8 Ibid.


9 Webster's Third International Dictionary, (unabridged).


10 Op cit.


11 Appellants' Brief page 5


12 Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. United States Lines, 22 SCRA 674, 679-680.


13 Ibid., page 682.


14 Ibid., page 681.


15 Articles 1732, 1753 and 1766, New Civil Code.


16 Article 1766, New Civil Code.


17 Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, citing Andrada vs. Argel, 65 O.G. 1054.


18 Words and Phrases 676, citing Yazoo & MVR Company vs. Altman, 187 SW 656, 657.


19 Bill of Lading No. 18, page 2.


20 Bill of Lading No. 18, Section 11.


21 Gutierrez Hermanos vs. Oria Hermanos, 30 Phil. 491.